

ROUTLEDGE STUDIES ON ISLAM AND MUSLIMS IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA

Foundations of Islamic Governance

A Southeast Asian Perspective

Maszlee Malik



Foundations of Islamic Governance

The aim of this book is to explore and analyse the Islamic axioms, foundation principles and values underpinning the field of governance in an attempt to construct the architectonics of a new systemic and dynamic theory and formulate the articulation of ‘Islamic governance’. This discursive and abstract piece, rather than being an empirical exercise, assumes to produce a ‘good governance’ framework within its own formulation through a value-shaped dynamic model according to *maqasid al-Shari’ah* (higher objective of *Shari’ah*) by going beyond the narrow remit of classical and contemporary discussions produced on the topic, which propose a certain institutional model of governance based on the classical juristic (*fiqh*) method. Through an exclusive analytical discursive approach in this book, readers will find that Islam, as one of the major religions in the contemporary world with the claim of promising the underpinning principles and philosophical foundations of worldly affairs and institutions through a micro method of producing *homoIslamicus*, could contribute towards development of societies by establishing a unique model of governance from its explicit ontological worldview through a directed descriptive epistemology.

Maszlee Malik is assistant professor in the Faculty of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Sciences at the International Islamic University Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur. He holds a doctorate degree (PhD) from Durham University in Durham, UK in Good Governance. His research area is in Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*), Classical and Contemporary Islamic Political Thoughts, and Islamic Movements and Good Governance. He is the author of the books, *Good Governance: a Critical introduction* and *Islam, Civil Society and Islamic Governance*.

Routledge Studies on Islam and Muslims in Southeast Asia
Series Editors: Syed Muhammad Khairudin Aljunied,
Kamaludeen Mohamed Nasir

1 Foundations of Islamic Governance

A Southeast Asian Perspective

Maszlee Malik

Foundations of Islamic Governance

A Southeast Asian Perspective

Maszlee Malik

First published 2017
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

and by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2017 Maszlee Malik

The right of Maszlee Malik to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Names: Maszlee Malik, 1974-, author.

Title: Foundations of Islamic governance : a Southeast Asian perspective / by Maszlee Malik.

Description: New York, NY : Routledge, [2017] | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2016035078 | ISBN 9781138219748 (hardback) | ISBN 9781315414652 (ebook)

Subjects: LCSH: Islam and state. | State, The. | Political culture--Islamic countries. | Islam and state--Southeast Asia.

Classification: LCC BP173.6.M28 2017 | DDC 322/.10959--dc23

LC record available at <https://lccn.loc.gov/2016035078>

ISBN: 978-1-138-21974-8 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-315-41465-2 (ebk)

Typeset in Galliard
by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear

Contents

<i>Preface</i>	vi
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	viii
<i>List of abbreviations</i>	ix
<i>Prolegomena</i>	xi
Introduction	1
1 Governance: definitions and conceptual framework	8
2 Deconstructing the concept of Good Governance	37
3 Religion and governance: a philosophical inquiry	68
4 Ontological and epistemological sources for Islamic governance	78
5 New approach to the texts: epistemological method-related concerns	102
6 Contributions of Muslim scholars in the development of knowledge base for governance	115
7 Architectonics of Islamic governance: locating the axioms, foundational principles and working mechanism	136
8 Articulation of Islamic governance	195
Conclusion	233
<i>Epilogue</i>	247
<i>Bibliography</i>	249
<i>Index</i>	275

Preface

International institutions have promoted a ‘good governance’ agenda as an archetypal model to achieve development for underdeveloped and developing countries. However, closer scrutiny can trace the root of this agenda back to the hegemonic nature of modernity that proposes a specific meta-narrative upon others, as part of Eurocentrism. Many, however, have criticized this Eurocentric paradigm, since the non-Western communities with their own constructed version of ‘good’ in governance have also proven their ability to develop and prosper in the present or in the past. Thus, the cultural and value-laden nature of such vernacular concepts provides the rationale for the existence and practice of other paradigms. In line with this argument, Islam, with its long history of governance and richness of its values can be considered as another alternative, which should be thoroughly examined to disclose and depict its conceptualization and paradigm of ‘good governance’.

The aim of this book, thus, is to explore and analyse the Islamic axioms, foundation principles and values underpinning the field of governance in an attempt to construct the architectonics of a new systemic and dynamic theory and formulate the articulation of ‘Islamic governance’. This discursive and abstract, rather than being an empirical exercise, assumes to produce a ‘good governance’ framework within its own formulation through a value-shaped dynamic model according to *maqasid al-Shari’ah* (higher objective of *Shari’ah*) by going beyond the narrow remit of classical and contemporary discussions produced on the topic, which propose a certain institutional model of governance based on the classical juristic (*fiqh*) method. In this new dynamic paradigm, a discourse-oriented approach is taken to establish the philosophical foundation of the model by deriving it from Islamic ontology, which is then articulated using the Islamic epistemological sources to develop and formulate the discursive foundations of this new theoretical framework. A deductive method is applied to the ontological sources and epistemological principles to explain the architectonics of this new theory, which are represented by the constructed axioms, which later help to articulate the working mechanism of the proposed ‘Islamic good governance’ framework through a specifically formulated typology to function as an alternative conceptualization of ‘good governance’. In doing so, the author has tried to take into consideration the current reality in

bringing the text into reality by resorting to *maqasid al-Shari'ah* (higher objective of *Shari'ah*). This research is an attempt by the author, who came from the multi-religious and multi-cultural background of Southeast Asia, which requires Muslims to always be cautious when dealing with people, not to impose literally the Islamic texts and jurists views from a different time and background on the issues of governance.

This study, through an exclusive analytical discursive approach, finds that Islam, as one of the major religions in the contemporary world, with the claim of promising the underpinning principles and philosophical foundations of worldly affairs and institutions, through a micro method of producing *homoIslamicus* could contribute towards the development of societies by establishing a unique model of governance from its explicit ontological worldview through a directed descriptive epistemology. Thus, the research on governance in this study does not only focus on the positivistic materialist components such as institutions or mechanisms or growth per se, but it encompasses the value-laden holistic nature of human life in accordance with the Islamic worldview as an important contribution. In doing so, it formulates the ‘good governance’ in Islam in relation to the conceptualized ‘*ihsani* social capital’, which constitutes the main thrust of the constructed model. Nonetheless, this generative (non-cumulative) paradigm of looking into the governance issue should be viewed as an incomplete certainty as the production of the continuous *ijtihad* (reasoning) progression will continue to reveal ways through which its working mechanism can be expanded along with potential developments in its philosophical formation.

Acknowledgements

I am greatly indebted to my *Mevlana* and dear guru, Professor Mehmet Asutay, for being my guidance and teacher, which had taught me a lot during my sojourn in the UK from 2007–11. It was his patience and supervision that made it possible for me to bring this work to completion. The amount of knowledge, and most importantly, wisdom I have learned from him is invaluable.

I am equally thankful to my dear mentor and icon, Dr Azzam Tamimi, for his charismatic, passionate and forbearance since we first met back in the year 1991 and that has inspired me to be what I am today.

Similarly my utmost gratitude to all those who inspired me, helped me and encouraged me during the course of my research amongst the IIUM colleagues, comrades in Durham. My community, IIUM Academic Staff Association (ASA), members of *Pertubuhan IKRAM Malaysia* (IKRAM) (formerly *Pertubuhan Jamaah Islah Malaysia* aka JIM), MSM UK/Eire, MISG ABIM UK, MPF members, IDEAS fraternity, Orkids family, Usrah Wacana Ilmiah brethrens, TFTN friends, Dapur Jalanan companions, Usrah Cecawi, Institut al-Qayyim, Conclave of Tajdid and others.

My special thanks go to Associate Professor Dato' Dr Mohd Asri Zainul Abidin (Dr MAZA), Prof. Dr Musa Nordin (Muslim Professional Forum), Associate Prof. Dr Syed Khairudin alJuneid (National University of Singapore), Professor Dato' Paduka, Dr Mahmood Zuhdi Abdul Majid, Dato' Dr Seri Shahidan Kassim, Prof. Dr Habeeb Ahmad (Durham University), Ustadh Alias Othman, YB, Hj Saari Sungip, Dr Dzulkefly Ahmad, Ustaz Sakjan Muri, Wan Saiful Wan Jan and Dr Akram Laldin.

Without the love, support, endless prayer and continuous motivation from my mom Hawa @ Zabidah Hj Mohd Don, my wife Dr Hamidah Mat, my children Nusaybah, Sumayyah, Rufaydah and Mujaddid, and my family in Skudai Kiri, JB, Pedas and Padang Sera, Kedah, it would have been impossible to accomplish even a tiny part of this book.

Lastly, some part of the discussion on the definition of good governance and the role of religion in governance has been initially published in my other books on *Good Governance: a Critical Introduction* and *Good Governance, Civil Society and Islam*. Both were published by IIUM Publisher.

Abbreviations

AHDR	Arab Human Development Report
CIPFA	Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy
E-HDI	Ethics-augmented Human Development Index
EU	European Union
FBO	Faith-based Organisations
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
GWG IIAS	Governance Working Group of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences
HDI	Human Development Index
HIC	High-income Category
IDB	Islamic Development Bank
IFI	International Financial Institutions
IGI	Islamic Governance Index
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISI	Import-substitution industrialization strategy
LIC	Low income category
LMC	Low middle income category
MDGR	Millennium Development Goals Report for the Arab Region
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NPE	New Political Economy
NPM	New Public Management
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OIC	Organization of the Islamic Conference
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UK	United Kingdom
UMC	Upper middle income
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNESCAP	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific

x *Abbreviations*

UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisations
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFDD	World Faiths Development Dialogue
WGI	World Governance Index

Prolegomena

In his controversial poem '*Shikwah*', Allama Iqbal of Lahore lodged his complaint to God (*Khoda*) about the poor conditions of Muslim nations of the time. In his reply to the complaint in the form of a supposed answer he would receive from God, Iqbal (in God's words) repudiated the *Shikwah* by asking the Muslims to look at their own wrongdoings, which had led to those conditions. In reflecting on the poetic wisdom, and considering the state of the Muslim *ummah* (nation) we can see that nearly a century later, despite some changes having taken place in the Geopolitics of the independent Muslim countries, the majority of them have still not achieved a proper standard of 'development'. Underdevelopment, corruption, famine in some cases, lack of education, a non-sustainable environment, dictatorships and other socio-political and economical calamities are synonymous with and have plagued the Muslim *ummah*.

The available statistics and literature depict that most human rights, life quality and development, governance and transparency or accountability indices show that Muslim countries always score the lowest (Chapra, 2008a: 156–62). On the other hand, most of the corruption indices, rights abuse, power abuse and the like indicate that these countries have the highest scores. International studies demonstrate that only 13 countries, which constitute less than 23 per cent, of the 57 member countries of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) are democracies (see: www.Electionworld.org for its 2002 report). Of the remaining 44 undemocratic countries, 31 are pseudo-democracies, five are absolute monarchies, three are dictatorships and five are in transition. Although the concept of democracy is understood in these countries it is mostly relegated to the structure or mechanism of democracy in the sense of electoral system and superficial democratic structures for the altering of power without the real meaning of democratic institutions that ensure all aspects of freedom to the citizen (Siddique, 2000). In most cases, the same regime continues to rule for the control of resources and the manipulation of power, which they regain continuously with the help of draconian laws and which curb people's freedom, especially the freedom of media and expression (Nasr, 1995). The lack of freedom in Muslim countries is quite apparent in the data rendered by the 'Freedom of Press 2008' report by Freedom House, in which only one Muslim country (Mali) has been categorised as free, while 17 others are listed as partly free, and the remaining 40 are not free.¹

The powerful control of regimes over the media and the absence of feasible accountability processes and transparency contribute to poor governance in Muslim countries. Regimes become infallible and resistant to any criticism of the policies they produce. Any country operating under such a climate will ultimately find itself immersed in corruption and will witness the marginalisation of the majority of its mainly poor citizens. A myriad of empirical studies have proven that corruption and poor governance, which are the results of lack of freedom, have a substantial adverse effect on development (Kauffman *et al.* 1999). The correlation between corruption and lack of freedom in Muslim countries is clearly seen in the ‘Corruption Perception Index’ for the year 2008 (prepared by the Berlin-based Transparency International), which lists 133 countries with a score ranging from 10 (least corrupt) to zero (most corrupt); a score of 5 on this index indicates a borderline country. Only six Muslim countries are above this borderline with scores ranging from 5.1 to 6.5, while 44 countries fall below it.²

The effect of corruption on the economic growth of the Muslim countries can also be clearly identified from their Gross National Product (GNP). Even though the total population of the 57 Muslim countries is approximately 1.194 million (Kettani, 2010) and constitutes a little over 21 per cent of the world population of approximately 6.827 million,³ their total Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) adjusted GNP is only US\$7,882 billion,⁴ which is only (7.3 per cent) of the world PPP adjusted GNP of US\$57,937 billion (IMF, 2010). Only four Muslim countries, all of which happen to be oil-producing countries, are included the high-income category (HIC) and only six in the upper-middle income (UMC) category. Eighteen fall into the low-middle-income category (LMC) and 29 fall into the low-income category (LIC) (World Bank, 2004: 251).

In terms of social development, the standard of education in the Muslim countries, which is another indicator for development apart from economic growth, also gives an adverse indication of the situation in those countries. Education, which received high priority in the early history of Islam and which was one of the causes of the rise of the Muslim people, has not received the due importance it is associated with from government budgets. Expenditure on arms and the survival of the regime and bureaucratic surplus enjoy higher priority in budgeting over people’s education, which in most of these countries is dependent on international aid. According to the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) (2005: 13) report for the year 2005, the average adult illiteracy rate in Muslim countries was 32 per cent in 2002. This means that around 426 million people are illiterate and unable to contribute to development according to their full potential. As evidence of this, the total number of universities in all the Muslim countries is only 600 whereas in the US alone there are 1,975 universities, or more than three times as many, when its population is less than one-fourth (Chapra, 2008a). Comparing the quality of those 600 universities to the 1,975 of the US would provide another negative indication of the underdevelopment of the Muslim countries.

According to human, social and economic indicators, most countries in the Middle East are performing badly in terms of development. The *Millennium Development Goals Report for the Arab Region* (MDGR) issued by the UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia in 2005 states that “31.5 percent of people in the Middle East and North Africa subsist on less than \$2 per day; moreover, 23.6 percent of them lack basic health and education services and a decent standard of living”. Furthermore, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) issued the 2002 *Arab Human Development Report* (AHDR) which states that three major challenges to socioeconomic growth in the Arab nations are: the repression of women’s empowerment, insufficient competent professionals/technocrats relative to income and the overall lack of freedom. AHDR mentions that the growing number of illiterate people in Arab countries (mostly women) also contributes to developmental issues in those regions (Abdel Samad, 2008).

Nevertheless, a contemporary remedy proposed for the above problems by the international financial institutions as part of the Breton Woods process was ‘good governance’. The ‘good governance’ phenomenon was first introduced as a panacea for underdevelopment and poverty in the early 1980s as part of the Washington Consensus process, and was proposed as a remedy for many other problems and challenges. Since the World Bank’s report on Sub-Saharan Africa in 1989, the term ‘good governance’ has become a consensus-agreed programme to tackle the developmentalist problems, not only in Muslim countries but also in other underdeveloped countries all over the world. Consequently, since the early 1990s, the topic of ‘good governance’ has attracted the attention of many researchers, politicians and economists. This research focuses on the concept through Islamic ontology and episteme without literally emulating views of Muslim jurists or thinkers from other parts of the world, specifically, the Middle East and the Sub-continent, just as has normally been done by many Islamists and traditionalists alike. Nevertheless, this research has been written from the perspective of a Southeast Asian Muslim author whose visions radiate beyond the region to look at the global Islamic world.

Notes

- 1 www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fop08/FOTP2008_WorldRankings.pdf. (Retrieved on 18 July 2009).
- 2 www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2008. (Retrieved on 19 July 2009).
- 3 www.census.gov/ipc/www/popclockworld.html. (Retrieved from US consensus bureau website on 1 June 2010).
- 4 www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2001.html. (Retrieved from CIA, The World Factbook on 1 June 2010).



Taylor & Francis

Taylor & Francis Group

<http://taylorandfrancis.com>

Introduction

In post-modern times there has been much empirical evidence to indicate that religions and faiths also play a pro-active role in the field of civil society, but more importantly in the development of societies, which is a major factor in political economic life for the development of a country, as well as its governance (Gaush-Pasha, 2005). For example, Hofstede's studies (1984 and 1991) provide rationale as to why cultural and traditional differences should be appreciated for effective management. The richness of human civilisations should never be neglected due to the deluge of Eurocentrism. Values, morals and wisdom produced by the 'others' through their cognitive rationality together with the Western cognitive rationality are the colours that will render the universe more positive and joyful. It is these elements that will bring a new aspect to the way studies on governance should be conducted. However, the failure to appreciate their role in forming comprehensive ideals for governance will turn the discourse of governance into a monotonous authoritarian paradigm in viewing human life, which is the case in its origin and proposal.

After establishing that such concepts, including the Eurocentric concept, are not value-free, religion as a form of ethical doctrine could potentially provide the 'internal good' for development through its doctrines on social cohesion, mutual co-operation and virtue-based community. In practice, the process of development is not an axiological neutral human activity, but like other activities it is impregnated with values and ethics (Cortina, 2007). In consequence, apart from mainstream liberal economic ethics (i.e. efficiency, competitiveness, economic growth, human rights, etc.) there are other traditional, culturally-constructed and religious ethics that are worth incorporating into the discourse in order to respond to the realities of each society for it to reach an acceptable and efficient solution for itself. It is through this premise that the Aristotelian concept of *praxis* is worth employing to explain how ethics and tradition can encourage a society to cooperate to attain the *telos* (the *internal goods*).¹

Stiglitz (1998) argues that cultural values should be preserved due to their essential function as a cohesive force for development at a time when many other values are weakening. Rationally, culture and values that enhance both human and social capital will generate public order through the production of good citizens who live in mutual cooperation and mutual assistance, transcending

2 Introduction

conflicts that mount up to establish social stability (James Coleman, 1990; Kenneth Newton, 1997). Casson (1993) points out that culture as ‘collective subjectivity’ will enhance efficiency through good behaviour, integrity, honesty, trust and cooperation that will have a great impact on economic performance. In the same way, Throsby (2001) suggests that culture will provide objectives for group development through certain worldviews, values and beliefs, and it will also affect economic efficiency by affecting behaviour, innovation, group dynamics and decision-making processes.

It is according to this reason that UNESCO (1997) suggested in its 29th General Conference Report that culture (if it is being strengthened and supported) could be an enormous potential key element, as a social capital, in the struggle against poverty. The same concern was voiced by the then President of the World Bank, James Wolfensohn, (Kliksberg, 2000: 12) who emphasised the essentiality of the independency of growth and social development and further suggests that: “Without parallel social development there will be no satisfactory economic development”. While on another occasion, the President of the World Bank also stressed the significance of social development through social justice and equality to complement the institutional and structural reform for political economic growth and human prosperity. Social capital and culture, thus, are key components of these interactions (Kliksberg, 2000: 12). It should be noted that these differences also highlight the distinction between ‘economic growth and development’.

Recent global religious uprisings in many areas have demanded a restructuring of faiths and values in the fields from which they were once banished (Casanova, 1994; Berger, 1999; Falk, 2001). As a result, exploration of the possibility of incorporating culture or religion specifically into the public sphere is no longer taboo. However, this new uprising, or what is termed by Micklethwait and Wooldridge (2010) as the return of God or ‘God is back’, emerges in a different form from that it took during the pre-Enlightenment periods. This global phenomenon is represented by the re-appearance of religions in the form of ethics, values and many other functioning forms rather than the previous institutional structure. This new form of religion usurps the realm of politics, economy, education, international affairs and governance without diminishing the existing structures. Religions from this new perspective are no longer mere beliefs in miraculous rescue from above (*deus ex machina*) but rather a vehicle for human betterment (Falk, 2001: 32).

Similarly, various researchers have dedicated their studies to the new role that religions can play in development (Haynes, 2007; Khan and Bashar, 2008). Many empirical studies have been undertaken on these topics and most of them indicate that religions, through faith-based or faith-inspired organisations and movements, have not contributed significantly to development. Amongst their outstanding contributions, those often quoted by many researchers have mainly tackled poverty, improved education, provided welfare services to the community, enhanced humanitarian works, and encouraged political participation in the struggle against corruption and misadministration (Gutiérrez, 1988; Akhtar,

1991; Casanova, 1994; Rowland, 1999; Phonghit, 1988; Gillingham, 2005; Marshall, 2005: 8–12; Bayat, 2007; Harrigan and El-Said, 2009; Deneulin, 2009). Therefore, the appreciation of values derived from other civilizations, faiths or cultures must be accompanied by an investigation of their meaning and origin. Furthermore, such endeavour necessitates a deep scrutiny of the world-view that determines how governance should be interpreted and conducted.

Likewise, the present evolving good governance paradigm Eurocentricity despite it sharing outcomes which can be seen to be ‘universalistic’, can be seen through the deconstruction of the agenda from its anti-religious/anti-cultural ethos that underpins its discourse by neglecting any indigenous factors for development. Furthermore, the current discourse of development as proposed by the good governance project is solely measured by materialistic achievement through growth and the perceived ‘universalistic’ values *per se*, without allowing any room for others’ interpretations to fairly define the development. The role of religious ethos, as will be discussed in this research will prove that cultural matters do matter in development, and thus the need for an independent discourse, particularly for Muslims. For such reasons, this research will be developed along the lines of replying to the need for a separate and unique paradigm for good governance for Muslim societies. This aim will be the central working hypothesis of this research.

It is according to this rationale that the quest for Islamic governance, as another attempt to explore ‘cultural-based’ governance through the endogenizing framework, is justified. Islam, as a belief system and a way of life as perceived by Muslims, in some relative manner is unable to fit within the rather narrow framework of the post-Enlightenment concept of religion.² The elements of ideology might accommodate some characteristics of Islamic teaching but this still does not fully incorporate the comprehensive meaning of Islam as perceived and acknowledged by Muslims. As Iqbal ([1974] 2008) suggested, the essence of Islam comprises the matter of faith, feeling, and intellectual, doctrinal, philosophical and other spheres of human life. Furthermore, the studies of Islamic orientation in various fields, such as Islamic banking and finance, Islamic economics, Islamic education, Islamic management, Islamic administrative development, Islamic political theories, etc. are not new. In spite of this, the Islamic contribution to the field of good governance (macro governance) has yet to be explored.

The common perception of Islamic governance is a dark image of a non-democratic and autocratic system, or a dictatorship with iron claws, or the governance of the cleric elite with the infringement of people’s freedom under the banner of religion. All of these elements (which unfortunately resemble the reality in some contemporary Muslim countries) are known and accepted as major impediments to development. Moreover, current representations of Muslim reality by most of the regimes simply add more fuel to the stereotyping by Western sceptics of the presence of religion in the political sphere. The amalgam of religion and governance according to this paradigm indicates taking a step backward to the Dark Ages when injustice dominated human life under the umbrella of the Church and God’s word. Such a conception was not only

4 *Introduction*

echoed by people like Weber (2003 [1958]), but also became a major trend in explaining the incompatibility between Islam and the modern liberal world (Toynbee, 1935; Hitti, 1958; Hodgson, 1977; Baeck, 1994 and Lewis, 1995).

In responding to the sceptics, Maxime Rodinson's (1973) characterization of Islam as an *ideologie mobilisatrice*, that is, an ideology that facilitates social and political mobilization, might be a good answer. As Rodinson articulated in his widely-known piece, Islam is not only compatible with capitalism, but it has its own inner aim to drive Muslims toward development. A similar assertion on the compatibility between Islamic doctrine of economy and capitalism, which will eventually lead to social change and economic development, can also be found in Turner (1984). In the same vein, Chapra (2008a: 846) also challenges the claims of the cynics by applying Ibn Khaldun's theory of the rise and fall of civilization. According to this theory, Islam has activated all the developmental factors in a positive discretion through a multidisciplinary approach to development. The approach encompasses all-important socio-economic and political variables, including the sovereign or political authority, beliefs and rules of behaviour (*Shari'ah*), people, wealth or stock of resources, development, and justice, in a circular and interdependent manner.

Ibn Khaldun (Rosenthal, 1967: 19) concludes that the rise and fall of civilizations is closely dependent on the well-being or misery of the people. Therefore the fall of any civilization (as well as the current underdevelopment climate in Muslim countries) is not only dependent on economic variables but is also derived from the combined roles of moral, institutional, psychological, political, social and demographic factors (Chapra, 2008a: 840). As a remedy, Ibn Khaldun proposes the activation of Islamic creed, spirituality and horizontal-vertical moral values to contribute to the moral and material uplifting of individuals, which is the central factor behind the rise or fall of civilizations and countries.

However, totally denying the theory of the sceptics as might be argued by some apologists will never shed any new light on the subject, nor will totally accepting it. To maintain an objectivity of research, we have to admit that Islamic texts could be manipulated (or are being manipulated) by some who might wish to legitimize undemocratic governance. Hence, a fresh way of exploring and at the same time revealing the new dimension of governance from Islamic epistemology, by taking into account human experience and justice and fairness factors, is essential. Thus, a new *ijtihad* (reasoning) in dealing with the subject is absolutely mandatory. Humanistic governance based on the preservation of the dignity of human beings, which has been the focal point in Islamic tenets, the inviolability of life, and responsible freedom should be explored and promoted as another alternative voice of current modernity hegemony.

In sum, if economic and policy-oriented issues are all but value-laden, it is therefore rational that an Islamic conception of 'governance' should be developed to fit into its own vision. This, as explained above, could increase the efficiency of development efforts in the Muslim world by directly appealing to people's values. This suggestion assumes that the developmentalist failures in the Muslim world are perhaps partially due to the imposed developmentalist

agendas, which are not rooted in the aspirational worldview of the people whose lives are expected to be affected for the better.

This book, thus, aims to explore and analyse the Islamic axioms, foundation principles and values underpinning the field of governance in an attempt to construct the architectonics of a new systemic and dynamic theory and formulate the articulation of 'Islamic governance', in the hope of discovering a remedy for the cases of 'bad governance' and underdevelopment in Muslim countries. Rationally, religion that predominantly became the centre of Muslim life could probably play an efficient role in overcoming such problems. In fact, the long history of Muslim politics has proven that Islamic values managed to bring about efficiency of governance and administration in certain periods of time. Despite the universal and common meanings of those values, Muslims value them more according to their own terms and meanings. The *persona-religiousus* (Ibrahim, 1996) tendency within the heart of most Muslim individuals would provide grounds for the implementation of those ideals.

However, to present an 'out-of-the-box' proposal which differs from the mainstream analysis, advocacy and action for major social change is indeed a kind of paradigm shift. Paradigm shift stipulates a critical deconstructive method of representing the proposal of an exploration of new dimensions and activities that crosscut subjects and contexts. These dimensions and activities, however, should emerge primarily with a certain worldview to give a strong foundation on which they will interact with the reality. The foundation should be able to produce certain specific principles for the new paradigm rooted strongly in its epistemology. It is from those principles that a new approach will be developed as an articulation of their ideals.

The formulation of the foundation should be based firmly on Islamic tenet, which al-Faruqi (1992) termed *tawhid*. *Tawhid* is considered as *a priori*, and believed to explain the 'truth'. It is from this *a priori* 'truth' that the reality of life and the world are explained. This worldview illuminates the ideal of Islam and conceptualizes an epistemological paradigm from which Muslims derive their knowledge. Accordingly, the attempt to explore Islamic ideals to fit as an alternative means to the conventional governance set-up must embark from this starting point. Therefore, a new method is to be formulated to crystallize Islamic principles of governance by constructing a new alternative within the magnitude of value-laden, ontology-determined epistemology. It is expected that this new approach must transcend the current (nature-matter) materialistic monism of governance by replacing the ends of its process with transcendental values, and by making humans a starting point of the subject and not as mere commodities. Furthermore, it must fit into the framework of comprehensive contemporary usage of 'good' governance from the ontological-determined Islamic epistemology through a deductive method.

As far as the term epistemology is concerned, the exploration also involves Islamic traditions and previous contributions to the subject, but without literal transcriptions. They will only represent the ongoing, creative attempt to comprehend the paradigm implicit in different Islamic texts and phenomena. On the

6 *Introduction*

other hand, due to the new nature of the recent description of ‘governance’, a new distinctive approach that advocates modern political economic issues should apply modern socio-economic analysis with new presupposition established from Islamic epistemology (Choudhury, 1992, 1995, 1999, etc.). This kind of approach suggests that theoretical foundation of Islamic Political Economy should emanate from the complete substitution of the neo-classical idea of replacement and its later variations by the *Principle of Universal Complementarity* (Choudhury 1994). This approach is essential to this research, which looks at the Islamic ontological-determined epistemological role of ethico-economic and political systems, with governance as its grand subsystem, as a new emerging theory.

Finally, this book aims to explore the principles of governance within Islamic discourse through the epistemological sources of Islam, namely the Qur'an, the Prophet Muhammad's traditions (*Sunnah*), the pious Caliphs' experiences and the *maqasid al-Shari'ah*. It adopts the framework of modern good governance theories and applications to explore the ideal concepts and principles of governance within the Islamic epistemology. The concepts of Islamic governance should be understood from the political and economic ethos that could emerge from the aforementioned sources. This aim confirms al-Badawi's assertion (2002: 21) that an ideal civilization requires divine guidance to give it a firm foundation, an incentive and a framework, which gives progress a sense of direction and an ethical orientation. Accordingly, the exploration of values from Islamic sources and history will be applied in the field of governance. Instead of dealing with the forms and structures, this book will derive the core principles of governance from Islamic epistemological sources. This book may become a useful reference for those who are trying to understand how Islam can contribute to the current discourse of governance from a moral and value point of view.

Exploring new territories with new methods by leaving *chez soi* is similar to what Jacques Derrida in *Contre-allée* terms ‘departing towards the unknown’, risking all the risks, pleasures and dangers that the ‘unknown’ has in store. Moreover, this unknown is about exploring a territory that is unpopular and considered an imagined ‘picture’. For many, imagining a future that is beneficial for humanity is equal to dreaming. But hopefully the journey that this research has taken is not as bad as the tone of some lines from Orhan Pamuk's novel *The Black Book* (*Kara Kitap*): “We live but for a short time, we see but very little, and we know almost nothing; so, at least, let's do some dreaming” (Pamuk, 1994: 183).

Notes

1 By applying MacIntyre's Aristotelian insight into the role of tradition in human life, Cortina (2007: 5–6) concludes that traditional bond can motivate the work of development by motivating society to attain the *internal goods* within certain *ethical and moral frameworks* through the cultivation of *virtues* by *different social agents* according to certain *models* facilitated by political, economic and citizens' *institutions* based on

specific *philosophical foundation*. With such a framework, she claims that people are not a means to another end, but are valuable in themselves.

2 Religion is translated as ‘*al-din*’ in Arabic. The term connotes two different definitions due to its usage and context. The general definition for ‘*al-din*’ refers to the way of life and all manners that relate to conducts from both ritual-spiritual aspects and the secular. This comprehensive meaning of ‘*al-din*’ was acknowledged by al-Shatibi through his saying: “(*al-din* as the way of conduct) is but an act of worship that encompasses rituals (*ibadat*), customs (*Adat*) and human relation (*mu'amalat*)”, and his remarks on another occasion, “All the human conducts that are recognized by the *Shari'ah* is but an act of worship”. Such a wide scope for the meaning of ‘*al-din*’ comprises every action and conduct of humans, which will find their general and moral guidance in al-Quran and *sunnah* (Prophet Muhammad’s traditions), implicitly and explicitly. While the specific meaning of ‘*al-din*’ refers to the ‘ritual-spiritual context’, which the Muslim scholars define as ‘*al-umur al-diniyyah al-ta'abuddiyyah*’ and does not involve any other human conduct such as economics, politics, education, culture etc. (al-Uthmani, 2009: 86–105). In our discussion, the main concern will focus on the general meaning of ‘*al-din*’ as the way of life as perceived and believed in strongly by many Muslims. It is from such a worldview that the epistemological issues regarding the subject of governance can be explored and derived.

1 Governance

Definitions and conceptual framework

The ‘governance’ phenomenon indeed is another big idea that has re-emerged in the past decade. The term was first introduced as a panacea for underdevelopment and poverty in the early 1980s, and was suggested as a remedy for many other problems and challenges, as well as being viewed as another ideological excuse for certain power groups to dominate others. At the same time, the term ‘governance’ currently connotes a myriad of meanings depending on the context in which it is being used and what adjectives are added to it. The term undeniably has its significance and philosophy, so it became very popular and a favourite term of many. Hence, this introductory chapter attempts to locate the origin of the term, its meaning, framework and philosophy. An unambiguous understanding of the concept is crucial in order to comprehend its implications for the framework of this research.

Defining the concept

After the World Bank’s report on the underdevelopment of Sub-Saharan Africa in 1989, the term governance took on a new dimension. It has since become a multi-usage phrase in diverse fields and areas. The term, which was once firmly linked to the political setting of government, has now become common in the fields of political economy and development. The definitions of governance, therefore, are manifold.

To begin with, the term governance is etymologically connected to the Greek verb *kubernán* which means ‘to pilot or steer’. Plato used the verb regarding how to design a system of rule. The Greek term gave rise to the Medieval Latin *gubernare*, which bears the same connotation of piloting, rule making or steering (Kjær, 2004: 3).

Lexicographically, governance is derived from the Latin ‘*cybern*’ which means ‘steering’, the same root as in ‘cybernetics’ (the science of control). Cadbury (2002: 1) relates this meaning to Cicero (106 BC–43 BC) who in his *De Senectute* (On Old Age) states “[h]e that governs sits quietly at the stern and scarce is seen to stir”.

Later, the term evolved to be used in French (*gouvernance*) in the fourteenth century to refer to ‘seat of government’ or the royal officers rather than to the process of governing or ‘steering’ (Pierre, 2000: 23).

The term ‘governance’ was used extensively in the earlier modern day to mean the act of governing, as in the function and performance of ‘government’ and the word ‘government’ was defined as the “form of organization of State” or a “body or successive bodies of persons governing a State; ... and administration or Ministry” (*Concise Oxford Dictionary*, 2009). The term governance denotes the performance or conduct of governing; the function of governing; the sway, control. Hence, to govern is to “rule or control with authority; to be in government” and also refers to the relationship between the governors and the governed, such as that between the government and the people, and has at its basis the decision-making powers ceded by individuals to those in authority so that the common interests of society can be served (Iqbal and Lewis, 2009: 2). For a long time, the usage of the term was mainly limited to constitutional and legal issues concerning the conduct of ‘affairs of the state’ and/or to the direction of specific institutions or professions with multiple stakeholders (Jessop, 1998: 30).

Within this framework, the words governance and government differ from each other, since government in its technical usage focuses on the political system with its institutions (electoral system, type of government, political parties, bureaucratic, etc.), while governance implies

general conduct of which power is exercised by governments and authorities at national, regional and local levels, and the way in which they fulfil their duties of care and accountability in managing and dealing with the economic, social, ecological and cultural resources and institutions for which they are responsible.

(Van Dok, 1999: 10)

Perhaps the redefinition by the Canadian Institute on Governance of the term will give a clearer picture of this demarcation: “Governance comprises the traditions, institutions and process that determine how power is exercised, how citizens are given a voice, and how decisions are made on issues of public concern”.¹

The current use, however, no longer deals with the term governance as a synonym for government. Rather, it refers to a new process of governing; or a changed condition of ordered rule; or the new method by which society is governed (Rhodes, 2003: 46), or it might also signify the modes and manner of governing, of the institutions and agents in charge of governing. This new broader dimension of the recent use of the term still engulfs its literal meaning of “the art of steering societies and organizations” (Graham *et al.*, 2003: 2). The new use of the term ‘governance’, hence, departs from its original meaning, which exclusively connotes the political guidance or steering to the non-hierarchical control model focusing on cooperation between state and non-state actors, and the participation of larger actors. This new understanding of ‘governance’ is broader than that of ‘government’.

A very detailed concept of governance, produced by the Commission on Global Governance (1995: 2), clarifies the term as: “The sum of the many ways

10 *A framework of governance*

individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is the continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative action may be taken". Consequently, this new paradigm also represents an alternative for the old framework of government for hierarchical control, on the level of national, inter-state policy (i.e. EU policy) and in international relations (Kooiman, 1993; Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992).

However, a thorough investigation of the contemporary utilization of the term governance indicates that it has shifted enormously from its initial usage. Not only has the separation between governance and government become exacerbated, governance is also no longer confined to the political realm. The term has become a concept that differs in terms of usage from one context to another (Williamson, 1989: 11). These differences are elaborated further in the following sections.

Conceptual framework

Although governance has only recently entered the standard Anglophone social science lexicon, it has become a buzzword in various circles. A closer look at the subject will uncover the diverse usage of the term, which is applied to different contexts and different connotations. However, the semantic meaning of governance as 'steering' is still present in all the usages despite the differences. The following sections deal with those different usages based on the diverse definitions. The definitions imply clearly that the concept of 'governance' is not an exclusive terminology but rather can be applied to a variety of organizations and institutions, and is thus not limited to politics or economics as might be expected (Rhodes, 1996: 47–56, 2000: 55–63; Hirst, 2000: 13–35).

(i) Governance as policy instrument

Despite its various and inconsistent usage, the term governance as defined by political scientists refers to two of the most basic questions: 'Who governs?' and 'How well?' The former refers to the issue of power, its distribution and resources in the community and political structure, while the latter, referring to the issue of 'Good Governance', focuses on effective institutions, efficient methods of operation and equitable policy outcomes (Jreisat, 2004: 1004). This basic understanding of governance deconstructs the very fundamental concept of the use of the term governance, which can be found in Hyden's (2001) definition:

Governance is the stewardship of formal and informal political rules of the game [which] refer to those measures that involve setting the rules for the exercise of power and settling conflicts over such rules.

This definition is similar to the classical meaning and the general understanding of the term governance, which implies the framework of government and

the discussion about instruments involved in governing the state. This is also the general definition given by the World Bank to the term, governance as: “The exercise of political power to manage a nation’s affair” (World Bank Report, 1989: 60). The focus of discussion in this type of governance is about power, the distribution of power and other issues related to government.

This definition is similar to that of Landell-Mills and Serageldin (1992: 304), who maintain that governance denotes how people are ruled and how the affairs of a state are administered and regulated. It refers to a nation’s system of politics and how it functions in relation to public administration and law. Thus, the concept of governance goes beyond that of ‘government’ to include a political and politically-constructed administration dimension.

Kooiman (1993: 258) defines governance as:

The pattern or structure that emerges in a socio-political system as a ‘common result or outcome of the interacting intervention efforts of all involved actors’. This pattern cannot be reduced to [the outcome produced by] one actor or groups of actors in particular.

This definition does not impose a structure but states that political culture produces its own style and structure of governance out of its political culture in an inductive manner, which, however, may not be Good Governance. Graham *et al.* (2003: 2), in contrast, state that the core meaning of governance emphasises the fundamental principle of governance which is about power, relationships and accountability: who has influence, who decides and how decision makers are held accountable. Thus, governance according to them is:

The interactions among structures, processes and traditions that determine how power and responsibilities are exercised, how decisions are taken, and how citizens or other stakeholders have their say.

(ii) Governance as minimal state

Discourse of minimal state has been a heated debate in the political economic field for many years, and as an important feature of the neo-classical-based new public administration, it refers to the extent and form of public intervention and the use of markets and quasi-markets to deliver ‘public service’ (Rhodes, 2003: 47). Referring to this neo-classical position, Stoker (1998: 18) suggests that: “Governance is the acceptable face of spending cuts”. However, the concept refers to more than the ‘cuts’, it refers to the nature and the shape of public administration or the operation of governance. Governance as the minimal state encapsulates, therefore, the preference for ‘less government’ but also ‘small yet efficient government’. By referring to such notions of governance, governance can best be described as: “... self-organizing, inter organizational networks characterized by interdependence, resource-exchange, rules of the game, and significant autonomy from the state” (Rhodes, 2003: 15).

It should be mentioned though that the very idea of minimal state is not new. From the emergence of Smith's *laissez-faire* up to Hayek's view on the limited authority of the state, the idea has aimed at preserving the individual's rights from being infringed by 'the state' (Hayek, 2007 [1944]), as the minimal state was the theme of the nineteenth century liberals and was the core part of their ideology of 'liberties'. State as perceived by the liberals is only responsible for traditional duties such as security, welfare and the rule of law (Hayek, 2007 [1944]).

Accordingly, the market is to be free from the tyranny of the state. However, this notion of less-state control must not be confused with the anarchist idea of state-nihilism. The extreme idea of Rand (1967), Rothbard (1961) and Friedman (2002) known as the anarcho-capitalism which emphasizes the ultimate free-market and the non-interference of the state is not what governance means by minimal state. Similarly, according to the proponent of Good Governance, minimal state is highlighted as an important tool in achieving efficiency for development. Even the market's efficiency depends heavily on the governance issue and minimal state interference. However, in the later stage, due to the failure of the market in some cases, some experts are calling for state interference for regulation and for efficiency of the economy (World Bank, 1997).

(iii) Governance as corporate governance

As can be seen from the two previous technical definitions of the term governance referring to its usage in the macro governance issues (public policy and state), the word governance has also been employed widely at the micro level, specifically in the public sector. At this micro level, the term governance is strongly associated with the concept of 'corporate governance', which deals with business, finance, management and organizational affairs. In this framework, corporate governance, also occasionally referred to as 'Good Governance' at the micro level refers to the way in which business corporations are directed and controlled (Jones and Michael, 2004; see Cadbury Report, 1992: 15).

The Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Cadbury, 2002: 1) defines corporate governance as: "The system by which companies are directed and controlled". This framework identifies the principles of Good Governance as being a stakeholder decision-making process aimed at efficiency through integrity, openness and accountability. Such a concept, as elaborated by Demb and Neubauer (1992: 187) in their classic work, *The Corporate Board: Confronting the Paradoxes*, was termed: "The process by which corporations are made responsive to the rights and wishes of stakeholders".

In explaining the genealogy of the concept, Aguilera and Alvaro (2004: 418) suggest that the concept was triggered by certain events, mainly from the period of transition of the conglomerate merger movement in the 1960s in the USA to refer to the empire-building behaviour by management through hostile takeovers, and then to the shareholder rights movement of the late 1980s up to the early 1990s. Initially, the first code of governance in the business sector came

into being in the late 1970s in the USA amid the great corporate fervour of business, legal, academic and political constituencies (Aguilera and Alvaro, 2004: 418). The other event that led to the emergence of the corporate governance issue was the 1990 British recession and the series of high-profile corporate failures, which resulted from the weakness of internal corporate control. The events raised the issue of corporate accountability both in the public mind and in the House of Commons (Monks and Minow, 1995).

However, numerous scholars and researchers agree that it was the 1992 *Cadbury Committee Report: Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance in the UK* (also known as the *Cadbury Report*), the first of several reports on corporate governance, which led to the strong emergence of the concept in the private sector. It became the flagship guideline that deliberately challenged the effectiveness of voluntary regulation and British corporate democracy (Aguilera and Alvaro, 2004: 419). The report was concerned with “the perceived low levels of confidence both in financial reporting and in the ability of auditors to provide the safeguards which the users of the company reports sought and expected” (Cadbury Commission, 1992). To overcome this, the report strongly promotes the need for the independence of directors, greater shareholder involvement and the establishment of board committees. These elements of procedures and mechanisms are what are still known as the corporate governance or Good Governance of organizations.

Consequently, since the report, ‘corporate governance’ as a guiding concept of management of business and organizations has been introduced globally and adopted by many as ‘good practice’ to ensure the efficiency in the management and operation of organizations. In the later stages of the twentieth century corporate governance was widely implemented in the public sector after being ‘translated’ by the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA, 1994: 6). The aim of promoting the concept to the public sector is to ensure efficiency of governance in the public sector (Rhodes, 2000: 56). The report also urges the need to change the culture and the climate of public services towards a more commercial style of management. It also points out the need for the public service to establish a sound system of corporate governance and exercise work practices based on three principles: the openness or the disclosure of information; integrity or straightforward dealing and completeness; and accountability or holding individuals responsible for their actions by a clear allocation of responsibilities and clearly defined roles (Rhodes, 2000: 56). This led to the emergence of what became known later as New Public Management (NPM).

(iv) Governance as New Public Management

The 1980s and 1990s witnessed drastic changes in the area of public service according to the global structural adjustment programmes towards efficiency. ‘New Public Management’ (NPM) as the new institutional economic² movement helped to generate a set of administrative reform doctrines built on ideas

of *contestability, user choice, transparency* and close concentration on *incentive structures* (Mc Laughlin *et al.*, 2002).

NPM is derived from two major ideas: (a) the ‘public policy’ schools developed in the 1970s, which became famous in the 1980s; and (b) the ‘managerialist’ movement around the globe (Hood, 1991: 6; Lynn, 2003: 14; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004: 8–10).

This model offered a new approach based on two concepts: the *corporate management* and the *marketization* of the public sector operating within the framework of the private sector’s model of business and market-driven values. It was also part of the reform influenced by the aforesaid ‘corporate governance’ phenomenon that caused a tsunami of reforms in the way the private sector was managed or governed.

Technically, the term ‘corporate management’ refers to the implementation of ‘private sector management methods’ to the public sector through performance measures, managing by results and value for money and closeness to the customer (Hood and Jackson, 1991). Such a corporatization approach was part of the NPM reform package that led it to also be known as *managerialism*. By the same token, the other part of the reform, *marketization* refers to “introducing incentive structures into public service provision through contracting-out, quasi-markets, and consumer choice” or in other words ‘new institutional economics’ as it has come to be known (Hood and Jackson, 1991: 5; Rhodes, 2003: 48).

The public management framework implies a diversion from government service delivery (rowing) to more of a governance style of service, which involves stakeholders’ involvement in ‘policy decisions’ (steering) in public management that has put NPM into a wider connotation of the ‘governance’ concept (Rhodes, 1996: 49). In the meantime, Osborne and Gaebler (1992: 20) criticized the traditional way of public service provision, proposing a paradigm shift reform ideal into the sector with more elements of governance. They argued that bureaucracy is a redundant tool for rowing (service delivery) and came up with a unique ‘entrepreneurial government model’ based on ten principles:

- a The promotion of competition between service providers;
- b Empowering citizens by de-centralizing bureaucracy into the community;
- c Measuring the performance of agencies through outcomes;
- d Goals and missions must drive them;
- e Clients are defined as customers and deserve choices;
- f Problem prevention rather than problem-solving services;
- g More effort in earning money rather than spending it;
- h Decentralizing authority by embracing participatory management;
- i Market mechanism operation rather than bureaucratic;
- j Solving community problems by mobilizing the private, public and voluntary sectors.

In conclusion, within such a framework, the concept of governance operating in the field of public service transforms the public sector from its conventional

state into a new realm of a more efficient operational structure based on corporatization. Within such a sphere, the public sector no longer acts as a service delivery department *per se*, but rather a corporate entity that aims to serve the people as clients with more efficiency based on the market values of competition, markets, customers and outcomes (and not only rules and regulations). This transformation of the public sector according to Osborne and Gaebler (1992: 34) promotes less government (or less rowing) and more governance (more steering).

In tandem, the efficiency of public services is one of the characteristics of Good Governance proposed by the World Bank which defines efficiency in the public services (according to their notion of Good Governance) as: “Competitive and market-oriented; privatisation of public enterprises; reformation of civil service through the reduction of over-staffing; introducing the budget discipline; decentralisation of administration; and make the greater use of non-governmental organizations through the networking framework” (Williams and Young, 1994: 87). The presence of all these elements as perceived by the World Bank, as well as other international financial institutions is expected to enhance public management thus leading to the end of poverty, corruption and all the elements that create hurdles in the process of development (Smith, 2003: 202–48).

(v) Governance as socio-cybernetic system

In the process of reform, by minimizing the state and the efficiency of the public service, the decision-making process no longer became the exclusive right of a single central authority. The new concept of ‘governance’ in its macro realm implies that stakeholders within the macro governance system should have their share in the decision-making process. This phenomenon has led to what is known as the socio-cybernetic system (Rhodes, 2003: 50). The ‘socio-cybernetic’ approach entails the end of single sovereign authority in making decisions within the state by introducing the limits to governing by a central actor. In other words, policy outcomes are not solely the product of actions by the central government. Within this new framework, various actors specific to each policy area replace government as the single actor. These social-political-administrative actors interdependently formulate decisions, actions, intervention and control with shared goals (Rhodes, 2003: 50).

Within this framework, ‘governance’ is the result of those interactive social-political forms of governing. Thus, the act of ‘governing’ (or goal directed interventions) becomes separated from the ‘governance’ process, which is the result of social-political-administrative interventions and interactions of government and other actors such as the private firms, NGOs, association of NGOs, the civil societies and business entities (Keohane and Nye, 2000: 12).

Kooiman (1993b: 258) states that

Governance ... can be seen as the pattern or structure that emerges in a social-political system as a ‘common’ result or outcome of the interacting

intervention efforts of all involved actors. This pattern cannot be reduced to one actor or group of actors in particular.

In the same vein, Governance International UK offers a similar view to this new framework of ‘governance’, which emphasizes the nature of the socio-cybernetic system by describing governance as: “The negotiation by multiple stakeholders of improved policy outcomes and agreed governance principles. To be sustainable, these have to be made operational on a regular basis”.³

These interactive interventions and interactions make all the actors in a particular policy area interdependent. The order in the policy area thus, is not from the highest level but emerges from the negotiations of several involved and affected parties (Rhodes, 2003: 50). Kooiman (1993a: 4) suggests that:

These interactions are . . . based on the recognition of (inter) dependencies. No single actor, public or private, has all knowledge and information required to solve complex dynamic and diversified problems; no actor has sufficient overview to make the application of needed instruments effective; no single actor has sufficient action potential to dominate unilaterally in a particular governing model.

In conclusion, within the aforesaid approach, central government is no longer supreme, but is thus minimized. The political system is based on ‘the centreless society’ in the polycentric state characterized by multiple centres. Hence, the task of government is to enable socio-political interactions; to encourage many and varied arrangements for coping with problems and to distribute services among several actors (Rhodes, 2000: 58). Consequently, the term ‘governance’ within such a framework does not only explain the system, but it also refers to the networks amongst the actors involved in the governance process. This can be seen in the following framework of the usage of the word governance.

(vi) Governance as self-organizing networks

In elucidating the implication of the term governance in its recent multiple usage, Rhodes (1996: 660) relates it to ‘*self organizing*’ or ‘*inter organizational networks*’. This realm of governance means the nature of a network that is autonomous and self-governing. An ideal structure of networks according to Rhodes (2000: 61) resists government steering, develops its own policies and moulds its environment based on mutual consensus. Furthermore, he asserts that the networks are characterized by four major features: interdependence between organizations; continuing interactions between network members; regulation by rules of the game negotiated and agreed by network participants, and a significant degree of autonomy from the state. The networks are not accountable to the state because of their self-organizing nature (Rhodes, 2000: 61).

In the same manner, Kickert (1993: 275) states that government is no longer the sole actor of governance in the contemporary structure of the societal

system. Other autonomous social institutions in modern countries also play a role in shaping the policies and the future of the country. However, those institutions can only operate with a certain degree of freedom of autonomy and self-governance. Deregulation, government withdrawal and steering at a distance are all notions of less direct government regulation and control, which lead to more autonomy and self-governance for social institutions. This provides a broader dimension for governance; hence, it further distances itself from the old usage of the term, which refers only to the act of governing by the government. Rhodes (2000: 63) suggests that governance as networks is a ubiquitous and important form of governing structure in advanced industrial societies.

This usage of governance fits into the previous framework of governance, which is also inclusive. These new usages of frameworks necessitate the involvement of larger governance actors and a reduction in the monopoly of single central actors in the 'governance' process for efficiency and effectiveness. The idea of interconnection, networking and self-dependency as governance does not only apply at the macro-national level, it also expands towards the international and supra national. At the international level, the term governance is used to indicate the interdependent nature of global actors in achieving mutual goals and aims as described in brief in the following paragraphs.

(vii) Governance as international interdependence

Recent studies on governance encompass the discussion on the role of governance in both international relations and the international political economy. The global networking of organizations and the governance of international agencies that manage to deliver many duties conventionally undertaken by the state are part of the discussions. The increasing emergence of non-state actors such as NGOs, civil society networks and 'anti-globalization movements' on the global level has seen these interdependent networking actors become more crucial. This interdependent networking structure of international actors has become known in recent times as 'global governance'. The application of the notion of governance was the natural result of mounting evidence that the international system is no longer composed simply of states, but rather the world was undergoing fundamental change (Weiss, 2000: 806).

Global governance involves shifting the location of authority in the context of integration and fragmentation. Rosenau (1992b: 13) defines governance as follows: "Global governance is conceived to include systems of rule at all levels of human activity – from the family to the international organization – in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has transnational repercussions". In explaining the process of the concept, he maintains that global governance is

a pervasive tendency ... in which major shifts in the location of authority and the site of control mechanisms are under way on every continent, shifts

that are as pronounced in economic and social systems as they are in political systems.

(Rosenau, 1992a: 18)

‘Global Governance’ is, thus, the result of globalization as a socio-economic and political fact. This definition implies the erudition of the state authority by international interdependencies (Rhodes, 2000: 57). Held (2006: 151–157) suggests that under global forces four processes limit the autonomy of nation states: the internationalization of production and financial transactions; international organizations; international law; and hegemonic powers and power blocs. The limited autonomy of the nation state, thus, leads to their weakened governance capacities, though they remain as pivotal institutions (Rhodes, 2000: 57). The power of the nation state has been distributed to the international level upwards, and to the sub-national agencies downwards. The states then become the ‘source of constitutional ordering’, providing minimum standards in a world of interlocking networks of public powers. Rhodes (2000: 58) then points out how the European Union illustrates the transnational policy networks emerging by arguing that: “in the EU, multilevel governance posits links between the Commission, national ministries and local and regional authorities”.

(viii) Governance as New Political Economy

The term governance is also commonly used in a new discipline known as the ‘New Political Economy’ (NPE). NPE is an approach to governance that re-examines the government of the economy and the interrelationships between civil society, state, and the market economy (Rhodes, 2000: 59). Within this tradition, Lindberg *et al.* (1991: 3) describe governance as “the political and economic processes that coordinate activity among economic actors”. Their research explores the transformation of the institutions involved in governing economic activities. The emergence and rearrangement of several institutional forms of governance is the main focus of the research.

A survey of the relevant survey indicates that six ideal types of governance mechanism can be identified within the new political economy ideals: markets, obligation networks, hierarchy, monitoring, promotional networks, and associations (Lindberg *et al.*, 1991: 29). Subsequently, in contrast to the idea of ‘hollowing’ the state in the new realm of governance, the state in this framework is not just another governance mechanism, but it acts as the gatekeeper to sectoral governance and can facilitate or inhibit production and exchange. This approach in a way is also relevant to public administration because it explores the ways in which the state as actor and structure, constitutes the economy and influences the selection of governance regimes despite its minimal role, which it shares with others, especially in decision making.

Following the line of argument, Jessops (1995: 317, 324) points out that governance is “the complex art of steering multiple agencies, institutions and

systems which are both operationally autonomous from one another and structurally coupled through various forms of reciprocal interdependence". He also asserts that the basis of hierarchical, top-down co-ordination is being undermined by the dramatic intensification of societal complexity, which stems from the growing functional differentiation of institutional orders within an increasingly global society. With this approach, he contrasts the governance as a 'new political economy' with the old Marxist political economy genealogy by segregating between governance (as steering the networks) and regulation, which is the core of the Marxist approach (Jessops, 1995: 323).

Jessop's analysis of governance draws on his strategic-relational approach with its focus on the complex dialectical interrelationships between structure, agency and strategy. Hence, this approach, according to Rhodes (2000: 60), is relevant to the study of Public Administration because of the critical perspective it brings to the instrumental concern of governance with solving co-ordination problems, arguing that governance is not necessarily more efficient than markets and identifying several strategic dilemmas that make governance prone to fail. However, this framework of governance is not appealing in comparison with Good Governance.

(ix) Governance as 'Good Governance'

The initial idea of Good Governance as the antonym for bad governance was developed as a concept of governmental and political reform to be imposed on Third World countries in the interest of expanding the world market economy. However, after the World Bank 1989 report on the underdevelopment in Sub-Saharan Africa, the term took on a new dimension referring to the structural adjustment programmes of the neo-liberal market agenda of the Bretton Woods institutions to minimize the role of governments in favour of the market for what they claim as "successful economic development" (Van Dok, 1999: 11). Later in its 1992 report the World Bank published its ideas of Good Governance, which it claimed was a framework for "sound development management". The report contains the central elements believed to be the formulae for successful development: accountability, a legal framework and information as well as transparency (World Bank, 1992).

The aim of the Good Governance concept or framework was to achieve responsible administration, rule of law receptive to development, and efficient management of the public sector, that is good market economy, while at the same time exemplifying the conditions to remove the risks from strategies of globalization and internal lending policies (Bovaid, 2003: 163–4). Tetzlaff (1995: 113) defines the World Bank as the "inventor and proclaimer of the concept". The term Good Governance, thus, became widely used by international agencies. The philosophy behind such a policy is that it aims to provide international aid only to those who are eligible. Those countries with Good Governance, therefore, will be entitled to receive the loan, while the countries which exercise 'bad governance' must abide by certain conditions

stipulated by the bank and adopt certain reforms before they are eligible for the loan (OECD, 1996).

These motives have been clearly mentioned by the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development), one of the leading international organizations in promoting the idea of Good Governance along with the World Bank, in their definition of Good Governance. According to them, the concept refers to: “the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority necessary to manage a nation’s affairs” (OECD, 1995: 14). Within this framework, Good Governance as a reform agenda encourages competition and markets; privatization of public enterprise; reforming the civil service, introducing budgetary discipline; decentralizing administration and making greater use of non-governmental organizations, in order to achieve efficiency in the public service (Williams and Young, 1994: 87).⁴ The word governance, thus, is closely associated with this definition.

To summarize, the term Good Governance, according to Leftwich (1993) is built upon three strands: systemic, political and administrative. The systemic use of governance covers the ‘distribution of both internal and external political and economic power’. In this sense, governance is broader than government. While the political use of governance refers to ‘a state enjoying both legitimacy and authority, derived from a democratic mandate’. The administrative use of governance, however, refers to “an efficient, open accountable and audited public service” (Rhodes, 2000: 57). All these elements conclude the very essence of the Good Governance mechanism in achieving its goal for development.

Reflecting on the definitions

In conclusion, technically ‘Good Governance’ as a comprehensive concept within such a paradigm engulfs the previous usages or frameworks of governance. Good Governance according to this usage encompasses public policy in its political usage; it also encompasses corporate governance, the role of minimal state for market economy, and also the NPM for the public sector, and the socio-cybernetic system for non-governmental organizations, and it crystallizes the ideal of the new political economy. The concept also prepares the foundation for global governance as an international interdependence.

In perspective, the multiple-usage of the term governance exemplifies how it encompasses various connotations beyond its initial semantical and literal usage. There is no precedence for any particular interpretation of the word, either in the academic realm or in popular language. Hence, the boundaries of the concept have been vague. It is used freely to convey users’ ideas without being dictated to by any set of semantic or methodological criteria shared by a community of users (Frischtak, 1994: 11). As a result, it has been used widely to express different things, which do not necessarily refer to the same problems or issues.

In dealing with such vagueness, a deconstruction of the concepts developed by the varying usages of the term ‘governance’ refers to certain values that

reflect the main idea of steering, self-organizing and networking (Rhodes, 2003: 53). These values can be summarized by a number of characteristics and can be summarized as follows:

- i Interdependent nature between organizations. Governance is broader than government, covering non-state actors. Changing the boundaries of the state means the boundaries between public, private and voluntary sectors become shifting and opaque;
- ii Continuing interaction between network members, caused by the need to exchange resources and negotiate shared purposes;
- iii Game-like interactions, rooted in trust and regulated by rules of the game negotiated and agreed by network participants;
- iv A significant degree of autonomy from the state. Networks are not accountable to the state; they are self-organizing. Although the state does not occupy a sovereign position, it can indirectly and imperfectly steer networks;
- v Efficiency in reality is the major determining factor of governance debates. All the usage of the term 'governance' and all the application of concepts using the terminology aim to achieve efficiency.

In conclusion, despite the manifold usage of the term, here we will try to narrow the focus to 'Good Governance' as discussed above. Being the most prevailing connotation of the term governance, it will be the major underlying discourse in achieving the main objective of this research. In the following section, the characteristics and principles of Good Governance as developed by world institutions will be the main theme for scrutiny and examination. The philosophy of these principles is deconstructed to understand why they have been chosen and what their relevancy is. These principle issues are pivotal in this research, since the establishment of an 'alternative' paradigm for Good Governance requires the understanding of the structure and philosophy of the current one.

'Good Governance': an overview

Despite the manifold usage of the term 'governance' in modern times, it is 'Good Governance' that has been widely promoted by international institutions that will be the focal point of this research. The concept is believed by many to be the modern way of ensuring development, harmony and peace amongst the world's population in the future through reforming administration of delivery and services. 'Good Governance', as an international agenda, is closely related to the major factor in governance, the government, in comparison with other notions of 'governance',⁵ as it combines ideas about political authority, the management of economic and social resources, and the capacity of governments to formulate sound policies and then perform their functions effectively, efficiently and equitably (Blunt, 1995), which imply a set of rules (*system*) governing

the actions of *individuals* and organizations (*society*) and the negotiation of differences between them that could only be crystallized through proper *institutions* (Van Dok, 1999).

To better understand more about the concept, a brief look into its historical root is essential. Literally, the prolegomena of the ‘Good Governance’ agenda dates back to 1989 following the World Bank report on Sub-Saharan under-development. The post-Cold War period witnessed the pro-active role by the Bank to assist the Third World countries in Africa and ex-communist countries, especially in Eastern Europe, to develop their economies. The policy of the World Bank during that particular period was to bring reform to the public sector with the objective of ensuring efficiency and economic growth. It continued this as its policy and its practice until a shift took place in the 1990s following a 1989 World Bank report that blamed a ‘crisis of governance’ in Sub-Saharan Africa for the lack of effective use of development aid in the region (World Bank, 1989). A World Bank Staff Paper in 1991 identified external agencies as “potentially key political players capable of exerting considerable influence in promoting good or bad governance. In raising the shortcomings of a country’s governance, external agencies are calling into question its government’s performance” (Landell-Mills and Serageldin, 1991: 13).

Nevertheless, looking back at the pre-Good Governance discourse, a number of other preceding events also played a role in preparing the ground for the trend. It might be possible to trace it back to the post-enlightenment period due to modernity and Eurocentrism, or maybe further to the pre-medieval period as far as the Greek and the Romans as discussed in the following chapter. However, the main periods for the advancement of Good Governance come mostly from the post-second World War atmosphere of the Cold War and the development of the Third World debate. In the following sections, the periods and events and factors that led to the emergence of the Good Governance fad are discussed briefly.

The genesis

A journey to the core philosophical foundation of ‘Good Governance’ as a concept is necessary to understand its comprehensive nature. The current liberal democratic values that shaped the contemporary notion of governance can be traced back specifically to two major events: the American Revolution, and more significantly the French Revolution. These two revolutions brought the idea of secularization and democratization of society as a final blow to the two great orders that used to dominate European and Western politics: the ‘clergy’ and ‘the Noble polities’. As an alternative, two new forces emerged to form part of the class of plural societies, the organized ‘labour’ and ‘organized capital’ along with weaker roles of the clergy and the nobility (Finer, 1997, 3: 1567).

These liberal democratic values also led to the emergence of a few other phenomena that contributed to shaping the landscape of modern politics and hence governance. Amongst them are:

(i) Constitutionalism

Constitutionalism comprises the idea of *restricting the powers of the government*, to confirm the idea of limitation of arbitrary rules and to guarantee individual freedoms. It is based on the core principles of liberalism, namely; *upholding the ideal of the rule of law*, by defining the rules on written law or codified documents known as constitution; and *treating the constitution as the supreme law* of the land; *without any exclusion upon the citizens in abiding them* (Finer, 1997, 3: 1571). This idea was enshrined in the Western world after the French ‘Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen’, and all other written constitutions that were to follow. Sartori (1962) describes the constitutions as “a frame of political society organized through and by the law for the purpose of restraining arbitrary power”.

(ii) Nationalism

The Westphalia Treaty was the foundation of the idea of nation state to flourish on European soil. However, it was French nationalism that provoked other countries to embrace nationalism as the basis of their existence. Spain, Prussia and German-Austria, Ireland, Italy, the Rhineland, Poland and the Balkans embraced liberalism hand in hand until c.1848, after which they found their paths veering towards Conservatism (Finer, 1997, 3: 1573). Nationalism has in fact created the driving factor towards economic survival and the struggle to protect the interest of the countries within their borders, which in the later period resulted in the emergence of radical ideas such as Fascism and Nazism.

(iii) Bureaucracy

The late nineteenth century witnessed a new wave of reforms of public administration. The pre-modern bureaucracies which were known as “personal, traditional, diffuse, ascriptive and particularistic” were replaced by modern bureaucracies which exemplified by Weber as “impersonal, rational, specific, achievement-oriented and universalistic” (Hughes, 2003: 19). The reforms started in the UK after the 1854 Northcote–Trevelyan Report which criticized the patronage nature of the public offices. The report proposed merit-based appointments through examinations, leading to non-partisan and neutral administration.⁶ The Report recommended an act of parliament, creating a Board of Public Administration (which later became the Civil Service Commission in 1870). The report became a landmark document in the development of European bureaucracy and the guideline for UK public management agenda for 70 years (Lynn Jr., 2006: 69).

The reforms in the UK later influenced opinion in the United States. The assassination of President Garfield by a disappointed civil servant job-seeker as a result of the corrupted system in the civil service sector led to the 1883 Civil Service Reform Act (the Pendleton Act) (Gladden, 1972: 318). The Act contained four key points:

- a The selection of civil servants’ positions must be through examinations;
- b Appointments should only be made from the highest-grade achievers in the examination;

24 A framework of governance

- c The imposition of an effective probationary period before absolute appointment;
- d The apportionment of appointments in Washington according to the population of several states and other major areas.

The model was inspired by the ideas of Woodrow Wilson, who strongly believed in the view that politicians should be responsible for making policy, while the administration would be responsible for carrying it out. In Europe Max Weber formulated the theory of bureaucracy, the idea of distinct, professional public service, recruited and appointed by merit and the idea of political neutrality of public servants was the major icon of the reforms. From these two figures, the notion that administration could be technically and instrumentally removed from the political sphere was derived. Later, Frederick Taylor's theory of scientific management was adopted by many for the public sector (Hughes, 2003: 20). This traditional model of Public Administration, later known as the 'bureaucracy' model, became the leading trend in the public services, especially in the Western world.

(iv) Civil society

The modern idea of civil society emerged in the eighteenth century, influenced by political theorists; the genesis of the concept was believed to be traced back to Adam Ferguson (1723–1816) in his *Essay on the History of Civil Society* (1767 [1980]) and Thomas Paine (1737–1809) in his *Dissertations on the First Principles of Government* (Paine: 1975). Ferguson (1980) suggests that the development of a 'commercial state' is a means of bringing change to the corrupt feudal order and strengthening individual liberty. Paine (1795) suggests that the institution of civil society is to bring about an equalization of powers that shall be parallel to, and a guarantee of, the equality of rights. However, neither Ferguson nor Paine drew a clear distinction between the state and society. It was George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), who made the distinction in his *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* (1821). Furthermore, Hegel used the term "bürgerliche Gesellschaft" (now referred to as *Zivilgesellschaft*) in German to emphasize a more inclusive community (Pelczynski, 1984: 183).

(v) Human rights

The Second World War left scars on the body of universal humanity and world peace. The United Nations Organization was then set up to establish a new world order in accordance with the principle upon which the war had been fought. The response by the international community to the atrocities committed by the Nazis created a landmark for international peace and the human rights issue (Donnelly, 2003: 136). The UN according to Article 1 of its charter was established with its major purpose being:

To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting

and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

This article hence leads to Article 55, which indicates that the UN shall promote “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion”. In order to obtain such goals, Article 68 required the Economic and Social Council to set up commissions for the promotion of human rights.

Thus, on this basis the Council established the Human Rights Commission (1945) that was to draft the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1946 as approved by the General Assembly. After a series of meetings and discussions by the Commission, the declaration was finally adopted by the United Nations General Assembly by Resolution 217 (III) on 10 December 1948 at Palais de Chaillot, Paris. However, the Declaration has no binding power and was not intended to impose a legal obligation on states, but as a mere declaration of principles for which the states were expected to strive. The chair of the Commission, Mrs Eleanor Roosevelt stated “it was first and foremost a declaration of the basic principles to serve as a common standard for all nations” (Robertson and Merrills, 1996: 28).

Development in the further stages of the Declaration have been closely related to the preservation of human rights and freedoms and no longer measured through economic growth alone. During the late 1950s and early 1960s the world witnessed the earlier UN-related ideas such as decolonization, localization and human rights sweeping over the global political events under the banner of democracy and development. Political and economic discourses predominantly overshadowed all the mantras concerning the two aforesaid principles; hence they moulded the trend of the domestic policies of many countries as well as the foreign policies of the developed countries, specifically the non-Communist countries in interfering with the ‘Third World’ or underdeveloped nations. During the Cold War, the newly independent countries were still against the ideas of ‘new political economy’, ‘social capital’ and ‘public goods’, which were debated in the developed countries (Weiss, 2000: 798).

These new ideas were viewed by some as threats to the newly-emerged and weak countries, especially towards their economic and social choices. They remained closed to the international political and economic literature of the 1970s and 1980s that promoted public-choice theory, rent-seeking behaviour, directly unproductive profit-seeking activities and the new institutional economics. It was at the end of this period that the snowball effect of non-democratic countries, mainly in Asia and Latin America, began to transform themselves into democratic nations. Since the overthrow of Portugal’s dictatorial regime in April 1974, the number of democracies in the world has multiplied dramatically (Diamond, 1992).

Before the start of this global trend toward democracy, there were roughly 40 countries that could be classified as more or less democratic. The number increased moderately through the late 1970s and early 1980s as a number of

states experienced transitions from authoritarian (predominantly military) to democratic rule. This phenomenon has been termed by Huntington (1992) as the ‘third wave of democracy’. He defines this “wave of democratization” simply as a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period (Huntington, 1992: 21–6).

This wave of transitions to democracy was motivated by certain global changes during the period, which can be summarized into five major trends:

- a the deepening legitimacy problems of authoritarian governments unable to cope with military defeat and economic failure;
- b the burgeoning economies of many countries, which have raised living standards, levels of education and urbanization, while also raising civic expectations and the ability to express them;
- c changes in religious institutions that have made them more prone to oppose governmental authoritarianism than defend the status quo;
- d the push to promote human rights and democracy by external factors such as non-governmental organizations and the European Community; and
- e the ‘snowballing’ or demonstration effects, enhanced by new international communications, of democratization in other countries (Huntington, 1992).

Reflecting on the emergence of the concept of Good Governance

On the other hand, Weiss (2000: 796) argues that the emergence of governance at national level is rooted in a disgruntlement with the state-dominated models of economic and social development throughout the socialist bloc and the Third World at this period (between the 1950s and the 1970s). Consequently, the growing dissatisfaction amongst international relations students towards the dominating theories of the realist and liberal-institutionalism in the 1970s and the 1980s has lead to the emergence of the ‘global governance’ phenomenon at the international level.

Accordingly, the aforesaid event coincided with the practitioners and scholars of development critiques on the failure of reforms in many countries to bring development to the people at the end of the 1980s (Ngaire, 1999: 39), which led them to the discovery, by the early 1990s, that it was ‘bad governance’ that contributed to those failures. The renewed interest in institutions for the social scientists during that period coincided with this finding. Subsequently, the concern for the institutions has become the topic of discussions amongst economists and experts (Mearsheimer, 1995; Keohane, 1995).

Subsequent to these events, the post Cold War phenomena, which witnessed universal interest in democracy and democratization, prepared the ground for scholars and practitioners to suggest a panacea from the liberal democratic value formulae essential for effective reforms (Diamond, 1992). The notion of ‘Good

'Governance' then was formulated not only by having effective reforms, but the complete package of democratic participation and accountability. The combination of all these factors prepared a "background for a whole new literature and set of prescriptions about Good Governance" (Ngaire, 1999: 40). The notion of Good Governance entails placing the state and society at the service of the market, under the presumption that economic growth under a liberal democratic environment alone will deliver development.

The broader understanding of this notion implies the idea of strengthening the institutional capacity of the state through the enhancement of autonomy, efficiency, rationality and training, but with its minimized role in the market and civil society (Landell-Mills, Serageldin, 1991). Under this new concept, the 'governance' process evolved into a wider concept that included the institutions, the market and society in steering the state. The new phenomena have driven researchers to produce new political and sociological literature about conditions and institutions needed to represent and mediate the vast and competing array of interests in any society. Simultaneously, the international institutions, namely the international aid agencies modelled their own useful indicators of Good Governance as part of their reform package to be implemented by the recipient countries (Ngaire, 1999: 40). The indicators are based on certain factors they believe to be the benchmark for Good Governance: participation, accountability, transparency and fairness (World Bank, 1992; UNDP, 1993).

In unison, during the 1980s the import-substitution industrialization strategy (ISI) advocating for government interventions in the market to promote large-scale modern industries gave way to a new paradigm referred to as the Washington Consensus⁷ (Mehmet, 1995: 125–6). This approach identified the market as a universally efficient mechanism to allocate scarce resources and promote economic growth. Under its influence, the Bretton Woods international financial institutions, particularly the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, actively encouraged governments to dismantle market control as the 'standard' reform package for crisis-wrecked developing countries (Williamson, 1989). According to the Washington Consensus, Good Governance exists essentially as the political administration of economic policies: the deregulation of exchange, trade and price systems, and the preferential treatment of individual and corporate investors, while eliminating governmental involvement in credit allocation (Hayami, 2003; Rodrik, 2006).

The consensus had an enormous impact on the discourse of globalization and became the beacon for development, profoundly influencing the drastic reformation movements in the area of public service. New Public Management (NPM) was a new institutional economics movement during the 1990s, which generated a set of administrative reform doctrines built on ideas of *contestability*, *user choice and transparency* and close concentration on *incentive structures* (McLaughlin *et al.*, 2002). These doctrines appeared as a new kind of revolution to the field, debunking the traditional military bureaucratic ideas of 'good administration', which strongly adhered to the idea of orderly hierarchies and elimination of duplication or overlap (Hood, 1991: 6; Lynn, 2003: 14; Pollitt and

Bouckaert, 2004: 8–10). NPM is derived from two major ideas: (a) the ‘public policy’ schools developed in the 1970s, which became famous in the 1980s; and (b) the ‘managerialist’ movement around the globe. This model offers a new approach calling for the public sector to be run within the framework of the private sector’s model of business and market-driven value for efficiency.⁸

The collapse of the Soviet Empire is considered by many as the beginning of the new era, and by some as the end of history. Fukuyama (1992) declared that liberalism won and would rule the earth to establish a new dawn of human civilization. These ideas led to other events that eventually brought about the emergence of the Good Governance theory. It was the World Bank’s 1989 report on the underdevelopment of Sub-Saharan Africa as a result of bad governance which first sparked the term that later became *fad du jour* to many, as previously mentioned in this chapter. After the World Bank’s introduction of the narrative of Good Governance, the world began to witness the concept and its relationship to political conditionality has been largely embraced by other international organizations such as the United Nations and other international aid agencies (Burnell, 1994: 485).

The World Bank’s proposal of the Good Governance agenda was a summary of concepts and principles formulated as a result of the events discussed⁹ with the underlying idea that bad governance is increasingly regarded as one of the root causes of underdevelopment, corruption and other evils in societies. The proposal is closely related to processes of democratization, where the primary aim is to intensify the quality of democracy as a prescription to development and modernity for the Third World and developing countries. In promoting the reform, international agencies utilize a triple strategy: (a) Strengthening independent judiciaries and effective legislatures to curb and counterbalance executive powers; (b) Empowering and expanding the capacity of civic society by nurturing grassroots organizations, advocacy NGOs, and the news media; (c) Financing the democratic mechanisms to establish competitive, free and fair elections and other forms of participation in governance processes (Kaufmann, 2003).

With such grand designs, the international agencies and donor countries legitimize their interference in the internal affairs of the beneficiary countries (Weiss, 2000). However, the degree of interference varies from one institution or agency to another, according to their agenda. The agenda of those institutions and agencies could be seen from the characteristics of ‘good’ being given to their notion of governance. The proposal as a concept keeps evolving and changes from one institution to another, but the focal discourse maintains the same philosophical foundation and aims.

Good Governance as a concept

Tracing back the proceedings that led to the surfacing of ‘Good Governance’ as a substantive concept or reform agenda, we may possibly conclude that ‘development’ was the concern and the major aspiration of its early initiators. Additionally, Good Governance materialized on the World Bank’s agenda as one of

the themes of the Bank's 1991 Annual Development Economic Conference (World Bank, 1992b). In its report, the Bank associates the attainment of development with Good Governance proviso. Furthermore, the Bank conceptualized 'Good Governance' to indicate the manner in which power and authority are exercised to prepare a conducive environment for development "in the management of a country's economic and social resources" (World Bank, 1992a: 1).

This conception of 'Good Governance' became extensively discussed and debated after the above-mentioned report. Other international institutions such as UNDP, USAID, OECD, which deal with the similar development issues, afterwards redefined the term according to their particular aim, aspiration, outline and policies. According to them, the realm of Good Governance is not only confined to the reform of the government that governs, but also includes other entities such as public policies, institutions, civil societies, system of economic relationships, or a role for the non-governmental sector in the business of the state. In sum, Good Governance, thus, expresses approval not only for a type of government (usually democracy) and it relates political values (i.e. human rights) but also for certain kinds of additional components (Smith, 2007: 4).

United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), for example, in their mission to assist the developing countries, define 'Good Governance' as: "The process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented (or not implemented)".¹⁰ Here, the concept of the decision-making process implies the importance of the democratic process that should be adopted by developing countries as development in those countries was normally impeded by the autocratic nature of the governments. UNESCAP's approach in crystallizing the Good Governance concept is to restructure the nature and mechanism of the decision-making process in those countries to engulf non-state actors to ensure efficiency and democracy. Conceivably, Graham *et al.*'s (2003: 5) proposition on the citizen's function in the decision-making practice in the governance process is closer to UNESCAP's by saying: "Mode or model of governance that leads to social, environmental and economic result sought by *citizens*".

Correspondingly, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) explains the nature of citizens' empowerment in the decision-making process in their characterization of 'Good Governance' as:

The exercise of economic, political, and administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels. Governance is a *neutral* concept comprising the mechanisms, processes, relationships and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their rights and obligations and mediate their differences.

(UNDP and Governance, 1997)

This definition implies that Good Governance is seen as a far-reaching way of steering the state through the empowerment and power dissemination progression.

Despite its emphasis on the significant role in governing, UNDP also includes other elements of power that will contribute towards Good Governance. As can be seen in further arguments, the neutrality of the state or government is crucial in order to avoid the enforcement of ‘one way of governance’, which they believe will decrease the role of non-state actors in development.

Analogously, OECD has presented a more specific picture of Good Governance by taking into account the objective to be achieved and issues to be embarked upon in the course of the idea of governance. Governance according to them is “management of government in a manner that is essentially free of abuse and corruption, and with due regard for the rule of law” and characterized by participation, transparency, accountability, rule of law, effectiveness, equity, etc. This definition encompasses the role of public authorities in establishing the milieu in which other elements of governance function and determine the distribution of benefits (OECD, 1995: 14). Similar to the new realm promoted by the World Bank, OECD was also inclined towards broadening the horizon of governance by including all non-state actors in the process of development.

The Governance Working Group of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences has also highlighted the issue of non-state actors involvement in development as part of ‘Good Governance’ (GWG IIAS, 1996) in their assertion that: “[Good] Governance refers to the process whereby elements in society wield power and authority, and influence and exact policies and decisions concerning public life, and economic and social development”. This definition suggests that Good Governance involves active interaction between the formal institutions of the government and those of civil society. The interaction will encourage citizen’s participation in order to generate the social, economic and financial policies that drive the state economy for the benefit of its citizens (Weiss, 2000: 797; Kakabadse *et al.*, 2004: 230). This definition and other similar descriptions of Good Governance mention the elements of preserving the citizen’s or majority interest and the way of steering (the what and how) remain as its major pillar.

Apart from Good Governance, another expanded normative framework for international development initiatives under the UN umbrella was introduced under the name Millennium Development Goals (MDG) as a product of the post-Cold War period. The MDG formed part of an innovative international approach to international affairs firmly grounded in the concept of ‘liberalism’ as fundamental to peace and economics. This approach, which is derived from the Western experience proposes that political and economic liberalization would be effective antidotes to poverty and underdevelopment, under the tutelage of the rich countries and in particular a new United Nations revitalized after the disappearance of the Soviet Union. Thus, promotion of human rights, democracy, elections, constitutionalism, rule of law, property rights, Good Governance and neo-liberal economics have become part and parcel of the international Good Governance project as well as the basis for a rapid surge in social and economic affairs (Bendana, 2004).

However, as described earlier, Good Governance, as a prevailing concept in the current debate on development, occupies the main theme in this research. Despite its general framework described above, the details of what constitutes 'Good Governance' are yet to be referred to. Due to the variety of parties that promote the concept, the characteristics of Good Governance differ from one proponent to another, with few similarities and goals. Those variations of Good Governance features, which narrow the term into the discourse of development according to the international financial institutions, are discussed in the following section.

Features of Good Governance

Leftwich (1993) identifies three strands to Good Governance: systemic, political and administrative. The systemic use of governance implies that the process exceeds the normal understanding of 'government' which includes the "distribution of both internal and external political and economic power". The political use of governance means, "a state enjoying both legitimacy and authority, derived from a democratic mandate", while the administrative use refers to "an efficient, open accountable and audited public service". Hence, based on these strands the means to achieve 'Good Governance' are formulated. Similarly, the characteristics of Good Governance must be developed based on the objectives agreed by the stakeholders (Bovaird and Loffer, 2003: 10).

For instance, the World Bank in its earliest prominent 1992 document on Good Governance entitled '*Governance and Development*' identifies the distinctive features of Good Governance as: "Efficient public sector management, accountability, legal framework for development and information, and transparency" (Moore, 1993: 24). While a degree of similarity can also be found in the European Union white paper on Good Governance, which recommends 'European Governance' as a system that bears five major characteristics: openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence (White Paper on European Governance, 2001). The same qualities with some additions were also agreed by the participants of the first World Conference on Governance in Manila in the 'Manila Declaration on Governance' in 1999 which defines 'Good Governance' as: "a system that is transparent, accountable, just, fair, democratic, participatory and responsive" (Manila Declaration on Governance, 1999).

The evolving nature of globalization and practice of governance drove the World Bank to develop further concepts of Good Governance in the 1990s. Through the World Bank Institute and the Research Department of the World Bank led by Daniel Kaufmann and Art Kraay, they developed the 'World Governance Indicator' (WGI) in 1996. Based on the data provided by 30 prominent institutions involved in issues related to governance, the indicator is applied as a barometer to evaluate the governance performance of more than 200 countries all over the world (Kaufmann *et al.*, 2008: 16). However, in their study released in May 2005, the World Bank presented the latest update of its aggregate governance indicators for 2004 for 209 countries and territories, designed to

measure the following six dimensions of ‘good’ governance: voice and accountability, political stability and non-violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption (Kaufmann *et al.*, 2005). The WGI evaluates the governance performance of those countries from these six major dimensions, or characteristics. Those countries with high scores in the afore-mentioned areas are considered well governed, while those with poor scores are considered badly governed countries.

Comparably, the United Nation Development Programme (UNDP) as an agency within the United Nations (UN) responsible for the development of developing countries also established their own characteristics for Good Governance to be achieved by those countries. According to the UNDP document on the subject, ‘Good Governance’ is defined as any system in any country, which has all eight of the following characteristics: participation, consensus oriented (policies), accountability, transparency, responsiveness, effectiveness and efficiency, equitability and inclusiveness, and rule of law (UNDP and Governance, 1997). These elements are to be achieved through a reform package offered by the agency.

To conclude, the qualities and descriptions of ‘Good Governance’ discussed are aimed at attaining justice, avoiding dictatorship, ensuring the participation of people in policy making, eliminating corruption and administration misconducts, and upholding civil liberty. Its proponents consider Good Governance to be the major factor of economic growth, and thus development. Hence, with Good Governance, the aid given will be effectively utilized and fairly distributed for the benefit of the people (Nanda, 2006). Those elements by their nature are interrelated. The implementation of any single element with the absence of the others will not guarantee the efficiency of governance as believed in by the promoters of the Good Governance approach.

The aforesaid elements or characteristics could be accumulated as the Good Governance leitmotif, which aims to achieve the following principles (Van Dok, 1999: 13):

- i Conducive framework for the *private sector*;
- ii *Market economy* with stable, development-oriented economic and budgetary policies;
- iii *Rule of law* and *transparency* in all areas of the public sector and combating corruption;
- iv Competent, efficient and responsible government and administration committed to *accountability*;
- v Effective government and administration at regional and local levels through *empowerment*;
- vi *Democratic* political system and a pluralist society;
- vii Active *participation* of the people in political decision-making and development processes;
- viii Decisive role of *civil society*, especially non-governmental organizations (NGOs);

- ix Efficient national *education and health* care system;
- x *Freedom of the press* and independence of the media;
- xi Protection of *human rights*.

However, in summarizing the concept, Graham *et al.* (2003) summarise all these values in five major principles: The first principle is 'legitimacy and voice' that encompasses 'participation' and 'consensus orientation'. The second principle is 'direction' based on the value of 'strategic vision'. The third principle is 'performance', which includes the values of 'responsiveness' and 'effectiveness and efficiency'. The fourth principle is 'accountability', which is the basis of both 'accountability' and 'transparency'. The fifth principle is 'value', which encompasses 'equity' and 'rule of law'.

Conversely, due to the failure of some experiments of the Good Governance project in a number of countries, the concept started to evolve and expand. Furthermore, the concern over Good Governance by the promoters has also evolved within the two decades since its implementation. It was initially concerned with the improvement of political leadership of democracy and integrating economic and social goals through the non-state actors (with the banner of minimizing the state); then the second generation of Good Governance emphasized economic and social rights with a call to bring the state into action to reform economic and social development due to the failure of the market; and the current trend of Good Governance is moving towards emphasizing integration of economic and social welfare through well-governed society, which entails improvements in governmental institutions and sound development management (Weiss, 2000: 805).

These developments led to the new formulation of the notion of Good Governance by some experts. Mahbub ul Haq (1999), who was known for his statement that "the concept of Good Governance has failed to match the radicalism of human development", proposed 'humane governance', which comprises holistic reform in politics, economics and civic governance. This new concept emphasizes upholding and ensuring the concept of integration between good political governance and good economic governance through the empowerment of the people (self-organization) within the framework of good civic governance to serve basic human needs. This proposal inextricably links the principles of 'ownership', 'decency' and 'accountability' as its major components. Such ideas preceded the concerns regarding human development, human well-being and other human economic fields. However, it is still attached to the very similar philosophy and foundation of the initial Washington Consensus ideals.

Conclusion

The term governance, which technically connotes a wider perception than government, is both a very new and a very old subject in political studies. It is closely associated with political concepts like constitution, government, polity, politics, bureaucracy and many others. The most common usage of the term has been for

the description of decision-making processes and ensuing implementation, frequently being associated with state institutions and mechanisms. However, the contemporary development of the Western liberal democracies has engulfed the detailed knowledge of mechanisms and actors of governance into the realm of 'governance'. Furthermore, the expansion of developmentalism in the political economy and developmental discourse has widened the discourse of governance to encompass the field of economics, legal, social and private organizations; hence, 'reinventing' the new concepts of governance (Weiss, 2000: 795–6).

The former usage of governance denotes more the traditional state (and its political bodies and institutions) 'steering' concept of governance (the state-centric approach). Unlike the former, the new definition of governance is a modern concept that focuses on the role of society (society-centric) and its ability to governance by co-ordinating common interests and *self-steering* (positive approach) or to resist the regulations and impositions of the state (negative approach). This new approach to the notion of governance implies that state is only regarded as one of the many equal actors in society, together constituting *a network* regulating and co-ordinating policy sectors according to the preferences and interests of their members.

Within this paradigm, the discourse of 'Good Governance' as part of the continuity of the developmental progress emerged with certain aims and goals. The concept that was first introduced by the World Bank, and then followed by other international aid agencies and financial institutions kept expanding in response to the agenda prepared by the Washington Consensus (Hayami, 2003; Rodrik, 2006). The relatively new concept due to its dynamic nature opened the doors for the parties involved to encapsulate their own philosophy to develop a distinctive barometer of the concept based on the agenda they are moving towards achieving. Though most of the characteristics developed might vary from one institution to another, they share common principles, such as how power and authority are exercised; the management of a country's affairs; the relationships between rulers and those ruled; how conflict is resolved; how interests are articulated and rights exercised etc. (Weiss, 2000).

Finally, one can also conclude that despite the different interpretations of the term 'Good Governance' there are common elements agreed by many. The common elements can be attributed to four major themes: constitutional reform, political reform, administrative reform and public policy reform (Smith, 2007: xi) that works for administration, politics and economic development (Heiden, 2001). Based on these themes, the characteristics or the mechanisms of Good Governance are being developed and built to achieve the ultimate goal of governance, which is the development of countries with an efficient working environment. Despite contrasting terms and concepts, most of the concepts refer to the same philosophy and principles to achieve the same goal. However, the aspirational view of Good Governance is not free from its critics. Various parties have debated several issues related to the idea, including the motives of the institutions promoting it. The following chapter discusses some of the major criticisms against the idea of Good Governance.

Notes

- 1 Canadian Institute on Governance (www.iog.ca).
- 2 The new institutional economics also refers to introducing incentive structures (such as market competition) into public service provision. The bureaucracies' disaggregation and greater competition through contracting out and quasi-markets; and consumer choice are the things stressed by this new trend of economics (Barzelay, 2002: 15; Gray and Jenkins, 1995).
- 3 Governance International United Kingdom (www.govint.org).
- 4 Rhodes (2000) suggests that: "Good Governance marries the new public management to the advocacy of liberal democracy".
- 5 Such a notion has been clearly defined by the founder of the term in its modern usage – the World Bank – in its report which states that 'governance' refers to: "the exercise of political power to manage a nation's affairs" (World Bank, 1989: 60).
- 6 This method was said to originate from the ancient Chinese practice, which imposed examinations as a means for the selection of the administrative officials (Lynn Jr., 2006: 41).
- 7 The consensus promotes ten major principles, namely: Fiscal discipline; Concentration of public expenditure on public goods (including education, health, and infrastructure); Tax reform towards broadening the tax base with moderate to marginal tax rates; Interest rates to be determined and positive; Competitive exchange rates; Trade liberalization; Openness to foreign investment; Privatization of state enterprises; Deregulation or abolishment of regulations that impede entry to restrict competition, except for those justified on safety, environmental and consumer protection grounds, and prudential oversight of financial institutions; Legal security for property rights (Hayami, 2003).
- 8 However, this type of reform differed from country to country despite their managerially centric and non-administrative idea. Some countries rejected the 'small government' ideology, and most favoured it. However, they were unified by the perception that views centralized bureaucracy as problematic apart from the two other factors mentioned earlier. As an example, the UK has their 'Next Steps' reform, which is different from the New Zealand and Australian versions of contractualization. Canada has its '*La Relevé*'; the Irish are implementing their 'Irish Strategic Management Initiative'; the German have their 'Lean State' reform programme; the Scandinavians are known for their Scandinavian reforms (Matheson, 2003: 42); while in the USA two books managed to create a revolution in the field of public service during the 1990s. David Osborne and Ted Gaebler's best-selling '*Reinventing Government*' and Micheal Barzelay's '*Breaking through Bureaucracy*' strongly influenced Clinton's administration to come out with reforms towards effective public service. '*Reinventing Government*' proposed the universal 'steering not rowing' principles of governance, which suggested more participation, accountability and less state control type of public administration. They insist that the new proposed model be called 'entrepreneurial government' (1992: p. xix), which implies: 'using resources in new ways to maximise productivity and effectiveness'. Barzelay's book on the other hand, presented the new post-bureaucratic paradigm of public management, which provided the text for a new generation of reform-minded activists (Lynn Jr., 2006: 110). However, the former has had more influence than the latter.
- 9 World Bank presented 'Good Governance' in 1992 as part of the criteria for granting loans to developing countries. The proposal promotes reforms in the public sector with '*new public management*' along with the *theory of rational choice* and the *theory of public choice*, which they believe will lead to the efficiency of public services and the public sector in general. At this stage, 'governance' implies the exercise of authority through formal and informal traditions and institutions for the common good, thus encompassing: (1) the process of selecting, monitoring,

36 *A framework of governance*

and replacing governments; (2) the capacity to formulate and implement sound policies and deliver public services, and (3) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.

(Kaufmann, 2003)

10 www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/Ongoing/gg/governance.asp.

2 Deconstructing the concept of Good Governance

Big ideas, attempts at grasping the whole world in thought, are renowned for breeding discontent and raising future expectations. Big ideas are also well-known sources of fear and contempt among their proponents, who accuse them of oversimplified descriptions of the world, often suspecting them as well of serving as ideological alibis for power groups bent on dominating others.

John Keane, *Global Civil Society* (2005: ix)

The ‘Good Governance’ agenda introduced by international financial and aid institutions according to the Washington Consensus is a result of the conventional developmental theories, which represents the contemporary kernel of truth on how to develop from an Eurocentric perspective (Mehmet, 1995: 127). It was thus promoted within the spirit of the emergence of neo-liberal discourse during the 1990s as the major prerequisite of development according to its proponents. ‘Good Governance’ usually, therefore, refers to a political regime based on the model of liberal-democratic polity, which protects human and civil rights, combined with a non-corrupt and accountable public administration (Neumayer, 2003), and is expected to be the outcome of the economic and financial liberalization policies.

Despite its fervent promotion as the primary idea in determining the ideal way to develop with the objective of ensuring the well-being of the people, it also faced criticism from various parties for some of its shortcomings. Good Governance as a concept or agenda was exported from the developed Western countries to the ‘Third World’ after the World Bank’s Sub-Saharan Report in 1989, which is considered by some as the enforcement of a neo-liberalism idea on the world (Mehmet, 1995: 126). While some scrutinize it as neo-colonialism by developed countries (Pagden, 1995; Moore, 1996; Anghie, 2000), others believe it to be a part of a Western project to undermine the ‘other’ way of life (Rahnema, 1997: 384). On the other hand, many researchers launched their criticism of the concept from its technical failure based on the empirical results of its operation in Latin America, Africa and the Balkans (George and Sabelli, 1994: 142–61; CAFOD, 1998; Goldstein, 2000; Stewart, 2000; Harrigan and El-Said, 2009; Stiglitz, 2002).

Since this research does not focus on the technical issues in the operational and mechanistic matters of the concept, it aims only to establish the gap in its philosophical issues. Therefore the criticism considered in this chapter is less concerned with the empirical arguments, concentrating instead on deconstructing core subjects to show the foundation of the governance discourse. This chapter, consequently, is developed around three major criticisms of the conventional Good Governance proposal that relates to the core of the philosophical inquiries. The discussion on the liberal agenda within Good Governance, the Asian values proponents who oppose the Westernization of the governance discourse and the post-developmentalism hostility towards the 'developmental hegemony' of the developed countries upon the Third World advances as a launching pad for further investigation.

By deconstructing the line of arguments of the opposition, and the meta-structure of the concept, one can see that the most prevailing discourse on 'Good Governance' was that of modernity and Eurocentrism (Mehmet, 1995). These two predominant principles reflect the grand design of the concept in determining how the contemporary world's population should live. As part of the post-Enlightenment legacy, these two cardinal concepts are constantly developing along with the contexts and changes, to ensure that the West will always remain at the centre, and the peripheries will always remain as they are. Thus, modernity and Eurocentrism as the major framework for 'Good Governance' are discussed below and will be argued in detail regarding their implications for the underlying conception of governance with the objective of opening up its concept and assumptions so that a robust and logical attempt can be made later to construct it through Islamic episteme.

Amongst the prevailing criticisms of the Good Governance programme is that it is a neo-liberalisation agenda imposed by the developed Western countries on the others. The collapse of the Communist Bloc, the impact of the pro-democracy movements and the wave of democratic changes around the globe have been recognized as the leading motivations for this agenda. It has also been claimed that the promotion of structural adjustment and economic reform programmes in the Third World, and later in Eastern Europe towards capitalist economic formation and public policy from the late 1970s with the objective of enhancing efficiency, was part of the new liberalism influence (Leftwich, 1993: 608; Tetzlaff, 1995).

Following the trend of the period and due to the failure of developmentalist states caused by the debt crisis during the 1970s; and hence their failure to deliver political and economic development, the discourse of development, economic growth and modernization has shifted towards the new emerging trend of the neo-liberal agenda. Therefore, the Washington Consensus came as a new face of hegemonic power in the 1980s (Mehmet, 1995; Kothari, 2005) after it was adapted as part of the new global order. The Washington Consensus thus offered structural adjustment and economic reform and liberalization policies based on the liberal market economy framework to establish the initial base of the coming liberal world. After the collapse of Communism as an ideology,

Western liberalism declared its victory and was promulgated by some as the end of history (Fukuyama, 1992), hence the further domination of the Western neo-liberal agenda in the discourse of development with a Hegelian mindset.

The neo-liberal reforms mainly aimed at shrinking the role of state, corporatization and interference in others' sovereign economy in the name of the free market though global interconnectedness has convinced some experts that the idea of 'Good Governance' as part of the reform, is but a part of the Western agenda to convert the world to liberal domination (Moore, 1993; Burnell, 1994; Pagden, 1998; Jreisat, 2004). Furthermore, the liberal agenda under the banner of 'Good Governance' to be implemented by Third World countries could be seen in liberal elements as part of its reform package, such as neutralizing (or minimizing) the role of the state, encouraging and funding liberal democratic reforms in the electoral system, enhancing the discourse of human rights and individual liberties (through the freedom of media and politics), empowering of non-state actors (especially the civil society organizations and market actors), free trade and free market (capitalism) (Williams and Young, 1994). It was apparent that most of the aid given was poured into institutions involved in adhering to those liberal elements amid the minimization of the state role. In the same breath, Western political leaders frequently called for such reforms during the 1990s, promoting them as 'the new beginning' for the world (Leftwich, 2000: 118–19).

The 'Good Governance' agenda, as discussed in the previous chapter, during its initial phase technically imposes the limited state framework, which demands greater scope for competition and a free market economy leading to democratic reforms and hence the policy is considered as an essential tool for development. It was also believed that a market economy, within a democratic environment, which entails 'Good Governance', were the key factors of economic growth and prosperity (Leftwich, 1993: 605). This formula was promoted not only to serve the purpose of economic growth, but it was also believed to be crucial to maintaining peace and stability at both domestic and international levels (Weiss, 2000: 796–803). However, reality has proved that this ideal, widely promoted by international donors, is not a silver bullet to solve all problems. Critics of the concept succeeded in raising their concerns regarding some of its hidden dimensions and aspects, which had been overlooked by many.

In the same line of argument, some radical circles suggest that 'Good Governance' as promoted by the Western world was indeed part of the wider governance of the predominant 'New World Order' (Leftwich, 1993: 611). This would support Fukuyama's aforesaid thesis of the ultimate triumph of liberal democracy. However, the proponents of 'Good Governance' do not easily accept this allegation as they believe that the values promoted through the proposed reforms, especially by the IMF, World Bank and UNDP, are in fact universally-accepted norms and values by many (Graham *et al.*, 2003). Furthermore, it is those values that have brought development and economic growth to the developed countries, especially the US and Europe, in the last century.

Another primary issue is the perception of enforcement of the neo-liberal agenda on Third World countries through the human rights framework. Since

the World Bank's proposal for Sub-Saharan development through implementing the 'Good Governance' elements, the human rights issue has been recognized by most international aid donors as the benchmark for Good Governance, which justifies them pouring loans or 'donation' into any country (Smith, 2007: 48–9). The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) for instance, clearly states that its funding is only for those programmes designed to increase participation in development, to support and strengthen democratic institutions and civil society and support human rights (William and Youngs, 1994: 85).

Governance is not only perceived as an economic issue but also as a political agenda for democratization and, therefore, has always been associated with the protection of human rights by not only the donors, but by most of the developed countries' leaders (Williams and Young, 1994: 85). Shihata (1999: 329–30) insists that the World Bank through its Good Governance project has indirectly contributed towards the objective promotion of 'human rights', by ensuring the development that will benefit the people as a whole. Consequently, by uncompromising emphasis on human rights, Good Governance has been seen as a strategy to promote human rights and democracy by international agencies (Weiss, 2000: 795; Crawford, 1995; Axworthy, 2001).

According to the proponents of Good Governance, the preservation of human rights and the application of human rights laws, which are part of the leading liberal values, are essential for development (Ghai, 1994: 4; Sen, 1999; Donnelly, 1999). The promoters of Good Governance policies claim that all the liberal values that came with the reform agenda are universally acknowledged for the interest and well-being of the people. Democratic values based on liberty, respect for human rights, market economy, efficiency and other liberal values, which are strongly based on ideals such as individualism, secularism and positivism were, consequently, promoted as a prerequisite for the formation of better governance for the people (Graham *et al.*, 2003: 8).

However, having an introspective into the reality, these 'universally accepted' values should be viewed from their epistemological construct and from their priorities and suitability for implementation in underdeveloped or developing countries. Without taking into consideration the indigenous and cultural factors, those universal elements might be perceived as something foreign despite the positive result they might aim to achieve. Furthermore, the conditionality promoted under the banner of 'Good Governance' by international institutions, only deals with the institutional and mechanistic reforms and not the people's essentials of the recipient countries. The ignorance of the 'bread and butter' needs of the people, meant most of the reform imposed on those countries only resulted in 'social conflict' and social disparity (Mehmet, 1995; Alcantara, 1998; Rodrik, 2006). Such enforcement is viewed by some as a neo-colonialist project by the developed countries to spread their domination over others, which will be discussed in the following section.

Shihata (1991: 85) explains that the World Bank insists on governance with the objective of promoting fairness, justice, liberty, an independent judiciary,

respect for human rights, and an efficient and corruption-free bureaucracy, and by insisting that these were the basic requirements for a modern and efficient state. Despite such positive values and expectations attached to 'Good Governance' by the aid agencies, some researchers have taken a sceptical attitude toward the whole concept and policy. The pre-conditional loan from those agencies, namely by the World Bank, that comes with the 'Good Governance' reform has been viewed, mainly by critics, as part of the neo-colonialization enterprise (Tetzlaff, 1995: 20). Stiglitz (2002) states that the culture of 'conditionality' imposed by those agencies and institutions cultivates the 'feel of colonial ruler' in them.

George and Sabelli (1994: 142–61) point out that the concept of Good Governance has been created as a scapegoat for some parties to blame those who failed to fulfil what was required from them. The 'unfulfilled' conditionalities of Good Governance imposed by the World Bank and other international donor institutions to the borrowing countries will provide an option to blame them if things go wrong. It will be a 'blame-the-victim' situation. In the same vein some other critics perceive that the 'Good Governance' approach is but a subtle way for America to impose its hegemonic power upon the developing countries, specifically the African countries, thus resulting in neo-colonialism (Moore, 1996; Anghie, 2000).

Good Governance as a tool for neo-colonialization derived from the long-inherited 'colonialism mentality' was and is actually a mere continuation of Western colonialist policies. Pagden (1995) traces the roots of this mentality back to the age of Old Greece, where they divided the world into 'us' and 'them'. This can be traced back to Plato's complaint about the separation between the Hellenic races and other races, which they described as 'barbarian'. The Roman *Imperium* who believed in their lordship over the 'barbarians' later inherited this Hellenistic feeling of superiority.¹ This lordship could only be achieved if they managed to impose on them their way of life by living in the 'Civitas', which afterwards evolved to the notion of 'civilization'. The Christian Roman Empire then continued the status quo with some modifications by adding a religious flavour to it (Pagden, 1998, 2001, 2008; Parekh, 2006: 16–49).

Lordship attitudes then became the theme of the European colonialist in their colonization expeditions. Not only did the wealth of the colonized countries become the main motivation of the colonialist expedition, but the belief that they were the only nations with the superiority in understanding the laws of God and of nature over the 'primitive' people drove them to impose their cultures on the people of those colonized nations. 'The primitives' of the colonized lands according to the conquerors, were not only their servants, but had also to embrace the European lifestyle, European religion (Christianity), European dress and eating habits, European beliefs, European technologies, etc. (Pagden, 1998: 12–14). Furthermore, this attitude later evolved to Kant's idea of '*ius cosmopoliticum*' or the cosmopolitan rights. It was the original idea of universal laws and political order for all nations. The authority of this international rule of

law must be guarded by the nations themselves for which Kant proposed republican states (Kant, 1991: 102).

Kant's idea of this world order changed from one treatise to another as can be seen by the development of the idea itself. For example, in *The Idea for a Universal History* (1787) he describes the world order as a "united power and the law-governed decisions of a united will" (Kant, 1992: 47). While in his *On the Common Saying*, he articulated that "This may be true in theory, but it does not apply in practice" (1793). He proposes that the guardian of the world order must be an international society with legal powers. The same idea was proposed in his *Perpetual Peace* (1795). However, in his *The Metaphysics of Morals* (1797), he concludes that such an international world order can only be practised in a 'universal association of states that come to hold conclusively true condition of peace' (Kant, 1991: 156). This formula offers the image of a higher political order, which all societies must emulate as a model "in order to bring the legal constitution of mankind nearer to its greatest possible perfection" (Kant, 1991: 191).

This could be viewed as the background for universalism in international political affairs. Kant also believed that the practice of cosmopolitan rights is the key to harmony and happiness. This explains the genealogy of the aspirations, which the modern usage of the term 'governance' has come to describe. Pagden (1998: 14), therefore, argues that the World Bank's promotion of 'Good Governance' is but another "transvaluation of European or more generally Western imperial values" implying that they are just continuing the colonization crusades that have been pioneered by the Greeks, then the Romans, followed by the Christian Romans, and ultimately by the European conquerors during the centuries of colonization.

Based on a similar argument, the Good Governance agenda has been associated with the Western governments' agenda, specifically the United States, to influence world economics in their favour (Mehmet, 1995; Anghie, 2000). The World Bank was also implied to be working according to Western governments' favour (Preston, 1992: 10), which was the result of the strong influence of the 'development orthodoxy' from the wider development community of the Western world from governments, NGOs and academics. Similarly, the focus on governance by the World Bank was partly based upon the consensus adopted by those orthodox's that political considerations play a significant role in ensuring and determining development (Williams and Young, 1994: 88; Mehmet, 1995).

The World Bank's emphasis on human rights issues as part of the Good Governance project has also been viewed as part of a United States-oriented agenda, which has always had a tradition of focusing on human rights (according to their Universalist's definition) in its foreign policy (Lancaster, 1993: 13). Such reality fertilizes the strong thoughts that the World Bank, through its Good Governance project, is heavily influenced and moulded by the Western agenda, in particular the United States. Moreover, some extreme opponents of the so-called 'Western' version of 'Good Governance' claim that such sudden interest

amongst the West in trade reforms and concerns for human rights and democratic reforms are disguises and cynical ploys to destroy the competitive advantages of Asian countries (Robinson, 1996: 320). In response, they promote what is known as 'Asian Values'.

Responses to the Good Governance discourse from the periphery: the Asian values discourse

Amongst other criticism of the universalist approach, rationalizing the idea of governance carries the Western philosophy of liberal freedom which, one way or another, can be considered as the source of sexism, racism and imperialism (Mahathir, 1995a). It was a continual argument amongst the strong proponents of Asian values, namely the former Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dr Mahathir Mohammad, the former Prime Ministers of Singapore, Lee Kwan Yew and Goh Chok Tong, who loudly declared the incompatibility of 'Western' governance with Asian culture and tradition (Bonnett, 2004). Mahathir (1995a) who is known for his vocal criticism of the perceived social and political trends in the West, for example, has linked the vast and massive social problems in the West to the excessiveness of democracy. Western political institutions and unguided freedom in the Western world, according to Mahathir (1995b), are responsible for the uncured problems on Western soil. Western ideology has bred virulent forms of individualism and grasping materialism at the expense of positive community-oriented values and spiritual well-being, according to Mahathir.

In the same way, Tong and his predecessor, Lee Kwan Yew are proud of their country's (Singapore) economic development without adopting the Western style of governance. Lee Kwan Yew, for example, points out that through adherence to the ideals of Confucius, the Singaporeans managed to erect the monument of prosperity and glory of their country without having the political freedoms of the West. He is quoted as saying: "Singapore ... [is] a Confucian society, which places the interests of the community above those of the individual" (Lee Kwan Yew, 2000: 542). This idea was propagated as early as 1983 during the rule of Lee Kwan Yew, who was the then Prime Minister of Singapore, when the Institute of East Asian Philosophies (IEAP), which was sponsored by the ruling regime when PAP was first set up. The objective of the institute was to advance the understanding of Confucian philosophy so that it could be reinterpreted and adapted to the needs of present society (Lawson, 1995: 14).

Lee also asserts that the main difference between the Confucianism of the East Asian and Western liberal societies is the emphasis and the sacredness of the family. The state can never replace the role of the family by any means. Family values give the strength and influence to every individual in society to maintain the culture of thrift, hard work, filial piety, respect for elders and for scholarship and learning. These values, according to Lee Kwan Yew, are the major recipe for productive people and economic growth (Lee Kwan Yew, 2000: 545–6). This indeed refers to micro dynamics of Good Governance.

Goh (1994), on the other hand, argues that the right economic policies and the preservation of Asian Values are the major ingredients of the country's remarkable economic growth, rising standard of living, increased longevity, low urban crime rates and massive development. The element of community and nationhood, disciplined and hard-working people and strong moral values, family ties and traditional network are in fact the golden rules that constitute the Singapore version of Asian values according to Goh (1994). He asserts that all these values are related directly to 'Asian culture' which puts group interest 'above that of the individual' (Goh, 1994).² As for them, the Western political liberty and the idea of excessive freedom are not suitable and will diminish the Asian values that are the core principal of their success (Bonnett, 2004: 113–21).

It should be noted that Malaysia's version of 'Asian values' differs from its neighbour in not adopting the Confucianism values. Malaysia's multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious society requires a different treatment and approach. Racial harmony was addressed as the government's major priority in order to maintain the political and social fabric of the country. Any racial tension or conflict will hamper the development agenda and could be used as a pretext for preventing political freedoms. Hence, in the case of Malaysia, the emphasis is on the rights of the majority, i.e. Malays and the indigenous people (*Bumi-putera*) who will always have the priority in the country's agenda. Therefore, the argument was that the Western liberal idea of civil liberty is difficult to implement on Malaysian soil due to the different culture and social structure of both societies. However, the concept of Good Governance in Malaysia still refers primarily to transparency, accountability, the separation of powers, the end of corruption and social integration (Subramaniam, 2001).

The economic growth in Singapore and Malaysia, as well other Confucian Asian countries, namely the economic dragons (Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan) is used as evidence that the Western version of liberal democracy as found in 'Good Governance' is not necessary or a prerequisite for economic growth. This argument, however, needs to be clarified. Economic growth alone can never be an indicator for development. Those countries that might enjoy growth are not necessarily free from corruption, though it might not be as bad as in the underdeveloped or other developing countries.

Furthermore, feeding bellies has become important in the Asian system to maintain the autocratic regimes in power and to silence the people regarding the elimination of political rights. People were left without freedom, either to make their own choice or to enjoy political rights. Nevertheless, it is rather important to realize that people who do not have political rights cannot claim their economic rights either. Additionally, economic growth *per se* without freedom can never indicate the level of development. Sen (1999), in opposing the 'full-belly' thesis, maintains that freedom of the people, which encompasses political rights, freedom of expression, government accountability and the rights of women and the minorities are the yardsticks of real development, as these empower individuals.

In supporting the argument of the proponents of Asian values, Hofstede and Bond (1988) argue that Eastern cultures have their own uniqueness in shaping world civilization through their own approach, which is distinct from the Western approach. Therefore, in culturally contextualizing Good Governance, Subramaniam (2001: 75) suggests that the theme of Good Governance can be seen to assume significantly different roles, depending on the political and cultural dynamics operating in each particular context. These critics might have their basis in justifying the role of culture and religion in governance to a certain degree, but their blanket rejection of 'Western' values, specifically in the issue of governance, is rather vague and to some extent might sound rather stereotypical.

In replying to the opponents of Western values, Lewis (1995) maintains that social unrest in the birthplace of Western ideas and philosophies cannot be a justification for the rejection of those ideas. Social problems are not solely Western problems; they occur everywhere and in fact they are part of universal human problems. He asserts that other cultures can never replace Western culture and values. The method that was developed by the post-Enlightenment West was indeed the vanguard of the exploration of other civilizations and cultures, which hence made them popular. Indeed, as he argues, the world should thank the West instead.

Despite these different angles the supporters of Western liberalism advocating 'Western' democratic Good Governance, always come to the conclusion that Western democracy is still the best invention in human history. The proponents of Asian values or cultural relativists might not be justified when they purposefully manipulate culture to legitimize their autocratic regime and the practice of dictatorship (Case, 1994; Lawson, 1995: 5; Diamond, 2002) but the West has a lot to learn from good Asian values such as emphasis on family values, community-based governance, the respect of elders and leaders, etc. The reality of the destruction of values and ethics in the Western world is undeniable, but that can never be an excuse for not emulating the good aspects of the democratic values in accountability, transparency, rule of law and the empowerment of the citizens. Liberal values have indeed contributed a great deal to curbing dictators and despots in the Western world. Nobody can deny the fact that the idea of democracy and liberalism are derived from the ashes of the final blow to dictatorship and tyrannies (Lawson, 1995).

Anwar Ibrahim (1996), former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, proposed a middle path. As a contrast to the 'Asian Values' proposal that he claims is just an excuse by the autocratic leaders of Asian countries to justify their undemocratic governance, he suggests that the Asians need to acknowledge universal values without compromising their own Asian values. He suggests that despite the 'right to difference' some Western values were actually essential for the people regardless of their background (Abaza, 2002: 70). The need to learn from each other is the key concept to what he calls the 'Asian Renaissance'.

Anwar states in his book *The Asian Renaissance* (1996: 18–19) that:

Asians must be prepared to champion ideals which are universal, It is altogether shameful, if ingenious, to cite Asian values as an excuse for autocratic practices and denial of basic rights and civil liberties. To say that freedom is Western or un-Asian is to offend our own traditions as well as our forefathers who gave their lives in the struggle against tyranny and injustice

However, Anwar does draw the demarcation between his proposals for 'Asian Renaissance' with European values when it comes to the religious issue. He asserts that if the European Renaissance was the final declaration on the death of God and the burial of the church's role in private life, the Asian position is the opposite. Religion, therefore, plays a great role in shaping the Asian people, their lives and attitudes. Asian man, he claims 'at heart is *persona religiousus*'.

However, despite the debates, one should never neglect the vagueness of the so-called 'Asian Values' (Godement, 1997). To which Asians is the term 'autocratic leaders' referring? As the word Asian is mentioned, the Indians are also part of the Asian community; the Mongolians are undoubtedly part of the people who constitute the 'Asian' identity. Apart from them, the Malays in the Malay archipelagos, which comprise Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, Southern Thailand and Southern Philippines, are amongst those who by identity and genetically are Asians. The Indians, the Arabs, the Persians, the Ceylonese and the Ghurkhas are all Asians. Thus, the attempt to monopolize or to seclude Asian values only to the idea of Confucianism or any other 'ism' should not overlook those other cultures and values, which do not necessarily bear the same philosophy and principle (Sen, 1999: 234).

Moreover, Sen (1999: 234) claims that even Confucius allowed freedom of speech and the struggle against injustice. More than that, Confucius also did not recommend blind allegiance to the state. Sen also points out the example of the non-Confucius style of Asian values, which reflects non-authoritarian rulings such as those of Ashoka and Kautilya from India, and the Muslim Akbar, the Moghul.

In sum, what Sen and other critics of Asian values try to point out is that Asian values should never be an excuse for regimes and autocrats to legitimize their injustice. What Ibrahim (1996) stated might be true, that whatever values are registered in order to define one's cultural identity, they must not debunk the universal values which condemn dictatorship, injustice, oppression, racism, corruption and the curb of civil freedom. On the other hand, Chan (1997) suggests that the beauty of the variety of cultures and ethics should complement the preservation of human rights, and not repudiate it.

Deconstructing Good Governance: the post-developmentalism critiques

Amongst other critiques of Good Governance was the aim to be achieved from the proposed Good Governance projects, namely economic growth. Economic growth has been associated with development, since it is seen by modern

economies as an indicator of development itself. Amid different models and philosophies applied and developed in defining development, the most prevailing and dominant is the belief that the Third World should follow in the footsteps of the West.

Notions of progress and growth as indicators of (materialistic) development have been part of post-Enlightenment Western discourse. However, the contemporary notion of 'development' construed through the exemplified modernization lifestyle and national economic growth essentially emerged as a post-World War II phenomenon (Gordon and Sylvester, 2004: 9). Development during the Cold War was a pretext for Western liberal interference in Third World economic affairs and was seen as part of the crusade to save those countries from 'Communist subversion' (Enke, 1963: 11). Consequently, its aim to bring 'progress' to the Third World was an integral part of the struggle against the Soviet Union and international Communism (Gordon and Sylvester, 2004: 11).

In further delving into the philosophy of development, it can be stated that development started as a quest for 'modernity', and while the history of development is complex, the modernization project has consistently been at its core. Modernization, loosely defined, denotes "the process by which a society comes to be characterized by a belief in the rational and scientific control of man's physical and social environment and the application of technology to that end" (Mehmet, 1995). It is from this paradigm that the discourse of development (despite its universal appeal) if deconstructed would be seen as "a set of practices and beliefs that are part of the Western political and cultural imagination" (Rahnema, 1997). It presumes a universal and superior way of ordering society from the post-Enlightenment Western perspective, and that all societies are to advance toward a similar goal in their life due to the same worldview. Within this discourse, no local or indigenous cultures, economies, self-concepts, or ways of existing are valued and acknowledged, for the entire development project is premised on its subjects 'developing' into the Western modernity project, which negates other forms of rationalities by imposing its hegemonic social formation (Rahnema, 1997: 384).³

Similarly, according to this paradigm, poverty became the benchmark and the identity of the Third World, while 'development' and economic growth were to be imposed on them according to the 'Eurocentric' construction, which is based on the experience of Europe, as the only solution. Completing this scenario is the imposed 'universalist' belief that indicates the ultimate superiority of the modern post-Enlightenment Western culture, values and people, and their theories. This worldview has long been orchestrated by Western thinkers and scholars, resulting in the colonial era, and is now becoming another magic mantra under the neo-colonial banner of the right for the Western world through their institutions to intervene in politically weaker, poorer and darker countries. Hence, 'development' becomes the legal and political means, as well as the moral justification for interventions. In the same spirit, the development paradigm also originated within the context of collapsing colonial empires and a

global economy dominated by the United States. As a result, the US had a profound influence on the formation and operation as well as in the construction of the objectives and approaches of the Bretton Woods international financial institutions post-World War II. These institutions – mainly the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund – are at the centre of development theory and policy (Escobar, 1995: 12–14).

It is through these institutions that the economic experiments and development theories, amongst them the ‘Good Governance’ model, have been applied to the recipient countries. Development theories have run the gamut as sustainable development, micro-development, women-centred development, endogenous development, appropriate development, ‘basic needs’, and both state and market-led development, which are summarised in the term ‘Good Governance’. What began as economic growth to eradicate poverty evolved to include “enhancing participatory democratic processes”, “enlarging choices”, “affording the opportunity to develop to one’s fullest potential”, “participation in decisions affecting one’s life”, and affording the “means to carry out national development goals and promote economic growth, equity and national self-reliance” (Rahnema, 1997: 388–9).

Unfortunately, the sidelining of local cultural elements in the ‘Good Governance’ programmes imposed on Third World countries to achieve what is defined as ‘development’ has resulted in a decline in social welfare and an increase in other problems. Much empirical evidence suggests that the Washington Consensus reform through the Bretton Woods institution’s ‘Good Governance’ programme has not been a total success. Despite the focus on the eradication of poverty and development, the social and welfare implications of reform have been disappointing. Theory and evidence show that when these prescribed policies are implemented in Latin America, and the Middle East and North African (MENA) region, the outcome is often a drastic increase in poverty, unemployment and inequalities (George and Sabelli, 1994: 142–61; Goldstein, 2000; Stewart, 2000; Harrigan and El-Said, 2009; Stiglitz, 2002).

As for the post-developmentalists scholars, poverty and want are not entirely socially constructed, but there are concrete aspects leading to them (Kothari, 2005). They suggest that people existed and lived before the West came to their rescue, and they dealt with such issues through a variety of internal and locally-constructed mechanisms, even if those mechanisms were imperfect (Alatas, 1972). Unfortunately, the possible value and viability of such indigenous knowledge was not even considered as the Western concept of development was deployed. Likewise, many of the currently ‘underdeveloped’ regions of the world were, according to history, developing quite well before their cultures were crushed or shifted in entirely new directions by Western expansion since the sixteenth century (Alatas, 1972).

To discover the root of this paradigm, an exploration into the genuine and substantive meaning of modernity is essential; therefore the following sections provide a holistic understanding of modernity and its impact on the discourse of governance, and how it should be addressed and treated as a prerequisite to the core discussion in this research.

Critical analysis: Good Governance as part of the modernity project

The critiques discussed in the previous sections generally point to a similar root-cause that makes the Bretton Woods concept of ‘Good Governance’ a debatable issue. Most of the critics imply that the root of the problem is derived from the Eurocentric nature of the concept. The neo-liberal agenda, neo-colonialism, Western values and developmentalist domination all refer to one main source: the Western influence and dominance of the ideological, political and economic construction of the field in the discourse of development. Eurocentrism, according to many, is rooted strongly in the very realm of modernity.

Liberal values, as the core foundation of the ‘Good Governance’ reform agenda, are but another product of modernity, which was the greatest achievement of post-Enlightenment Europe. To understand the phenomenon of modernity, and its comprehensive disposition in relation to Good Governance, it is essential that modernity as a linear development project should be examined by making reference to its historical roots as well. Following on from the debate, responses to modernity as the foundation of Good Governance are also discussed. It is from this premise that this research is directed to promulgate an alternative means to conventional (modernity rooted) Good Governance.

The Medieval Dark Ages nightmare left scars in the minds of Europeans and the West in general. The deprivation of humanity under the banner of religion and monarchy was the major theme of the period of darkness. It was in such an atmosphere that the Church and the clerics as the religious authority determined the form of knowledge, which kept people ignorant and superstitious. The situation legitimized absolutist forms of power as exemplified by the European kingdoms and kings prior to the Enlightenment. Until the eruption of the French and American revolutions, the status quo remained. These revolutions, which spelled the end of absolutist rule, sought to construct a system of power, which was scientific and based on rational contract between the individual (who was then male and white), and his elected government. Subtle analysis, critical thinking and diversity of ideas were the major theme of thinkers from the period, which had a great impact on both political power and thinking and the lifestyle of the people.

The (nation) state in its modern form was revealed as the individuals’ representative to secure their interests, hopes and ambitions for a better future. However, the most pivotal idea of Enlightenment, in which modernization emerged as the focal point, is that reason and science have the ability to change and improve the nature and social condition of human being. This awakened the Western people from their dependency on metaphysics in the search for the well-being of life (Hamilton, 1992; Porter, 1990). This idea has become so powerful in the modern period and has been accepted by many as common sense. In tandem, science allowed humans to determine their life, control Nature instead of being controlled by it and to make it more productive to serve the purpose of their lives through the invention of machinery, which would

abolish drudgery, and free humans from illness and famine (Shanin, 1997) and thus declare the victory of utilitarianism. In this process, religion and superstition that were once heavily depended upon to face those calamities, were now being denied and cursed for their failure and irrationality.

Since then the post-Enlightenment occidental world has revealed itself to be the centricity of the future life of the human species. Enlightenment as a landmark of ‘modern’ civilization cannot only be defined as a period of time, but must also be understood as “a set of interconnected ideas, values, principles and facts which provide both an image of the natural and social world, and a way of thinking about it” (Hamilton, 1992: 21). In supporting this, post-Enlightenment transformation must not be read as a monolithic process, but should be viewed as a gradual process of change in the tradition of knowledge and thinking. The pre-eighteenth-century Western intellectuals, as an example, labelled the post-Enlightenment period the ‘Age of Reason’, before ‘reason’ was challenged and later intellects shifted to experience and sensitivity (empirical) then towards utilitarianism. Despite the diversity, the whole process of transformation as a ramification of the Enlightenment on Western soil led towards the generic term ‘modernity’ (Porter, 2001; Wegner, 1994). This modernity, which represents “Western civilization and culture”, was glorified as the model of absolute truth and value, hence the “universal model of progress and development” (Bennett, 2005: 25).

Marshal (1994: 7) explains the discourse of modernity as follows:

Modernity is associated with the release of the individual from the bonds of tradition, with the progressive differentiation of society, with the emergence of civil society, with social equality, with innovation and change. All of these accomplishments are associated with capitalism, industrialism, secularisation, urbanisation and rationalisation.

Equally, the idea of modernity can be summarized in a few specific central ideas as, ‘*reason or rationality*’ as a way of organizing knowledge (hence a modern man is a rational man); however, reason alone is not sufficient in defining truth and knowledge, hence ‘*empiricism*’ is the only way to determine the validity of any idea through empirical facts as a result of experiments and scientific explorations; thus ‘*scientific*’ knowledge is the only key to expanding all human knowledge which allows ‘*universalism*’ reason and science to produce general principles and laws to be applied to all situations; this will lead to ‘*progress*’ by improving the nature and social conditions of human beings through the application of science and reason towards their well-being and happiness and must preserve the principle of ‘*individualism*’ through the eradication of any domination of the authority upon individuals. In fact, it is the individuals who produce society through their thoughts and actions and individuals are the starting points for all knowledge and action.

In order to safeguard those principles, the ‘*Secularist*’ worldview must dominate the realm of knowledge and structures to replace traditional religious

authority, which manipulated and abused society during the pre-Enlightenment years; this entails '*toleration*' as the major theme of humanity and modern life enshrining the concept of '*uniformity of human nature*', which teaches the concept of equality amongst the human race according to their rights. However, all these concepts can only be implemented with the existence of a viable '*freedom*' in individuals' lives with the absence of any barriers to belief, trade, communication, social interaction, sexuality, ownership of property and voicing opinions and thoughts (Hamilton, 1992: 21–2; Porter, 2001).

Apart from the aforementioned elements, the extreme aspects of modernity imply that God has been declared dead (*Gott ist tot*) by the final blow of Enlightenment sciences. According to such views, the post-Enlightenment scientific method and the spread of the secularization of European society has killed the Christian God that was the centre of value and meaning in life for nearly 2,000 years (Von Der Luft, 1984: 263–76). Not only has the Church been prevented from interfering in the public sphere, but the metaphysical discourses such as revelation, the sacred and scriptures have been confined to private matters and often rejected in the name of modernity. Marx ([1843] 1970), who described religion as the opium of the people (*Die Religion ... ist das Opium des Volkes*) insisted "the abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is required for their real happiness". While in the post-Enlightenment-oriented knowledge, Augusta Comte (Giddens, 1974: 1) illustrates the negation of religion in his conclusion of the development of human thought. He explains that human thought passed through three stages: theological, metaphysical and then scientific (positive), which supposedly parallel the individual's intellectual development from childhood through adolescence and then adulthood.

This worldview can best be reflected by the Western epistemology of knowledge, which heavily emphasizes the rejection of Church, metaphysics and other 'irrational' hegemony with its strong foundation of secular objectivism, which was later declared as 'the' scientific method in the quest for knowledge (Hall, 1992: 312–13). Such development constitutes the liberal tradition in the conceptualization of anything related to worldly affairs by negating the presence of religion in the public sphere. However, the institutionalization of liberalism did not take place until the beginning of the twentieth century.

Such a paradigm promotes the meta-narratives or meta-theories that this Western worldview can explain the world. Modernization is presented as 'the rational' and 'the universal' social project to be achieved by the irrational, passive and 'non-modern' others. This meta-narrative or grand narrative (*grand récit*) was uttered loudly by the Enlightenment thinkers such as Diderot, Baron de Montesquieu, Baron d'Holbach, Voltaire, Burke, Adam Smith, Henry Kames, John Millar, Adam Ferguson (Hall, 1992: 312–13; Porter, 2001), and also by Hegel, Marx and Weber. Most of their writings depicted the others, mainly the 'Oriental', with bad images hence requiring the Western modernization project to 'civilize' them (Said, 1978; Roberts, 1985: 194–202; Mann, 1988: 10–15; Habti, 2006: 57).

Modernity as Eurocentrism

The term modernity has been synonymously associated with the West. To be modern is to be Western as perceived and propagated by many. The West is not constituted as a single solid entity; rather it operates at a number of levels, in a number of discourses, performing slightly different functions (Sayyid, 1997: 100). The term 'West', apart from being a definition for certain forms of socio-economic organizations such as developed, industrialized, urbanized capitalist, secular and modern, is also a discursive horizon centralized in European cultural practices and intrinsically involved with the identity of Europe. European cultures, lifestyles, systems and knowledge as the main image of the 'West' and 'modernity' has been put at the centre of human life in modern times (Roberts, 1985; Mann, 1988; Hall, 1992). This Eurocentrism, which represents Western civilization, reflects 'modernity' and 'emancipation' and in this manner, is the 'end' of world history.

Eurocentric modernism from the day of Spinoza to Descartes, Mill, Hegel, Marx and Darwin until Dewey also implies that science and technology with their positivism approach guarantee progress (Sayyid, 1997: 102–6; Bennet, 2005: 25). However, it was Hegel who hailed 'European experience' as the centrality of world civilization by declaring its 'universality' and 'ultimate reality' upon others. He stated, "As Europe presents on the whole, the centre and end of the old world, and is absolutely the West so Asia is absolutely the East" (Solomon, 1983: 99). Hegel, according to Habermas was the "first philosopher to develop a clear concept of modernity". As for such a 'worldview', Peter Singer states that Hegel was the main contributor for the universal intellectual and the political developments of the last 150 years (Singer, 1983: vii).

At the same time, Weber succeeded Hegel in glorifying Eurocentrism and associated it with modernity in continuity. Perhaps the most often-quoted remark from Weber's preface to *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (Weber, 2003 [1930]: 25) provides a clear paradigmatic picture of this blended Eurocentric with modernism:

A product of modern European civilization, studying any problem of universal history, is bound to ask himself to what combination of circumstances the fact should be attributed that in Western civilization only, cultural phenomena have appeared which ... lie in a line of development having a universal significance and value.

It should also be stated that Weber in his effort to glorify Western values as 'the' universal norm reiterates in many of his works that Western culture has been historically described as rationalistic. He affirms that Western scientific and technical adequacy and expediency lead to rational conduct and capitalist activities, in contrast with Oriental culture, which is 'despotic' and deficient in rational calculability and hence incompatible with modernity and modernization (Bendix, 1977). Habermas (1983: 157) describes it as follows:

Weber identifies in retrospect the ‘universal-historical problem’ on which he endeavored throughout his life to shed light; the question of why, outside of Europe, “Neither scientific nor artistic, nor political, nor economic development entered upon that path of rationalization peculiar to the Occident”.

Here, Eurocentrism as articulated by Weber presupposes a priori that ‘only’ the West, since the Enlightenment, has been able to produce the universal normative cultural phenomena from its own evolutionary direction (Dussel, 1996: 133). This worldview insists that the post-Enlightenment European experience through its history and civilization (the Enlightenment philosophy, Protestantism, French Revolution and Industrial Revolution) became the heart of Western constructs especially in the production of knowledge and social theories (Larbi, 2004: 176; Habti, 2006: 54). Modern European culture, civilization, philosophy and subjectivity hence became glorified as the abstractly human universal. Weber (2003 [1930]: 16–18) maintains that the cause of European modernity’s superiority was possible with certain determinations such as capitalist enterprise, capitalist calculus, organization of labour power, technico-scientific knowledge, systems of bureaucratized control, permanent military power, rationalization of existence at all levels.

The ‘Eurocentric’ in this manner shaped the humanist modernist discourse in creating the superiority of the ‘Self’ upon the ‘others’, thus determining the normative view of the ‘good’ of the ‘Self’ upon the ‘bad’ of the ‘others’ resulting in the paradigm of ‘centre-peripheral’ between the European nation and the others. This ‘Eurocentric’ paradigm as coined by the post-colonialist thinkers appeared to be ‘the’ determination of the world populations’ lifestyle for the modern period (Fanon, 2001 [1961]; Said, 1978; Einstadte, 2000).

Equally, modernity as a political and intellectual project, has a long tradition of dominating, excluding and misunderstanding the non-West. One comes to realize that the theorization of colonialism, which has failed to see the universal and the modern in the non-West gives importance to the theory of Eurocentrism incurring the mainstream theories of modernity and modernization.⁴ This stance seems to imply that modernization is not merely a structural transformation, but also a practice based on discursive formations, e.g. the cultural, scientific, economic and political superiority of the West. Western values and beliefs were imposed and forced onto the others, specifically the Third World as a means of saving them from underdevelopment and backwardness (Schech and Haggis, 2000: xii).⁵

Consequently, for the issue of governance, the Western model, which was the most appealing and the most successful model hitherto is strongly derived from and rooted in this ‘paradigm’. Fukuyama’s ending of the history for humankind supported such claims with the assertion that Western liberal values have declared victory over the others (Fukuyama, 1992), hence neglecting some values and norms, which are considered as inadequate with the ‘universal’ barometer of modernity and development. Market economy along with its

components of individualism, property rights, liberty, pluralism and small states were part of fundamental factors in the liberal framework to ensure the workability of the market system. As part of Eurocentric modernity, the concepts mentioned in the previous chapter were believed to be the 'end' version of human economic development. This can clearly be seen through the reform agenda imposed and proposed to the underdeveloped and developing countries under the banner of the Washington Consensus-oriented Good Governance concept (Mehmet, 1997).⁶ The situation is described by the critics of the concept as the 'new-colonialism' agenda imposed by the liberal Western-dominated international institutions dealing with the issue of development and governance. In a more detailed prescription, Mazrui (2001) describes the situation as the 'hegemony of Eurocentric culture', characterized by the larger picture of economic stratification, military inequality, a disproportionate emphasis on European ideologies, the proliferation of Western-derived systems of education, consumerism and lifestyle.

Moreover, such hegemony was not new. Since the early developmentalist idea imposed by the West on the 'others', the global capitalist realm has brought a hierarchical dimension that separated the developed, which benefit from the others from the underdeveloped who serve them (Schech and Haggis, 2000: 13–15). This hierarchical relationship is the essential political and social vision of modernity in its conceptualization of the periphery. According to this the 'others' were expected to accept the values, not only by becoming modern, but also by embracing modernity as a project (Huntington, 1992: 285). This hierarchical nature of the relation creates a permanent demarcation between the developed Western countries as the centre and the 'others' at the peripheries. The implementation of Western developmentalist agenda (as well as the centrally-planned socialist economy as its rival) with its various forms (modernization, linear development theory, structural change theory and international dependency theory) in the non-modernity developing world failed to help these countries converge with the aspiration of Euro-centric modernity; instead they brought further dependency of the latter on the former (Schech and Haggis, 2000: 13–15) or in certain parts of the world alternative development agendas resulted in 'other modern'. It should be noted that the global debt crisis during the 1970s, which was the failure of previous attempts at development requires a new approach to bring the lower in the periphery to the centre through convergence.

However, a new trend emerged after the collapse of Communism – neo-liberalism, as described in the previous chapter. Accordingly, neo-liberalism emerged as the final version of the modernity project in the economic field culminating with the Washington Consensus, hence the 'Good Governance' agenda. Akin to the previous developmentalist projects, the Good Governance agenda continues rigorously to propagate neo-liberal structural adjustment reform to global societies, thus imposing Western-formulated reform agenda onto the 'others' through the empowerment of the market and shrinking the state (Schech and Haggis, 2000: 49–53). However, the emergence of Eastern

Asian countries to converge with the centre as mentioned earlier (Hofstede and Bond, 1988; Pierre and Peters, 2000: 181) opened many eyes to how the non-liberal approach would work well in replacing the failure of developmentalism. In responding to such situations, a fresh look into the other narratives is needed to formulate new methods of development beyond the framework of modernity and Eurocentricity. Consequently, the post-modernist approach appears as an antithesis to the whole modernity project. This approach became a trend among some critics of modernity as a useful tool by which to understand the nature of the aforesaid failure thus formulating a new alternative paradigm.

The developments in economies and policies of the developing countries in the twentieth century indicated that modernity's projection of convergence did not take place and the 'others' remained very much within their peripheral existence despite consuming modernity. The failure of the developmentalist agenda in the 1970s is a clear testimony to the failure of modernity as a project. This does not only imply a failure in the mechanistic nature of development, but also a clear failure in the aspirations and projections of modernity. Consequently, the trust in social sciences, which has been a product of modernity, has been eroded by claims that modernity as a project cannot be universal, and this eventually paved the way for the emergence of post-modernity as a reaction.

Deconstructing modernity

In exposing the dark side of modernity, post-modernist thinkers often resort to the deconstructive approach. Lyotard (1992: xiii) as an example, through his deconstruction of modernity as a concept, maintains that the meta-narratives or the modernity grand narratives failed to provide general agreement on the rules for settling disputes amongst multiple narratives. Modernity being a 'grand narrative' promised reason and enlightenment, but its adverse historical records spoiled it, namely the Holocaust, the corruptions of empires, mutually assured destruction, genocide etc. He ended his report on knowledge by waging war on modernism totality through the exploration and acknowledgement of the 'others', thus recognizing the differences (Lyotard, 1992: 82). Criticism of the modernism approach to knowledge also came from Vattimo who viewed human history as an ongoing process, which moves towards the perfection of the human ideal. Vattimo claims that history, which can be divided into phases and periods, has presented different modes of culture, civilization and development. History as a conception in this manner (which views itself as a progressive realization of humankind perfection) is required to be unilinear (Sayyid, 1997: 107–9).

While considering modernity as an 'incomplete' project, in the same manner, Habermas insists that the plural contemporary experience of modernity as the sole example of universal rationality should be its completion (Habermas, 1984). Giddens echoes Habermas by contending that capitalism and the nation-state, the two landmarks of modernity, originate from the West, hence are part of the larger 'Western project'. Ironically, he believes that the ramifications of

the contemporary worldwide globalization of modernity will contribute towards the new interdependent communities in the future history of the world (Giddens, 1990: 174–5).

Amongst the heavy criticism of the Western domination over the ‘others’ through the modernity agenda is the viewpoint that can obviously be seen through the work of Robert Young. Modernity, as pointed out by Young (1990: 19–20) is ‘European culture’s awareness that it is no longer the unquestioned and dominant centre of the world’, hence, the West is no longer the axiomatic centre of modernity’s meta-narratives. Both agree to acknowledge the role of the non-West or the rest in shaping the new reality of post-modernism. Sayyid (1997: 110) describes this kind of post-modernity as an effort in de-centring the West hence ‘weakening of the narratives that constructed Western identity’. Subsequently, de-centring the West is also equilibrium to the de-ipheralization of the rest and bringing it to the centre.

On the other hand, Foucault (Rabinow, 1984) in his critical analysis of social phenomena explains the relation between power and knowledge, and how the former is constructing the latter. Equally, although Said (1978) does not specifically categorize development as part of Orientalism, his reminder on the imperial nature of the Western worlds as part of ‘systemic discourse by which Europe was able to manage the Orient’ provides a useful point to deconstruct the nature of the modernity project represented by the developmentalist and the recent neo-liberal Good Governance agenda as another facet of domination by the former over the latter. According to these premises, development as part of the modernity project is thus interpreted as a particular vision and intervention, and as a regime of knowledge, truth and power to serve the benefit of those who determine the discourse. In the same breath, development as an agenda is also viewed as an ensemble of knowledge, interventions and narratives, which at the same time represents the power of the centre to sustain its hegemony over the peripheries (Curry, 2003; Crush, 1995; Mitchell, 2002; Power, 1998; Rahnema and Bawtree, 1997; Schech and Haggis, 2002).

Despite its severe challenge and destructive discourses on Eurocentric modernity, the post-modernity Achilles heel has been obviously noticed. While acknowledging the ‘others’ different epistemological references, the counter-discourse of post-modernity deconstructs the failure of the modern to acknowledge the worldviews and ontological elements in beliefs and values. Post-modernism attacks the meta-narrative resulting in the denial of truth and reality. What is left after the deconstruction of ideas is nothingness (Giddens, 1990: 46). This kind of epistemological relativity might serve the purpose of the positivist, in particular the Nihilists or the non-Absolutists. In such a situation, the denial and negation of revelation and faiths in which adherents hold on to their own truth and reality will never find justification, since the deconstructive method of post-modernism will leave them with nothingness and the neglect of their ontological ground. Moreover, the post modernity approach could still not bring about convergence in economic development, so as a result a linear development could not take place.

Despite its inability to contribute directly to the development discourse, post-modernists' analytical approach, such as Foucauldian critical assessment of the relation between knowledge and power, Derida's deconstructivism and Said's critical analysis of Orientalism, serve as useful social science approaches to explaining the social phenomena for the exploration of 'others' narratives and rationality beyond the Eurocentric world. Furthermore, beyond post-modernism is a world of multi-civilization, which offers a pluralistic sphere in which people will rediscover their traditions by shaping their own modes of knowing, being and doing due to the cognitive rationality. This will bring further recognition of the existence of 'other' social reality beyond the realm of Eurocentric modernity, such as Islamic civilization, India, China and other numerous cultures, which are part of this plural world (Inayatullah and Boxwell, 2003: 14). Such recognition requires a fresh look into the studies of culture to understand the different rationalities due to their narratives. Thus, the cultural relativity approach will be further explored to prepare a methodological ground for that purpose.

The cultural relativists' response

In the task of establishing the 'endogeneity', cultural relativism as another response to Western ethnocentrism created a different approach by giving a meaning and foundation to the other's values. The 'Cultural Relativists' believe that ethnocentrism may take obvious forms, in which one consciously believes that one's arts are the most beautiful, values the most virtuous and beliefs the most truthful. It can best be understood from the Benedictine-Herskovitz formulation that

what is right or good for one individual or society is not right or good for another, even if the situations are similar, meaning not merely that what is thought right or good by one is not thought right or good by another ... but that what is really right or good in one case is not so in another.

(Frankena, 1973)

Boas (1974 [1887]: 66) explains furthermore that: "the main object of ethnological collections should be the dissemination of the fact that civilization is not something absolute, but that it is relative, and that our ideas and conceptions are true only so far as our civilization goes". Boas and his students understood anthropology to be an historical, or human science, in that it involves subjects (anthropologists) studying other subjects (humans and their activities), rather than subjects studying objects (such as rocks or stars). Under such conditions, it is fairly obvious that scientific research may have political consequences, and the Boasians saw no conflict between their scientific attempts to understand other cultures, and the political implications of critiquing their own culture.

In the same vein, Gadamer generally stresses the dialogical exchange between reader and text, between the present and the past. Pantham cites Gadamer to

have stated that the human solidarity that is envisaged is not a global uniformity but unity in diversity, instead, everybody should learn to appreciate and tolerate pluralities, multiplicities and cultural differences. The idea of hegemony or unchallengeable power of any one single nation according to Gadamer is dangerous for humanity. It would go against human freedom. Alternatively, Gadamer proposes the concept of ‘unity in diversity’, and *not* uniformity or hegemony, which according to him is the heritage of Europe. This unity-in-diversity ideal should be embraced by the whole world, in which it should include Japan, China, India and also Muslim cultures. Essentially, according to Gadamer, every culture, every people have something distinctive to offer for the solidarity and welfare of humanity (Panthal, 1992: 132).

Dallmayr (1996: xiii) states that Gadamer has repeatedly envisioned a cultural diversity in the globalized *cosmopolis* of today and an encounter between the cultures of the West and the East and henceforth a dialogue. Globalization has greatly affected world cultures, and this was one of the concerns Heidegger was engrossed in for a long time. With the growing Westernization and acculturation, Gadamer set out on cross-cultural engagements and ‘fusion of horizons’ and engagement in discussing of the Self and Other (Dallmayr, 1996: xiv). Moral relativism as clarified by Kluckhohn (1944) did not mean the denial of absolute or universal moral standards hence justifying some savage tribe to behave in a certain way for the intellectual warrant given. On the contrary, Cultural Relativity according to Kluckhohn means that ‘the appropriateness of any positive or negative custom must be evaluated with regard to how this habit fits with other group habits’.

In replying to the cultural relativistic approach, Lawson (1997) solicits the needs for others to understand the universal value of Western ideology. While deconstructing the rejections and criticism of the cultural relativist of the Western style of governance, Lawson (1997) concludes that opponents subscribe to the idea of traditionalism. Traditionalism as an attitude emerges at the point where the preservation of a particular social or political practice becomes a matter of political concern, often for an instrumental reason. Culture then becomes an excuse and scapegoat to maintain the status quo of the elite on the political stage with its strong attachment to the people’s hearts. The autocratic nature of most Eastern cultures thus seems incompatible with the democratic nature of the proposed ‘Good Governance’ by the West (Lawson, 1997: 6).

Lawson (1997) warns that the cultural relativism approach that emphasizes the suitability of certain ideas with certain territory and boundaries will only create more diversion among the world’s population. The feeling of otherness between nations will breed racism as everybody will perceive whatever belongs to the other as a threat and will always be looked at suspiciously. Rejection by the cultural relativist is perceived by Lawson as a post-Cold War reaction, and but a phenomena of Occidentalism, which in a way indirectly supports the conservative radical ideas of the clash of civilizations. While defending the liberal thoughts (of the West) as being a consistent advocate of appreciation and

toleration, Lawson (1997: 10) implies indirectly that Western liberalism is still the ideal solution for the world.

However, such blank prejudice towards the relativist is rather baseless. Eck (1993: 194) explains that the assumption put on relativism as a total denial of fixed right or wrong was against the true ideal of relativism itself; she maintains that: “a thoughtful relativist is able to point out the many ways in which our cognitive and moral understandings are relative to our historical, cultural and ideological contexts”. It is from such an understanding that a thoughtful relativist is a ‘close cousin’ of the pluralist and someone who is able to ‘relate’ to and engage with people of other communities and show how absolutism can give rise to bigotry and oppressive dogma (Henzell-Thomas, 2002: 15).

While on the other hand, looking into the role of cultures and other non-Western values, it appears that the acknowledgement does not necessarily imply the relativistic nature of them, but rather the recognition of the relativity of their epistemology. Kantian cognitive rationality best describes the acceptance of epistemologies. The diversity of cultures however, must not be accepted if any culture goes beyond the universal values or natural laws that can be agreed upon and which abide by common sense. In accordance with this view, the German ethnographer Gastav E. Kleman’s definition of culture as ‘civilization’ best describes its true meaning. However, it was Taylor who enshrined this type of culture in the opening line of his *Primitive Culture*: “Culture is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morality, law, customs, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society” (Taylor, 1999). In this definition, cultural relativism helps in understanding non-Western civilization, by constructing the alternative paradigms in the field of development under its new form of ‘Good Governance’.

Additionally, the incorporation or activation of cultural elements represented by endogenous values and norms would reflect the hegemony of Western developmental discourse, which is described by Escobar (1995) as a “top-down, ethnocentric and technocratic approach, which treated people and cultures as abstract concepts, statistical figures to be moved up and down in the charts of ‘progress’”. With culture being considered and involved in bringing up the well-being instead of merely capital accumulation for materialistic wealth, the discourse of development will find its new appearance as a cultural process and not as a ‘system’ or universal applicable technical interventions intended to deliver some ‘badly needed’ goods to a ‘target’ population. Governance, which aims for the ‘development’ or (in a more culturally friendly jargon) the people’s well-being, becomes a more individual-driven change derived from certain significant patterns of behavioural norms accumulated by the cognitive rationality of the people, instead of an imposed or enforced agenda from outside.

This new alternative discourse of (cultural-inspired) development will emerge as a non-destructive force to culture under the name of people’s interest unlike the current prevailing ‘Eurocentric Good Governance’ (as coined by Escobar (1995: 44)). The recognition of such a paradigm will also eradicate the endless separation between the ‘developed’ West and the less-developed and inferior

‘Third World’, hence ending the inherent discrimination within the international system as described by Bhaba (1990). In fact, the perceived ‘less-developed’ is to be converged with the more ‘materially developed’, not with the domination of the latter over the former by any governance reform agenda or through certain financial institutional aid, but through the mutual strategic economic alliance and exchanging technologies based on mutual recognition and acknowledgement.⁷

In an effort to position culture within the discourse of development as a new reconstruction concept of governance, the colonial discourse of current governance must first be identified and replaced. The post-colonial approach of criticizing the colonial hegemony in discourses exemplifies another useful method. Accordingly, reconstruction of a new cultural-inspired discourse of governance from the ‘other’ perspective would surface through the post-colonialist argument.

Post-colonialists’ response

Post-colonial theorists are those diverse groups of thinkers or scholars who aim to deconstruct the legacy of colonial rule through critical engagement. Their efforts at destabilizing colonial rule, deal not with the political gamut aftermath *per se*, but with the economic, cultural, intellectual and the most intensive one, literacy (Ashcroft *et al.*, 1995: 2–3). The post-colonialists start by deconstructing the colonial idea and theories to reveal the meaning behind colonial discourses; then they emphasize the restructuring of theories and knowledge based on the discourse of endogeneity, which detaches its paradigm from the colonial meta-narrative (Williams and Chrisman, 1994: 7–8).

Amongst other criticisms by the post-colonialists of modernity were the uneven forces of cultural representation involved in the contest for political and social authority within the modern world order. They directed their challenge at normalizing the Western hegemony on the ideological discourses of modernity. This situation led many post-colonial writers to stress the importance of retrieving and/or constructing a culture, which offers a positive identity. Hence, formulating their critical revisions around issues of cultural difference, social authority, and political discrimination is another means of revealing the antagonistic and ambivalent moments within the ‘rationalizations’ of modernity (Bhabha, [1994] 2008: 265–6). In explaining such a stance, During (1987: 33) highlights “the need, in nations or groups which have been victims of imperialism, to achieve an identity uncontaminated by Universalist or Eurocentric concepts and images”.

In sum, the key concept in approaching the alternative discourse to Eurocentric knowledge within the method of post-colonialism is the acknowledgement of all civilizations as potential sources of social science theorizing (Alatas, 2001: 58). As such the rational post-colonialist approach paves the way for the establishment of the lost identity as the result of colonialism. It emerged to challenge the ‘modernist colonial ideology’ being imposed on them and presented an alternative solution from the ‘other’ point of view. This post-colonial discourse

then will promulgate endogenous intellectual creativity and an autonomous tradition of social science for decolonization and the indigenization of the social sciences. In this way alternative discourses constitute a revolt against ‘intellectual imperialism’ by purging Eurocentrism and thus “register a crucial break from the hegemony of a colonial past ...” (Alatas, 2001: 58).

Due to the nature of this approach, which emphasizes the issue of representation by revealing the colonized people’s experiences, large chunks of the studies were aimed at destabilizing a number of the binaries underlying the discourse of the West and the rest. Accordingly, this deconstruction method leads to the reconstruction of the colonized’s own development discourse in the ways canvassed by their own worldview and cognitive rationality, hence an alternative paradigm that will put the Enlightenment ideals of modernity into question (Schech and Haggis, 2000: 70). Similarly, in the field of political economy and the discourse of development, such an approach provides ‘alternative’ discourse on governance that will be directed as a counter or opposition to the current Eurocentric discourse on ‘Good Governance’. Thus, the exploration of ‘alternatives’ for the Western production of a universal code of ‘Good Governance’, which emphasized the ‘one cloth suits all’ approach, would be another critical assessment of the project of modernity.

Following the line of argument presented by the post-colonial theorists, it was the cultural sphere factor that shaped the relationship between the West (as the hegemony) and the others (as the colonized) (Schech and Haggis, 2000: 70). Thus, the element of culture must be taken into account in any study of governance (UNDP, 1994; Blunt, 1995; Dwivedi, 2001, 2002). Blunt (1995: 4) maintains that any definition of governance must be able to accommodate local variations. In the same way, the World Bank (1992) in its discussion on ‘Governance and Development’ illustrates the mutual needs of both the relative ideological and cultural neutrality of the general account and the ethnocentrism of certain features of the more detailed analysis of Good Governance.

However, any alternative cultural-based model of governance should not appear in a vacuum and reject the universal ‘good’ presented by the current discourse. Instead, a new relationship between the reality represented by the Western agenda and the alternative cultural paradigms should be constructed as a new hybrid model of governance. In developing such a new paradigm, a new approach of multiple modernities could be a suitable framework for the hybridity.

Since governance is also perceived and constructed socially, as opposed to the Universalist claim of modernity, different culturally expressed norms with their own ontologies and epistemologies are expected to lead their own construct of governance as a process regardless of the nature of the outcome. As Schumpetarian worldview considers that each vision should lead its own paradigm, it is natural that each culture should create its own governance construct with its own value system. This can be located within post-modernity, which accepts the logical expression of the ‘other’ forms as long as they have their own internal consistency. While the post-modern condition helps to acknowledge the existence of other constructs, the ‘other’ constructs’ failure to develop their own

paradigm results in not reaching the post-modern condition, but rather mimicking modernity in various modern forms leading to the emergence of multiple modernities.

Towards alternative approaches to governance

The appreciation of other civilizations and values would lead to a more mutual understanding within the world community. Furthermore, mutual acknowledgement and mutual respect alone would not be sufficient without the symbiosis process of these modernities. Epistemological humility is a vital prerequisite to enable people of different cultures to learn and mutually exchange values that share common interests, hence developing new universal values, which is no longer vernacular and ethnocentric. The discursive formation of respect, recognition and pluralism should be the theme of such a realm (Eisenstadt, 2000a: 20–1).

According to this rationale, further discussion on the topic will explore the realm of religion and faith as different versions of culture in defining the notion of ‘Good Governance’ from ‘others’ worldview. In the current trend of cultural studies, religion and faith from a phenomenological perspective gives the human race a ‘sacred canopy’ against the threat of the meaninglessness (*anomie*) of the world and accordingly will lead society to appreciate the innate precariousness of the *nomos* (meaningful order) (Berger, 1967: 28). In the same vein, Armstrong (2002) asserts that neglecting the influence of faith (which she calls ‘*mitos*’) in the contemporary life is indeed a great loss. She adds that the failure of incorporating the ‘*mitos*’ in real life will lead the *logos* community astray and to calamity. On the other hand, a great deal of empirical evidence indicates that religion and faith also play a pro-active role in the field of civil society, which is a major actor in the political and economic life of a country, as well its governance (Gaush-Pasha, 2005).

In responding to such needs, perhaps a new method of studying the role of culture and faiths in governance is necessary. A great deal could possibly be learned from Islamic values relating to the issue of governance that was the product of the worldview presented by its epistemological sources. The same scale should be applied similarly to the rich Confucianism-oriented Chinese culture and philosophy from the advice of Confucius and Mencius. In the same way, the Dharma-based Indian values articulated from the wisdom of Kautilya and Asoka regarding political and administrative affairs is another invaluable source to enhance the ideal. The same rationale should be applied to other cultures and faiths that have views concerning the matter of governance. In spite of this, the exploration and the articulation of those values must be conducted with cautiousness and according to universal values without neglecting any element of justice, fairness, freedom, liberty and human rights. The existing abuse of culture to justify the misconduct and undemocratic proceedings committed by certain regimes should not be taken as a good example of the ideal of incorporating culture and faiths in the field of governance.

On the other hand, regarding the empirical field, current reality proves that many indicators point towards the workability of the multiple modernities approach within the current modern framework of governance. Amongst others, the emergence of cultural and faith-oriented organizations and movements in the political, social and economical fields has created a substantial impact on the discourse of development in many developing and developed countries. Islamic relief and social organizations, as well as the emergence of Islamic political parties as part of the 'Islamism' phenomenon in Muslim countries globally, is an example of the enormous extent to which faiths can explicitly contribute towards the betterment of people's social-political condition as well as their economy.

The sporadic activities of the Evangelists in tackling the issues of hunger, famine and poverty in many underdeveloped countries and similarly the Church's mobilization in support of the anti-apartheid campaign and the Jubilee campaign for debt forgiveness were arguably other central themes to the visibility of faith-based organized contributions towards the process of governance. Similarly the active mobilization of Latin American Catholic churches in support of literacy is another example. While in another part of the globe, Ghandism, Buddhist Savordhaya, Buddhist Tzu Chi and other faith-inspired and faith-based organizations' involvements prove that religion is another facet of culture that could play a positive role in the governance process (Casanova, 1994: 3–10; Nasr, 1995; Piscatori and Eickelman, 1996; Bayat, 2007; Mandeville, 2001).

Multiple modernities

In modern times, philosophies, faiths and ideologies compete with each other to impose their definition of the perennial truth. Even if we look into the broader dimension, different societies with their own civilizational history and background are living with their *sui generis* culture and values, which they perceive as the definite 'way of life' according to their own ontology and epistemology. The past civilizations, which mostly emerged not on Western soil, (i.e. Indian, Chinese, Babylonian, Egyptian and Islamic civilization) contributed towards determining and shaping the culture of the Western predecessors. Transitions to what we know as modernity, took place in those civilizations long before the Europeans and the Americans, alas producing different results that reflect the current predecessors' divergent starting points. Furthermore, those cultures, ideologies, faiths and philosophies are also imposing their own 'meta-narratives' on those who adhere to their values. This is what is best described as 'multiple modernities' rather than the 'vernacular' modernity (Taylor, 1999; Eisenstadt, 2000a; Wittrock, 1998).

Taylor (1999: 162) maintains that different cultures' understandings of the person, social relations, states of mind, good and bad, virtues and vices, and the sacred and the profane are likely to be distinctly rooted in their previous experience of civilization. He asserts that:

The future of our world will be one in which all societies will undergo change, in institutions and outlook, and some of these changes may be parallel, but they will not converge, because new differences will emerge from the old. Thus, instead of speaking of modernity in the singular, we should speak of ‘alternative modernities’.

Within this idea, Westernization is no longer synonymous with modernity, and the Western version of modernity is not the only authentic face of modernity despite its historical precedence and the fact that it continues to be the basic reference point for the ‘others’ (Eisenstadt, 2000a: 3). The multiple-modernities approach could be an effective approach to bring the ‘other’ civilizations or cultures into the centre. Hence the centre will not be dominated by a single hegemony associated only with an ethnocentric interpretation of the term ‘modernity’. This reassessment of modernity and detaching the sole monopoly of a certain version of what is modern will acknowledge the role of ‘others’ in determining the trend of the world’s population.

The most prevailing idea of this new approach is the presumption that the contemporary world could best be understood as a story of continual constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural programmes. This ongoing reconstitution involves all actors contributing towards the emergence of all-encompassing new ‘meta-narratives’ instead of different competing narratives. Multiple institutions and ideological patterns are to be reconstructed by specific social actors in close connection with social, political and intellectual activists, and social movements in pursuing different programmes of modernity, holding every different view in what makes societies ‘modern’. Through the engagement of these actors with broader sectors of their respective societies, unique expressions of modernity are realized.

In conclusion, the multiple modernities project shifts the previous Eurocentric domination paradigm of modernity by emphasizing the inclusionary dynamic of ‘modernity’ and allowing the peripherals or ‘others’ to be borrowed and cross-fertilized into the existing ‘meta-narratives’. This paradigm challenges and diminishes the logic of exclusionary divergence, binary opposition or the clash of civilizations, which were the central discourse of Eurocentrism. Accordingly, Westernization is being detached from its synonym, the ‘modernity’ project. According to this, the Western patterns of modernity are not the only ‘authentic modernity’, despite their status quo as the historical precedence and the basic reference points for others (Asutay, 2009b).⁸

In the field of governance, multiple modernities can be best viewed from the way development (which is the main goal of governance) is perceived. The failure of convergence to the modernity project through the developmentalist agenda brought the modernist critics to re-evaluate the way people perceive the notion of ‘development’. As a result, each vernacular modern appearing in the world emerged from different foundations and paradigms, hence leading to multiple modernities. Post-developmentalist criticisms as discussed earlier were amongst the prevailing discourse of the anti-thesis. Similarly, the growth of

references to sustainable development in the 1970s and 1980s, were also part of an increasingly reflexive criticism of mainstream development assumptions and practices (Redclift, 1987). Additionally, as modernity has been reconceptualized as multiple (Sivramkrishnan and Agrawal, 2003) or, according to Eisenstadt *et al.* (2002: 22), as 'diverse yet related' modernities, the mainstream thinking about development and its geographies becomes more challenging and contested. The modern way to look into development is not solely considered as the product of the West alone.

It is according to this reasoning that a fresh look at alternative means to the existing 'Good Governance' agenda is but another attempt to raise the other version of modernity. In searching the rationale for different narratives for governance, the values and the sources of others provides the rationale. It is a fact that no human endeavour is value-free, which implies that reality is socially constructed (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). Despite the Eurocentric modernist projection of universal values, to dictate the everyday lives of individuals, reality proves that individual actions are produced and carried out in a socially constructed manner due to the particular worldview to which they subscribe, which explains the differences in each area of life (Asutay, 2007). In a similar manner, "economic systems ... do not function within a vacuum, but are significantly affected and shaped by a set of 'influential factors', mainly the worldview subscribed by the society" (Bornstein 1979: 7).

Within the framework of multiple-modernities, the alternative narratives for development are to be explored with a more useful conceptualization and to fit in with the new inclusive framework of modernity beyond the post-development critique (Pieterse, 2000) and post-modernist deconstructivism. This is similar to Curry's suggestion that post-development should go beyond critique to explore and emphasize alternatives. In his words:

one way forward for post-development is to begin to focus on the non-market economic relations associated with gift exchange and social embeddedness of economies. By emphasizing the social dimensions of economy, post-development strategies for alternative development would seek to identify and enhance opportunities for the inflection of market economic relationships and practices to align development efforts more closely with indigenous socio-cultural meanings of development.

(Curry, 2003: 420)

It is within this inclusive framework of multiple modernity that the exploration of alternative governance based on values, culture or religion as another narrative to fit into the existing 'Good Governance' agenda will find its justification. However, to bring religion into the public sphere in the post-modern period requires a different approach due to the pre-modern experience with the Church. In this way, religious values and ethos from their specific ontology and epistemology as part of the wider definition of culture will be the main discourse to be analysed. With culture becoming the major theme for the exploration, a

rigorous exploration of the relation between culture and religion, and the role of both in the process of development should be carried out.

Notes

- 1 Aristotle went a step further and equated Europe with freedom, independence, and the rule of law, and the non-Europeans with arbitrary, tyranny and slavish submission (Lewis, 1995: 64).
- 2 Asian Values, apart from Mahathir's, are strongly attributed to the Confucian Chinese values. Their main premise that makes them distinguishable from 'Western' values are constituted in the following points:
 - a The emphasis on family values. Family provides the model for the organization of authority and responsibility within the political system. Based on this principle, every individual has great respect for the leaders in the community.
 - b Interests of the community or the group take precedence over the vested interest of individuals. Thus individual rights and freedoms are secondary to the individual obligations towards the community.
 - c Political decision-making is based on the orientation of consensus rather than confrontation through a representative political system.
 - d Social cohesion and social harmony are priorities, which can be attained through moral principles and strong authority.
 - e Economic growth and development are associated with social cohesion and strong authority, and a right of every citizen and country. Hence, the state plays a critical role in the economy and not the market, unlike the Western liberal ideology. On the other hand, every individual will strive strongly as part of his or her contribution towards the state.

(Robison, 1996: 310–11; Hofstede and Bond, 1998: 8)

Based on these values, the Singaporean government concluded their Good Governance constitutes: 'Accountable and transparent government; Long-term orientation by the government in deciding policy options for its society; and social justice, which emphasises equality of opportunity regardless of race and religion but through fair competition or meritocracy'. All this is based on one overarching criteria: strong leadership! (Principle of Governance, Singapore government website, (www1.moe.edu.sg/ne/About_NE/Governance/governance_principles.htm)).

- 3 This will be elaborated further in the subsequent section on the issue of modernity.
- 4 It is worth noting that there is a discrepancy between the modernity approach in dealing with physical sciences and the discourse of political economic and development. While in the domain of physical and natural science, the theory of relativism manifests itself in scientific concepts, hypotheses, theories and even scientific laws. This method implies the abandonment of hard causality, adopting instead concepts of correlation and procedural definition and aspiring to a partial rather than a complete explanation of phenomena in avoiding the fallacy of simple causality. However, when it comes to the discourse of development, politics, economy and governance, the modern (materialist rationalist monist) scholars and thinkers remain the mainstream operative paradigm that underlies the outlook adopted by Bretton Woods and other neo-liberal institutions (el-Messiri, 2006: 59).
- 5 Alatas (1972, 11–12) claims that any blind imitation of this Eurocentrism imposed by others on their own soil and degrading their own culture and civilization is but another glimpse of a 'captive mentality' by the colonized-minded 'others'. The state of 'captive mentality' merely emulates everything from the West based on the Western paradigm in their life without taking into consideration its suitability to the different context and culture, without any attempt to criticize and challenge them. By doing so, the captive

mind will continue the intellectual domination by the colonialist which pervades all levels of scientific enterprise including problem solving, analysis, abstraction, generalization, conceptualization, description, explanation and interpretation. In this situation, the captive mind lacks creativity and the ability to raise original thoughts, continuously directing the ‘others’ minds which are regarded as less superior compared to the Western mind, alas imposing ‘Academic Imperialism’ by the West on the Western knowledge (Alatas, 2000).

- 6 As an example, Landell-Mills (1991) implies that the World Bank, as one of the promoters of the ‘Good Governance’ agenda only assists countries that succumb to the modernization agenda of the World Bank. Similarly, Williams and Youngs (1994: 94–6) point out that the World Bank also formulates the transformation levels for the developing and underdeveloped countries based on Mill’s liberal idea of liberty. The transformation levels consist of neutral state at the state level to ensure market economy through the liberal public sphere at social level, and liberal self and modern patterns of behaviour at the personal level. It was only through these transformations that the level of governance in any countries would be regarded as ‘good’.
- 7 But of course, as mentioned in prior paragraphs, the acknowledgement of cultural relativism is not a justification of any systematic and legalized human rights abuse and any undemocratic rule in the name of culture. The notion of justice, which is widely accepted by the international community and recognized by religions and cultures as Sen (1998) presented in his assertion of the central principle of freedom) must remain unabridged.
- 8 However, to bring the paradigm of multiple or multi-modernities is to challenge the domination of the existing Eurocentrism, which enjoys its supremacy in imposing its meta-narrative to the ‘other’. The pre-‘end of history’ period, where the ‘other’ version of modernity, namely Soviet Communism (Eisenstadt, 2000a: 11), despite its Western and post-Enlightenment origin, failed to cohere with the status quo. However, the collapse of Soviet Russia as the final frontier of Communist ideology left Western liberal democracy as the sole champion of modernity for the civilized world (Fukuyama, 1992). Accordingly, Huntington (1992) asserts that the emergence of another version of civilization, which creates multiple centres would invite a clash of civilizations after the collapse of Communism. Fukuyama (1992) in contrast, declares the final triumph of Western liberal values upon the other civilizations or modernity, hence echoing the Hegelian thesis of the end of history. Perhaps, despite the contrast between Huntington and Fukuyama, both of them with *animus* and *disdain* agreed on the superiority and the centrality of Western liberal civilization. Akin to other contemporary proponents of the predominant West, the other version of modernities, civilizations and cultures are seen as the enemy of the kernel truth of development and human civilization.

3 Religion and governance

A philosophical inquiry

I ascribe a basic importance to the phenomenon of language. To speak means to be in a position to use certain syntax, to grasp the morphology of this or that language, but it means above all to assume a culture, to support the weight of a civilization.

Franz Fanon

Under the modernity project, religion has been perceived as a dogma that is against ‘rational’ or ‘universal’ (liberal) values that is not welcomed in the public sphere, or more precisely in the political-economical fields. Such precepts are to be understood from the historical perspective of the failure of church-state domination over the people. Initially, since the decline of religious domination on Western soil, the constant struggle to eliminate religion as a whole from the public sphere became a norm in the major discourse of philosophers, scholars and most Western thinkers.

Despite the initial goal of those who waged this struggle to constrain and deprive the hegemony of religion in secular arts and sciences, and other ‘worldly’ realms, Kant brought this struggle to a new dimension with a compromising formulation. Through his transcendental idealism, ‘religion’ was acknowledged as the only means to engage lofty metaphysical issues, but inappropriate for all other matters. For everything save meta-physics, reason is both necessary and sufficient, and it is with this division of intellectual labour that Western modernity was founded. With this position taken by Kant, restricting religion to an important set of metaphysical concerns protects its privileges against state intrusion, but restricts its activity and influence to this specialized sphere (Lincoln, 2003).

The Kantian approach nevertheless is far from useful in explaining the current global trend of the return of religion in many ‘secular’ territories, and in setting up the foundation, which needs to be applied in this research. In reality, the contemporary return of religion goes beyond the ‘transcendental’ border and encroaches the area in which faiths were once totally banned. It is in conjunction with this phenomenon that the main thesis of this research is to be constructed. In determining a presupposition to present the focal idea of this

research, which is to introduce Islamic values as part of the contemporary governance discourse, the ground for such debate must initially be prepared. Through the employment of Taylor's multiple modernities approach, the following argument deals with such concerns. However, a philosophical introduction to how religion constructs an alternative solution for governance is essential.

Religion from the consequential and functional perspectives will lead society to appreciate the innate precariousness of the *nomos* (meaningful order) (Tipton, 1984: 282–4). Equally, from a phenomenological perspective, religion gives the human race a 'sacred canopy' against the threat of the meaninglessness (*anomie*) of the world (Berger, 1967: 28). However, the modern positivistic approach to the discourse of development and governance which devalues religion and other normative elements to stress the quantifiable aspects of human experience rather than the meaning will never be an efficient tool for the functionalist view of religion. The only choice is to shift towards more interpretative and consequentialist approaches, which seek to interpret human action and focus on understanding the meanings people give to their own actions and the consequence of those actions to the topic of study, which in this research is development and good governance. The emphasis hence is moved from mere observation and description (what is) to understanding (why and how) hence challenging the conventional value-free proposition of positivism (Thompson and Woodward, 2000: 52–3).

With regard to the 'why' and 'how' questions posed earlier, philosophy of ethics represents a useful tool to understand the significant nature of religion. For instance, the philosophy of ethics raises the question of goodness. This question results in many ethical theories which lead to different conclusions or answers to the question of 'What should one do?' or 'How should one live?' (i.e. Kantian ethics, Aristotelian ethics, Mill's utilitarianism, etc.). In the same line, it also examines moral claims, which underpin a society's core values and social norms. Akin to other ethical and moral theories, religion as another source of ethics and established doctrines provides substantial answers to those questions. By applying the typology of 'tradition' (according to the definition by Alasdair MacIntyre, 2007 [1981])¹), religion is to be understood as a conception of 'what good living is about', which is then expressed through social practices performed by believers. Within such concepts, we could conceptualise an early assumption of how religion (as a set of ethical propositions along with its theoretical structure) would fit into the discourse of development and governance.

Similar to the 'tradition' typology of religion, Lincoln's (2003: 5–7) deconstruction of religion brings another holistic view in explaining the nature of religion. In defining the concept, Lincoln attributes four domains of what he called polythetic and flexible, as the characteristics of religion:

- i It entails a transcendental discourse (from its claims to authority and truth);
- ii It imposes a set of practices with the goal of producing a proper world according to the religious discourses to which the practices are connected;

- iii It requires a community whose members construct their identity with reference to the religious discourse and its practices;
- iv It depends on institutions that regulate religious discourse, practices and community, reproducing them over time and modifying them as necessary, while asserting their eternal validity and transcendental value. Lincoln also implicitly constructed religion with a beyond-transcendental and more comprehensive framework. Such a definition also implies a maximalist type of religion unlike the Kantian (and other) minimalists.

Furthermore, religion as a form of ethical doctrine could profoundly act as an agent to attain the internal good in development through its doctrines on social cohesion, mutual co-operation and virtue-based community. Practically, the process of development is not an axiological neutral human activity, but like other activities, it is impregnated with values and ethics (Cortina, 2007). Apart from mainstream liberal economic ethics (i.e. efficiency, competitiveness, economic growth, human rights, etc.) there are also other culturally traditional ethics and religious ethics that are worth incorporating into the discourse. It is from this premise that the Aristotelian concept of *praxis* is worth employing to explain how ethics and tradition could encourage society to cooperate in the attainment of *telos* (internal good) and the same goes for religion.

By applying MacIntyre's Aristotelian insight into the role of tradition in human life, Cortina (2007: 5–6) concludes that traditional bonds can motivate the work of development in motivating society to attain the 'internal good' within certain ethical and moral frameworks through the cultivation of virtues by different social agents according to certain models facilitated by political, economical, and citizens' institutions based on specific philosophical foundation. With such framework, she claims that people are not means for other ends, but are valuable in themselves.

Following this line of argument, governance encompasses the discourse of politics, economics and public administration, and is thus value-loaded at its most elementary level and shaped by individual values derived from individual worldviews, as part of individual social construct. Since factors affecting worldviews differ, different worldviews exist leading to different 'systems' for different people (Asutay, 2007). Religion and faith are amongst the major determining factors that fundamentally construct worldviews. The meaning (*nomos*) that religion brings through its ontological dimension leads to the construction of distinguishing narratives to development through the governance process.

Accordingly, this distinctive religion-based framework represents the endogeneity of non-Western discourses on governance, hence creating narratives instead of the meta-narrative of the modernist projection of universal values. According to the previously mentioned multiple modernities framework, the acknowledgement of other worldviews allows religion to play a role in the creation of alternative means in the realm of governance. The following section explains the more significant role of religion in development as the aim of governance, through the explanation of how religion could be articulated in development, theoretically and empirically.

Articulation of religion in development

The concept of secularization has been amongst the major prevailing elements of modernity. Secularization can be understood as ways in which religions and faiths are unwelcome in the public sphere, which includes the realm of governance. Nevertheless, a closer scrutiny of the subject from the sociology of religion approach as well as anthropology and other approaches, might show that a certain degree of religion is being accepted beyond its Kantian metaphysical border within the modernity project. Similar to the approaches mentioned in looking into the response towards modernity, the subsequent arguments look into rationality and how religion still has the dynamism to exist and function in 'secular' territories including having an impact on development.

In explaining the way in which religion can find its place and function in the public sphere, Casanova (1994: 5–6) employs a sociological approach in proposing the concept of '*deprivatization*' of religion. He explains how secularization (as one of the landmarks of modernity) would allow religion and faith to enter its public sphere in a homeostatic way through the current global uprising of religions around the world.² As there is no monolithic way of explaining the nature of the relationship between secularization and religion, he insists that this new phenomenon is not a continuation of the decline of the established *caesaro-papist* church that has been rejected and declined after the final blow it received from the modernity project.

In the same way secularization, as a process of differentiation between various spheres (economic, social, political, religious, etc.) and the social and scientific spheres, progressively emancipated itself from the prism of religious institutions and norms. This differentiation process leads to the *deprivatization* of religion, where religion refuses to be relegated to the private sphere. At the same time, its claim to enter the public sphere left to it by the process of differentiation that is civil society, redefines the very boundaries of the differentiated spheres. Thus, civil society has been a field where the *deprivatization* of religion has found a way to escape from mere private territories into the supposedly 'secular' realm. Through this new space, religious institutions and organizations pose their repudiation to the status quo of positivism by bringing the interconnection of private and public morality, and by challenging the claims of moral spheres and renormativization of the public economic and political spheres (Casanova, 1994: 5–6).

From another sociological point of view, the *social norms* approach could also explain the consequence of religions as a set of values for social practices (Raz, 1999, 2003). This approach claims that values would be meaningless without shared social practices to sustain them (i.e. solidarity, freedom, taxation, mutual co-operation, caring, etc.). Values seen as 'irreducibly social good', are inherent in numerous social relationships such as family, trade unions, interest groups, religious communities, or those bound by a common history or language (Taylor, 1995). These social norms contribute a large degree of involvement towards development through civil society and social capital. This situation is

supported by the way faith-based or faith-inspired organizations and movements vigorously utilize the environment to articulate their ideals, hence good governance and development.

Similarly, the anthropologist Talal Asad (1993) rejects the traditional anthropological perception of religion as mere symbols that resemble a system of meanings.³ He maintains that religion needs coercion, through law and power, to make individuals act according to religious precepts; it also presents social embodiment and constitutive activities of the world, which implies the need for a set of practices to express the beliefs, as well as discipline (by institutional structures) to enforce them and a community of believers in which this discipline is exercised and enjoys their allegiance and serves as the base of their identity. Due to the needs of social and public spaces to exercise religious beliefs, he concludes that the religious world and the social world are inseparable, and interact in an interdependent and mutual manner. Akin to the previous argument, the recent global return of religion into the public sphere exemplifies this anthropological theory.

It is rather interesting to discover that even the founder of the liberal market economy, Adam Smith (1976: 189–814) also acknowledged the contribution of religion in the realm of the laissez-faire economy. In his *An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, Smith explains the role of established clergy towards the market-oriented economic development process through the ‘moral enforcement’ mechanism. The values of honesty and integrity as a determination of the veracity of business ethics are essential for the enhancement of business activities. He further advocated an ‘open market’ and ‘freedom of speech’ for all religious groups so that rational discussion about different religious beliefs and practices can create an environment of “good temper and moderation”, which is essential for sustained growth and development (Smith, 1976: 793–4). This indeed indicates that even at the beginning of political economy, religion and values were perceived to be important factors shaping individual choices and behaviour, which indeed came to an end with Marshalian revolution.

Similarly, Khan and Bashar (2008) deconstruct the functions of religion and present the way through which religion can contribute to development from several dimensions. For instance, Islamic ethics will affect productivity through certain personal traits of ethics, thrift, honesty and openness to people. Furthermore, the enhancement of economic growth and development by promoting a positive attitude toward honesty may increase levels of trust and reduce levels of corruption and criminal activities. Religious rituals, on the other hand, also play a significant role in economic activities by promoting in-group trust and cooperation that help overcome collective-action problems. In the meantime, religions also exert a positive impact on human capital by enhancing education levels through the encouragement of seeking knowledge to epitomize wisdom. All these motivations will accumulate the creation of ‘social capital’, which is essential to growth and development, hence good governance and vice versa (Marshall, 2005; Haynes, 2007).

By following this line of argument, it seems that religion acts substantively as a catalyst for the accumulation of 'social capital' and thereby growth, which is a widely-accepted norm in development literature (with different kinds of interpretations and definitions). Following the successive emphasis on physical capital, human capital and knowledge capital, researchers find adding 'social capital' to growth models as an explanatory variable enhances the explanatory powers of growth and development models in an indigenized manner (Khan and Bashar, 2008).

'Social capital' refers to social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness, which arises from connections between individuals in the same way as physical capital (accumulated by physical objects and human capital) and refers to the properties of individuals. In this way, social capital can be depicted closely to what some have called "civic virtue" (Putnam, 2000: 19). Collier (1998), on the other hand, in explaining how social capital can contribute towards overcoming the issue of poverty, characterizes social capital as the internal social and cultural coherence of society, the norms and values that govern interactions between people, and the institutions in which they are embedded. Social capital, hence, has a significant impact on economic advancement through social networking, which acquires positive externalities and facilitates joint action for mutual benefit outside the market.

Despite the externalities that it may produce (and has already produced in many cases), religion, as a motivation for social capital, works very well to enhance the role of civil society, participation, poverty and corruption eradication, education and accountability. The effects of religion on social capital and development can be seen in the contemporary empirical studies, which show how the current global uprising of religion contributes to the fields of political-economy and social sphere. Social capital is also able to generate public order through the production of good citizens who live in mutual cooperation, mutual assistance transcending conflicts and striving to establish social stability, which are vital in good governance (Coleman, 1990; Newton, 1997), as these lead to capacity development for economic development in communities.

Marshall (2005: 8–12), however, suggests that religion and faith can play a greater role in development beyond civil society and social capital parameters. In the paper 'Faith and Development: Rethinking Development Debates', she proposes that religion can give hope and meaning to the lives of millions of people through their teachings on core values which are essential to human relationships. This will balance the distribution of wealth through philanthropic missions of faith organizations to help poor communities. The paper also maintains that faith is another motivational factor for engagement towards development. This has been proven through the global Millennium Development Goal agenda throughout the world in developing educational sectors, dialogue and health issues. In terms of conflicts, faith organizations have also played a tremendous role in providing solutions, preventions and humanitarian support. Faith communities have also contributed immensely towards the recovery of many post-conflict and post-calamity situations. The post-December 2004 tsunami is a prevailing example.

Religion and governance: empirical cases from the periphery

There is considerable empirical evidence to show that faith, ethical and moral-based approaches can fit into the discourse of development (Marshall, 2005; Haynes, 2007). Amongst them are the studies done on the co-relation between the efficiency of the bureaucratic system and development with Confucius ethics in some East Asian countries (Frederickson, 2002; Harris, 1990). Despite its authoritarian approach, it is acknowledged that Confucian traditions have brought rapid growth to some of the countries (Frederickson, 2002; Harris, 1990; Dellios, 2005). Some argue that not only did the Western-rule-of-law based governance fail to manage complex social problems with laws and regulations but they also witnessed relentless calls for greater morality amongst their leaders.

Likewise, Roman Catholic social teachings, particularly those since *Populorum Progressio*, articulate a faith-based view of development in which the contributions of spiritual disciplines and of ethical action to a person's 'vocation to human fulfilment' are addressed alongside contributions made by markets, public policy, and poverty reduction (Reed, 2001: 21–30). Meanwhile in Central and Southern Latin America, further visions of development have arisen in the liberation theologies by some radical Catholic priests,⁴ who criticize structural injustice and call for greater religious engagement in political and economic institutions to ensure equitable development. Their cause and struggle aim to awaken the people to rise up against the causes of their poverty and deprivation, and recognize development as liberation through political education and conscientization. Many point out that these began with the publication of Gustavo Gutierrez's *Theology of Liberation*, and distinct liberation theologies have emerged in other major faiths accordingly (Gutiérrez, 1988; Rowland, 1999; Akhtar, 1991; Phongphit, 1988; Gillingham, 2005).

Religions and faiths also play a pro-active role in the field of civil society, particularly in the field of social capital, which is amongst the major factors in the political and economic life of a country, as well as its governance. The *Global Civil Society Report 2004/5* (p. 5) argues that

There is no way we can understand the logic, strategies and dynamics of civil society anywhere in the Third World unless we bring the transcendental dimension back into our analysis. Religious devotion is a fundamental motive for many social movements in the South, from Latin America to Africa and South Asia.

(See also Romero 2001: 475–90)

Political and social movements and advocacy campaigns have often drawn upon religious motivations and the support of religious leaders. For instance, the churches' mobilization in support of the anti-apartheid campaign and the Jubilee campaign for debt forgiveness was central to their political visibility.⁵ In this vein, the Catholic Church was also among the parties mobilized in support of literacy in Latin America (Casanova, 1994: 3–10; Mandeville, 2001).

The emergence of what is now known nowadays as global (non-violent) political Islamic movements in the Muslim world has to some extent contributed towards the democracy and good governance process. Their contribution can be clearly seen in the constant struggle against corruption and administrative misconduct of the mainly undemocratic regimes of Muslim states. It is becoming apparent in Muslim countries that parties with Islamic aspirations emerge as the voice of the people for reform and criticize the massive extent of corruption committed by the regimes that in many cases lead to poverty and the underdevelopment of most Muslim countries. Through the democratic activities of these religious movements, we can see how religion plays a role in the political life of the people (Nasr, 1995; Eickelman and Piscatori, 1996; an-Naim, 1999; el-Affendi, 2003) through constant struggle to produce a 'better society'.

Consequently, the activities and orientations of those movements manage to influence development on the soil they are on, which they operate to some extent. For the same reason, the Islamism phenomenon also has a significant impact on the social capital of the community in many Muslim nations. Their relentless struggle to provide welfare, charity and education to the people as part of their *modus operandi* benefits a large proportion of the community. The movements also rigorously manipulate the vacuum left by most of the Middle Eastern and North African states ruled by autocratic and corrupted regimes. Despite their initial aim, which is to spread their ideologies as well as for recruitment purposes and using the activities as the pretext, the movements have contributed massively toward tackling many social problems that the regimes have regularly overlooked (Bayat, 2007; Harrigan and El-Said, 2009).

In the field of socio-economic development, the active involvement of religion in governance can be seen through faith-based organizations' (FBO) activities. These organizations, whether local, national, or international, within the larger picture of civil society, are significant purveyors of education, service delivery and other non-market activities. Many of the efforts are driven out of their religious motivation and consciousness of their duty in spreading the values to which they adhere (Ferris, 2005). For example, the most popular and greatest efforts to be studied belonged to the Christian evangelical development agency, World Vision (Myers, 1999). In 2003, they had a cash budget of US\$819 million, and an effective budget of US\$1.25 billion due to in-kind contributions, which were later utilized for their evangelical work around the globe (World Vision, 2003).

Another good example is the Buddhist self-governance '*Savordhaya Shramadana*' Movement in Sri Lanka, which managed to mobilize its members to develop the underdeveloped rural and suburban areas in the country. Inspired by Ghandi,⁶ the movement, established by Dr A.T. Arayatne, provided people with educational means, health, communications and job opportunities, which enhanced the economy of the people⁷ (Zadek, 1993; Kumar 2003). Akin to those FBOs, the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), Islamic Relief, Catholic Relief Services, the Aga Khan Development Network and others also deliver significant resources hence contributing to the development of many countries

worldwide. According to the holistic contemporary technical definition of governance, these organizations effectively mobilized the third sector to cultivate development and eradicate poverty (Fukuyama, 2001; OECD, 1995; Ghaus-Pasha, 2005: 2; Ikekeonwu *et al.*, 2007).

This is what inspired the establishment of the World Faiths Development Dialogue in 1998 to become a platform for different religions and faiths and the multi-lateral development agencies of James Wolfensohn and Lord Carey, then Archbishop of Canterbury (Tyndale, 2003: 26). The World Bank's '*World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for the Poor*', also maintains that religious schools, institutions and organizations in many countries were referred to frequently as effective delivery mechanisms for the people. The report also highlights the importance of faith groups in providing services, emphasizing the importance of people's participation in planning and running them, as well as to make the services accessible to all levels of the community voluntarily (WFDD, 2003). It should also be mentioned that the World Bank's '*Faiths and Environment: World Bank Support 2000–5*' Report stresses that many positive engagements and the efficient role of faith organizations and institutions around the globe have contributed proportionately towards the preservation of the environment and sustainability of their countries with the support given by the World Bank (World Bank, 2006).

Despite the role they played, the discourse of development based on religious precepts was not well developed as a separate discipline of knowledge from the religions' unique ontological roots, but rather a mere response to certain circumstances and realities. In fact, evaluation of the existence of religions or faiths or culturally-inspired factors along with their paradigms were still viewed and evaluated using the conventional economic paradigm, without any appreciation of their own unique cultural cognitive paradigm. Furthermore, the variables used to evaluate the rationale of incorporating religion or culture into the current governance paradigm still represent considerable bias in favour of Euro-centric modernity values in examining the subject.

Notes

1 According to MacIntyre (2007 [1981]) in his 'After Virtue', the Enlightenment Project that negates traditional morality has failed. We are now left with the remnants of the traditional system that can sustain us. In the book, he also argues for the continued validity of the Aristotelian attempt to ground moral thinking in the virtues, those qualities which develop in us as we seek a vision of the good, striving in collaboration with others towards ends that disclose themselves more fully as we pursue them. He declares liberal individualism to be at odds with this tradition. MacIntyre was accused of being a relativist due to his in profound rejection of absolutist morality. In the prologue of the 2007 edition, MacIntyre suggests:

the best type of human life, that in which the virtues is most adequately embodied, is lived by those engaged in constructing and sustaining forms of community directed toward the shared achievement of those common goods without which the ultimate human good cannot be achieved.

2 Berger (1999) terms such a situation as the '*deseccularization*' of the world.

3 Here, Asad was replying to the traditional anthropological definition established by

Clifford Geertz (1973) that views a religion as (1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.

- 4 The Liberation theologies confirm that solidarity with the oppressed has become a religious practice. They believe that any discourse of good governance (such as democracy, human rights, the rule of law and the free market) is baseless when social and political relationships derive their authority from a basically unjust and exploitative social order (Kumar, 2003: 19).
- 5 The Jubilee 2000 campaign for the cancellation of the unpayable debt of the most highly indebted countries demonstrates the efficiency and how the strong influence of religious organizations could be when they are mobilized as a collective lobby. It also proves that religious actors can play active roles beyond the monasteries and ritual-spiritual issues, and can also act as purveyors of moral values that are important in bringing a fairer deal for a global egalitarian and holistic development agenda (Tyndale, 2003: 26).
- 6 Ghandian '*gram-seva*' (village service) ideal has been the basic philosophy for his notion of development. The idea reflects that service was fundamental to community uplift. According to Ghandi, development as part of the nature akin to life and time is cyclical. Development according to him is not a process of human endeavour but rather a process of life. 'Service' is thus to find a sense of satisfaction in service and not in its outcomes and targets. Service is to build a society based on compassion and respect where diverse cultures, religions and ethnicities could flourish together. This very ideal is derived from the cardinal principles of the Hindu worldview, '*Seva*' (service) which aims to create an interdependent and harmonious society based on sharing and caring. (Kumar, 2003: 16–17).
- 7 The famous slogan used to get its members to participate in the voluntary activities was "We build the road and the road builds us", see: www.sarvodaya.org/.

4 Ontological and epistemological sources for Islamic governance

If there were no question, there would be no scientific knowledge. Nothing proceeds from itself. Nothing is given. All is constructed.

Gaston Bachelard (1934)

Any quest to provide an alternative to the conventional conception of ‘Good Governance’ due to having been sourced from different ‘light’ must not only be represented as a process of presenting different pictures, or mechanisms with its own values and norms, but also must be preceded with different ontology and epistemology in formulating them. While in the field of governance, the creation of alternatives implies not only the materialization of new systems, but also a whole new structure of knowledge that reflects how reality is being perceived by different views from the existing paradigm. Hence, the alternatives in such structures represent a whole new branch of knowledge with its own epistemology. However, the quest for epistemology in any branch of knowledge can never be achieved without being preceded by a proper scrutinization of the ontological aspect, the exploration of which provides a bigger picture of the knowledge by representing the notion of the ‘reality’ of the world it represents.

The notion of reality in one’s mind is a socially constructed reality through the values of a particular worldview emanating from a particular ontology. This worldview later describes the notion of reality for its subscribers. In articulating the accurate meaning, function and importance of the worldview in a person’s life, an individual without a worldview is like “a man who has an abundance of furniture and is continuously moving it from house to house” that nothing is ever fully unpacked or put in its right place so proper use can be made of it (Shariati, n.d.). In the same meaning, to having a great deal of compartmentalized knowledge without a foundation of a definite worldview is akin to having all the materials needed to build a building but lacking a design as to what should be built. To simplify, worldview represents a paradigm that summarizes the comprehension that a person has about ‘being’ or ‘existing’. It explains the meaning of ‘knowing’ such as the meaning of life, society, ethics, beauty and ugliness, truth and falsity (Palmer, 1996: 114; Cobern, 1991; Vidal, 2008).

A worldview could be seen as an articulated perception of social reality in the idealism of Hegel; the dialectic materialism of Marx; the existentialism of Heidegger, Jaspers and Sartre; the absurdity of the futilism of Albert Camus and Beckett; the Taoism of Lao Tze; the ‘*karma*’ of Hinduism; the pain and *nibanna* or nirvana of Buddha; the *wibdat al-wujud* or unity of being of Hallaj; the pessimistic determinism of KhayyAm; Schopenhauer and Metternich, etc. Unlike modernity’s universal reality, the variety of worldviews reflects the ‘cognitive rationality’ that constructs humans’ way of thinking and perceiving the ‘world’ and ‘life’ they live within. In the same token, in supporting the differences of worldviews, Eaton (1990: 7–8) states that people’s perception and people’s interpretation of reality varies from one to another. Even the very obscure surrounding environment, which appears the same before everybody’s eyes, would have different meaning in one’s apprehension. Context, surrounding, beliefs, physical structures, norms, amongst others are involved in shaping the differences of the way people think and envisage, and hence the rejection of objective reality. According to such premise, the current assertion of Western modernity on its universality upon others in an attempt to impose it *ad infinitum* is no longer valid in the post-modern or multiplicity of the modern world as it assumes that there is only one fixed single view to determine the conduct of humankind and neglecting the multiplicity cognitive nature of the human mind (el-Messiri, 2006: 20).

Such a universalist view of modernity, however, reflects the cultural imperialistic nature of Eurocentric hegemony (self) upon the ‘others’ by imposing one symmetric geometric pattern of reality based on monism of reason, causality and absolute control rather than incomplete, asymmetric patterns that are more representing the plurality of human life. This neo-imperialism is also exemplified in the modernity framework that asserts only one single method from that single (world) view to explain reality. Such paradigm is based on the assumption that the centre of the universe exists within the modern Western materialistic ontology and not beyond it, while ‘others’ are expected to converge towards the Eurocentric ‘reality’ in order to be ‘accepted’. This indeed represents an inconsistency with reality, which comprises various cognitive paradigms and worldviews.

The term ontology is etymologically derived from a Greek word, *onto* which means ‘something that exists’, and *logos*, which means ‘logical knowledge’. Thus, literally, the term ontology refers to the knowledge of ‘reality or characteristics of something that might also exist in abstract terms’ (Runes, 1976: 219). However, interestingly this term was never used in ancient philosophy even during the time of the Greeks. It was first constructed by Lohard in his ‘*Liberdeadeptione*’ (1597) and ‘*Ogdoas Scholastica*’ (1607) as “the metaphysics, which considers all things in general, as far as they are existing and as far as they are of the highest general and principles without being supported by hypotheses based on the senses” (Øhrstrom *et al.*, 2005: 425). While technically, the term ontology is defined as “a branch of philosophy concerned with articulating the nature and structure of the world” (Wand and Weber, 1993: 220), and might

also briefly be defined as well as “a set of terms and their associated definitions intended to describe the world in question” (Uschold and King, 1995: 1). In the same meaning, it is also defined as “a theory concerning the kinds of entities and specifically the kinds of abstract entities that are to be admitted to a language system” (*Webster’s Third New International Dictionary*, 2002). In sum, the ontological question is about answering, “what is the form and nature of reality and, therefore, what is there that can be known about it”.

The ontological and epistemological questions concern what is commonly referred to as a person’s *Weltanschauung* or worldview. *Weltanschauung* could be defined as “a comprehensive view or philosophical conception of life, world and universe especially from a specific standpoint” (*The Concise Oxford Dictionary*, 1995: 1592; *Collins English Dictionary*, 1998: 1731), which is also best described as “a set of implicit and explicit assumptions about the origin of the universe and the nature of human life” (Chapra, 1992: 1). Different worldviews lead to different values and norms, simply because through one’s worldview he sees and explains the world and his place in it. As a building with its foundation, worldview serves as an essential base for man since the way he thinks, acts, behaves and his reflections towards everything are directly influenced by his worldview (Chapra, 1992), which, as argued later, justifies the Islamic governance through the Islamic worldview.

The modern Western Eurocentric realm developed their worldview based on an adverse experience of the pre-Enlightenment period. The Enlightenment was perceived as the rebirth of a new world, which rose from the ashes of the dark ages into a new ‘civilized’ future. The Churches, which represented religion and religious institutions, were blamed for the pre-Enlightenment state of darkness and the uncivilized world. The philosophers and thinkers during the Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment period hence formulated ‘science of man’ instead of depending on ‘God centred knowledge’ (Porter, 2001: 19). This new formulation directed the dominance of an empirical-scientific approach to knowledge (positivism), claims of individualism, negative freedom and instrumental rationality (Taylor, 1999: 156).¹ Eventually, ‘secularism’ had dominated all the domains in people’s life in the West. Any attempt to bring out God from church into the public domain was considered as taboo, uncivilized and a move towards the dark past.

It was the search of certainty and rationality that drove post-Enlightenment Europe to reject all metaphysical and religious dogma from the field of knowledge and reality. Uncertain divine laws were replaced with the certainty of the empirical results of the senses and observation. In the same token, divine providence was replaced by providential progress. No knowledge, under such worldview can be accepted as valid upon an unquestioned foundation if the sphere of reason is wholly unfettered because even the most firmly held notions can only be regarded as valid ‘in principle’ or ‘until further notice’, failing that, “they would relapse into dogma and separated from the sphere of reason, which determines the validity of any premises” (Giddens, 1990: 49). This worldview as claimed by the Western philosophers had dynamited obsolete religious myths

about man and his place under God, thus breaking with ‘*mythopoeia*’ thinking and advance “from myth to reason” (Porter, 2001: 19).

Such worldview connotes the unity of sciences and the mind’s ability to accumulate information and recreate reality in accordance with natural law, which reinforces the idea that only science can guide societies and rationalize them. With regard to the subject governance, a closer glare into the way development and growth (as the goals of good governance) are being defined by contemporary economists, we could identify the concept of nature-matter and materialist monism is derived from value-free positivism underlying its whole framework. Both development and growth is but a variation on the natural and economic structure, a one-dimensional entity that can be explained within the framework of the modern Western worldview of economics based on materialism and causal monism. Hence, both concepts are both quantified and measured in general materialistic terms and become an end to themselves, and not a means to achieve an end. In replacing the non-rational values, (materialistic) development itself as a manifestation of progress is considered as the ultimate value. With such a background, materialistic progress is becoming *ad infinitum* on the level of theory and *ad nauseam* on the level of practice (el-Messiri, 2006: 40–1), while the heterogeneous ‘other’ understanding including Islamic worldview perceive these through different means and value systems and norms through different paradigm. The rest of this chapter thus explores the Islamic worldview to establish the ontological foundations needed in attempting to construct a new paradigm of Islamic good governance through the ontological and epistemological construct of Islam.

Constructing the concept of Islamic governance: ontological and epistemological building blocks

After the brief introduction as part of the previous chapter, this chapter begins with the issue of ontology as a core fundamental principle for ‘Islamic’ alternative to current paradigm of governance. The discussion starts with the presentation of the ‘*tawhidic* reality’ as the *Haqq* (truth and reality) presents the very ontology of Islamic knowledge and the central principle, through which Muslims interpret reality and which is expounded in detail. The ontology then articulates to the reality through ‘epistemology’ derived from Islamic ontology, which constitutes the foundation of the new ‘Islamic’ theory of governance as the worldview of Islamic governance. The epistemology reflects the originality of the theory, which is in a way to develop a new paradigm of knowledge in the field of development studies.

The discussion continues with the articulation of both elements in classical and contemporary literatures dealing mostly with political and economical issues through the framework of Islamic thought. The literatures will be analytically and critically analysed to locate gaps and lacunae that will justify the exploration of this research, hence formulating a different method and paradigm in establishing an alternative model for governance.

Tawhidic reality

In contrast to the aforesaid Western paradigm as a worldview, Muslims derive their worldview from the Qur'an or the revealed knowledge, which explains its *a priori* ontology by insisting the very core and comprehensive concept and application of *Tawhid* or the Oneness and uniqueness of God the Almighty. *Tawhid* as an axiom derived from the premier principle of Islamic theo-centric cosmology encapsulated in the declaration of *Shahadah* (*La ilaha illa Allah*) which proclaims the denial of any other god apart from Allah and also the affirmation on the *sui generis* of Allah as the 'almighty God' to be worshiped and glorified.² This principle implies that Allah is one in His essence (*dhat*), one in His attributes (*Sifat*), one in His names (*Asma'*), one in His works (*af'al*) and the only object of worship. Such principle also solicits the other interrelated principle of *tanzih* (no compromise with the transcendent purity of Allah) for His existence (*wujud*); and rejection of any type of relationship of ontological proximity and identification between the absolute (Allah) and the relative (created beings) in His status as the Creator and administrator of the universe (*rububiyyah*) and the only worshipped God (*uluhiyah*). Any actions that contradict or breach this principle of *tawhid* is considered as *shirk* or associating the absoluteness of Allah with other beings. The state of *shirk*, which is the anti-thesis of *tawhid*, condemned strongly in the Islamic belief system and those who committed it were disqualified from being true Muslims.

The *Tawhid* concept becomes the *axis mundi* of *homo-Islamicus* (or the Islamically re-affirmed individual) ontology and determining the 'truth' and the 'reality' for Muslims. It represents the ultimate truth or reality, which is known in Islam as *Haqq* in their life. This concept, clearly articulated through the status of human beings from an Islamic perspective, was deliberately elucidated in the Qur'an through the story of human creation, and accepted as 'a priori' in Muslims' faith. The purpose of the human race creation has been described in the Qur'an a few times through a dialogue between God and the angels (2:30–9; 15:28–44; 38:69–74). There, God expressed His will to the angels the creation of a new being who would be the best of all His creatures and hence would be assigned the status of His vicegerent (*Khalifah*). As a vicegerent, man is responsible not only for himself, but also for everything in the universe including the animal kingdom and nature. In order for man to understand his responsibility and status, God frequently demands him to observe, ponder and use his rationality.³ The ability of man to rationalize is simply based on his possession of reason ('aql), physical and intellectual capabilities, knowledge and other resources. This endowment by God in a way is the *raison d'être* of human superiority upon other creatures.

Equally, the Qur'an also speaks of a covenant between man and God (7:172) in which man recognized God's position as his Creator. In other words, this covenant implies that the ability to perceive the existence of the Supreme Being is inborn in human nature. By highlighting the rights and obligations of God over man, and man over man, the Qur'an establishes the point that man serves

God mainly by serving humanity and other creatures. By comparison to the ‘secular materialistic’ position of the Western worldview, the *khilafah* (vicegerency) position and the covenant taken by the human race to execute their responsibility (Qur'an, 33:72), is to worship God by living according to His guidance (*'ibadah*) (Qur'an, 51:56) and to develop and administrate this world in a harmonious way for the benefit of all creatures (*'imarah*) (6: 165; 45: 13). Such responsibility or trust has been rejected by other creatures, but accepted by human beings: hence, they are living in this worldly life in the state of being tested (Qur'an, 6:165).

As a prerequisite of being tested, man was also endowed with freedom or *ikhtiyar* to choose. Such freedom, which made man different from the angels, gives man a determining power to deliver his responsibility, thus, making him accountable before God. For every decision or choice an individual takes, he is accountable⁴ as being mentioned in the Qur'an (75:36; 23:115; 76:2). It is through this responsibility-accountability paradigm, the Qur'an points out that worldly human life is connected to the Hereafter. Human life in this world (as a testing ground) will be the major determination of his new life after his demise. It is his choice then which will lead him either to *falah* or salvation in this world and in the Hereafter or otherwise. Thus, the objective of individuals is to achieve *ihsan* or beneficence to achieve *falah*.

In essence, Muslims believe that reality, namely life, has two dimensions: eternal and temporary. The temporary worldly life was created for man to be tested in determining his eternal life in the Hereafter (Qur'an, 6:165). “Islamic ontology presents a comprehensive integrated unique bi-dimensional worldview, this world (universe) and the Hereafter”⁵ yet interlink, as this world is perceived to be the ‘fields’ of the Hereafter. Such ontology differentiates between ontological proximity of the post-Enlightenment West and of the worldviews of other religions. The repercussion of this ‘*tawhidic* reality’ can clearly be seen in the way Muslims respond to their worldly life, in which governance is part of it (Iqbal, [1974] 2008: 155). Within a pristine understanding of this *tawhidic* reality, governance as a process and development as the result of the process are taken out from the Western materialist monist paradigm absolute *donnee*. Instead, the implication of *tawhidic* reality expands the implication of the governance process and its end beyond the materialistic notion towards achieving *falah*, a ‘multi-dimensional comprehensive salvation’.

This state of ‘multi-dimensional comprehensive salvation’ or *falah*⁶ in the worldly life can be achieved through the comprehensive well-being in one’s life as a result of conformity to guidance (see: Qur'an, 2:189; 3:130; 3:200; 5:35; 5:100; 24:31; 28:67; 24:51). This comprehensive well-being could be obtained through preservation of the highest objectives of *Shari'ah* (*maqasid*), which is interpreted as human well-being, when the guidance is being followed and implemented in one’s life. Furthermore, the *tawhidic* reality that shapes an individual’s worldview will turn him to a ‘being’, ‘doing’ and ‘functioning’ individual who will try to secure and promote the *Maqasid* to ensure *falah* not only for himself but also for the community and the human species in the universe by

enhancing *ihsan*. This also indicates that *tawhid* necessitates social well-being alongside individual well-being and also makes it the responsibility of the individual to contribute to the social well-being. The Qur'an states this 'functioning' individual's mission as the continuation of Prophet Muhammad's mission as the mercy agent to the universe, as evidenced in the following verse of the Qur'an: "For I [Allah] have created you [Muhammad] to be nothing but a blessing for all creation".⁷

It should be noted that an important social articulation of *tawhid* is being the source of justice as well. In other words, the true meaning of *tawhid* in human life also emphasizes the importance of justice as part of *tawhidic* implication on individual conduct. *Tawhid* implies the vertical ethical axiom implying justice, which necessitates individuals to live with the spirit of justices amongst themselves. However, *tawhid*'s articulation of justice is related to vertical ethicality and hence refers to individuals having equal distance to God. In other words, this implies that individuals are equal in their relationship with God. It is upon such a concept of equality that justice must prevail as the common value shared by the individuals, hence equality in the sight of Allah. This has consequences on the *falah* process as part of *ihsan*. Consequently, *falah* of a human being during this life and the Hereafter is reflected by the eternal life in Heaven.

This '*tawhidic* reality' worldview, which is a *sine qua non* for Muslims, provides a unique dimension for the inquiry of Islamic epistemology of knowledge.⁸ *Tawhidic* reality as the ontology needs to be articulated by the epistemology to bring itself into reality. The following section, hence, explores Islamic epistemology that is inspired by *tawhidic* reality in order to prepare the ground for further exploration of Islamic governance.

Islamic Ontological Quest for Epistemology

Quest for epistemology is the quest to answer three major questions: 'What knowledge?'; 'What can we know?', and if we think we know, it raises the third main question: 'How do we know that we know?'. In other words, in an easier manner, the field of epistemology as an intellectual enterprise is replying to the quest of what constitutes knowledge and the methodologies for acquiring it (Khan, 1999: 109). Since Islam provides a particular ontological base, the establishment of 'Islamic epistemology' enables Muslims to provide the foundations for liberatory philosophy that will bring Muslims out the darkness into the light (Islam) of *Hikmah* (wisdom) (Khan, 1999: 109). This confirms what Nandy (1988) asserts that any effort to establish a non-modernist or non-Western knowledge in the world must first claim its own epistemological primacy by decentering the 'Western notion of knowledge'. Islamic epistemology in such meaning provides the foundations needed for a new Islamic paradigm of 'governance'.

By referring to the dominion of *tawhidic* reality, 'the quest of epistemology' as foundation for Islamic theory of knowledge must begin from the arch-principle that all knowledge is dominated by its sacred quality and nature.

Muslim scholars never separated knowledge from revelation unlike post-Enlightenment Western epistemology (Nazr, 1994: 123). Such an assumption derives from the very ontological argument that Allah, which Muslims believe as the only omnipotent God and the Creator had created everything. Consequently, such belief affirms that all knowledge, including those produced by human logic or reasoning like everything else in the universe ultimately originates from Allah, as they are related to knowing what Allah created on earth. Allah as believed by Muslims is the all-Knower, all-Seeing and the source of all the knowledge in this world. Allah equipped human with reason and knowledge of this world. These qualities enable humans to be the guardian and the *khali-fah* or vicegerent of Allah in the universe.

It was through this vicegerency task that Adam has been exalted and elevated above other creatures despite of its earthly origin (Qur'an, 2:30).⁹ The elevation and the choice was made by Allah who had taught Adam *all the names* (Qur'an, 2:31) or the nature of the world as a preparation for such position. Many exegesists interpret 'the names' as the *key of knowledge* (El-Sheikh, 1999: 61). God also bestowed Adam with 'aql (reason) to distinguish him from the non-human nation. These two elements (reason and knowledge) qualified Adam and his consort, Hawwa to be the leader of God's creatures in heaven and earth. A general conclusion can be drawn from this event as part of Islamic epistemology that God or Allah is the main source of knowledge. Since He was the one who created the universe, and He was the one who endowed Adam and his offspring with knowledge and reason, Muslims believe that He is the origin of everything and the ultimate source of knowledge (He is *al-'Alim*: The all-Knower) (al-Qur'an, 6:59; 34:26). In describing such nature, Allah Himself asserts: "If the ocean were ink (wherewith to write out) the words of my Lord, sooner would the ocean be exhausted than would the words of my Lord, even if we added another ocean like it, for its aid" (Qur'an, 18:109). Hence, since Allah teaches the way of knowing, Qur'anic knowledge constitutes the source of Islamic epistemology as well.

This could also be identified from the far-reaching understanding of the Qur'anic verse (25:35), which indicates that God is "The light of the heavens and earth". Ibn Sina argues that all knowledge existing in this world is part of God's knowledge, and it is revealed to us through a divine, active intellect and that the intellect bestows light upon light (guidance upon guidance) on human beings (Yezdi, 1996: 14–16; 193–4). God in this specific verse declares himself as the main source of knowledge (light) for the human being. While in many other verses, it is indicated that God declares profoundly He is '*Alim* (the All-Knower), *al-Hakim* (the All-Wise), *al-Haqq* (the All-Truth), *al-Khabir* (the All-Aware). For that reason, it is a religious duty upon every Muslim to pursue their search for truth and knowledge. This, thus, clearly identifies the ontological nature of Islamic epistemology.

The relation between ontology and epistemology of Islam is clearly identified from the acceptance of the revelation sent to the Prophets as mentioned by the Qur'an. It was described that prophets were sent or chosen from mankind to

preach to their people on the guidance (books and scriptures) revealed for them to follow. As for the final Prophet as believed by Muslims, Muhammad was chosen and trusted with al-Qur'an that is affirmed by Muslims as the 'final revelation'. The Qur'an as guidance was given numerous titles to manifest its capacity as the major epistemological source for Muslims such as *Kalamullah* (God's word), *al-Furqan* (the criterion between truth and false) and *al-Kitab al-Mubin* (the clear book). Along with the Qur'an, Prophet Muhammad was considered in Islamic ontological antecedents as the other major epistemological source for knowledge, as he is the guide to the guidance. Hence, his traditions (known as *Sunnah* or *Hadith*), in which his words, actions and tacit approvals being recorded are but a part of that general meaning of revelation as understood and agreed widely by Muslims¹⁰ despite of its humanly nature. Nasr (1996: 27) coins that for Islamic philosophy to be accepted as 'Islamic', it must be rooted from these two epistemological sources.

In sum, *tawhid* is the root of the Islamic worldview and system of values (Yezdi, 1996). With it, Muslims confirm that God's Oneness is the cause and effect of the 'interactively integrated' process of the universe and is expressed both in the realm of comprehension and in the order of cognitive reality. As a result, in the epistemology of *tawhid*, the difference between Kantian a priori and a posteriori does not exist, and the ontological difference between form and reality is also inessential (Choudhury, 1993). The Qur'anic verse (20:114) "My Lord! Increase me in knowledge" indicates that God enjoins Muslims (through Prophet Muhammad) to literally plead Him for knowledge. The verse implies that God declares that He is the fountainhead of all knowledge in the universe; hence, the human being should seek His guidance in their search for knowledge (Mir, 1999: 99). Based on this '*tawhidic* reality', revelation (*wahy*) received by all prophets from the Divine source, is considered the most certain knowledge,¹¹ which constitutes the knowledge and the articulation of the divine knowledge in their understanding of the world.

Rationality ('aql) and revelation

After identifying the nature of Islamic ontology and epistemology, it is also important to identify how these works in the generation of knowledge. Thus, the articulation of knowledge according to ontology and epistemology necessitates some other foundational axioms, one of which is '*aql*'. As it is through '*aql*', individuals perceive and comprehend the knowledge created and disseminated by God through revelation.

In this *tawhidic* paradigm, revelation also stimulates human '*aql*' to recognize the beneficence of their Creator, to worship Him alone, to execute the mission as His servants and vicegerents on earth. '*Aql*' alone is not sufficient without the efficacy of the senses as mechanisms to digest the experiences as part of the mankind knowledge. Revelation, as guidance from the Creator, must be informed by the reason and to be stimulated by the senses (Qur'an, 7:9; 67:23). The Qur'an reminds Muslims to be grateful for such a precious gift, "the faculties

of knowing”, bestowed upon them by the Almighty. These faculties are important as sources of empirical knowledge of the world were very much emphasized. It has also been emphasized that the physical senses as instruments of knowledge do have their limitations (Bakar, 1999: 6–7).

On the other hand, by acknowledging the *‘aql* and the senses, al-Qur'an asserts that there are indeed other sources of knowledge in which proper study and orientation compliment the truth of revealed knowledge. However, these other sources do not carry the same status as *wahy* as the non-revealed knowledge is not directly bestowed by Allah to man. On the other hand, it is vulnerable to methodological and axiological limitations. To acquire non-revealed knowledge, humans are equipped with all the necessary faculties of knowing which enable them to search for all that they need to know (Wan Daud, 1989: 36–7). The status of *‘aql tabi’iy* (pure reason), has been recognized by both al-Qur'an and Sunnah as a prerequisite for the inquiry of such knowledge. In the same meaning, al-Qur'an reiterates the importance of comprehending, contemplating, thinking, pondering and other activities that relate to the reason (*‘aql*) and reasoning.¹²

Furthermore, al-Qur'an also regards the universal phenomenal as ‘Ayat’ or signs of God's universal system to remind “those who are possessed of intellects” (*li ulti al-Albab*) (3:7, 190), and are capable of invoking reason. Likewise, al-Qur'an also constantly encourages, urges or exhorts human beings to spare no effort in utilizing their sensory faculties to ‘hear’, ‘carefully listen’, ‘look and insightfully see’, ‘ponder’ all the ‘Ayat’ in the Qur'an itself (revelation) and the ‘Ayat’ around them. Those who refuse to do so were abhorred and condemned as *di’af al-’uqul* (possessed of weak intellects or minds), *la ‘aqla lahum* (possessed of no intellect at all), *la ya’qilun* (incapable of sound reasoning) (5:58, 103; 10:42; 22:46; 59:14), and even castigated as being mindless as beasts (*an’am*) and understand nothing “except a shout or cry” (25:44; 2: 171).

This is simply because the human mind or *‘aql* was inherited with the ‘nature knowledge’ of ‘names’ that was endowed to Adam and his offshoots. This nature of knowledge embedded within *‘aql*, which some call rationality just needs to be simulated by experience, and then it will lead to the expansion of the mind itself. This kind of knowledge is also a field of acquisition. The Qur'an story about the son of Adam who murdered his brother and learned from the crow on the way to bury the corpse of the murdered¹³ indicates an important epistemological lesson on the role of experience and rationality. The traditions of Prophet Muhammad himself have recorded myriad of statements implying the importance of *‘aql* and rationality as sources of knowledge. Amongst them was the Prophet's reply to Mu’adh bin Jabal amid sending him to Yemen as a judge. After asking Mu’adh on his references in giving his judgement to the people, Mu’adh replied: al-Qur'an and the *Sunnah*, and in the absence of both sources while dealing with issues, he resort to using his rationale by doing *ijtihad* (*Ajtahid bi ra’yi*). The Prophet testified Mu’adh's method of judgement as the one affirmed by Allah and His messenger.¹⁴

Prophet Muhammad also confirmed in his word: “I have been sent only for the purpose to complete good morality”.¹⁵ This tradition apparently indicates

that Islam recognizes the good morality and good values of others as Islam was sent through the Prophet to complete them. In the same meaning, the tradition emphasizes the need to learn from the *'aql* which is the source of the moral which is not derived from the revelation. This can clearly be seen in the Prophet's practices in a couple of events such as remaining some of the pre-Islamic etiquettes, acknowledging some of the pre-Islamic political conventions such as *Hilf al-fudul*.

The word *Fudul* commonly means 'virtuous', while *Hilf* literally means 'alliance' or 'confederation', but the term is often translated as 'Alliance of the Virtuous' (Ibrahim, 1982: 355). It was a pact of the pre-Islamic Meccan people in which Prophet Muhammad was involved in its formation during his youth. The pact was formulated in order to establish justice in the Arabian peninsular for maintaining the harmonious environment amongst the tribes for better trade by upholding the principle of justice, helping the vulnerable parties and collective intervention in conflicts to establish justice. The famous pact was pledged by various chiefs of tribes in the house of 'AbdullAh bin Ja'dan. After receiving the revelation, the Prophet lamenting about the pact and affirmed on the legitimacy of such pact before the revelation by saying, "If I were invited to a similar alliance or treaty in Islam, I would welcome the idea" (Narrated by Ahmad).

Based on this case, Ramadan (2007: 20–2) formulates three principles from this pact of alliance that will benefit the contemporary Muslims:

- 1 Islam embraces values derived from the human conscience and rationality;
- 2 Islam acknowledges the righteousness of non-Muslims and the importance of preserving justice as a universal value regardless of faith and belief;
- 3 The message of Islam is not a closed value system, but an open one and welcomes any mutual understanding and co-operation with other value systems on the basis of common interest.

Another practical example of the status of human *'aql* in Islamic epistemology is the tradition, which was reported by one of the Prophet's Companions narrates:

I was walking with the Prophet when he passed by some people at the tops of their palm trees. He asked: 'What are they doing?' They answered: 'Pollinating the male into the female.' He replied: 'I do not think that this will be of benefit.' When they were told about what the Prophet said, they stopped what they were doing. Later, when the trees shed down their fruits prematurely, the Prophet was told about that. He said: 'If it is good for them they should do it. I was just speculating. So, forgive me. But if I tell you something about God, then take it because I would never lie about God'.¹⁶

Another narrator added that Prophet Muhammad said: "You know your worldly affairs better than me (*antum a'lam 'an umur dunyakum*)".¹⁷

Another tradition that implies the same spirit of the importance of learning from the experience is Prophet Muhammad's decree on '*ghilab*', which literally means the occurrence of sexual intercourse during the period of nursing a child. The pre-Islamic Arabs strongly believed that such practice was harmful for the nursing baby if its mother were to become pregnant, which in reality has no logical basis. Regarding the matter, Prophet Muhammad was recorded as saying: "I had almost intended to forbid '*ghilab*'. Then, I noticed that the Byzantines and Persians do that without it causing any harm to their children".¹⁸ The Prophet's affirmation on the experience of the other nations was indeed an indication of a testimonial way in describing the reality, which is part of empirical approach in searching for knowledge and truth.

Amongst other examples on the appreciation of other's knowledge and good practice can also be learned from a *hadith* narrated by Muslim (no date: 3/2222) from 'Amru Bin al-'As, which he was reported as saying:

I heard the Prophet (Peace be Upon Him) and he said: 'On Judgement Day most of the People will be Romans'. Amru said to him: 'What do you mean by what you say?' He said: 'I say what I heard from the Prophet'. He said: 'It may be because they have four qualities: they are patient and refrain from civil unrest; they are quick to rouse themselves and recover after a disaster; no sooner have they fled then they attack; they are charitable to the poor and the orphan and the weak; and they have prohibited the oppression of kings'.

This hadith and its like implies that Prophet Muhammad as understood by his companions acknowledged and recognized good morals and qualities of others without having any prejudice on the sources of those practices. This position of the Prophet affirms the intellectual humility encouraged by Islam that should be embraced by all Muslims in their quest for knowledge and well-being. Furthermore, this is the spirit of cohesion conveyed by al-Qur'an, in which the humankind are addressed by al-Qur'an to learn from each other due to the differences in cognitive rationality they may have. See al-Qur'an (49:12)

O People! We have created you out of a male and a female, and We have made you tribes and sub-tribes that you may recognize (and do good to) one another. Surely, the most honourable of you in the sight of Allah is he who guards against evil the most. Verily Allah is All-Knowing, All-Aware.

The important role of '*aqil*' in developing knowledge and Islamic recognition of it leads the famous Egyptian reformist of the nineteenth century, Muhammad 'Abduh to stress that:

If it were upon the Prophet to explain the natural and astronomical sciences, that would be the end of the activity of human senses and intellect, and that would spoil human freedom.... Yes, the Prophet advised people

briefly to use their senses and intellect on whatever improves the welfare, broadens their knowledge, and in the end advances their souls.... Therefore, the doors for these sciences are intellect and experimentation not tradition and religious sciences.

(al-Dhahabi, 2:420)

However, despite the appreciation of the role of '*aql*', the realm of rationality in Islam is still a bounded one, as this type of rationality only finds its legitimacy within the framework of the ontology or '*tawhidic* reality'. Any transgression beyond the parameter of the worldview or any contradiction with it nullifies the authority of '*aql* in Islamic tradition.

Accordingly, Islam does not deny the fact that knowledge could be attained and truth could be achieved. However, the plausibility for the attainment of knowledge in Islam is derived strongly from the basis of Islamic ontology that all the knowledge originated from Allah, the all-Knower and the sole Creator. Allah's knowledge has been imparted to mankind as the '*khalifah*' or the trustee in two ways: first, through revelation (*wahy*), which was only revealed through a few selected people through the divine act. This type of knowledge despite its divine origin was being disseminated to all mankind as part of their duty as God's messengers to the world. In addition, such knowledge was not confined to the metaphysics per se, but also included the guidance of human worldly affairs for their well-being (*maslahah*) in both worlds. The knowledge of the metaphysic, or known in Islamic tradition as the *ghaybiyyat* or the unseen can only be known through this way, and accepted as the *i'tiqad* (belief) with the level of certainty (*yaqin*).¹⁹

The other way Allah imparted His knowledge to mankind was through the 'names' (key of knowledge) that been thought to them. The natural knowledge, which is inherited cognitively, makes them able to understand the nature (names) of the world and its surroundings. With that natural inherited talent, humans stimulate their rationality ('*aql*) and their senses (*hawas*) by experience to establish their knowledge about the world, its nature and the system of things (*sunan al-kawniyyah*). This type of knowledge could be attained through acquisition (either through invoking the rational by thinking, through empirical means or others), hence known as the acquired knowledge (Abu Bakar, 2001: 67–8).

In responding to the demarcation between Godly knowledge and human knowledge, the Andalusian well-known philosopher, Ibn Rushd (1966: 185) suggests that human knowledge must not be confused with the divine because of their essential differences and that 'true' knowledge is the knowledge 'of God'. This hierarchical structure of epistemology is derived from the strict ontological hierarchy in Islamic thought that according to Ibn Rushd, is to dignify the *nubuwwah* (prophecy) as the sole source of the revealed knowledge. He deliberately emphasizes this classification to differentiate Islam as the 'true' religion from Greek myths on which Plato built his epistemology (Ibn Rushd, 1966: 251).

In the same vein, the well-known Muslim theologian, philosopher and jurist, Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali in his earlier writings, namely *al-Mankhul min Ta'liqat al-Usul* (The Sifted of Jurisprudence Commentary) had identified ten levels of knowledge. The ten levels start with the knowledge of the existence of the self (*al-'ilm bi wujud al-dhat*), pain and pleasure, followed by knowing the impossibility of the agreement of contradictions and ending with the knowledge that results from narrations (*sam'iyyat*). While dealing with the epistemological issues of knowledge in Islam, al-Ghazali stresses the role of logic and reason as one of the sources of knowledge refuting the *al-Hashawiyah* group who restricted the sources of knowledge to only the Qur'an and *Sunnah* without any room for the former. Al-Ghazali also concludes that rational discernment (*tamyiz*) is the source of knowledge to humans and that there is a certain level of discernment (not rational but instincts) possessed by the animals making them incapable of seeking truth and knowledge²⁰ (al-Ghazali, 1970: 50).

This enumeration of knowledge by al-Ghazali might not be helpful if being accepted in its literal and classical manner. The superficial understanding of the argument will lead to the replication of the earlier attempts of the Muslim scholars in enshrining their ideals of political science inspired by Islamic values. However, in establishing 'Islamic Governance' as a new emerging knowledge, the subject should be explored from the ethos and moral perspective instead of lengthy discussion on the mechanistic institutional or *fiqhi* (legal) approach. In contrast with the conventional political institutional approach to the issue of governance, which deals mostly on the deductive based mechanistic problems, the ethos and moral horizons dealing with the epistemological issue should found the base for a new paradigm.

Despite the enumerations and classifications in which the revealed knowledge was given further emphasis and higher status in Islamic intellectual milieu, Muslim scholars never maintained that the empirical sciences are useless or harmful. In fact, the history of Muslims has shown how that empirical knowledge emerged and flourished in parallel with other revealed-based knowledge. Although a few incidents did happen when some knowledge perceived by certain groups of Muslims as contradicting with the fundamentals of Islamic teachings, thus, threatening the originality of Islam, it has never managed to shape the mainstream understanding of Islam and the tradition of Islamic intellects. The rejection of non-revealed knowledge or any discrimination towards empirical knowledge will result in the decline of Muslims in their worldly affairs. With regard to such issues, Faruqi (1992: 1–5) asseverates that all sciences in Islam, whether religious, moral, or natural are essentially a quest to discover the order underlying the variegated world of multiplicity.

In responding to such a classical dilemma, Ramadan (2009) proposes the reading of 'two books' (the revelation and non-revealed knowledge) in order to establish a new Islamic paradigm in producing knowledge in the contemporary period. While enunciating the limitation of the classical methods of the jurists (*fujahah*) and the *maqasidic* approach with a little appreciation of its universal deductive, he insists on the need to explore the universal experience. The

universal experience, which was part of the product of time, is but another verse (*ayat*) from God for Muslims to comprehend and stimulate their rationality to work on it. This universal experience should be understood together with the revelation that guides Muslims with its general principles and detailed guidance in some of its parts. Thus, such a suggestion indirectly implies the need for a discursive formation between some of the adequate Western epistemological strategies with an Islamic one.

It should be noted that this demarcation of knowledge leads to different classifications of knowledge amongst the classical Muslim scholars, based on the rule of priority they believe in. The enumeration prepares the foundation for an alternative ideal for governance. This alternative ideal will be structured on the '*ontological determined epistemology*' or the '*articulated tawhidic reality epistemology*'.

Similarly, *tawhidic* reality-oriented epistemology also implies that knowledge possessed by human beings is only valued by obeying God's guidance in the terrestrial life.²¹ By implementing such, human beings will guarantee their *falah*. In this case, such articulation of '*tawhidic reality*', is obviously contrasting the post-Enlightenment Western epistemologies, which are literally based solely on the metaphysic negation ontology, which is classified by Davutoglu (1994) as *ontological proximity*. This rejection of 'God' interference in the field of knowledge flourished in the Western scholars' inquiry of reason and rationality in defining the reality hence formulating the 'humanistic' episteme, which is in a total contradiction with Islam. El-Messiri (1994) argues that such materialistic and humanistic epistemologies ignite the very idea of imperialism, which is the continuation of physical colonialism.²² The internationalization or universalization of these humanistic worldviews leads to the exclusion of others' worldview, which entails the denial of other's values, beliefs, faiths and norms in the field of knowledge. Other's knowledge was merely considered as myth, non-valuable, useless and tales before the Westerners.

Epistemological sources: methodological concerns

The ontological and epistemological aspects are the most crucial elements in establishing the foundation required for the axiomatic approach in developing 'Islamic governance'. Philosophical enquiries in establishing the grounded theory, which contributes to knowledge development, must have its own unique foundational dimension, which differentiates it from the others. Hence, knowledge from '*tawhidic*' understanding is not the result of inventing or rediscovering or knowing something unknown, but the rediscovery of that which has always been known. This challenges the post-Enlightenment West worldview's domination on knowledge.

Upon such rationale, the quest to formulate an Islamic model of governance requires new *ijtihad* to converge both revelation and acquired knowledge. New methods, which are more dynamic but at a same time normative, should be employed to proliferate Islamic ideals on the governance issue in conforming to

the parameter of ‘*tawhidic* reality’ determined epistemology. This new method must have the role of the rational to abstain any literalist approach towards the texts (revelation). A new way is of looking into the substantive issues within the text by taking into the account the context and socio-historical elements in applying certain interpretation of the text relate to the field of governance is indispensable. Moreover, (bounded) rationality is also vital when developing holistic ethical and moral concepts from the revelation for the field of governance. Furthermore, such ‘moral foundation’ could be developed through a thorough examination of the universal values and common senses from the highest objective of *Shari’ah* (*maqasid al-Shari’ah*) through the ‘universal inductive method’ to achieve ‘human well-being’.

Accordingly, this new method demands an exploration of significant ontological determined epistemological sources to ensure the originality of the new model (as a new emerging knowledge) in terms of sources, framework, concepts and objectives. Revelation, represented by al-Qur'an²³ and *Sunnah* (Prophet Muhammad tradition) are major references in the realm of Islamic epistemology,²⁴ while the history of the four guided Caliphs (*al-Khulafa’ al-Rashidun*), as a historical proof of the articulation of the revelation is another undisputed source in such formulation. However, this does not give any divinity to their experience or any impeccability to their actions. Finally, *maqasid al-Shari’ah* (the higher objectives of *Shari’ah*) as another approach towards understanding revelation will be another epistemological source in fathoming any ‘implicit general idea’ or hidden wisdom of *Shari’ah* in its bigger picture to be reflected onto the field of governance.

In the quest of Islamic epistemology, the *tawhidic* reality only provides the foundation for the question ‘what is worth to know’. The proposition in replying to such a question leads to the establishment of the sources of knowledge without further explanation on how to derive knowledge from the sources. The revelation is that represented by al-Qur'an and *Sunnah* requires certain esoteric methods in formulating knowledge. The status of reason in corresponding to the revelation also demands another epistemological method in bringing the harmonization between the two sources. In responding to such topics, Muslim scholars, mainly the *usuliyyun* (jurists) have elucidated a few methods, which resulted in different approaches to extracting rulings and knowledge from the sources.

Muslim jurist of the eighth century, Muhammad bin Idris al-Shafi’i for instance, adopts the textual analysis through procedures for interpreting the meaning of the revealed text, and extends its application to actions and events not directly addressed by revelation (Khudari Beq, 2002: 5). This method resulted in the emergence of much new knowledge, such as *fiqh* (Islamic rulings), *ulum Hadith* (Sciences of Hadith) and *ulum al-Qur'an* (Sciences of al-Qur'an) and *usul al-Fiqh* (Islamic Jurisprudence) itself as a science of epistemology. In dealing with the revelation, al-Shafi’i strongly emphasized the language and literature explanation of both al-Qur'an and *Sunnah* without neglecting the context, which was supported by the *asbab al-nuzul* and *asbab*

al-wurud (al-Shafi'i, 1940 [1358 H]). Al-Shafi'i's method was later emulated by master *usul al-fiqh* scholars, known as the Shafi'ites or *al-Mutakallimun*. In contrast to the *Shafi'ites*, the Hanafites tried to enumerate certain groups of rulings from the revelation based on its similarity and the common ground thus clarifying their logical underlying causes (*'illat*) which lead to the rulings instead of looking into the details of the evidence from al-Qur'an and *Sunnah* separately or particularly. From this extraction methodology, the Hanafites formulate certain principles, tenets and categories (*qawa'id istinbat*) to be applied to new events, which *Shari'ah* is silent on. Such methods reconstruct the sequences of dialectical reasoning (text-context), starting from legal answers and working its way up towards the codification and theoretical fundamentals (Khudari Beq, 2002: 6).

Realizing the limitation of revelation (Qur'anic text and the Prophet's tradition) Muslim scholars resorted to the method of (*fiqhī*) *qiyyas* or legal analogy. For centuries, the method being accepted by nearly a consensus of scholars as a primary procedure for extending the rules of *Shari'ah* to new events, to which no provision could be found in the revelation about them. However, these two methods only work excellently in the field of positive legalistic or are mainly utilized as the tool of deriving the *fiqhī* rulings or the Islamic jurisprudence from revelation. Its limitation in covering larger and wider events for the narrow result of such a procedure (by comparing two particular objects or events only) leads to its inability to cover other aspects of knowledge concerning human life.

Along with the aforementioned limitations, the two previous methods are also ostensibly absent of the overarching principles of general *Shari'ah* rulings, which are useful to establish new formulation of a new method in harmonizing revelation and reason (Safi, 1996: 90–1). Despite the wide acceptance of the two methods for centuries in the field of *fiqh*, they failed to formulate a useful tool for the Muslim intellects to communicate with the social sciences based on Islamic epistemology and worldview. This phenomena lead to the scarcity of literatures in such fields for several centuries. Eventually loopholes invoked an Andalusian Maliki madhhab scholar, Abu Ishaq Ibrahim al-Shatibi (died 790 H) to establish his thesis of *maqasid al-Shari'ah* (the higher objectives of *Shari'ah*) based on the procedure akin to Ibn Sina's 'form of argument',²⁵ which promotes the pattern of syllogism (logical *qiyyas*) and induction (*istiqrā'*).

Al-Shatibi (1996: 2/29–39) argues that the particular or *juz'i* rules of *Shari'ah* are not operating independently by themselves, but rather governed by the universal laws (*qawanin kulliyah*). These laws, according to al-Shatibi could be identified through a thorough reading of the revelation, which represents the '*Shari'ah*'. This thorough reading or what he coins *istiqrā' kulliy* (complete induction) procedure expands the scope of *ijtihad* from its early narrow limitation of a particular legal *qiyyas* to the wider universal laws to govern the rules of new events across the time. This new procedure utilizes both induction (particular to general) and deduction (general to particular) methods in harmonizing revelation and reason. Such a comprehensive new approach, however, is distinguished from the classical application of the inductive method by al-Shafi'i

(through his demarcation of generality (*'am*) and specificity (*khas*)) by its functional purpose. Instead of applying it only as a tool for textual analysis, al-Shatibi includes *istiqra'* as a methodological tool for deriving principles. In the same token, al-Shatibi also managed to integrate inductive and deductive reasoning into a unified methodology.

The *maqasid al-Shari'ah* approach also implies the new utilization of logical *qiyas* (syllogism) to replace the conventional *fiqhi qiyas* (legal analogy) in legal reasoning. The tool that was so popular in *kalam* (theosophical) tradition as well as the philosophical works has been introduced by al-Shatibi to replace the *tamthili qiyas* (analogy) or *fiqhi qiyas* (legal analogy) as the only allowed form in *fiqh* studies throughout the centuries. The syllogism became so essential in the process of formulating *Shari'ah* rules from the revelation after al-Shatibi managed to prove the necessity to combine both induction and deduction approaches for the systemization of *fiqh*. Based on the syllogism, al-Shatibi concludes that the universal laws or higher objectives (which he calls *maqasid*) of *Shari'ah* are to protect and promote human interest (*masalih*) in the terrestrial life and also in the Hereafter. This *maqasid* is to be categorized into three hierarchical levels, in which the *maqasid al-daruriyah* (necessary purposes) resides at the top, and is followed by the *Hajiyat* (exigencies) and *tahsiniyyat* (facilities) respectively²⁶ (al-Shatibi, 1996: 2/326).

In sum, al-Shatibi managed to establish a new epistemology in producing new Islamic knowledge through his *istiqra' kulliyy* (complete induction) method. The classical Muslim scholars of *mantiq* (reason) who employed the procedure of induction in their arguments (*hujaj*) differentiated between *istiqra' tamm* (complete induction) and *istiqra' naqis* (incomplete induction). The application of the former will lead to the production of definite (*qat'iyy*) knowledge while the former gives a *zanniyy* (probable) knowledge (al-Ghazali, 1993: 1/51–2). In doing such, al-Shatibi sheds specific light on this rule-extracting process and imposes a general deductive approach in light of the said higher objective.

According to such an approach, examination of texts cannot be carried out unless public interest (*al-maslahah al-'ammah*) is taken into account. Ultimately, the preservation and promotion of the *masalih* (interests) are only determined to serve the higher objective set up by the divine Lawgiver. This method harmonizes revelation and *'aql* (rationality), or even more, it gives rationality an enormous role in interpreting the revelation (Al-Qaradawi, 2004: 70). It might be one of the useful tools in the creation of new knowledge based on ontology-determined epistemology. Furthermore, the understanding of the universal laws of *Shari'ah* from the *maqasidic* approach will give a wider scope of exploration on the moral issues in the governance field. Despite its heavy dependence on reason, the *maqasidic* approach still keeping the *tawhidic* reality thus remains as the bedrock for its ontology.

However, the post-modern world urges the Muslims to deal with the texts beyond the aforesaid traditional and classical way of the *fuqaha'* (jurists). Texts must not be confined in the classical orthodox epistemological framework, but

must be expanded to an epistemological enquiry by looking into its meaning for the contemporary sciences. In achieving such means, Muslim intellects should depart from their initial traditional paradigm in dealing with the sources. With due respect to the aforementioned comprehensively evolved method developed, the expansion of the *Qur'an-Sunnah* episteme requires a re-reading of both the scriptures of the texts. The new reality of human knowledge due to the changes in life, in particular the humanities, demands a new approach,²⁷ which involves looking into the two sources (Al-Alwani, 1991). This new approach, however, is not the modification of the sources, but rather a transformation of the mind and eyes that read them, which are indeed naturally influenced by the new social, political, economical, and geographical and scientifically environment in which they live. A new context changes the horizon of the text, renews it and sometimes gives it an original purport, providing responses never before imagined (Ramadan, 2006: 4).

Notes

1 Such methods became the major principals of the Positivist philosophers. They insisted that true knowledge is based on scientific statements. The statements can only be verified based on empirical results, and could only be derived from observations and logical deductions from them. According to these methods, any statements that could not be disconfirmed by observations such as values, ethics and moral judgements were meaningless and not scientific, hence the negation of religious beliefs from the body of knowledge (el-Messiri, 2006: 29–38). This conclusion then becomes the cardinal principal of the Vienna circle. Reuben (1996) writes that:

In the late nineteenth century, intellectuals assumed that truth had spiritual, moral and cognitive dimensions. By 1930, however, intellectuals had abandoned this broad conception of truth. They embraced, instead, a view of knowledge that drew a sharp distinction between 'facts' and 'values'. They associated cognitive truth with empirically verified knowledge and maintained that by this standard, moral values could not be validated as 'true'. In the nomenclature of the twentieth century, only 'science' constituted true knowledge. Moral or spiritual values could be 'true' in an emotional or non-literal sense, but not in terms of cognitively verifiable knowledge. The term 'truth' no longer comfortably encompassed factual knowledge and moral values.

However, positivism hence requires the framework of 'secularism' as its competent worldview. The dark ages of the European continent caused by the amalgam of churches and the state causes the transition to secular thought in the whole Western realm, which later claimed its universality. Secularism is but the triumph of reason (science) over superstition (metaphysics) to Western civilization. In tandem, religious faith is portrayed as inferior to and in constant conflict with reason (the true knowledge). Consequently, secularism is glorified as the most vital pillar for modernity (Tawney, 1926). While the Enlightenment, which is the period where secularism and positivism emerge is perceived as the dawn of the Age of Reason, where the world and the people are enlightened by reason, science and a respect for humanity.

2 Despite its basic definition, *tawhid* implies the unification of Allah and the denial and rejection of any association of Allah with the creatures; different theological schools of thought define *tawhid* with different elaboration in detailed comprehension of the concept. The classical Muslim theological philosophers (who were also known as the 'Mutakallimun' (theologians)) were divided into two major sects: the *Mu'tazilah*

(pure rationalists) and the *Asha'irah* (moderate rationalists). Both sects interpreted '*tawhid*' based on the Islamic theo-philosophical method as the understanding of affirmation of the unification of Allah in His essence (*dhat*) and attributes (*Sifat*). However, in details they diversify in defining the relation between the essence and the attributes. As for the *Mu'tazilah*, *tawhid* requires the separation of essence as the pre-existent and eternal and His attributes. The *Asha'irah* in contrast believe that both the essence and the attributes are eternal and in fact belong to a single entity, which is Allah Himself. Nonetheless, both of the sects agreed that Allah's attributes are *sui generis* and nothing is equal to His glory and greatness. On the other hand, the *Muhaddithun* (scholars of Hadith) along with others who reject the theo-philosophical tendency of the *Mutakallimun* opt a literalist approach to *tawhid*. Ibn Taimiyah, whom the new formulation of *tawhid* paradigm spearheaded this school of thought enumerated *tawhid* into three major categories, *tawhid uluhiyah* (Believing that Allah is One with no partner or associate in His divinity), *tawhid rububiyyah* (Lordship) and *tawhid al-asma' wa al-sifat* (names and attributes). Despite the differences between the methods used to define the 'unity' or 'oneness' of Allah in His essence and His attributes, all agreed in one common conclusion that *tawhid* entails transcendence (*tanzih*), which is the act of denying or rejecting anything that will lead to immanence (*tashbih*) between Allah and His creation. Any act of such will be considered as a blasphemy act of associating (*shirk*) Allah with the creation.

- 3 Look, for example, (Qur'an, 4:82; 7:24; 23:68; 38:29; 47:24).
- 4 And also, Prophet Muhammad has mentioned it in myriad, and amongst the famous was the report that mentioned that every single individual is a leader, and everybody will be accountable for his leadership (narrated by al-Bukhari (1985: 1/304) and Muslim (no date: 2/1459)).
- 5 Which is totally against the views of existentialists like Jean Paul Sartre, Martin Heidegger and others' opinions, which say that human life or human existence is without purpose (Baheshti and Bahonar, 1993: 161–4).
- 6 *Falah* is derived from the root of *Fa-la-ha* and originally means, 'to plough' (Ibn al-Manzur, 1955: 2/547). Plough implying going through a route with difficulty and eventually reaching harvest, the word has been apparently adapted to have a general meaning of reaching safety and salvation after struggling for it. In the context of Islam, *fulah* means attaining triumph and prosperity in the worldly life and the Hereafter. This of course can be reached when God is pleased with his servant (although this pleasure is the result, to a great extent, of God's own extreme mercy and forgiveness).
- 7 Al-Qur'an (21:107).
- 8 Davutoglu (1994: 78–9) developed his own 'Qur'anic System of Semantics' in establishing what he called 'Ontologically determined epistemology' through linking the frequently used terms in al-Qur'an which he believes indicate significant messages on the topic. He further elaborates that Allah (mentioned 2,800 times) is the Owner of the universe (*Rabb*, mentioned 950 times) that He created (*kawn*, mentioned 1,300 times). He is communicating (*qawl*, to say, mentioned 1,700 times) through His *Rusul* (messengers) that brought His *'ilm* (knowledge and to know (verb), mentioned 750 times) to be conveyed to human beings. He also develops the etymological relation between Allah as '*'Alim* (the all-Knowing) with the '*'Alam* (world or creatures) through His '*'alam* (signs) by imparting to them His '*'ilm* (knowledge). He insists that within the framework of this semantic system, it is impossible to separate the context of knowledge from the context of being, hence the strong attachment between Islamic epistemology of knowledge with the ontological antecedents.
- 9 The answer for those questions should depart from the gist of the *Tawhidic* reality that explains that the human race was created as the 'vicegerent' of God on earth. However, this vicegerency was envied by *Iblis* (Satan) who believes that he is superior to Adam and his offspring (al-Qur'an, 2:34). It is true, that Adam's earthly origin

made him, along with his children, weak thus making them easy prey to the resentment and machinations of *Iblis*. *Iblis*' first ever victory in deceiving the human nation was his ability to seduce both Adam and Hawwa, which lead to their expulsion from Heaven (al-Qur'an, 2:36). This victory marks the beginning of the endless conspiracy of *Iblis* to make Adam's children prone to the ignorance of *Iblis* and to lose the Names (the keys of knowledge) given to them. The expulsion prepared a new dimension of human history on earth that marked the genesis of human chapter on earth. Adam and Hawwa realized their mistake and repented to God, who later promised both of them His guidance. As long as the pair and their offshoot obeyed and followed divine guidance, they would be safe from the machinations of *Iblis* (al-Qur'an, 2:37–8). The guidance will also assist them to fulfil their ultimate goal both in the *dunya* and the *Akhirah*. This 'guidance' then becomes the medium of how God communicated with His beings in imparting His knowledge to them. As Soroush (2009: 2000) maintains in his analogy of such a situation, it is just like taking the water from the ocean. The human can never be allowed to take the whole ocean, but only receives a small portion of the ocean water in a pail or container that transmits it from its original source. This promise of guidance entails the continuous mission of the Prophets whom have been chosen by God as a mediator or messenger for the guidance of their fellow man (Qur'an, 62:2; 74:1–3; 87:6–9). The guidance that consists of true knowledge from the Creator is sent in the form of revelation (*wahy*) or times in the form of *kutub* (books) or *suhuf* (scrolls). In them, He taught human beings His positive commands, His prohibitions as a test for them, His promise (*wa'd*) and His threat (*wa'id*), the *ghaybiyyat* (unseen), the life Hereafter (*Akhirah*) and the prophecies of events that would occur in the future (*nubuwwat*). The Messengers or Prophets in such cases acted only as 'the' channel of communication and not as 'the God' in human form or the 'revelation' itself. Al-Qur'an clearly states that: "Say: The knowledge is with Allah only, and I am but a plain warner" (67:26). However, Prophets and Messengers as the chosen individuals for such a task were equipped with certain qualities that qualify them to deliver the mission. Hence they are infallible, wise, aided by an evident miracle, bring about deductive knowledge and the knowledge in fixity, and also responsible in conveying the details and the true understanding of God's guidance.

- 10 Muslims since the day of al-Shafi'i had agreed that *Hadith* or the Prophet traditions is recognized as revelation though not on a par with al-Qur'an but has the legal authority equal to it (el-Khadduri, 1987: 109–16). There are many indicators in al-Qur'an indicating the importance of *Sunnah* as part of the revelation and as a complement to al-Qur'an, (Qur'an, 3:31; 3:132; 4:65; 4:80; 16:44; 24:63; 33:36; 49:1; 53:3; 4; 59:7, and others) (Azami, 1977; al-Hafnawi, 1991; Mahmoud, 1998; al-Siba'è, 2006; Qaradawi, 2007).
- 11 Amongst the perceptions on the relation between knowledge and religion amongst the post Enlightenment Western community, is that God has been hiding the knowledge from human beings just like the churches once hid the knowledge of reading and writing from the people. The discovery of the knowledge of reading and writing by the majority of people lead to the revolution against the church (Behishti and Bahonar, 1993: 145–7). However, this is not the case in Islam, the first verse to be revealed to the Prophet Muhammad was "read" (al-Qur'an, 96:1). Despite of the illiterate nature of the Prophet himself, the whole idea of Islamic teaching was the value and the virtue of knowledge. Adam was created with knowledge according to al-Qur'an. He was equipped with knowledge to make him more superior than the rest of the creatures, hence entitled to be the trustee of the world (Qur'an, 2:30–3; 31:20; 11:61; 67:15; 17:70). Moreover, knowledge has been regarded as very special in Islam. There are several places in the Qur'an where God praises those who possess knowledge (2:32; 39:9; 58:11). By the same token, a lot of statements being narrated to Prophet Muhammad that place men of knowledge at the level of the heirs of the prophets, praise the seekers of knowledge and those who impart it to others, and also

stress the obligation upon every Muslims to seek knowledge. In sum, Islam identifies knowledge as a marker of privilege. Thus according to this '*Tawhidic* reality', the act of attaining knowledge is not only a possibility, but is indeed necessary and regarded as an obligation upon all Muslims unlike the Greek and sophists, who in contrast view knowledge as vain imagination (Wan Daud, 1989: 62). Having said that, instead, knowledge "possessed a profoundly religious character, not only because the object of every type of knowledge is created by God, but also the intelligence by which man knows is itself a divine gift" (Naâr, 1994: 123). According to Nasr (1994: 150), the ultimate aim of knowledge in Islam is to be able to "perfect and actualise all the possibilities of the human soul"; that leads to "that supreme knowledge of the Divinity which is the goal of human life".

- 12 For instance, al-Qur'an invokes reason consistently by using verb roots referring to the use of the intellect (and their clusters), such as *fahama* (understand, realize), *faqaha* (understand, comprehend), *fakkara* (think, reflect), *tadabbara* (ponder, deliberate), and *'aqala* (search for causes, find reasons and connect ideas in order to comprehend). In the same vein, the verb *'aqala* is repeated in the Qur'an about 50 times, and the rhetorical refrain '*afala ta'qilun*' (Can't you reason?) is repeated at least 13 times in various contexts of reasoning (al-Sheikh, 1999: 72).
- 13 Then Allah sent a raven, who scratched the ground, to show him how to hide the shame of his brother. 'Woe is me!' Said he; 'Was I not even able to be as this raven, and to hide the shame of my brother?' Then he became full of regrets.
(Qur'an, 5:27)
- 14 Narrated by Ahmad (2000: 37/333), al-Arnaut recommends this Hadith as authentic due to its meaning and wide acceptance by Muslim scholars despite of its weak (*lā'īf*) chains of narrators (*sanad*).
- 15 Narrated by Malik in *al-Muwaīīa* (Ibn Abdil Bar, 1968: 24/333), and recommended as authentic (*Sahih*) by Ibn Abdil Bar (1968: 24/333–4). The Hadith was also narrated by Ahmad (2000: 14/512–13).
- 16 Narrated by Muslim (no date: 4/1735).
- 17 Narrated by Muslim (no date: 4/1836).
- 18 Narrated by Muslim (no date: 2/1066).
- 19 According to the Muslim theologians, the level of certainty (*yaqin*) also varies according to the *Iman* (innate belief). The *'ilm yaqin* (certain knowledge) is only the first step towards believing, established through the knowledge of things. The *'ayn al-yaqin* (knowledge by sight), which is the second step in believing of the *ghaybiyyat* through experience, in which the certainty of the believed things is gained after experiencing some spiritual encounters. The utmost certain knowledge, the *haqq al-yaqin* (knowledge by the unity of subject and object) is the highest level of knowing and believing and is only attainable by an elect few (Akhtar, 1995).
- 20 However, in the later stage al-Ghazali (Bakar, 2006: 203) formulates new categories of knowledge specifically in both his treatises, *Mizan al-'amal* and 'The Jewels of the Qur'an'. In those pieces, he suggests that knowledge can be classified into four major categories: theoretical and practical sciences; presential (*huduri*) and attained knowledge (*husuli*) sciences; religious (*shar'iyyah*) and intellectual (*'aqliyyah*) sciences; and *fard 'ayn* (obligatory on every individual) and *fard kifayah* (obligatory on all) sciences. However, he gives more extensive emphasis for the third category. Religious sciences (*al-'ulum al-Shar'iyyah*) is defined by al-Ghazali in his 'Book of Knowledge' as "those which have been acquired from the prophets and are not arrived at either by reason, like arithmetic or by experimentation, like medicine, or by hearing, like language" (al-Ghazali, 1962: 36–7). Whereas, in the intellectual sciences (*al-'ulum al-'aqliyyah*), it has been defined by al-Ghazali as those sciences which are attained by the human intellect alone (al-Ghazali, 1937: III, bk. 1, 1372–4).

However, his definition of religious sciences was not consistent since in the same book he divided the praiseworthy religious sciences into four parts: 1) Science of the sources (*usul*) which constituted four major sciences, the Qur'an; the *Sunnah* (Prophetic traditions); the *ijma'* (consensus of the Muslim mujtahids); and *athar al-Sababah* (Traditions of the Companions); 2) Science of the branches (*furu'*), that is *fiqh* (jurisprudence) and science of the Hereafter; 3) Preludes of the sciences (*muqaddimat*), such as linguistic sciences to understand the Qur'an and the Sunnah; 4) Supplementary (*mutammimat*) sciences such as the science of Qur'anic interpretation.

Ibn Khaldun (2005 [1967]: 344) enumerates these sciences under the category of the transmitted sciences (*al-'ulum al-naqliyyah*), which has a wider and larger scope than al-Ghazali's first definition of the religious sciences.

Despite the different categorizations by al-Ghazali, Bakar (2006: 205) denies any contradiction between the definition and al-Ghazali's latter classification since al-Ghazali himself gave the title of *muqaddimat* (preludes) and *mutammimat* (supplementary) to the third and fourth categories rather than calling them the religious sciences by themselves. Consequently, al-Ghazali (Bakar, 2006: 205, 222) positions the sciences of ethics and politics under the category of religious sciences rather than intellectual or philosophical unlike al-Farabi who preceded him in the classification of knowledge. In his *al-Munqidh min al-Dalal* (al-Ghazali, 1952: 19), al-Ghazali clearly states that the Muslim philosophers' teachings in the political and ethical sciences were drawn mainly from the revelation sent to the Prophets. The philosophers, according to al-Ghazali never separated their knowledge of both sciences from the revelation by independently relying on reason. From such a premise and in conformity with his definitions, he concludes that political and ethical sciences must be included into the division of the religious sciences.

- 21 This notion of knowledge requires a holistic approach that entails the embracement of socio-political and moral aspects. One who possesses knowledge in Muslim history is also the one who is himself furnished with high morality and ethics. The possession of knowledge invokes the owner of the knowledge to act upon their beliefs and commit themselves to the goals, which Islam aims at attaining. Hence, the Islamic theory of knowledge encompasses knowledge (the process of acquiring information), insight, social actions and the fruits of the knowledge itself. While in the same manner, the ultimate purpose of *'ilm* or knowledge according to the *Tawhidic* reality is for one to execute his mission as *Khalifah*, and in the same meaning, the attainment of knowledge is also for the well-being of the human life in both worlds. In such a manner, this paradigm can guide Muslims to separate between 'good' and 'bad' knowledge and ideas according to their worldview (Mir, 1999: 101).
- 22 The imperialistic epistemological vision according to el-Messiri, stood upon certain 'Eurocentric' pillars such as rationalization, secularization, expansion and invasion, which lead to the centricity of Western sciences upon the others. This worldview has lead to the calamities and genocides on the non-Western soils by the Westerner colonial powers under the banner of secular imperialism based on materialistic, utilitarian and rational view. He even insists that the historical baggage of this Imperialistic epistemology vision also encompasses the disaster perpetrated by the Nazi in European soil itself (el-Messiri, 1994).

- 23 Davenport ([1882] 2009: 48–9) says:

The Qur'an is the *general code* of the Muslim world, a social civil, commercial, military, judiciary, criminal, penal and yet religious code. By it everything is regulated – from the ceremonies of religion to those of daily life, from the salvation of the soul to the health of the body, from the rights of general community to those of each individual, from the interest of man to those of society, from morality to crime, from punishment here to that of the life to come.

24 Gibb (1958: 73–4) explains:

For Muslims its proof-texts were to be found in the Koran and Prophetic Tradition; and on this assumption the jurists and theologians of the second century elaborated a structure of Law that is, from the point of view of logical perfection, one of the most brilliant essays of human reasoning.

25 Ibn Sina (1960: 169–75) notes that the movement of thoughts (*fikr*) in reasoning entails the production of new knowledge. The movement of thoughts can only produce scientific knowledge if it follows the form of an argument (*hujjah*). The argumentation could then follow the two main patterns of syllogism (logical *qiyas*), which is designed to ensure the validity of the argument (*fi'lāl*) with its formal rules; and induction (*istiqrā'*), which is beyond the normal, applied deductive reasoning.

26 The *al-maqasid al-darrriyyat* is essential to human life and is indispensable for the attainment of the ‘interest of religion and life’, without which destruction and disorder would prevail. There are five necessary purposes of *Shari'ah* in this category: the preservation and the promotion of religion (*din*), life (*bayat*), progeny (*nasl*), property (*mal*) and intellect (*'aql*); while the *hajiyat* are the corollary principles intended to ease hardship and extreme difficulties which could lead to idleness and inactivity; and the *tahsiniyyat* are to promote the positive in human life which belongs to the area of virtue and morality (al-Shatibi, 1996: 326).

27 The call for renewal and re-reading the texts is not a new phenomenon. The late Afghani and his disciple, Muhammad 'Abduh promoted it in the calling for reform (*islah wa tajdid*). As for al-Afghani, 'Abduh and the proponents of reform, amongst those causes that can rejuvenate the *ummah* (Muslim community) is the new interpretation of the Qur'an. 'Abduh (1966) with his eclectic theology approach proposes that the *Shari'ah* is equivalent to natural law (with the exception of religious rites (*ta'abbudiy*) (Enayat, 1982)). In expanding the guidance of al-Qur'an and shunning away from the limitation of the traditional literal exegesis of al-Qur'an, 'Abduh believes, for: “On the Last Day God will not question us on the commentators on how they understood the Qur'an, but He will question us on His Book which He sent down to guide and instruct us” (Jansen, 1974: 19).

5 New approach to the texts

Epistemological method-related concerns

“My Lord! Increase me in knowledge”

The Qur'anic verse (20:114)

In referring to the topic of governance, the *maqasidic* method could be crystallized by having a holistic and comprehensive contemplation of the Qur'anic verses and the authentic Sunnah.¹ They are to be understood to derive some concepts, principals and terms based on their accurate and proper understanding and their usage without neglecting the socio-historical factor during the Prophetic era.

In dealing with the texts for the establishment of new principles of governance, the exploration of the Qur'anic episteme is to be used in extracting moral and ethical principles and values that correspond to the issue of governance.² It is also worth looking into the texts from the *consequentialistic 'moral and value' perspective*, since the resulting hermeneutic of legal rulings is based not so much on specific rules spelled out by the text as it is on the ethical principles revealed as God's purposes behind the text.³ Such an approach is indeed in line with the spirit of the revelation itself in which most of the verses and rulings understood from the verses (even those that relate directly to the total obedience to God), justified or reasoned by their moral aspect, which is the ramifications of the acts that can benefit the worldly life thus going along with reason.

However, it ought to be noted, that all the worldly rulings and the instruction did not explicitly expound in al-Qur'an. Or else, it would not be a sustainable

guidance for human beings due to its contextual nature from the exoteric meaning of the Book. The Qur'an can only function as the last long guidance through its enlightening approach towards worldly matters. Verse 69 in Chapter 16 implies that the Book (al-Qur'an) as '*tibyan*' (enlightening) for everything. Any attempt to explain the verse otherwise will bring a massive contradiction with the reality. The divine Enlightenment from the text thus must be translated into the general guidance through the process of '*tadabbur*' (reasoning and contemplating).

Accordingly, the consideration of the socio-cultural and socio-political context of the verses, which could be detected through historical events concurrent with their revelation, will assist the understanding of the underlying causes of those verses. This approach helps the exploration of Islamic ethical messages and philosophical precepts that are worth applying to the field of governance, hence developing a new science called Islamic governance. Such an approach brings the implicit messages related to the governance issue unearthed from the two sources to be more morally and rationally reasonable than the dominant discourse of the traditional (relatively) deontological legal positivistic *fiqh* approach. However, this approach does not imply the negation of all the existing exegesis formulated by the classical scholars. Classical *mufassirun* (scholars of *tafsir* or exegesis) have contributed their best in preserving the original meaning of the revelation that suits the situation they were living with.⁶ Despite their contextual-oriented exegesis, it prepares a general outline for the later generation in dealing with the text through the understanding of proper usage of certain semantic and technical terms, concepts and principals in the Qur'an. The semantic and metaphoric elements in the Qur'an lie strongly with the full comprehension of the Arabic language. Consequently, the classical exegesis, which is strongly based on the tradition and full understanding of the Arabic language, enables one to comprehend the messages conveyed by the Qur'an. Unfamiliarity with the Arabic language, its style and the Islamic faith may be barriers to a true interpretation of the Qur'an (Al-Baqillani, 1951).⁷

Equally, Prophet Muhammad's tradition or the *Sunnah* also requires a new method to work with.⁸ *Sunnah* as a whole is not to be viewed with monolithic lenses; in fact, the classical scholars divided the actions of the Prophet into distinct categories. The division of *Sunnah* into legislative (*sunnah tashri'iyyah*) and non-legislative *Sunnah* (*sunnah ghayr tashri'iyyah*) as an example, has provided useful guidance in order to distinguish between a Hadith, which provides a basis for a *fiqh* ruling and a Hadith, which does not (al-Qaradawi, 1998). Furthermore, the *Sunnah*, concerning the political field is to be demarcated between what is '*tashri'* (legislative/legally binding) and what is '*siyasah*' (politically oriented/not legally binding).⁹ These are the rulings, which originate from the Prophet in his capacity as imam or head of the state in his dealing with political issues and state administration, and are heavily dependent on the contexts. This type of *Sunnah* does not entitle individuals to any right, nor oblige them unless a lawful authority to that effect gives a decree (al-Qarafi, no date: 1/205–9).

Those politically oriented decisions made by the Prophet, as crystallized by Ibn al-Qayyim (1973: 4/373), “to realize the benefit of the public (*ummah*) on that specific context and situation”. He coined such kind of *Sunnah* as ‘*siyasah juz’iyyah*’ (specific policy).¹⁰ Consequently, for this type of *Sunnah*, it is not legally binding on Muslims in later generations; rather it is a political decision made by the Prophet that can be accepted or rejected due to the benefit of the public on the context and situation in following in the footsteps of the Prophet from whom the judgement out of such a principle is derived (Uthmani, 2006: 14). Such a stance relates to the doctrine that Prophet Muhammad did resort to his reasoning (*ijtihad*) in worldly matters that do not relate to the rituals, morals and core tenets of the creed (Shaltut, 2001: 499–503).

Such demarcation was explored even during the days of the Prophet. The Companions have shown their concern on what is ‘revealed’ and what is ‘rational’ from the Prophet’s decision¹¹ (al-Qaradawi, 1998: 38). They repeatedly asked the Prophet before putting their opposing ideas to the Prophet’s, “Is that what was revealed to you, or was it merely your idea?” or “Was that from the revelation, or was that a strategy for war?”, etc. These are related to policy matters, which could best be dealt with by the concerned leadership through the process of consultation (*shura*). It is therefore argued that a distinction should be made between a decision made on a question of law and a decision made on a question of policy. These decisions concerned policy issues and were not intended to become permanent legal rules (al-Qaradawi, 1998).

However, such enumeration does not imply the negation of religion and its values in Muslims’ life. The terrestrial affair conducted by Muslims, albeit with its *ijtihadi* (rational) nature, is still within the radius of their *tawhidic* world-view, hence not detached from its core. The Prophet himself advised his Companions by saying: “If I command you of the religious matters, execute them; and what I command you due to my rationale, verily I am a human being”.¹² In the same vein, as for the political and economic issues, the decisions taken by the Prophet were merely based on rationality but still take into account the revealed knowledge in determining the aim and impact of the decision. In dealing with this type of tradition, they should not be taken as definite, rigid and defined rules meant for all times and all situations to come as mentioned earlier. Instead, we should focus on *what the Prophet intended to achieve* (Rahman, 1996: 147–8).

Those traditions should be understood to have meant to ‘prevent a certain public harm and to acquire a certain public interest (*maslahah ‘ammah*)’. The spirit of ‘the prevention of public harm (*mafsadah*) and the acquisition of public interest’ should be pursued. However, the means used to prevent public harm or to achieve public interest may differ and the qualification and quantification of such benefit differ from one context to another. In dealing with those traditions, Ibn al-Qayyim (1973: 4/373) asserts that most of the policies were taken *for the sake of justice* and *to be defined by public interests*. Furthermore, it was not the actions that needed to be understood or emulated literally, but the spirit and the underlying causes that needed to be fathomed.

In concluding on such a discussion, Rida (1984: 10) states that

any rules derived from the *sunnah* (traditions), if they are not directly related to religious matters (*al-ahkam al-diniyyah*), are the fruit of Prophet's *ijtihad*, and we are not obligated to follow him in 'civil, political, and military matters' (*al-masalih al-madaniyyah wa al-siyasiyyah wa al-harbiyyah*),

is a useful guide to be implemented in revisiting the epistemological aspect of the *Sunnah*. He further suggests that: "God has entrusted (*fawwada*) to Muslims the management of their worldly affairs, both individual and collective, particular and general, on the condition that the worldly offend neither religion nor the guidance of the *Shari'ah*". This statement should be a maxim to enlightening the whole process of investigating the ethical and moral messages from the *Sunnah* in relation to the topic governance.

While in the matter of governance, although it is not necessary to emulate or impose literally the Prophet's traditions that are merely based on his political judgements, nonetheless they are needed in order to understand the underlying ethical and moral rationalities with all the values hidden in them from the aforementioned *consequentialistic* value and moral approach. The Prophet's actions and decisions along with the wisdoms beneath them should be viewed under the universal principals extracted from the Qur'an earlier to provide the stable moral framework for the governance process as could be seen in the ensuing chapter. The inter-connection between these two sources is utterly essential in expounding the comprehensive and integrated meaning of Islamic guidance according to the *tawhidic* worldview. The negation of any of these two sources will lead to the incomplete picture of Islam, hence giving the wrong result and misleading message. By formulating such a mechanism, the *tawhidic* episteme will be overarching the establishment of 'Islamic' governance.

In looking into how the revelation from both the Qur'an and the *Sunnah* could be articulated into different contexts and situations, the experience of the four guided Caliphs, as the first righteous leaders in Muslim history must be taken into account. The decisions and actions taken by the Caliphs during their governance reflect their social realization and understanding of the text and how it fits within the realm of political-economic life as opposed to within the period in which it was revealed (the Prophet's period), and also reflects an approach that is not merely a consequential and deontological. The differences of *ijtihad* taken by the Caliphs enshrine the more holistic view of how messages could be implemented amid changes and in different ways yet still be inspired and enlightened by the same principals and spirit. However, exploring the epistemological aspects of Caliphatic history does not necessarily mean they have to be emulated literally without taking the context and the socio-historical factors of the time into account as is discussed in the following section in order to provide historical contextualization for the use of ontology and epistemology of Islam in developing principles and policies.

Historical context of Islamic epistemology: experience in the *Khulafa' al-Rashidun* period

Unlike the teleology, dialectic and historicism approach, Muslims' approach to history focuses mainly on the lessons (*'ibar*, singular: *'ibrab*) that can be learned from it (Ibn Khaldun, 2005). Many lessons have been learned from Muslim history since the first day of revelation. However, the period of the Prophet's Companions occupies a special position of eminence and merit in Islamic epistemological inquiry as well as in Islamic faith (Ibish, 1966: 108). It is simply because they were the first to believe in Islam, and they witnessed the revelation, living with the Prophet, and were the recipients of the message when it was first handed to the human being and then articulated into worldly life. By such virtue, and due to their closeness to the Prophet, they were regarded as the best authority for the knowledge of the Prophet's tradition. Despite this, it was the four-right guided Caliphs (Abu Bakar, Omar, Uthman and 'Ali) who were the most prominent followers amongst the Companions according to Muslims apart from the Shi'ite tradition (Ibish, 1966: 110). As for the epistemology of Islamic governance, the practices of those four Caliphs are to be taken as part of the way of how revelation guidance is to be articulated into their governance style.

The first four Caliphs are regarded as the orthodox pious rulers of the Muslim *ummah* and Islamic community. According to Muslims, it was during the Caliphal period that Islam was practised perfectly and, with the dramatic conquests and the expansion of the Islamic state, was described by Lewis (2006: 12): "it appeared that 'God smiled on Muslims'". Thus, the *Khulafa' al-Rashidun* period served as the ideal reference for both spiritual and temporal achievements for the later generations of Muslims (Ahmed, 1985: 57; Watt, 1996: 40). The *raison d'être* of the pious Caliphate was the continuation of the divine basis of the polity through strict imposition of Qur'anic injunctions and the rulings of the Prophet. The Caliphs exercised their own *ijtihad* and many of the rulings came to be regarded as part of the experiments-turned-guidance for later generations in dealing with their political life. In articulating the importance of this era to the Muslims, Lindholm (1996: 79) remarks:

Remembering their glorious world-conquering past, Muslims have not pictured the 'City of God' in the Christian manner as beyond ordinary ken, achieved in the radiant future by faith and renunciation. For them, God's mandate was actually realized in historical reality, under the authority of the Prophet himself and the four pious rulers after him.

Lindholm (1996: 80) observes that Muslims over-glorified these periods as "divinely ordered social formation", thus the Muslim thought was "saturated with longing for a return of this ideal era". However, this does not indicate that their experience became sacrosanct thus bearing a kind of sacredness. The essence of their experiments was merely the method of dealing with issues

according to the clear and purified understanding of the two major sources of Islam, elsewhere; they were merely fallible humans ('Uthmani, 2006).

With due respect to this experience, it cannot bypass its own time and place. As long as the political practices were relative, so is the case of the pious Caliphs' experiences. Islamic political doctrine is an ongoing process with huge room for *ijtihad* (reasoning), an innovation unlike the ritual-spiritual elements of Islam. The experiment of the Caliphs should be viewed from a *revelation-guided social constructivist* point of view. It is wrong to emulate their experience literally into the different socio-economical context of another period. Hence, what could be learnt from those experiences is the methodology applied by the Caliphs in dealing with the situations based on their epistemological orientation, which was purely inspired by the *tawhidic* worldview. Upon that, the Caliphs' methods in interacting with the changing Islamic reality, with reference to their governance and administrative *ijtihad* are also essential lessons to be studied and critically analysed while enriching the effort to develop new ideals for Islamic governance.

The best way to deal with the experience of those Caliphs, hence, is to explore the common principles and guidelines followed by them in executing their task of governance in helping to structure the nature of Islamic epistemology in practice. Any close scrutiny on the subject will find the '*maqasid al-Shari'ah*' (objectives of *Shari'ah*) that were attempted by the Caliphs in their actions and judgements, with the attainment of justice for '*falah*' as the main motivation. These universal principles remained the determining factor in shaping the governance methods taken by them. The importance of understanding the *maqasid*, as mentioned in the discussion on developing new knowledge from the revelation, is also essential as a key when dealing with the four Caliphs' experiences to understand its value as an epistemological source. Without such a tool, the emulation of history might result in imposing an imagined reality into the current reality, which will never answer any of the contemporary problems. In understanding the *maqasid*, and in bringing the *maqasid* as an efficient tool in developing the concepts of 'governance' according to the *tawhidic* episteme, the following discussion will engage in the descriptive inquiry of the subject.

Al-Maqasid al-Kulliyyah (the comprehensive objectives)

In harmonizing the rational and revelation, thus avoiding a literal textual approach to the revelation, Muslim scholars have engaged with both the Qur'an's and the *Sunnah*'s implicit messages through varying methods. Those methods were applied to deduct the universal meaning to understand the hidden objectives God tried to convey to human beings. Such meaning prevails in the words of Ibrahim al-Nakha'i (died 96 H) as: "Verily, the rulings of Allah have their own specific objectives which are reflected as benefit and wisdom upon mankind" (Obeydi, 1992: 132). With the same understanding, another classical jurist, Al-Izz bin Abdul Salam (Abdul Salam, n.d.: 1/9) claims that "the greatest of all the objectives of the Qur'an is to facilitate benefits (*masalib*)

and the means that secure them and that the realization of benefit also included the prevention of harm". It could be comprehended from his word that all the obligations of the *Shari'ah* were predicated on securing benefits for the people in this world and the next, and it is the duty of Muslims to discover them and thus observe those objectives in their life and during the implementation of those duties (Obeydi, 1992).

These objectives were later expounded by al-Ghazali (1993) who maintains that the objective of *Shari'ah* is to preserve or protect the *masalib* (singular: *maslahah*), exemplified by the five main essentials of human beings: faith (*din*), life (*nafs*), intellectual (*'aqil*), property (*mal*) and lineage (*nasl*).¹³ Al-Ghazali believes that the major purpose of *Shari'ah* law is to 'safeguard' or preserve those essentials, which eventually bring benefit for human life. Due to such a rationale, al-Tufi (1989: 239) concludes that the preservation of these objectives consists in both "attracting utility" (*jadhb al-naf*) and "repelling harm" (*raf' al-darar*), and should be used as the major source of law after the Qur'an and the Sunnah. He adds furthermore that in some cases of *mu'amalat* (contracts and transactions), *maqasid* would supersede some minor rulings in the Qur'an and the Sunnah to achieve the highest objectives. However, in the issues of *'ibadat* (rituals or spiritual duties) which are the direct interactions with God, and considered as God's rights, the human mind cannot and should not attempt to discern the reasons behind the textual injunctions unlike the *mu'amalat*, where God delegated to humanity the right and duty to set up just rules and regulations in accordance with the public interest (*maslahah*).

It could be noticed that prior to al-Shatibi's definition of *al-maqasid*, other writers namely al-Juwaini, al-Ghazali and al-'Izz bin 'Abdul Salam emphasized the notion of 'protection' and 'preservation'. The word '*hifz*' (protection) has been recognized as the ultimate objective of *Shari'ah*. As in the aforesaid, al-Ghazali (1993: 1/172) coins in his *al-mustasfa* that the highest objective of *Shari'ah* is to 'preserve' or 'protect' faith, life, intellectual, lineage and wealth or property.¹⁴ Al-Juwaini (Awdah, 2006: 16) who preceded al-Ghazali also points out that the *maslahah* (benefit) (which he classified into three categories) are to be 'protected'. Al-'Izz (Abdul Salam, n.d: 1/9) despite his general statement of *maslahah* mentioned earlier (which is the general meaning of *maqasid*), which happened to seclude the meaning of *maslahah* into the connotation of '*hifz*' or protection too.

Nevertheless, al-Shatibi manages to bring a better and more comprehensive meaning of the *maqasid*, when he added the element of 'promotion' (*hifz 'an janib al-wujud*) instead of protection per se. He suggests that *Shari'ah* is not only being revealed to protect or preserve the *maslahah*, but it also 'promotes' the *maslahah* in order to realize the benefit for human life. The five essentials in human life (or six according to some) are not only being protected and preserved, but also being promoted and propagated as could be fathomed from the deduction reasoning of the revelation.

With such extensive concepts of *maslahah*, it could be interpreted as infusing real substance into the external shell (of Islamic rulings and law), thus proving

that moral obligation is related to Divine Omnipotence and Will and how the former in fact necessarily flows from the latter (Rahman, 1979: 115). With a proper understanding of such a philosophy, the application of the true understanding of revelation could avoid the legal positivism approach, which acts according to the formulated law without responding to the moral consequences of it.

Drawing on the Qur'anic verses: "We sent you not but as a mercy for all creatures" (107:21); "Allah does not wish to place you in difficulty, but to purify you, and to complete His favour to you" (6:5); and "In the Law of Equality there is (saving of) life to you" (179:2), al-Shatibi concludes that

Upon exploration of *Shari'ah* we have concluded that it was only set up to serve the interests of man. This is a conclusion that no one can dispute. Canon laws were made for only one purpose and that is to serve the interests of humans in this life and in the Hereafter.

In his *magnum opus*, *al-Muwafaqat*, which is one of the foremost treaties in this field, al-Shatibi categorizes into three classes the *maqasid* that divine messengers were sent to fulfil in the lives of humans. There are *masalih daruriyyah* (essential requirements) without which life will be ruined, *masalih hajiiyyah* (requirements pertaining to general needs) without which man can survive but may be in distress and hardship, and *masalih tahsiniyyah* (ameliorative requirements) whose absence would not seriously undermine the quality of life (al-Shatibi, 1996: 2/326).

However, Ibn al-Qayyim (n.d., 4: 309–11) presents the *maqasid* from a different angle through emphasizing justice and equity in ensuring welfare as the utmost *maslahah* to be preserved through Islamic *Shari'ah*. Furthermore, he insisted that the means to justice and equity could never be captured by a finite list; hence, reason will guide the Muslims on how to ensure both justice and equity in changing circumstances. The articulation of *maqasid* from this expanded point of view will be helpful in the effort to develop policies based on Islamic ontology in this research.

Similarly, Al-Qaradawi (1991) views the more inclusive approach to *maqasid* and further extended the list of the *maqasid* according to the contemporary reality and discourse to include social welfare and support (*al-takaful*), freedom, human dignity and human fraternity, among the higher objectives and *maqasid* of the *Shari'ah*. These are undoubtedly upheld by both the detailed and the general weight of evidence in the Qur'an and the *Sunnah*. Apart from him, a few other contemporary scholars also proposed other essentials, which emerged as the result of modernity and the development of human life. Environment and quality of life are amongst the themes included in the proposal as part of the new *Daruriyyat* (essentials) being observed by *Shari'ah*.

To conclude the discussion about the importance of *maqasid*, we could summarize that the *maqasidic* method represents a comprehensive holistic but rather universal approach towards *Shari'ah*. Any studies conducted on Islam,

the *Shari'ah* or the epistemological sources of Islam must never abandon the discussion on *maqasid*. In the same vein, *maqasid* is but a crucial tool in understanding the revelation or the texts of the sources, in which the negation of it will lead to the misinterpretation of the texts, hence Islam as a whole (Awdah, 2006).

In presenting a new normative governance theory based on Islamic epistemology, the highest objectives of the *Shari'ah* or *maqasid al-Shari'ah* should be the focal point of the discussion, as *maqasid* helps to operationalize and articulate Islamic knowledge into a mechanism of and principles for governance as a practical reality. In other words, under the shade of such an argument, the *maqasidic* approach will assist the quest to develop the aim of *tawhidic* reality into an Islamic governance model. As far as the aforementioned ontological maxim is concerned, the aim of the vicegerency mission of individuals is to fulfil the attainment of *falah*, which leads to the benefit in both worlds. The articulation of *falah* could be found in the comprehensive achievement of *maqasid al-Shari'ah*. The accomplishment of all the tiers of *maqasid* (*daruriyyat*, *hajjyyat* and *tahsiniyyat*) in the governance process can be a benchmark of an accomplishment of 'good' in the governance process. This situation can be explained in the modern jargon of 'human well-being'.

If the *maqasid* is to be perceived as the aim through the articulation of *falah* then it is no longer a mechanistic element to the governance process. It is a means and goal by itself. By such, good governance from an Islamic point of view is a governance process that consists of the *maqasidic* elements to fulfil the *maqasidic* end. Accordingly, within this paradigm, the governance process is not just a consequence of an independent deontological activity that just discharges responsibilities for the sake of delivering the vicegerency tasks. In fact, it is to be viewed from a virtue-based consequentialistic paradigm. It is a process designed to attain a holistic end for the benefits of individuals through its *tawhidic* individualistic paradigm, which goes beyond the instrumental value meaning. This paradigm imposes multi-dimensions of benefits, which encompass both individuals and community benefits, in this world and the Hereafter.

Additionally, *maqasid al-Shari'ah* provides valuable intellectual foundation for the subsequent development of Islamic governance theory. One of the principal objectives of the *Shari'ah* is the prevention of *mafsadah*.¹⁵ The induction of textual proofs in abundance point out the fact that removal of corruption (*dar' al-mafasid*) and acquisition of good (*jalb al-masalih*) are "the comprehensive objective of the *Shari'ah*" and the "fundamental universal rule of the *Shari'ah*" (el-Mesawi, 2006: 88–90). Muslim jurists are of the opinion that any measure that prevents a *mafsadah* is in line with the objectives of the *Shari'ah* even if the latter does not provide any indication as to its validity or otherwise, provided, however, that it should not turn a prohibited act into a permissible one and vice versa (al-Ghazali, 1993: 1/139–40).

The prevention of public harm or evil (*mafsadah 'Ammah*) should be amongst the priorities of Islamic governance according to the orientation of *maqasid al-Shari'ah*.

However, the harm (*mafsadah*) due to the dynamic interaction of human life presents itself in a variety of forms. It varies in degrees due to different contexts and societies, and can hardly be enumerated, not even through the revelation for the dynamism of the development of the human mind and its needs. Hence, the prevention of a certain public harm (*mafsadah*) to public interest in a certain context requires diversity of approaches and policies. In dealing with the issue of governance, *maqasid* determines the radius of policies governing society by accumulating general benefits and avoiding harm to the whole community in order to enhance public interest (*maslahah 'Ammah*) (al-Qaradawi, 2000: 2/986). The eradication of *mafsadah* (in its various forms) that may lead to underdevelopment, unemployment, and economic crises and the impediment of the accomplishment of the *maqasidic* goals is indeed an act of good (Islamic) governance.

Above all, the whole idea of *maqasid* implies a comprehensive implementation of justice in the community through the preservation and promotion of human well-being, which is the ultimate aim of a governance process. *maqasid* as part of epistemological sources in Islam is becoming a foundation to define human well-being. Thus, the articulation of Islamic ethos, which might be useful for governance will be taken under the umbrella of this *maqasidic*-based human well-being consideration. The articulation of this approach will be seen in the formulation of the axioms that relate to governance from Islamic epistemology in the following chapter.

The activation of *maqasid* within such an understanding can be understood within the spirit of verse (2:177) in al-Qur'an:

It is not righteousness that you turn your faces towards East or West; but it is righteousness to believe in Allah and the Last Day and the Angels and the Book and the Messengers; to spend of your substance out of love for Him, for your kin, for orphans, for the needy, for the wayfarer, for those who ask; and for the ransom of slaves; to be steadfast in prayers and practice regular charity; to fulfill the contracts which you made; and to be firm and patient in pain (or suffering) and adversity and throughout all periods of panic. Such are the people of truth, the God-fearing.

Notes

1 Al-Dihlawi (Hermansen, 1995: 387) asserts that:

There is no way for us to obtain knowledge of the divine laws ... except through the report of the Prophet.... There is also no way for us to have knowledge of the sayings of the Prophet ... except by receiving reports which go back to him by successive links and transmission, whether they are in his words; or they are interrupted Traditions whose transmission was verified by a group of the Companions and the Successors ... and in our time there is no way to receive these reports except to follow the literature written in the science of Tradition.

2 As an example: Al-Buraey (1985: 237), derives certain principles related to politics and administration, which is useful in the exploration of the discussion of governance:

1 Sovereignty: General (2: 255) (3: 26) (6: 18) (13: 9, 16, 41) (18: 26) (20: 6) (21: 23) (23: 88) (36: 83) (38: 5) (59: 23) (95: 8) (114: 1–3). A. Sovereignty of God alone (2: 107) (3: 154) (6: 57) (7: 54) (12: 40) (16: 28) (18: 26); B. Legal Sovereignty (2: 229) (5: 44,45,47) (7: 3).

2 Fundamental Right: General (2: 258) (3: 105) (4: 29, 93, 148) (5: 78, 79) (6: 109, 165) (17: 33) (24: 23, 27) (31: 18) (49: 6). A. Security of Life (17: 33); B. The Right to Private Property (2: 188, 267); C. The Right to Human Dignity (49: 11, 12); D. The Right to Privacy (24: 27, 58) (49: 12); E. The Right to Dissent (3: 110) (4: 59) (7: 165); F. The Right to Religious Tolerance (6: 108) (29: 46); G. The Right to Legal Defence (4: 58) (17: 36) (49: 6); H. The Right to Equality Before the Law (28:4); I. The Right to Basic Necessities (51: 19); J. Freedom of Association (3: 104); K. Freedom of Belief and Conviction (2: 256) (10: 99); L. The Principle of Personal Responsibility (6: 164).

3 Principles of State, Government and Administration: General (4: 58,59) (5: 2) (7: 69, 74, 128, 129) (21: 105) (22: 40, 41) (24: 55) (35: 39) (38: 26) (42: 38) (49: 13) (57: 25).

A Rights of the State over Citizens: (i. Loyalty (4: 59); ii. Maintenance of Law and Order (2: 191) (5: 33) (7: 85); iii. Co-operation and its limits (5: 2) (76: 24); iv. Participation in Defence (9: 38, 39));

B Principles of Foreign Policy: (i. Mutual Respect for Pacts and Treaties (8: 58) (9: 4, 7) (16: 91) (17: 34); ii. Honesty and Integrity in All Dealings (16: 92); iii. International Justice (5: 8); iv. The Quest for Peace (8: 61); v. Respect for Neutrality and Non-Combatants (4: 89, 90); vi. Prohibition of Imperialist Exploitation (16: 92) (28: 83); vii. Protection and Support for Muslims Abroad (8: 72); viii. Friendly Relations with Neutral Powers (60: 8, 9); ix. Kindness in International Relations (55: 60); x. Just Retribution for Transgressors (2: 194) (16: 126) (42: 40–2));

C The Administration of Justice (4: 58, 135) (5: 8, 42) (6: 153) (7: 29) (16: 90) (24: 2) (42: 15) (57: 25); D. The Ruler and the Ruled (2: 124, 247) (4: 58, 59) (5: 2, 33, 34) (12: 55) (18: 28) (26: 151, 152) (49: 13); E. People's Authority (2: 247) (3: 26) (4: 59, 83); F. The Principle of Consultation (*shura*) (3: 159) (42: 38); G. The Principle of Leadership (2: 124, 247) (3: 118) (4: 58, 59, 83) (18: 28) (26: 150–2) (38: 28) (39: 9) (49: 13).

3 For instance, al-Qur'an replete with comments on social matters such as often taking a humane stand on behalf of the weak (Ahmed, 1985: 47), mutual co-operation amongst the people, and the need for social justice in order to maintain stability in this worldly life and the life Hereafter. In the spirit of such critical revisiting of the way to deal with al-Qur'an, one can learn from al-Ghazali critiques on the effort to understand al-Qur'an from its literal meaning. In referring to such methods, he insists that the method is not sufficient for an understanding of the realities of the real meanings (*haga'iq al-ma'ani*) of al-Qur'an." (Heer, 1999: 241).

4 In many verses, the Qur'an gives an indication of this issue, amongst them (2:102) and (114:1–7). As for the importance and use of reason, see, for example, (79:26).

5 It can be seen on his passion that ... "Islam should be the moral basis of a modern and progressive society, but that it could not approve everything done in the name of modernization.... A Muslim society could adopt European ideas and sciences without abandoning Islam itself" (Hopwood, 1998: 6).

6 The Classical approach to the exegesis and commentary of al-Qur'an can generally be divided into two major methods: interpretation of the Qur'an according to the traditions (*tafsir bi al-ma'thur*), in which the interpretation of the Qur'an through the Qur'an itself, or the Prophet's traditions (*sunnah*), or the opinion of the Companions (*Sahabah*) and the early generation of Muslims (*al-salaf al-Salih*); while the second method of interpretation of the Qur'an was known as the interpretation according to

individual opinion (*tafsir bi al-ra'y*), in which the exegetes use their own reason in understanding the meaning of the Qur'an (Ayoub, 1984: 22–23).

7 As al-Baqillani (1951: 31) says in his '*Ijaz al-Qur'an*' (Miracle of the Qur'an): "no one could appreciate its miracle like the well-versed Arabic linguists".

8 In this research, I would opt for the moderate way in dealing with *Sunnah*. Only authentic (*Sahib* or *sassan*) *Hadith* will be accepted in this research. In dealing with the method of identifying authentic *Hadith*, I rather combine the method of the *mutaqaddimun* (the early scholars of *Hadith*) and the *muta'akhibirun* (the later generation of the scholars of *Hadith*).

9 The Classical *Usul al-Fiqh* scholars discussed the demarcation between various instructions of the Prophet in his capacity as a 'political leader' and those actions and instructions in his capacity as a 'divinely inspired prophet'. They are: a) Special legislative actions not predicated upon revelation, but special or specific actions relating to managing the state. For these type of *Sunnah*, they are not binding upon the whole *ummah* or future generations; b) Actions related to the public interest, which the Prophet acting as a 'head of government' and without which harm may occur to some specific circumstances and not a general rule for legislation; c) Actions/inferences, based upon a mere personal choice and preference. This is where the Companions of the Prophet would always distinguish between His actions as a [divinely inspired] Messenger and those as a political and military leader. In regard to this category of *Sunnah*, the Prophet frequently consulted the relevant people on matters related to their expertise many occasions (i.e. such as warfare) due to the Qur'anic advice to him "consult them about the matter"; d) Actions related to non-religious matters, the scholars differentiated between the *'ibadah* (worship) and the *mu'amalah* (social interaction). However, the Maliki Madhhab scholar of Tunisia in the twentieth century, Syeikh Tahir Ibn 'Ashur (2006: 34) expounded more on the issue and divided the *Sunnah* into 12 categories: Legislation (*tashri'*), issuing edicts (*fatwa*), adjudication (*qada'*), political leadership of the state (*'imarah*), guidance (*hady*), conciliation (*Illi*), advice to those seeking his opinion (*isharah*), counselling (*Nasihah*), spiritual uplifting of people (*takmil al-nufus*), teaching of transcendent knowledge or lofty truth (*ta'lim al-haqa'iq al-'Aliyah*), disciplining (*ta'dib*) and non-instructive ordinary statements (*tajarrud 'an al-irshad*).

10 It was categorized by Ibn 'Ashur as '*al-tashri'at al-juz'iyyah*' (specific jurisdiction), (Ibn 'Ashur, 2006: 36).

11 There are many incidents to prove such a claim. For instance: during the battle of Badr, Hubab bin Mundhir, one of the Companions voiced out such a worry when he counter-proposed the Prophet's decision to place the Muslim army on the top of the hill; in the same token Omar objected to the Prophet's decision on the fate of Badr's prisoners of war; While on another occasion, the Prophet's decision to maintain the people of Medina inside the city was opposed by the majority, who preferred to leave Medina and engage in an open fight with the Makkhan army during the battle of Uhud; in the same way Salman's idea to dig a ditch surrounding Medina during the *Ahzab* battle (also known as the battle of the ditch (*Khandaq*)) was adopted due to his experience witnessing the Persian strategy in countering the enemies siege; and many more reflect how the Companions managed to differentiate between what is 'revealed' and what is a mere 'rationale' from Prophet's decisions (al-Mubarakfuri, 2002: 195, 208, 222, 273).

12 Narrated by Muslim (no date: 4/1835).

13 Al-Ghazali suggests that:

In its essential meaning it (*maslahah*) is an expression for seeking something useful (*manfa'ah*) or removing something harmful (*madarrah*). But this is not what we mean, because seeking utility and removing harm are the purposes (*maqasid*) at which the creation (*khalq*) aims and the goodness (*salah*) of creation

consists in realizing their goals (*Maqasid*). What we mean by *Maslahah* is the preservation of the *Maqasid* (objective) of the *Shari'ah* law, which consists of five things: preservation of religion, of life, of reason, of descendants and of property. What assures the preservation of these five principles (*usul*) is *Maslahah* and whatever fails to preserve them is *mafsadah* and its removal is *Maslahah*.

(al-Ghazali, 1993: 1/286–7)

14 Al-Risuni (1992: 124) maintains that 'Abdul Malik bin 'Abdullah al-Juwaynî or known as *Imam al-Haramayn* (478 H/AD 1085) (the Imam of the two holy sanctuaries) was the first person to classify the *maqasid al-Shari'ah* into three major categories: Essential, Complementary or Embellishment and Desirable or Luxury (*daruriyyat, hajiyat, tahsiniyat*) all relating in one-way or another to *maslahah*. His disciple, al-Ghazali later on developed Juwaynî's idea further, by classifying the *Maqasid* into the preservation of the five essentials as discussed earlier.

15 The word *mafsadah*, derived from the root word *fasada* or *fasad*, has been mentioned almost 50 times in the Qur'an and has a wide range of meanings, amongst others: "a state of disorder, or disturbance, or of destruction, annihilation, waste, or ruin" (Lane, 1978: 1/2396). It also connotes mischief, corruption, exploitation, wrong, and all forms of injustice, mismanagement, anarchy, and chaos. *Fasad* is the opposite of *islah*, derived from the root word *lalaña*, which literally means "good, incorrupt, sound, right, or a proper state, or in a state of order" (Lane, 1978: 2/216). *Islah* refers to a state of equilibrium where things are in a proper order and balance. Muslim jurists have also used the words *sharr* (evil) and *darar* (harm) as synonymous with *mafsadah*.

6 Contributions of Muslim scholars in the development of a knowledge base for governance

“He who finds a new path is a pathfinder, even if the trail has to be found again by others; and he who walks far ahead of his contemporaries is a leader, even though centuries pass before he is recognized as such....”

(Ibn Khaldun, *al-Muqaddimah*)

A visit to both classical and contemporary Islamic literature relating to the governance discourse is essential in this research to locate how Islamic ontology and epistemology is articulated throughout history in developing the notion and policies related to governance. It will illuminate the quest to trace how Islamic ontology and epistemology could contribute towards the subject. Due to it being a recently developed notion, specific research directly dealing with the relation with the concept and notion of governance in Islam is scarce. However, classical literature on Islamic polity and economics or anything that brings close meaning to the notion of governance would serve as references to this research, which can help to see how Islamic ontology and epistemology is articulated in historical knowledge. The long history of Muslim and Islamic civilization constitutes a long series of experience of Islamic polity. Long before Hobbes, Mills, Rousseau and other Western political thinkers and writers propelled their masterpieces the Muslim scholars had been dedicating themselves to producing literature related to political thought and the political system alike.

Since the dawn of Islamic civilization, Muslims’ governance experience, which encompasses institutions and rulings, has been part of Muslims’ life. Cahen (1970: 2b: 531) suggests that political matters were conceived in terms of religious affairs since the dawn of Islam. Indeed, politics and economy have been part of the wide range teachings of Islam. Prophet Muhammad himself was both a ruler or administrator (of Madinah and the Muslim nation) and a prophet. Being part of *Shari’ah* rulings, political and economic issues were discussed by classical Muslim scholars under the shade of their epistemological sources. In tandem, Muslim empires, throughout the centuries also contributed in preserving the tradition and the system in varying manners. Some implemented the teachings literally, and some have been very selective, and some others chose to rationalize them with the context.

It was these experiences that motivated Muslim scholars throughout the centuries to preserve Islamic contents of politics and economics by producing a mountain of literature on the subject. Methods of developing the literature might vary, but the contents, which involve political, economic, constitutional and administrative aspects, are still the same. Classical literatures were mainly authored during the period where Muslims were living under the shade of their geo-politically diverse and pervasive empire state. The Caliphate institution also stood proudly as the supreme political institution across the Muslim lands despite of its feeble condition in some periods. The discussions in those literatures, therefore, mostly focus on the context the authors were living in. In general, classical jurists (*fujahā*) mainly attributed their writings to two major disciplines; the jurisprudence (*fiqh*) and theology ('*aqidah*) with the issue of Caliphate or *imamate* remaining as the centre of the discussions (Tibi, 1986: 15).

Contemporary literature on governance, on the other hand, was produced during the situation where Muslim nations were in a feeble state, without a Caliphate and when other Islamic political institutions were not functioning. Reactions towards the colonialization of Muslim lands and the remedies for weakness of Muslim leaders were amongst major motivations for the production of the relatively recent literature. Writings from this category engage predominantly on the topics of the 'Islamic state', 'Islamic Caliphate' or the means to re-establish the classical Muslims' political system or thoughts. However, in formulating an emergent paradigm to a new framework (governance) that might not be the case of previous literature, a different way of revisiting those opuses is needed.

In surveying the existing relevant literature, generally, the literature could be divided into eight categories: The classical institutionalism approach; classical *fiqhī* (jurisdiction) method; literature produced by Muslim philosophers; 'mirrors' for the rulers; literature produced by reformists; literature developed by the revivalists; literature produced by neo-revivalists and researches produced by academics.

The classical institutionalism approach

Historically, most of the literature produced using the institutional approach engaged heavily on the topic of *khilafah* or *imamah* (leadership), political institutions, duties and obligations of the institutions. The institutionalism approach of the classical scholars gives a glimpse of the concepts of governance practiced by Muslims throughout history. There were many institutions established by the Muslim rulers, especially during the Abbasid period, which reflects the understanding of efficient and effective public administration as part of the 'good governance' in those periods. It is important to note that most of the governance institutions established in the classical period were merely a continuity of the existing system inherited from the previous powers, i.e. the Persians, the Romans *et al.* Those institutions were kept intact with few adjustments for the assimilation process with Islamic values and norms (al-Buraey, 1985: 233).

Buraey (1985: 257, 261) suggests that these institutions are examples of the functions and values that were embedded within the Muslim community in

the past and could be a guideline for contemporary Muslims. They enshrine the manifestation of the Muslim administrators on how to govern efficiently throughout their worldview. There are numerous pieces produced by classical Muslim scholars based on such methods. However, the most prominent ones in dealing with the topic of governance are as follows:

(i) *Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyyah (Governance of the rulers) by al-Mawardi (c.364H/AD 975–450H/AD 1058)*

The book was written as a reaction towards the fatigue of the Abbasid Caliphs, and the emergence of the non-Arab (Buyids) domination upon the Islamic empire (Haynes, 2007: 55–102). It comprises 20 chapters with topics ranging from the major issue of the Islamic political system, the Caliphate or *Imamate* (central leadership of the Muslims) to administration of justice, finance and natural resources. It engages also in the discussion of the institutions within the Islamic state, from the executive power, judicial, governors to the security forces within the state (al-Mawardi, 2005: 37–82). There is also a full chapter on the '*Diwan*', which is similar to the modern-day bureaucratic system and its regulation on corruption as a landmark of the Muslims governance since the day of the second rightly guided Caliph, Omar, and during the Abbasid reign (al-Mawardi, 2005: 282–308). Al-Mawardi ends his book with the final chapter on the *Hisbah* institution, which focuses mainly on the accountability of both people and the government (al-Mawardi, 2005: 337–62), thus becoming known to be the first author to treat the subject.

His treatment on *Hisbah* brought a new dimension of Islamic concept of accountability, transparency and participation embodied in institutional appearance. While dealing with the issue of separation of power, al-Mawardi brings the concept of the administration of judiciary (*qudat*), which is separated from the office of the Caliph and the viziers. The concept of the rule of law is enshrined clearly in his discussion on the topic of *mazalim* in his treaty as part of the institution existing during his time to deal with the administrative cases involving the higher government officers including the governors and the Caliph himself (al-Mawardi, 2005: 116). However, from the first page to the end of the concluding part, the topic *Shura*, which is the most essential element of Islamic governance, is absolutely invisible. Though he discusses the issue of *ahl al-hil wa al-'aqd* (the people who loosen and bind) and their duty in selecting the Caliph (though in brief) (al-Mawardi, 2005: 6–7), but the concept *Shura* as a mechanism of empowerment was never mentioned.

(ii) *Ghiyath al-Umam fi al-Tayyath al-Zulam (The Saviour of the Nations from the Chaos of Darkness) by 'Abdul Malik ibn 'Abdullah ibn Yusuf ibn Muhammad al-Juwayni (419H/AD 1028–478H/AD 1085)*

This book was also known as *al-Ghiyathi* (the Saviours). It was originally written by al-Juwaynî as a gift to the grand vizier of 'Abbasid during his time, Nizam

al-Mulk, to serve as a legal advice for the vizier to carry out his duties as defined by the Shari'ah rulings' (Khir, 2007: 80). *al-Ghiyathi* significantly discusses the condition of Muslims in the state of the absence of Islamic government. In other words, it had a two-fold purpose: to examine the form of Islamic government and the options open to the Muslim community in the case of the non-existence of such a government. The book starts with dealing with the issue of the ruler (*khalifah*) and all issues related to the institution. While in the second part of the book, the author normatively explains how the political and religious life of the Muslim community in the absence of the *khalifah* should be conducted (al-Juwayni, 1979: 18–22).

Al-Juwayni (1979: 72–6) treated the political system with the notion that it is a fertile ground for *ijtihad*, and not bounded with definitive evidence. Hence, he adopted a critical approach to the prevalent political realities and uses his independent mind to analyse and judge the wide array of views about their legality (Khir, 2007: 81). He was critical also to al-Mawardi's method, which according to him was too simplistic in dealing with the text, and further accused him of trying to impose his own *ijtihads* as if they were definitive evidences. Helmi (al-Juwayni, 1979: 23) suggests that most of the Sunni authors on the Islamic political system and thoughts who came after al-Juwayni, such as Ibn Taimiyyah and others were influenced by '*al-Ghiyathi*'.

(iii) al-Siyasah al-Shari'iyah (Statecraft according to the Shari'ah) and al-Hisbah fi al-Islam (The Institution of Hisbah in Islam) by Taqiy al-Din 'Abul-'Abbas Ahmad ibn 'Abd al-Halém Ibn Taimiyyah, (661H/AD 1263–728H/AD 1328)

In his '*al-Siyasah al-Shari'iyah*', Ibn Taimiyyah implicitly brings the conduct of the ruler within the preview of the Shari'ah. As a realist of his era, he maintains that there is no single official Islamic form of government in Islamic traditions. The classical forms of the Islamic *Khalifah* state were merely built based on opinions, circumstances and custom (Ibn Taimiyyah, 2005). Rulers are to be elected by the people, or by the choice of the majority to be their servants through the doctrine of *wilayah*, which is a mutual contract between the people and the ruler. A ruler hence, holds the responsibility to look after the people and to implement justice in his territory (Ibn Taimiyyah, 2005: 13). He strongly opposes the idea of dictatorship and appointed rulers; and also he was against the idea of the small elite choice in electing leaders (Ibn Taimiyyah, 2005). Unlike his predecessors, Ibn Taimiyyah did not put most effort in his treatises dealing with the issues relating to the Caliphate as the ideal of the state symbol in Islam and the institutions supporting it.¹

He advocates a kind of political pluralism involving participation in the state in his discussion on the matter of *Shura*. He tried to give a more democratic interpretation of *Shura* by involving every citizen in the process of *Shura*, and not confining it to a certain group of people. People, according to him, should not only be subjects of obedience, but also must be actively involved and participate in

the affairs of the state by the power given to them by the *Shari'ah*. They must play the role of check and balance in the power exercised by government (Ibn Taimiyah, 2005: 250). In maintaining the order and the ideal of just and virtuous state, Ibn Taimiyah suggests that collaboration between the leaderships and the '*Ulama*' is essential. '*Ulama*' or the religious scholars, as the representatives of society, according to Ibn Taimiyah must play the role of a mediator between the ruler and the ruled (Zubaida, 2005: 100).

He also touched upon the issue of effective governance by pointing out elements of ineffective administration of a state, such as favouritism, nepotism and incompetency of administrators and government's officers. He discussed in detail about duties and responsibilities of executive power, the principle of competence in personnel selection, the right person for the right post and so forth. He suggested that the more qualified person is better and more suitable for any governmental post than the one who fears God most but is incapable of executing the tasks. The trust to preserve the benefit of the larger community and the need to serve the best for religion demands such decisions (Ibn Taimiyah, 2005: 9–14 and 21). Accordingly, public function, in what Ibn Taimiyah believed to be the most Islamic and efficient model is the one resting on two bases: capacity (*quwwah*); and trust (*amanah*) (Ibn Taimiyah, 2005: 20). The issues of equity in management, justice in collecting and distributing funds, consultation, decision making, and many others related to governance were also part of the discussions in the book (Ibn Taimiyah, 2005: 37–60). Based on his contribution to the world of administration and management in this book, some scholars crowned him as the father of Islamic administration (Bureay, 1985: 277).

Another significant treatise by Ibn Taimiyah regarding the matter of politics and governance is his classical book '*al-Hisbah fi al-Islam*' (the institution of hisbah in Islam), which has become the major reference for the discourses on Islamic political thoughts and Islamic economy. In this particular book, he insists that religion could not be practiced without state power. The religious duty of enjoining good and forbidding evil (*amar ma'ruf nahy munkar*), which is the gist of *Hisbah* institution can never be exercised in the absence of power and authority of a leader (*Imam*) (Ibn Taimiyah, 1985). The book was divided into two major chapters. In its first chapter, Ibn Taimiyah deals with the concept, principles and mechanisms for the management of an Islamic economy and highlights how different institutions of Islam play their respective roles to achieve the objectives of justice and freedom in society (Ibn Taimiyah, 1985: 17–70). In Chapter 2, the author deals with the principals of the Islamic society, which are based strongly on the concept of enjoining the righteous and forbidding the evil, the *imamate* (leadership), its institution, responsibilities and some elements relate to the issues along with the elaboration on the relationship between the ruler and the ruled with regards to their rights and responsibilities (Ibn Taimiyah, 1985: 73–133).

(iv) *Al-Muqaddimah (Prolegomena) by Ibn Khaldun (732 H/AD 1332–808 H/AD 1406).*

Ibn Khaldun's *magnum opus* was his 'Kitab al-'ibar',² a seven-volume universal history book, of which the first, the Introduction or 'al-Muqaddimah', is where he sets out his main theory. In 'Kitab al-'ibar', he analyses the basic conditions of Islamic life with a mind open to facts as a keen and shrewd observer. In the book, he interprets history and reveals its secret through comparison, theoretical comprehension and the analysis of the nature and causes of historical events, from which he derived the general laws which lay behind those events (Lambton, 1981: 155). *Al-Muqaddimah* independently serves as a key to past history and being recognized as literature that can facilitate practising statesmen towards a better judgement and a better appreciation of present-day events (Walzer, 1963: 45).

Ibn Khaldun compares the lives or cultures of civilized people ('Umran Hadari) in the city with the life of the Bedouin ('Umran Badawi) and tried to establish a relation between the two (Ibn Khaldun, [2005] 1967: 91–122). The major thesis of the book was the author's view on the importance of 'asabiyah for any state, empire or community.³ The 'asabiyah's importance within the tribal unit is shown exhaustively, he believes, but its application goes far beyond mere tribal life and is of an almost universal validity (Ibn Khaldun, [2005] 1967). He thoroughly understood the importance of the religious element in the actual events of Islamic history, and demonstrated how thoroughly 'religious' and 'political' forces are intertwined. Thus, he concludes that the 'asabiyah alone without an additional great force provided by the religion will never be sufficient to establish great civilization and vice versa⁴ (Mahdi, 1957: 199–201). *Al-Muqaddimah* expounds historic-sociological themes in a way far more excellent than its contribution towards the discourse of governance. The opus proportionately enlightens a holistic approach in understanding human nature, and the Muslim socio-historical context needed to formulate a new *ijtihad* for a new model of governance.

Classical contribution of *Fuqaha'*

Classical Muslim jurists (*fuqaha'*) have prolifically produced enormous volumes of *fiqh* encyclopaedias in dealing with political issues concerning Muslims. The topic of *imamah* (leadership), its responsibilities, the qualification of an *imam* or caliph, its authority, the *bay'ah* (oath of allegiance) and issues surrounding it, the *Shura* mechanism and its institution, and other things are amongst the themes discussed in those encyclopaedias. Methods applied by the *fuqaha'* also heavily emphasize the purely legalistic mechanism of determining the rulings rather than dealing with philosophical and historical elements. On the other hand, there is not a great of literature of the kind that deals with some specific political-economic issues in separated volumes. This type of literature normally engages with the issues discussed in rather specific and directed areas and most of them have become major references for some selected fields.

Amongst those books were *Kitab al-Kharaj* by Abu Yusuf (c.113 H/AD 731–182 H/AD 798), *Kitab al-Kharaj* by Yahya bin Adam (130 H/AD 752–204 H/AD 818) and *Kitab al-Amwal* by Abu ‘Ubayd al-Qasim bin Salam (150/4 H/AD 770–224 H/AD 838). However, apart from Abu Yusuf’s *Kitab al-Kharaj*, the two other books were merely compilations of Prophet Muhammad’s traditions along with the Companions’ views, with little comments and ideas from the authors.

(i) Kitab al-Kharaj (Land taxation) by Abu Yusuf (c.113 H/AD 731–182 H/AD 798)

Kitab al-Kharaj is the only work surviving among the many treatises Abu Yusuf produced. The book deals with *Kharaj* (Land taxation) issue and other topics related to the political issues such as public finance, penal code (*al-Jinayat*), the rulings on apostates, the position of the judges and government officers, the issue of loyalty and treason that probably existed during his time. His work was more judiciary in nature due to his background as the chief judge and a jurist of his time (al-Jneidal, 1986: 2/135). After his death, the Hanafi School used his work as a textbook for study. In his introduction to the book, Abu Yusuf states his reason for writing the book, which was originally replying to the request of the Caliph Harun al-Rashid (Abu Yusuf, 1934: 3). Some of the contents in the book also imply advice from the author to the Caliph, which he structured on a question-and-answer basis. There, he supported his arguments with evidence from the Qur'an and the Prophetic traditions, which he articulated in a reasoning form based on his own analysis.

Abu Yusuf’s contribution towards the idea of the governance of a country’s economic development based on Islamic ontology can best be summarized in three major points: The importance of justice and piety in the governance of the national treasury and policy by abiding God’s rule and avoiding forbidden revenue and expenditure; respect for individual private ownership and non-interference of the state on people’s wealth; and finally, the positive role of the state to develop the country through the encouragement of labour and land exploration rather than keeping them under welfare and as a regulator to regulate the market from any misconducts through the *Hisbah* mechanism (Abu Yusuf, 1986). The arguments and examples given by the author might only be suitable within his context; however, the substantial part of his justifications in those arguments exemplify the *fuqaha*’ method in producing new *ijtiihad* to the subject and is worth studying.

Muslim philosophers’ contribution to the relevant literature

Literature that has been produced by such methods places its emphasis mostly on the philosophical side of politics. In most of the treatises, the philosophers tried to harmonize the Hellenistic philosophies with Islamic values. The most prominent of all Muslim scholars using such a method was Abu Nasr Muhammad al-Farabi

(260 H/AD 870–339 H/AD 950). In both his treaties, namely ‘*al-Madinah al-Fadilah*’ and ‘*al-Siyasah al-Madaniyyah*’ he discusses the ideals and the aim of the ‘*Al-Madinah al-Fadilah*’ virtuous or excellent city (Walzer, 1985).

Al-Farabi’s teaching concerning political life and government is based on his understanding of Plato’s political philosophy and the manner in which he tried to introduce it to a society governed by divine law (al-Najjar, 1980: 112). Concerning the issue of leadership, al-Farabi enumerates the quality of the supreme ruler (the Caliph) in more or less orthodox terms while dealing with the opinions of the inhabitants of the virtuous city (*Al-Madinah al-Fadilah*) (Walzer, 1985: 247–9). However, unlike the other authors who deal with the issue of Caliph and the prerequisites of one in becoming a Caliph for the Muslim community, al-Farabi in ‘*Siyasah al-Madaniyyah*’ does not discuss much about the religious qualities but rather discusses the philosophical requirement needed from a Caliph. He believes that a ruler for the ideal regime must combine the philosophic with the prophetic faculty. In the same piece he abandoned any reference to God, revelation and Shari’ah, instead pointing out that the most important quality of the first ruler is the love of truth and wisdom (al-Farabi, 1959: 105–8).

While in his other piece, ‘*Fusul Muntaza’ah*’, al-Farabi points out that the supreme ruler (*Ra’is Awwal*) of the virtuous city must possess the quality of wisdom, perfect prudence, excellence of persuasion, excellence in imaginative representation, physical ability to wage war, and a perfect physical body (al-Farabi, 1971: 46). The ruler with all those qualities is called by al-Farabi ‘*al-Dustur*’. This view caused some researchers to imply the possibility that al-Farabi could be a Shi’ite. However, Lambton (1981: 72) refutes such claims proving that al-Farabi did not subscribe to the idea of ‘chosen’ or ‘selected’ lineage to be the major condition of becoming the ‘*Ra’is*’ (leader) of the virtuous state, especially in his book, ‘*Tahsil al-Sa’adat*’.

Furthermore, al-Farabi asserts that in the case of the absence of a ruler with such qualities, the administration of the state then must be delegated to a group of men who combine these qualities among themselves. They are known then as the select chiefs (*ru’asa’ akhyar*) and their regime is called the regime of the excellent. In case such a group is not found, then the chief of the city should be knowledgeable of the laws and traditions laid down by those who managed the cities previously. In such a situation, the ruler must have the wisdom and the correct opinion to interpret and apply these laws to new circumstances, and the other qualities as a credible elder as well as the ability to wage war. He will then be called the King of the Laws and his regime the Kingdom of the Laws. Finally, if such a person is not to be found, its place must be replaced by a group of men combining all of these qualifications, and they would then be known as the Chiefs of the Laws (al-Farabi, 1971: 66–7).

Al-Farabi sets freedom as the major principle of a virtuous and democratic city, where each one of the citizens is given free rein and left alone to do whatever he likes and no one has any claim to authority unless he works to promote their freedom. Another major principle is equality, which implies that all the

citizens are equal, and their laws say that no man is in any way at all better than any other man (al-Farabi, 1959: 141). Al-Farabi upholds that the citizen must have consent to participate in political activities, even if in a limited role, because they must strive for happiness by utilizing their ability to reason. However, Al-Farabi opposes the idea of rendering the decision-making process by government to the masses. Such a position is also applauded by Ibn Rushd who views the *jumhur* or the majority of the people as 'the people of rhetoric' (al-Najjar, 1980: 111).

Furthermore, Al-Farabi maintains that the rulers should be able to maintain power and not be forced to succumb to wavering political ideas of the citizenry. Furthermore, the citizens' city must live with the spirit of *ta'awun* (mutual co-operation) and must avoid greed, selfishness and individualism (Walzer, 1985: 229). Such a city according to al-Farabi will be desired by many to live in (Zakaria, 1986: 86, 88). Neither Plato nor Aristotle mentioned this quality of mutual co-operation. One could conclude that in such a way, al-Farabi had managed to give a new meaning to the 'ideal state' based on the Islamic spirit of '*ummah*' (nation) and '*ukhuwwah*' (brotherhood) in which the ideal of Islamic governance was based throughout its history. However, al-Farabi did not contribute much to new ideas but rather explained Plato's *Republic* in Muslim jargon (Hofmann, 2001: 4).

Mirror⁵ approach

The closest approach of classical Islamic literature to the topic of governance was the 'mirror' approach. The 'mirrors' have been defined as advice given to the rulers (*khalifah*, *sultan*, *emir*) on the ethical conduct of their government and to uphold the concepts of justice and *Shari'ah* laws. They normally deal with the ethical, technical and details of governance and administration of the state. Mirrors are concerned with the art of government and governance. Mirror's authors are learned men often experienced in political and administrative affairs as viziers (ministers) or officials of the Muslim states and empires. Their method is that of anecdotes based on or resulting from political aphorisms. Their goal mainly is to educate the subject through their advice and examples. There are many mirrors produced by classical Muslim scholars in various languages. However, the most prominent amongst them all are the following:

(i) *al-Adab al-Kabir*, *al-Adab al-Kabir al-Saghir* and *Risalah fi al-Sababah* by 'Abdullah Ibn al-Muqaffa' (103 H/AD 721–139 H/AD 757)

As the pioneering mirror literature in Muslim history, these treatises were miniature mirrors for the addressee, presumably the prince or the caliph, and were very useful in reflecting the Islamic ethos in the respected realm as administrative text. In these pieces the author addresses al-Mansur (who may have never seen it) on specific problems facing the new 'Abbasid regime that succeeded the Omayyad's with no logical arrangement. Three major institutions of governance

have been treated acutely in these books: the army (*al-jund*), the judiciary (*al-qada'*) and the land taxation (*al-Kharaj*). The literal contents of the books might not be a suitable piece for contemporary democratic governance; however, it is a prescriptive reference in understanding the political and socio-historical atmosphere of the time and *fujaha'* responding to it. The author insists on the essential of an ethnically mixed body that should be taught only the tenets of a clear, concise religious code issued by the Caliph. In ensuring the army's standing, morale and future loyalty, the author suggests certain reforms on the welfare and meritocracy, including the removal of fiscal duties from the military, officer recruitment from the ranks based on merit, religious education, inculcation of integrity and loyalty, regular pay linked to inflation, and maintenance of an efficient intelligence service throughout the empire (Ibn al-Muqaffa', 1998). Apart from the suggested technical reforms, these mirrors also describe the ideal personalities and good conduct that Caliphs should live by.

(ii) Siyasat Nameh by Nizam al-Mulk (408 H/AD 1017–485 H/AD 1091)

This landmark treatise on Islamic mirrors comprises 50 chapters, compiled by the vizier Nizam al-Mulk just before his death. It was actually an answer to Malik Shah's request on how to deal with the cause of the troubles mounting in his kingdom (Lambton, 1984: 55). His answers in the book are mostly substantiated and illustrated by a large number of anecdotes⁶ mainly taken from history and tradition to explain every principle of political conduct (Nizam al-Mulk, 2002: xvi–xvii). Good administration of a state according to Nizam al-Mulk must bear certain characteristics that will ensure justice, stability and harmony. Primarily, he emphasizes the need of stability in a state by fulfilling the needs of the people, and the full control of the market through a planned economy by the state (Rivzi, 1977: 111, 165–7). According to his idea, the state works as both benevolent protector of the people and market regulator. The people's interest and welfare are the responsibility of the state in ensuring stability and the people's well-being.

In tandem, the people must also adhere to the same principle to create the God-fearing atmosphere. In such a way, an ideal Islamic government is the one that depends for its existence on the presence of law and moral-abiding subjects (Rivzi, 1977: 96). Moreover, Nizam al-Mulk concludes that only by abiding by the Shari'ah, the supreme law in the state, the ruler will attain his support from the people. This shows how unity between religion and politics is crucial in an Islamic state. Throughout such an ideal, Nizam al-Mulk has given a new definition of 'state' as a political institution with strong moral, social and humanitarian attributes (Rice, 1961: 97); while the moral attributes in this case derive from the sovereignty of Allah. He insisted the importance of judiciary independency, rule of law and an accountability system be exercised within the Muslim community and be the major principle of the state. Apart from the worldly quality of the ruler, the foremost quality that should furnish a Muslim ruler is *taqwa* (piety) (Nizam al-Mulk, 2002).

The significance of this book is such that the main principles enunciated therein still guide nations and rulers in their relations with one another and in their domestic affairs. This is perhaps attributed to the high degree of pragmatism and viability inherent in the ideas propagated because the book is an expression of a realistic political theory that emerges out of an actual political situation, and, therefore, helps us to understand the stage that the development of Muslim polity reached in the fifth century AH/eleventh century AD. Thus, there exists a strong cohesion and cogent embodiment between theory and practice, partly arising out of the position of Nizam al-Mulk as a real-life statesman.

(iii) Nasihat al-Muluk (Counsel for Kings) by Muhammad Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali (450 H/AD 1058–505 H/AD 1111)

The title of the book implies that the theme of the book is similar to Nizam al-Mulk's *Siyasat Nameh*. The book deals solely with the ethical and moral lessons relating to statecraft and administration like other mirrors. It does not indulge in the issues of systems and institutions of the Islamic state, but the advice may be drawn for the improvement of the administrative and bureaucratic machinery of the contemporary world (Bureay, 1985: 277). Al-Ghazali started his book with the issue of creed by explaining the principles of creed with special emphasis on the attributes and glory of God, and the issue of the Hereafter. The introductory chapter implies the importance of accountability (Bagley, 1964). Though he did not specifically mention the word accountability for the topic of the chapter, it can clearly be understood from the message he tried to convey within the sentences he used in the discussion. The message can obviously be comprehended in his reminder to the rulers that their power is but an endowment and trust of God to them. Their duty is to care for the people and to commit him to the ideals of fairness and justice, for justice is the value that upholds any government's legitimacy.

Al-Ghazali reiterates to the addressee that they will be accountable before God during the resurrection day and will be questioned on their performance and delivery. Al-Ghazali proposes ten principles that the rulers must follow in order to succeed during the day of judgement. Those principles imply good conduct and good administration values that should be followed by the rulers (Bagley, 1964). Al-Ghazali defines the aim of politics as determining the destiny of man in the life Hereafter.⁷ He also mentioned other qualities of political institutions that were created to support the rulers in their administration. As an example, he discusses comprehensively about the function of the *kuttab* (secretaries) as a pillar of good government. Bagley (1964) insists that al-Ghazali reflected his Aristotelian and Persian tendencies in the piece through some of his thoughts and advice that he decorated within an Islamic framework. On the other hand, Diyab (1990: 442) diagnoses that al-Ghazali's political views were shaped by the context in which he was living, where there was widespread political dissension, hence he felt a need for an authority that would

bring about political unity, demonstrate its sovereignty and regulate cultural and political life.

The contribution of reformists on the relevant literature

During the eve of the collapse of the Ottoman dynasty and during the calamity of the Ottoman Caliphs, few writers rose to present their critiques on governance issues in Muslim states. Most of the issues discussed by those who were then called reformist, were concerned with people's rights, the despotic nature of Muslim leaders, freedom of politics and Muslim unity. European Enlightenment remnants on the political life of the Europeans have shaken those reformist's intellectuality. Their exposure to the freedom of people and the invisibility of the despotic nature in the Western world made the reformists begin to contemplate the situations in Muslim countries. Amongst prominent contribution made by the reformists are the following:

(i) Tabai' al-Istibdad (The Nature of Dictatorship) and 'Umm al-Qura' (Mother of the cities) 'Abdul Rahman al-Kawakibi (1854–1903)

Tabai' al-Istibdad (The Nature of Dictatorship) was al-Kawakibi's critique of the Muslim rulers of his time. While '*Umm al-Qura'* on the other hand, articulates his ideal of the *ummah* unity under one unified commonwealth (Imarah, 1988; Abu Hamdan, 1992). Both books were highly influential in the field of Islamic political thought as well as in the issue of governance, and are considered as the landmarks of the author's contribution towards the discourse of governance.

In *Tabai' al-Istibdad*, Al-Kawakibi alerts his people to the cause of their malady, so that they are able to do something to change the situation they are living in. There, he blamed the dictatorship style of governance for the weakness of the Muslims. He strongly rejects the notion that Islam allows dictatorship, and suggests that the main pillar of good governance from an Islamic point of view is the practice of accountability and the large amount of freedom people have to exercise their political rights (al-Kawakibi, 1953: 18–19). This was shown, as he states, in early Islamic government, where Islam established the foundation of political freedom (al-Kawakibi, 1953: 8–9). Furthermore, he maintains that dictatorship and education run in opposite directions. All dictators are in trouble when their people become well educated. Hence, they try to keep their people in a state of ignorance (al-Kawakibi, 1953: 25–30). Moreover, he asserts that dictatorship weakens the national economy and encourages social corruption, destroying moral values.

In *Umm Al-Qura*, Al-Kawakibi presents his idea of unity through minutes of an imaginary conference attended by fictional representatives, which he describes as thinkers belonging to known towns of 22 Muslim countries. He supposes that those representatives should be the scholars who are representing civil

society (due to his admiration of the Western notion of independent civil society). Through the discussion, al-Kawakibi tries to impose his idea that reform could only happen to the *ummah* through educational means and is driven by the scholars as the leaders of civil society. He strongly disagrees that politics could play much of a role in the reform process. He imagines that those prominent people were convened in Mecca (also known as *Umm al-Qura*) during the *Hajj* (pilgrimage). The theme chosen for the conference is “the identification of the causes of the state of backwardness of the Muslim *ummah*, its symptoms and how to overcome it and set the Muslim *ummah* on the road to recovery” (al-Kawakibi (1316 H): 11–12).

The conference identifies no less than 86 causes of Muslim weakness, and then concludes that:

Muslims all over the world are indeed in a state of deadly lethargy; and the only remedy for the sickness then is only through proper education and continuously motivating young people to strive for a better status; to be taken in collective efforts by scholars and sages of insight and wisdom.

(al-Kawakibi, 1316 H): 91–9)

This book, however, does not directly involve the topic of governance; throughout the discussions of the representatives, some issues concerning governance have been deliberately addressed. The issues of political system, civil society, freedom and accountability have been debated in that imaginary conference. In the issue of governance, the conference finally agrees that progress is linked to accountability while regress is linked to despotism.

(ii) al-Hukumah al-Istibdadiyyah by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838–1897)

In *al-Hukumah al-Istibdadiyyah*, al-Afghani claims that the absence of justice and *Shura* (council), and non-adherence by the government to the constitution, were the diseases that led to the *ummah*'s state of paralysis. He strongly suggests participation of the people in the state governance for the citizen freedoms and rights. All citizens should be allowed to participate in the political and social dimension in the state governance through *Shura* and election. He strongly condemns despotism, which he considers as the fatal attribute to the *ummah*. Its existence in the *ummah* body is an earlier sign of its decline (Tamimi, 2000).

There, he professes his obsession with the philosophy of the republican government, which he sees as restricted government that is accountable to the public, and seeks the consultation of the governed, that is thus the antithesis of the absolutist one. The very idea of accountability, participation and transparency can clearly be understood from his endeavour. He was amongst those who persuaded the Ottoman Caliphate to be transformed to a constitutional state (al-Jneidal, 1986: 2/335). However, he did not try to address the detailed concepts of effective governance from Islamic traditions nor the history apart from

the general principles, which might be due to his lack of experience in the field of governance and administration. The only example he saw during his trips to the Western countries was the freedom and the peoples' participation that seemed to be the major absence on the Muslims' soil. His approach to the subject gave an introduction for any researcher to engage with the issue (Keddie, 1968).

(iii) al-Khilafah (the caliphate) by Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865–1935)

In his book *al-Khilafah*, Rida emphasizes Islam as a comprehensive religion that comprises guidance, mercy and socio-civic policy (by which he means politics). He states:

As for the socio-civic policy (*mu'amalat*), Islam has laid its foundations and set forth its rules, and has sanctioned the exertion of opinion and the pursuit of *ijtihad* in the matters related to it because it changes with time and place and develops as architecture and all other aspects of knowledge developed. Its foundations include the following principles: that the authority belongs to the people; that decision-making is through *Shura*; that government is a form of republic; that the ruler should not be favoured in a court of law to the layman for he is only employed to implement *Shari'ah* and the will of the people; and that the purpose of this policy is to preserve religion and serve the interests of the public.

(Rida, 1988: 9)

On the economics reform, with all his knowledge on classical Islamic paradigm of macro and microeconomics, he proposed 14 points on how Muslims can improve their economic and financial situation (Rida, 1988: 316–17). The points concentrate mostly on Islamic principals of ownership, expenditures, social justice and Islamic doctrine of benevolence individuals via *zakah* (alm), *infaq* (charity) and *waqf* (endowment). Rida believes that such an Islamic approach is a middle path between classical Capitalism and Socialism, and stresses that the *zakah* system is the most important instrument in the macro-economics of the *ummah* (Rida, 1956: 10/183). While in political reform, Rida asserts that true Islamic polity consists of two major elements: the acceptance of *tawhid* and *shura* (mutual consultation) in matters of state. Unfortunately, despotic rulers, he argued, have tried to make Muslims forget the latter by encouraging them to abandon the former. Rida was also known as a staunch proponent for the restoration or rejuvenation of the *Khilafah* or caliphate institution for Islamic unity (Rida, 1988).

Contribution of revivalists to the relevant literature

The total collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the year 1924 brought a new dawn for Muslim political life globally. Long before the total death of the empire,

numerous initiatives had been put forward to save the weak empire in order to rejuvenate the pro-active role of the Islamic Caliphate it used to play in the past. Enayat (2001: 78–103) mentions several efforts that had taken place after the collapse, such as the Pan-Islamism movement, the Caliphate Congress in India and others in bringing back the Caliphate institution to the realm of Muslim politics. But none of them reached their goal, but ended up with failure. Muslim revivalists who were generally seeking to reinstate Islam as a religio-political order and as a panacea to the global Muslims social, economical and political crisis later took this vacuum. They believed that true Islamic life at both personal and communal levels could only be implemented under the ‘Islamic State’ in which the systems applied were derived from the teaching of the Qur'an. The Islamic State’s scope of control is coextensive with the holistic view of human life and the temporal and spiritual, which are under the purview of Islamic ideology.

Hassan al-Banna and Abu al-A'la al-Mawdudi are frequently referred to as the cornerstone for the Islamist revivalism. Their ideas became a major launching pad for the global phenomenon of Islamist movements and managed to shape major events and discourses in the later period. These forefathers of the revivalist movement are worth mentioning in the exploration of understanding the principal of Islamic governance due to the nature of their discourses. Their ideals have been subscribed by many in creating the new reality as a panacea for the lame condition of the Muslim nation in their effort to rebuild the perceived glory of the past.

(i) Hassan al-Banna (1906–49)

Al-Banna (1988: 101–3; 394–5) laid down the ‘big picture’ of Islamic governance in his ‘*Maratib al-’Amal*’ (the Levels of Struggle). He pointed out that the destruction of the Caliphate institution, which he considered to be the guardian of both the Muslim *ummah* (nation) and the religion, has led to the demand from every Muslim to rebuild it from the ashes. The struggle for such a cause, he suggests, must start from the very foundation of the Muslim *ummah*, which is the individual. Hence, he asserted that an ideal Muslim is the one who is practicing the real teachings of Islam in his life based upon his ideal crystallized into what he called ‘*Usul al-’Ishrin*’ (the 20 Fundamentals); those individuals must engage with the second unit of the *ummah*, which is the family; the family units will constitute the Muslim community, which will play their active role in establishing the Islamic government in the Muslim land; the Islamic government will then unite under the banner of the Muslim commonwealth and will be ruled by the Caliphate institution; this, however, is not the ultimate aim for the struggle. The Muslim commonwealth is responsible for establishing what he called as ‘*ustadhiyyat al-’Alam*’ (the Patron of the world), which can be understood as the ‘Islamic World Order’ (el-Ghazali, 2000). Following on from this, Mitchel (1969: 131) suggests that al-Banna was preparing a movement towards achieving the ‘Islamic Order’ rather than an ‘Islamic State’, founded on the ground of the framework.

Al-Banna's goal of an Islamic nation was to be built upon the reform of individual hearts and souls. This would be followed by the organization of "society to be fit for the virtuous community which commands the good and forbids evil-doing, then from the community will arise the good state" (al-Banna, 1988: 54; 101; 118–22; 135–7; 330–1). While on another occasion, al-Banna (1978: 33, 36) claims that a Muslim state, which deserved *Ikhwan* endorsement, is the one that has four major criteria: the constitution, the laws and rules of which should be Islamic; the responsibility for carrying out political decisions should be given to those who are practicing Islam; the foreign policy should be in accordance with Islamic principles; and it should not hinder attempts to establish genuine Islamic systems locally and internationally. In conclusion, al-Banna's less-radical approach towards the issue of Islamic governance emphasizes the virtue of functioning and moral or faith-based individuals along with the implementation of *Shura* and Islamic ideology as the basic foundations of the Islamic community (Moussalli, 1993).

(ii) Abu A'la al-Mawdudi (1903–79)

Unlike al-Banna, Mawdudi's philosophy of governance was crystallized in his debates on the issue of Islamic state and its system, which is strongly associated with his name. Islamic governance in Mawdudi's Islamic state was founded on three foundational principles: *Tawhid* (oneness of Allah); *Risalah* (prophethood) and *Khilafah* (man's vicegerency of Allah) (Mawdudi, 1976: 9). The principle of *tawhid* implies that the sovereignty of God exceeds other legal or political sovereignty of human beings, thus the idea of *Hakimiyyah* (God de facto sovereignty in all aspects of human life), hence the right to enact and legislate rested alone for God. The *Hakimiyyah* entails that human-made ideologies are not acceptable and have no place before God's laws and systems (Mawdudi, 1982: 253; 1983: 166).

Mawdudi (1982) further suggested that Prophet Muhammad manifests God's *de jure* sovereignty on earth and his teachings to be part of the revelation of God in enacting the laws and any systems relating to human life. Islamic societies and communities over all time are to emulate in their life all the systems and guidance shown by the Prophet, while people, as the vicegerents of God, possess limited authority delegated to him by God. As vicegerents or God's representative on earth, they are obliged to administer their life, and in this specific manner, their political life and state according to God's will, which is enshrined in the teaching of the Qur'an and Sunnah. People as God's vicegerents are only the executors of the laws given by God.

However, Mawdudi did not favour the purely theological 'Church run-state' version of the Islamic State. He insisted that the Islamic State is an ideological state which implements the systems of Islam in the whole aspect of its administration and its government and administrators being chosen by the people according to the concept of *shura*. He chose the term 'Theo-Democracy' for his ideal state (Mawdudi, 1985: 37). Despite his acceptance of the people's choice

of government, he intensely rejected the amalgam of the Western idea of 'Nationalist Democracy', which was promoted by the colonial powers in India. Such an idea will only ensure the predominance of the Indian and non-Islamic forces and influences upon other races and religions in India (Metcalf, 1987: 135).

While in the economic sector, Mawdudi emphasizes strongly the need to establish a healthy economic order aligned with the nature of humanity. What he means by nature of humanity was the recognition of both private ownership and individual rights with the act of benevolence towards one another without being forced by third parties, i.e. the state. Furthermore, Mawdudi was against the interference of the state into the market and individual life, except in the role of regulator to avoid any mischief and corruption. He argued for the fair distribution of wealth based on needs and welfare rather than equal distribution, without taking into consideration the needs and socio-background. He was quoted as saying:

Equality of the unequal is no equality at all! Neither it is proper to change natural inequality nor to extend inequality to unnatural limits and make them inequitable. Both the extremes are equally reprehensible. A healthy economic system should maintain justice and keep the distribution of wealth within the limits prescribed by the Lord of the universe.

(Kausar, 2005: 130)

Contribution of neo-revivalists

The term neo-revivalist refers to certain individuals from the revivalist school of thought, but who later shifted from the typical idealism of earlier discourse to a realization of the need to appreciate the best of other worlds. This new discourse as coined by el-Messiri (2003) is derived from those who experienced both the Western and Islamic backgrounds. These cohorts started to engage with subject matters such as democracy, social justice, accountability, transparency, human rights and other modern political systems. Unlike their forefathers, the new discourse proponents seriously endeavour to incorporate those universal values into their struggle to create a new realm for Muslim society in their homeland. As for them, the universal values from the 'others' are in common with Islamic values and principals. Such a situation created an emergence of literature in the Islamists' circle and also a debate on the issue of governance. Amongst the prominent figures from the Islamist circle who are genuinely known as the proponents of this new discourse, according to el-Messiri (2003), are Al-Ghannoushi, al-Qaradawi, Muhammad Immara, Salem al-Ewwa, Azzam Tamimi, Louay Safi *et al.*

Research by academicians

There is also a great deal of literature by academicians relating to the issue of governance. Most of the this deals with the research on Islamic development,

management, public administration and institutions in various languages. Amongst them are: Kettani's '*al-Tartib al-Idariyyah*' (1927); Hanifi's 'A Survey of Muslim Institutions and Culture' (1964); Subhi Saleh's '*al-Nuzum al-Islamiyyah*' (Islamic Systems) (1965), and the others with the same title by Hasan and Hasan (1962); al-'Adawi (1972) and Wasfy (1977); Husaini's 'Arab Administration' (1966); Hamidullah's 'The Muslim Conduct of State' (1968); Sherwani's 'Studies in Muslim Political Thought and Administration' (1970); Mansour's 'Systems of Government and Administration in Islamic Shari'ah and Man-Made Law' (Arabic) (1971); Wasfy's '*Musannafat an-Nuzum al-Islamiyyah*' (1977); Asad's *The Principles of State and Government in Islam* (1980). On the other hand, an abundance of research dedicated specifically to the topic '*Hisbah*', which was one of the crucial elements in the classical Islamic governance throughout history had been produced for non-indoctrination or non-ideological academic purposes. Al-Buraey (1985: 292) lists a couple of them, which had been written in English, Arabic and French. However, none of them really has any direct impact on the debates over the new concept of governance.

Thus far, Al-Buraey's *Administrative Development: an Islamic Perspective* (1985) should be regard as a worthy piece dealing with the subject matter. Despite its focus on 'administrative development', it also discusses a wide range of issues concerning governance. Its attempt to explore the classical experience and to derive the values and principals to be applied to the contemporary reality enrich the alphabets of 'Islamic governance' inquiries. Unlike other researchers who are solely engaged with the historical artefacts that are implemented into the modern climate without analysing the socio-historical context of the current situation, al-Buraey managed to allocate the lacunae in the contemporary set-up without neglecting the contextual elements of the previous experiments. Despite lengthy discussions on administrative development issues and Islamic foundations, the ontological and epistemological issues were clearly abandoned. The book prepares a clear picture of empirical and practical proposals on the issue of governance, but neglects the philosophical and theoretical essence, which is needed to develop new knowledge.

Reflecting on the nature of the classical and recent literature

The preceding section provides a detailed account of the material produced by the Muslim scholars over the centuries, some of which are directly related to the subject matter, while most of them provide general remarks related to the topic of governance. Since this study aims at developing a systematic model of governance according to the ontological and epistemological provisions of Islam, as described above, a critical review of the above-presented literature is essential.

A critical comprehension of the nature of the afore-described literature reflects that they are mostly eclectic and advice-oriented, which consequently identifies governance as the process of Islamization of the inherited system of the land conquered by the Muslims, either as a result of the *fiqh*-oriented or

philosophical approach. Furthermore, those literatures were not produced systematically and they do not directly attempt to systemize the relevant knowledge by locating it in the ontology and epistemology. In other words, indeed they emerge from Islamic ontology because the contributors' knowledge base was Islam, but only as general rules rather than principles, which shapes a paradigm. In short, these attempts were not aimed at a paradigm, but they were mainly pragmatic attempts of having a better administration for Muslim rulers, rediscovering the power discourse to the ideal *fiqhi* legal positivistic orientation, or sometimes, the *aqidah*-motivated rhetoric (especially in the issue of *imamah* (leadership of Muslim nation)), etc. as for the classical pieces.

Elsewhere, on the other hand, contemporary literature was produced under certain circumstances where the previous central governance institutions such as the Caliphate were banished and other political institutions were not functioning as they once were. As a result, contemporary contributions would be categorized to some extent as mere reactions constructed by the social reality of the global Muslim nation (*ummah*) due to the colonialization of Muslim lands, while some of the pieces were produced as proposals and remedies to improve the weakness of Muslim leaders. As previously described, most of the writings from this category engage predominantly on the rhetoric of 'Islamic state', 'Islamic caliphate' or the means to re-establish the classical Muslims' political system or thoughts.

With reference to the topic of governance in its modern framework (which is defined in the earlier chapters of this book as another means for development), a new formulation is needed since the historical as well as current literature have not sufficiently and systematically contributed to the development of a particular paradigm, as the former is only aimed at providing remedies, and the latter seems to be obsessed with the politics of erecting the 'golden age' rather than engaging with the systemic of the process. Hence, this study represents a modest attempt to overcome this gap in Islamic thought and policymaking.

Conclusion

The effort to formulate and establish a new theory of governance based on Islamic ontology and epistemology, as reiterated earlier, requires a new way of looking into the epistemological sources themselves. Instead of dealing with the sources with a legal positivistic deontological approach, this research suggests a value-based consequentialistic position based on a universal deductive method of *maqasid*. Unlike most of the classical and much of the literature dealing with the topic of governance (which were produced under the field of Islamic political system or thought), which largely discusses governance institutions, mechanisms and legal issues, this new method will emphasize the hidden moral and ethical message beneath the texts. Likewise, this new method will produce certain principles and philosophical topics of governance as the prevailing discourse.

The classical exegesis is necessary in order to understand the relatively holistic picture of the *Shari'ah*, since it relates to the divine message and the articulation

of that message through the Prophet's words, actions and his Companions. Hence, the meanings derived should not be confined to a certain historical context, nor be literally applied to the non-context, but rather should be expanded on using the universal deduction method based on the central idea of *maqasid al-Shari'ah*. In tandem, a new proposed approach to expanding the meaning of the Qur'an is also needed to support the effort to explore the epistemological meaning of the revelation. This should also have the knock-on effect of bringing a wider understanding of the revelation-reasoned concepts across a broader horizon.

The expansion should not ignore the universal ethical message conveyed by many Prophetic traditions (*Sunnah*), which represents the articulation of the divine inspiration into the real world. Concepts and principals derived from such a process should be linked to each other in order to discover the underlying wisdom from the Qur'an and *Sunnah*, which needs to touch the sphere of human life. In formulating such methods, human reason, based on experience and universal law (common sense), must actively be included as a beacon. The method should be developed within the realm of the *tawhidic* reality and have a very comprehensive scope and not sit within a legal positivistic framework. The best of natural law emanating from human rational experience in the contemporary world through such a method will then find itself able to achieve the aforementioned *maqasid al-Shari'ah*, which can best be described in contemporary jargon as 'human well-being'.

The four Caliphs' experience can translate those concepts through their policies and innovations. However, those concepts are to be expanded through a thorough inquiry of the underlying ethical and moral philosophy and the implicit messages they convey to enlighten worldly life under the shade of the universal understanding of the higher objective of *Shari'ah* (*maqasid al-Shari'ah*). A bigger picture on how they can establish the concept of *falah* for human life beyond the contextual limit is by relating to the concepts one to another on the ground of *tawhidic* ontology. Having said that, the universal values within the spirit of those inter-related concepts should be unearthed by articulating them into the axioms representing the philosophy of governance that serve the interests of humankind in their worldly life.

Similarly, previous classical and contemporary literature provides a proportionate methodological approach reflecting on how both ontology and epistemology could be articulated in the political-economic field. Nevertheless, as mentioned, the literature does not offer the systematic framework that is needed to fill the gap of the subject matter of this research, so a new formulation is required, hence this research brings a fresh articulation of Islamic ontology and epistemology in the field of development, policymaking and governance. Through this formulation, a complete epistemological framework of Islamic governance could be established; hence, the Islamic ontology formulated 'Islamic governance'.

Furthermore, in this research, this new formulation will use a maxim-based approach in constructing principles for the new Islamic model of governance.

The exploration to deduce the principles of Islamic governance makes great efforts to identify Islamic ethical postulates of sufficient generality by using the epistemological approach. These ethics could be articulated through a set of axioms, which represent the whole realm of *tawhidic* reality (Naqvi, 1994: 41, Asutay, 2007). These axioms need to elucidate on how they possess all the characteristics of a spanning set, i.e., one that can serve a foundation for deducing scientific statements that are to be applied in the field of governance. These axioms in short must adequately encapsulate the comprehensive meaning of Islam's ethical philosophy. However, this set of axioms does not necessarily include all aspects of Islamic ethics, but should encompass those dominant aspects that are pertinent for deducing the rules of Islamic governance. The following chapter on the architectonics of Islamic governance will engage with the topic of axioms and elucidate deliberately on the details of the axioms.

Notes

- 1 This happened during the reign in which he lived where Muslim territories were fragmented into independent states and the Caliph was no longer the central power of the Muslim nation (Ibn Taimiyyah, 2005: 257–60).
- 2 The full title of the book reads '*Kitab al-'Ibar wa Diwan al-Mubtada' wa al-Khabar fi Ayyam al-'Arab wa al-'Ajam wa al-Barbar wa Man 'Asarahum min Dhawi al-Sultan al-Akbar*'. Rosenthal translates it as 'Book of lessons and archive of early and subsequent history, dealing with the political events concerning the Arabs, Non-Arabs and Berbers, and the supreme rulers who were contemporary with them (Ibn Khaldun, [2005] 1967: 1, 13)
- 3 The word '*asabiyyah*' could be translated into a modern abstract sociological term such as 'a collective group united by a sense of solidarity' and 'the irrational feeling of solidarity' (Walzer, 1963: 58). Rosenthal (Ibn Khaldun, [2005] 1967) translates it to 'Group feeling'.
- 4 Helmi (al-Juwaini, 1979: 24) proposes in his work that Ibn Khaldun's idea of '*asabiyyah*' (solidarity or social cohesion) was in reality taken exactly from the idea of '*shawaqat*' (power, i.e. the ruler must be the one who has the might and will be accepted by the people) discussed by al-Juwaini in *al-Ghiyathi* (1979: 96). However, this claim seems to be rather blunt since Ibn Khaldun did not even mention either al-Juwaini's name or his work as his reference, while at the same time he pointed out that he benefited or referred to the writing of al-Mawardi and other scholars.
- 5 Mirrors are those texts that reflect the principles of Islamic ethics produced in the pre-modern period mainly by kings' advisors to crown princes or to the kings as advice on how to conduct their affairs as a ruler.
- 6 Some of the anecdotes are not correct and have been only mentioned loosely by Nizam al-Mulk to make his point (see: Rivzi, 1977: 31).
- 7 This answers why al-Ghazali (Bakar, 2006: 205, 222) positions the sciences of ethics and politics under the category of religious sciences rather than intellectual or philosophical ones, unlike al-Farabi. In his *al-Munqidh min al-Dalal* (al-Ghazali, 1952: 19), al-Ghazali clearly states that the Muslim philosophers' teachings in the political and ethical sciences were drawn mainly from the revelation sent to the Prophets. The philosophers, according to al-Ghazali, never separated their knowledge of both sciences from the revelations by independently relying on reason. From such a premise and in conformity with his definitions, he concludes that political and ethical sciences must be included in the division of the religious sciences.

7 Architectonics of Islamic governance

Locating the axioms, foundational principles and working mechanism

“Allah commands you to deliver the trusts to those to whom they are due; and whenever you judge between people, judge with justice....”

(Al-Qur'an, 4:58)

Introduction

For centuries, most classical and contemporary Islamic scholars have intensively and widely utilized the legal positivistic *fiqhī* method when dealing with Islamic political or economic issues. For most of them, the rationale behind this was that the nature of those things was part of the *Shari'ah* body of legislation. This is simply due to the classical *usul al-fiqh*'s (Islamic jurisprudence) deductive method, which was/has been adopted as a major prevailing discourse in establishing the status of *fiqh*, in legislating most human affairs. This normative legal positivist method inspired the establishment of governance institutions in the past. Consequently, contemporary neo-Classical literalists have frequently echoed this classical approach. Upon such idealism, current global Islamic revivalism has ignited a kind of consciousness by redeveloping a 'utopia' of a *fiqh*-oriented Islamic 'state' or 'commonwealth' as an ideal model of 'Islamic' governance. This situation has resulted in a call for the resurrection of archaic mechanisms and structures of the classical administrations of Muslim empires to be transformed into a reality. Nevertheless, any thorough scrutiny of the classical governance models of the past will show that they were developed according to the particular context of the time.

For instance, Omar, the second righteous Caliph according to Muslim history, emulated many Persian administrations in his style of governance. Accordingly, succeeding Caliphs and rulers have followed his example. This dynamic, but non-systematic attitude implies the pivotal role of *ijtihad* and reasoning in formulating the governance models historically. The dynamism, however, gravitated toward certain core principals and immutable foundations in creating the *fiqhī*-inspired theory of political governance. Hence, any literal imitation of the classical structures of governance, without understanding their underlying philosophy or objectives, will end up in imposing a utopia onto

reality. For this reason, this research will adopt a non-conventional way of dealing with the governance issue when developing an ideal Islamic model.

As was discussed at length in the previous chapter, the approach applied in this book to formulate a new model of Islamic governance will be inspired by and founded on a specific Islamic ontological-determined epistemology instead of emulating the classical normative legal discourse to explain the nature of Islamic governance.

Appropriately, this model will be articulated through logical expression by using axiomatic formulation to explain its philosophy and fundamentals so that its working mechanism can be identified. Bachelard (1964) maintains that ideas can be conceptualized genuinely in a geometric form, which he believes to be the most proper language to validate and soundly explain itself. He adds that mathematical expression is the best language to express concepts and ideas, for exact scientific concepts can be conceptualized through mathematical forms. Consequently, the expression of philosophical or ideological ideas through mathematical or geometrical language will present the best proof of the fact that intellectual ideas are logical and scientific as opposed to conventional philosophies and religions that have to engage in discussion, argumentation, sophistry, debates and comparisons to prove their logic, which according to Shariati¹ is the weakest language of expression.

Due to such a rationale, the ensuing paragraphs provide a structural expression exemplified by axioms developed from Islamic epistemology in explaining the Islamic ontology-inspired ideal model of governance. This is due to the fact that in order to quantify as a distinguished governance paradigm, Islamic governance must also have foundational axioms alongside values and norms derived from the Islamic ontology. These axioms are described briefly in the following section along with their etymological root to justify why they are related to the topic of governance. The next section will elaborate on how those axioms can be integrated into governance framework, hence the formulation of a new model of governance. These axioms, which constitute the principal foundation of the proposed governance, are then articulated in reality through a unique and specific framework as will be discussed in the subsequent chapter.

The axioms

Etymologically, the word *axiom* comes from the Greek word (*axioma*) or (*axioein*), which means that ‘which is deemed worthy’ (*axios*), or fit, or that ‘which is considered self-evident’. Among the ancient Greek philosophers, an axiom was a claim that could be seen to be true without any need for proof. In a modern understanding, a set of axioms is any collection of formally-stated assertions from which other formally-stated assertions follow by the application of certain well-defined rules. According to this view logic becomes just another formal system. A set of axioms should be consistent; it should be impossible to derive a contradiction from the axiom. A set of axioms should

also be non-redundant; an assertion that can be deduced from other axioms need not be regarded as an axiom (Naqvi, 2003: 147–9).

An axiom is a self-evident truth upon which other knowledge must rest, and from which other knowledge is built up. To axiomatize a system of knowledge is to show that all of its claims can be derived from a small set of sentences that are independent of one another. Sardar (1985: 210) suggests that an axiomatic approach is important for Islamic economics to develop its own tools of thought and analysis and also its unique institutions, thus detaching it from a Western foundation. Thus, an axiomatic approach could be meaningful for an Islamic worldview if it satisfies four criteria: it must be an adequate and legitimate representation of Islam's ethical views; it must form the smallest possible set; the elements of the set must be internally consistent; and the axioms must have predictive power (Naqvi, 1994: 40–1). On this basis, a certain set of axioms can be developed to summarise Islamic ethical philosophy in relation to governance.

These principles or axioms are those that lead to spiritual development and enable the human being to reach noble heights of thought and action and rightfully claim the title of vicegerent of God on earth according to most Islamic economists. In addition, they aim at bringing up 'functioning', 'doing' and 'being' individuals. Various Islamic economics theorists such as Ahmad (1980), Siddiqi (1981), Naqvi (1981) and Chapra (1992, 2000) have applied this approach as a foundation for their discourse. Similarly, this axiomatic modelling approach and system analysis is applied in formulating the foundation of 'Islamic governance' in this research. This foundation will demonstrate the interactive and dynamic nature of the new theory based on contemporary economics' philosophical approach within the wider scope of political economy rather than in the narrow spheres of *taqlidi* (classical and traditional), or a legal positivistic *fiqh* framework. Thus, Islamic governance, within such an approach proposes an ethical and systemic understanding of political economy inspired from the ontological and epistemological sources of Islam. Consequently, the proposed governance model not only deals with means and forms (institutions and mechanisms), but also with the ends and substances represented through its unique axioms and means to articulate them.

A few axioms were formulated by Ahmad (1980), Siddiqi (1981), Naqvi (1981) and Chapra (1992, 2000) in explaining the framework of Islamic economy, amongst them: *Tawhid*, which refers not only to the unity of God, but also the unity of human life; *'adl* (justice) or equilibrium as a means of economic justice; *ikhtiyar* (free will), which explains human freedom in the realm of worldly affairs and the life hereafter; *tazkiyah* (growth towards perfection), which explains the necessity of growth through purification of attitudes and relationships and hence implies the endogenization of Islamic norms and values ready for development in terms of micro development of the individual, society and the natural environment according to their development path; *rububiyyah* (divine arrangements for nourishment, sustenance and directing things towards their perfection), which implies the necessity of sustainable economic growth and development; *khilafah* (vicegerency), which defines human beings as vicegerents of Allah on

earth implying man's ultimate accountability to Allah; *Ihsan* (Perfection): which means comprehensive beneficence and excellence, and the final crowning glory or finishing embellishment, and, last, but not least, the *maqasid* (highest objective of *Shari'ah*), which determines the utmost motivation for Islamic economics, which is the security of human well-being. Eventually, the ultimate aim of this axiomatic structure of the dynamic process of development in the economic, social and spiritual sense is *falah*, or salvation and happiness in this world and the hereafter.

However, in formulating the axioms related to the issue of governance within the radius of an Islamic framework, a semi-adjustment of the axioms with the addition of another related set of axioms are needed. This new and technically semi-different set of axioms will be expounded in detail in this section in terms of how they relate to the field of governance from their semantic origin and the consequences of the terms in their technical usages.

Thus, the axioms formulated to construct a philosophical foundation for an ideal (Islamic) governance are as follows: *tawhid* (unity), indicates the vertical dimension of the Islamic ethical system; *amanah* (trust) as a guiding principal for the empowerment of individuals in the governance process, *al-'adl wa al-ihsan* (justice equilibrium and beneficence) to provide for the horizontal dimension of equity and a benevolence society; *ukhuwwah* (universal solidarity) and *islah* (constant striving for comprehensive excellence with ethical and moral considerations). In order for these axioms to work efficiently, other previously-mentioned axioms developed by the Islamic moral economists are needed, such as *ikhtiyar* (free will) to constitute the functional norms of the governing process in the parameter of endowed 'free-will' with responsibilities. Similarly, both the previously-mentioned *tazkiyah* and *rububiyyah* axioms are necessary to provide an inclusive and broad nature of growth in human life according to the larger picture of the elemental aspect of governance, the *maqasid al-Shari'ah*. *Maqasid al-Shari'ah* is an essential ethical and moral foundation in Islamic governance used to understand the text and to expound the principles of Islamic political economics in relation to the objectives of the *Shari'ah* as a way or system of life, instead of just a legalistic traditional *fiqh* nature. *Maqasid al-Shari'ah* in such a context concludes that Islamic governance is a means to achieve 'human well-being' in the worldly life and the hereafter, as the '*falah*' axiom states.

Together, these axioms define the foundational principles and framework, in which the governance process takes place, incorporating intra- and inter-generational economic justice and worldview. Moreover, it reveals itself in the methodological framework of the Islamic political economic system. Unlike the normal approach to axioms as merely 'a set of formally stated assertions from which other formally stated assertions follow by the application of certain well-defined rules', the explanation for axioms that constitute Islamic governance analyses the inner structure and underlying philosophy of those major concepts. A holistic picture of those axioms can never be understood without any analytical consideration of other key terms surrounding them. After having the preceding discussion when providing justification for the axiom-based paradigm in

articulating the micro foundations of governance, the following sections provide detailed discussions on each of the axioms and their respective implications in relation to governance.

First axiom: *Tawhid* (Unity of God)

As repeatedly mentioned in this research, the Islamic worldview is based on *tawhid*, or the Oneness of God. Consequently, the centrality of a Muslim's life is also based on this concept of *tawhid*, which outlines the Muslim's character and lifestyle as asserted in the chapter on ontology. Consequently, all his deeds are acts of submission and worship. This "particularly denotes vertical dimension of Islam linking the imperfect and finite social institutions with a Perfect and Infinite Being" (Naqvi, 1994: 26). Unlike the post-Enlightenment worldview that dictates that all knowledge and systems should be objectively value-free, Islamic governance emphasizes values and morals, which are rooted strongly in revelation so that, in this case, individuals can indigenise governance as a concept and practical reality by identifying it as stemming from their own values.

Accordingly, the articulation of Islamic worldview in a Muslim's life will represent values and moral elements that are nourished by the guidance of revelation (Ghannoushi, 2001: 109). Subsequently, the formulation of governance axioms should be derived from such centricity. The basis of legitimacy of governance in Islam would follow that the prerogative that governance is a part of public interest or *maslahah*. Consequently, the right to govern has been vested in the people with their *tawhidic* worldview.²

Definition

Tawhid, as an Arabic word, derives from the root word *Wa Ha Da*, which means one, and it confirms the action or the articulation of oneness and unifying. Apart from the theological debates on the unity of God's attributes, the socio-political episteme reading on the *tawhid* concept can lead to a new aspect in understanding the philosophy of Islamic governance:

- i *Tawhid* implies the unity of the universality of God's message (revelation) to human beings.³ According to this tenet, Muslims believe that revelation is the centre of human life. It serves as the intrinsic guidance on how to live and conduct oneself as part of the means to worshipping Allah.⁴ Accordingly, it also represents the central philosophy of the Islamic system of knowledge. *Tawhid* inspires a system of governance, which is value-laden and strongly constructed on moral principles. In this way, this Islamic-ontology-derived concept of governance contrasts the current positivistic notion of governance, as it relates to the higher objective as defined by Allah.
- ii *Tawhid* also implies the unity of creation as *makhluq* (creatures) created by Allah. Human beings are empowered by Allah with the responsibility of

amin (trustee)⁵ to take care of all other creatures on earth (al-Qur'an, 7:74) with permission to make the most of (*istiskhar*)⁶ the universe but with moderation and not causing any destruction (*fasad*).⁷ Within the radius of this axiom, the environment, the animal kingdom and future generations of human being are considered as one nation, which needs to be taken care of by the 'trustee'.⁸ Inspired by this position, Islamic governance is a system in which sustainability and concern for the future should be the main theme.

- iii *Tawhid* also implies the equality of human beings as one nation and one community. Being the vertical ethical dimension of Islamic political economy, it implies equality of individuals in terms of their closeness to Allah. Therefore, this very concept necessitates mutual understanding and mutual recognition amongst human beings for them to live peacefully and in harmony under the shade of brotherhood (*ukhuwwah*).

Each of these definitional aspects of *tawhid* has consequences for governance in terms of shaping its value proposition, which are discussed in the following section.

Implication of tawhid on governance

Iqbal ([1974] 2008: 154) confirms that the essence of *tawhid* articulates the meaning of equality, solidarity and freedom. Those meanings require an endeavour to be transformed into space-time forces and to be articulated in a definite human organization. Upon such premise, the idea of well-being, development and other features of good governance must originate soundly from this *tawhid* axiom (Omar, 1992: 41–3).

According to this line of reasoning, the tawhidic worldview demands that ideal governance should only be established through comprehensive regulation of moral and spiritual aspects of human beings through the establishment of peace and harmony for the entire humanity based on justice and truth.⁹ It is through the manifestation of *tawhid* that any new idea on politics or economics rooted from it would attain its originality (Bennabi, 1993: 65). Accordingly, a tawhidic-inspired government will produce a state of God-fearing and piety amongst the actors of governance, and consequently, all parties involved in the process will conceive their participation and actions as part of worship (*'ibadat*). This inner feeling will enable the actors to function actively in gaining pleasure and reward from God, and similarly, the state of this continuous consciousness and connectedness with God through the implementation of the process will give rise to a state of *Iman* (faithful and piety). An individual who possesses *Iman* and has it as an inner motivation in his daily life (*mu'min*) will have the motivation to live with the spirit of Islamic governance presented by the axioms.

Tawhidic worldview also implies that the vertical dimension and equality of the Islamic ethical system manifests itself in the inherent equality of each individual as represented by their equal proximity to God. Such a worldview exemplifies the very meaning of equality from Islamic precepts of conduct. This

concept also leads to a great contribution of Islam to the ‘political’ field, which is the concept of perfect and unadulterated equality.¹⁰ This idea of human equality has been vividly illustrated in various Qur’anic verses in which every stage of human life has been described as uniform at every stage and in whatever period of world history he flourished (Qur’an, 36:77; 67:19–21). In the same way, Islam put an end to even a semblance of any superiority of man over other man on the basis of race, colour or clime in al-Qur’ān (49:13) and in many of the Prophet Muhammad’s traditions, particularly his famous farewell sermon (*khutbah al-wida*),¹¹ when he declared that henceforth there would be no distinction between Arab and non-Arab, and no differentiation between their status (Haroon, 1963: 265–6).

This concept of equality is the foundation for the Islamic concept of justice in governance through the principal of ‘universal solidarity’ or *ukhuwwah* (Shari’ati, 2007: 68). It is from this equality-based *ukhuwwah* within the framework of the axioms of *amanah* (trust) and *ikhtiyar* (free-will) that individual political freedom and liberty sprung. Accordingly, *tawhid*, as an essential part of an ideal governance system, provides for freedom of action whereby each individual is viewed as an integral part of the whole, to be empowered in the decision-making process with concern for public interests. This principle also implies a continuous and sustained system through “*risalah* (God’s Prophets as the source of divine guidance); *Akhirah* (life-after death, that is the continuity of life beyond death and a system of accountability based on divine law)” (Ahmad, 2003: 193). In conclusion, *tawhid* as an overarching principle in Islamic theory of governance entails that Islamic governance is a comprehensive framework of *amanah* (trust) to be delivered through its entire process, in upholding *al-adl wa al-ihsan* (justice and benevolence), with the theme of *ukhuwwah* (universal solidarity) and sustained by *islah* (constant striving for comprehensive excellence) in achieving the *maqasid al-Shari’ah* as the prerequisite of *falalah*.

Tawhid as the arch-principle of all the Islamic governance axioms enlightens the rest of the axioms for Islamic governance. However, due to its generic nature, the *tawhid* axiom requires other philosophical foundations or axioms to complement and explicate the complete picture of an ideal model of governance to be established in this book. Direct implication of *tawhid* could be exemplified within the notion of *amanah* (trust), since human life itself, according to the Islamic worldview, is an *amanah* from the Creator. The following section will deal with the concept of *amanah* and how it could benefit the construction of ideal Islamic ‘governance’, thus worthy and necessary of being one of its axioms.

Second axiom: *Amanah* (trust)

The *tawhid* axiom asserts the position of the human being as God’s vicegerent. According to this understanding, God had exclusively rendered his trust to humankind to administrate this world well and make it a peaceful and safe

place in which to live. God also designed a special task for the vicegerents, which was to exalt him (*'ibadah*) and to develop this world (*'imarah*). As 'trustee', every single individual is rendered with the trust (*amanah*) in his or her horizontal relations with other individuals. Everything in the universe belongs to God and everything was created for the service of man, who may use anything in the world for a positive purpose, but he is not supposed to abuse anything. The quality of believers in delivering *amanah* has been mentioned in many places in al-Qur'an: (4:58); (2:283); (33:72); (9:27); (23:8); The virtue of being a trustworthy or *al-Amin* also was associated with the quality of the Prophets (al-Quran: 26:107, 125, 143, 162, 178); (7:68); (44:18); (28:26); (12:54).

The 'entrusts' are the rights and responsibilities of one individual over the other (Qur'an, 7:74). In explaining this general idea of trust upon each individual, the Prophet Muhammad has been quoted saying:

Behold, each one of you is a guardian, and each one of you will be asked about his subjects. A leader is a guardian over the people and he will be asked about his subjects; a man is a guardian over the members of his household and he will be asked about his subjects; a woman is a guardian over the members of the household of her husband and of his children, and she will be asked about them; a servant of a man is a guardian over the property of his master, and he will be asked about it.¹²

Definition

Semantically, the word *amanah* (trust) is derived from the root word *Aa Ma Na*, which means peace, safety, protection and a state without danger and risk (Ibn Manzur, 1956: 13/21–5; and for the English meaning: Hans Wehr, 1979: 35–6). The term also denotes the aspiration to be entrusted to bring peace, safety from any danger and risk through a trustworthy protector. *Amanah* is central to a Muslim's life; subsequently every Muslim individual is entrusted to deliver his or her *amanah* just as prescribed by the aforementioned *Hadith*. Furthermore, from the same root comes the word *Iman* (faith or belief). A *mu'min* (believer) is at the same time an *amin* (trustworthy person). *Amanah* is in the state of *ma'mun* (safe and secured), in the hand of *mu'min* who is *amén*. In such correlation, *amanah* is equal to the state of good faith; hence, many verses and Prophet's traditions condemn the act of non-trustworthiness and betrayal. They are described as *nifaq* (hypocrisy) and *fsiq* (mischief). A believer must be trustworthy and a trustee according to this '*amanah*' paradigm.

Essentially, in the field of governance, this trustee typology dictates responsibilities of every actor in its process. It is stated in the Qur'an:

Allah commands you to deliver the trusts to those to whom they are due; and whenever you judge between people, judge with justice ...

(Qur'an, 4:58)

and in another verse:

Follow God, follow the Prophet, and those from among you who have been entrusted with authority.

(Qur'an, 4:59)

The light of these verses illuminates fundamental principles of governance based on the Qur'anic concept of *amanah* and its implication on society.¹³

An ideal governance aspiration embraced by the Muslim community is soundly based on individuals' practice of *amanah* in their daily conducts. *Amanah* within the individuals' self will create self-accountability to guide his conduct, which will create an inner feeling of responsibility to deliver the trust given and enable him to refrain from corruption and mismanagement. This inner feeling exemplifies the meaning of *ihsan* (comprehensive excellence) in which a person lives in constant awareness of God. *Ihsan* is essential in delivering *amanah*, and only emerges as an accumulation of *Iman*. The state of *Iman* entails *amanah* and vice versa. The Prophet Muhammad explains the interrelation of *Iman* and *amanah* in many of his traditions.¹⁴

However, behavioural norms alone are not sufficient to crystallize this concept of governance. It requires a comprehensive accountability system at every layer of governance mechanisms and institutions. For instance, *amanah* must be the prevailing and viable underlying philosophy for accountability, transparency and efficiency in serving the society whether in the public or private sector. Such a system with effective supporting institutions will bring the governance process closer to the notion of *Iman* as the fruit of *amanah*. Furthermore, self-realization of such concepts within individuals will contribute towards the micro-discipline of society. Thus, *amanah* or trust being an important dimension of good governance is enshrined in Islam as an essential element of faith. This implies that this dimension of good governance is no longer an optional matter for those who have *Iman*, but rather for them, it is an integral part of their value system.

Prophet Muhammad has shown the articulation of *amanah* in his life as he was known, even before becoming a prophet, as *al-amin* (the trustworthy). Furthermore, many of his traditions exemplify how *amanah* played a central role in his practice of governance. His strong emphasis on the importance of *amanah* could be seen in his appointment of state officers to execute their administrative duties, amongst them *al-wulat* (governors), *al-'Amilin* (tax collector) and *al-qudat* (judges) who were the main bureaucrats of the 'city state' of Medina.¹⁵ Moreover, principles of accountability and transparency permanently applied to the government of revenue and expenditure of the provinces, as well as the officials who administrated them (Burayy, 1985: 245). This can be seen in many of his traditions, amongst them an incident where an '*Amil* returned to Madînah loaded with tax revenues, and asserted that a substantive portion of the revenue was given to him as tokens from certain people, then the Prophet reminded him by saying: "What is wrong with the man whom we appointed as a tax collector

and he said this is for you and that was given to me? If he stayed in his parent's house, would something be given to him?"¹⁶. On another occasion, the Prophet reminded his companions by saying: "Whomsoever we appoint over an affair, we shall give him provision. What he takes after that is breach of trust."¹⁷

Thus, the fundamental idea of *amanah* in governance is signified by the notion of accountability before God and community. It was on this basis that the Righteous Caliphs understood their positions and duty, which was to personally supervise the community's affairs and to protect their *maslahah* (benefit) and their rights. It was reported that during Omar's time, when he was returning from one of his journeys he saw a woman with her children who were starving by the side of a tent that was situated in an isolated territory. Being the Caliph, and with the feeling of responsibility and *amanah*, he approached her tent and asked her about 'Omar, the Caliph' without introducing himself to her. In return, she swore against Omar for not taking care of her family's welfare. Omar replied: "How can Omar know about you who live so far?" She replied: "If he cannot be aware of his subjects, why has he accepted the burden of leadership?" Her reply made Omar agreed to take care of her welfare from then on (Al-Tabari, 1994: XIV/110). This incident indicates how leadership and governance are indeed an '*amanah*' (trust and responsibility) to be delivered according to Tawhidic reality. It was this type of *amanah* upon rulers to deliver by preserving public interest or *maslahah* upon which *fuqaha'* (jurists) established the maxim: "*tasarruf At al-ra'iyy manutun 'ala maslahah al-ra'iyyah*" (rulers' acts of conducts to be determined by the interest of the ruled) (Zaydan, 2004: 120).¹⁸

Implications of amanah to governance

In commenting on *amanah* (trust or responsibility) of leadership and governance, Ibn Taimiyyah (2005: 9–14 and 21), asserts two major themes reflecting its true meaning: first strict selection and appointment of officials, based on merit and qualification, and then the fair distribution of wealth in the community. These two factors are important in establishing justice in society. Conversely, due to the reality of the contemporary world, despite their pivotal role in governance the two above-mentioned elements alone are not sufficient to ensure efficiency of the public service. Complexity of the contemporary post-industrial world requires further exploration of Islamic epistemological sources to produce new *ijtihad* to act in response to existing needs and necessities. In reply to this challenge, the '*amanah*' axiom articulates three major functions of an effective 'governance' process: individual empowerment, accountability and freedom that will be elaborated further in the following paragraphs.

Amanah and tawhid lead to individuals' empowerment through the shura mechanism

Responsibility to deliver *amanah* in Muslim society demands 'individual empowerment' by a significant number of active people participating in governance.

Tawhidic reality implies that the vertical relation between God and human beings leads to equality amongst the latter's horizontal relation. Such a worldview indicates equality amongst citizens; hence, their collective rights to participate in governance as stakeholders. Rationally, by referring to the *tawhidic* ontology, it could be explained that absolute, cosmic sovereignty belongs to God; nevertheless, he endowed the administration and sovereignty on earth to the people, through the mandate of *istikhlaf* (vicegerency). The verse "O ye who believe! Obey Allah, and obey the messenger, and *uli al-amr* (literally translated as those who possess the order) among you" (Qur'an, 4:59) best describes the individual empowerment ideals in Islam (Imarah, 2005: 44).

This verse clearly indicates that every individual is required to obey Allah and the Messenger to establish rule of law within the community. Rule of law and harmony in the community can only be achieved by respecting the role of *uli al-amr*, from amongst you (*minkum*), or being chosen by you from within you (*min anfusikum*). The connotation of *minkum* (being chosen from amongst yourself or amongst you) implies that individuals are responsible for electing their leader as part of the command to 'obey Allah and the Messenger' (al-Ghannoushi, 1993: 110–11). Hence, rendering to them the authority to execute their responsibility to serve the community. However, recognition of *uli al-amr* is stipulated by the authority's compliance to the teaching of Allah and the Messenger, which in this case refers to their execution of the trust and responsibilities given to them as '*uli al-amr*' of the community or society. Should they fail to execute their responsibilities, they will also have failed to obey Allah and the Messenger. In such a situation, there will be no obedience towards them (Imarah, 2005: 44–5). With this understanding of the verse, individuals are considered as part of the authority in their society through their decision and choice, which is excellently articulated through the '*open shura*' tradition that will be explained further later in this chapter.

'Open *shura*' consists of both *shura* (individual empowerment) and accountability, which have been promoted in Islam through al-Qur'an, the Prophet's traditions and the administrations of the four-guided Caliphs (Imarah, 2005: 38–62). On the other hand, it can also be concluded that Muslims as individuals and citizens in the community are empowered to have their say and to determine their own destiny and not be dictated to or planned by the elites at the top under the banner of 'state' or 'authority'.¹⁹ A *shura* ideal reflects the concept of empowered civil society centred on the concept of *amanah*, and can be clearly articulated within the healthy environment of democracy (al-Turabi, 1987: 17–18; 1987b: 20, 73, 132–3). *Shura*, as one of the major principals of Islam is the most vital mechanism for delivering *amanah* through the concept of individual empowerment in a larger inclusive and collective manner, which in our case is the field of governance.

Etymologically, the term *shura* is derived from the root word *Sha Wa Ra*, which denotes an action of extracting honey from a beehive. From the same semantic meaning come the words *sharaÍ* and *shuraÍ*, which mean good or fine appearance, and often refer to a fine costume or garment. The word '*shaw wara*'

on the other hand bears the meaning of ‘pointing’, and the term *shura*, meaning of advice, mutual consultation, and in its widest scope a collective deliberation in which all parties *exchange* counsel (Ibn Manzur, 1956, 4: 434–7). Another term that might have a similar meaning to *shura* is the term *istisharah*, which means one side seeking counsel from another and the term *tashawur*, which in its general usage means mutual consultation. In its technical meaning, *shura* is strongly associated with the meaning of participatory political exercise (Ghannouchi, 1993: 108). In relation to the trustee typology of governance, *shura* semantically means ‘the extraction of the most quality decision (just like the honey), through the pointing of opinions to seek mutual agreement’ (Ibn Manzur, 1956, 4: 434–7). In conclusion, ‘*shura*’ connotes the appreciation of every individual opinion and choice, thus the indispensable nature of individual empowerment in governance process as stakeholders.

Shura (mutual consultation) has been mentioned as a virtue of a just Muslim leader in Qur’anic verses (3:159):

It is part of the Mercy of God that thou dost deal gently with them. Were thou severe or harsh-hearted, they would have broken away from about thee: so pass over (their faults), and ask for (God’s) forgiveness for them; and consult them in affairs (of moment). Then, when thou hast taken a decision put thy trust in God. For God loves those who put their trust (in Him).” In line with the previous verse, Allah also praises the believers who practice *shura* in their daily life in another verse: “Those who hearken to their Lord, and establish regular Prayer; who (conduct) their affairs by mutual Consultation; who spend out of what We bestow on them for Sustenance.

(Qur’an, 42:38)

All this indicates that a just leader from an Islamic point of view is the one who actively practises and lives with the spirit of *Shura* through the enhancement of individual empowerment.

Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (1990: 1, 152) points out that the philosophical foundation of the concept of *shura* was established in chapter al-Baqarah (verse 30–40) concerning God’s dialogue with the angels during the pre-creation stage of Adam. Al-Razi argues that God did not need to consult the angels on His decision (on the creation of Adam and his role to be given), however God deliberately mentioned the dialogue in the Qur’an as a pretext for certain purpose, which, according to them, was to guide the human being (the virtue and the sense) of consultation. Ibn ‘Ashur (1984: 1/395) furthermore points out that God’s consultation with the angels on the creation of the first human being, Adam aims to establish a norm and law instilled in the psyche of Adam’s offspring. Consequently, *shura* as another name for such consultation, which constitutes one of the essential dimensions or aspects of man’s God-given nature (*fi’rah*). In other words, *shura* is not a mere political notion in Islam, but first and foremost, it is an essential quality of man that God instils in human beings

to empower and dignify every human being with reason and choice (el-Mesawi, 2005: 100).

It is from this Qur'anic context that *shura* (consultation), is based on equality among those consulting in order to arrive at a collective decision (Ghanoushi, 1993: 108). The commentary goes on to note that this principle was applied to its fullest extent by the Prophet Muhammad in his public and private life, and was fully acted upon by the early rulers of Islamic society. The *shura* or Consultative Council had its origins in pre-Islamic times where it comprised a council of tribal elders. Originally, it constituted an informal forum of deliberation where decisions were arrived at when discussing new problems. During these deliberations, the problems in question were thrown open for general discussion. Members of the council were invited to express their considered personal opinions; Islam introduced improvements in accordance with the moral principles enunciated by the Qur'an (Strok, 1999).

Principally, the basic message of chapter *al-Shura* in the Qur'an is: "to live true in mutual consultation and forbearance, and rely on Allah",²⁰ contains the essence of governance from the Islamic perspective. Those who wish to serve Allah must ensure that their conduct in life is open and determined by mutual consultation between those entitled to a voice, as well as in the state affairs between rulers and their subjects. Since the Qur'an clearly mandates that any decision involving more than one party require mutual consultation inspired by the doctrine of *shura*, Islam encourages the participants to reach their resolution based on consensus (Shaikh, 1988: 115–28). In addition, the Prophet himself espoused it as a regular practice in his leadership, and the Pious Caliphs followed the same precedent after him. This would make *shura* a part of the normative precedent (Imarah, 2005: 38–62).

In essence, as an important trust from God, Islam demands of those holding this trust to engender truthfulness, justice, consultation and a spirit of consensus-seeking among participants during group decision-making through the practice of *shura*. Appropriately, also according to the spirit of *shura* leaders must allow freedom to the people through empowerment and reasonable mechanisms to enable others to participate in decision-making.²¹ Contained by such an atmosphere, all individuals would be expected to contribute their knowledge to the formulation and implementation of the *tawhidic* mission to collectively accomplish *falah*, and appropriately, consultative procedures should be applied to all affected within the community (Mohammad and Mohrnaud, 1999: 52–79). Consequently, *shura* ensures proper balance in the free will and free activities of human beings in the political sphere (Khan, 2002: 38).

Similarly, *shura* requires the active participation of citizens directly in the political, administrative and governance related realms. Governance as a collective trust upon every empowered Muslim individual is a sphere in which they must collectively decide their future in the light of *tawhidic* worldview. This collective obligation can be properly fulfilled through what is known today as representative governance, to enable consensus-oriented actions and policies. Consequently, democratic political mechanisms such as fair elections, freedom

of campaign, wider spaces for consultation through media, online and other administration means are part of the prerequisites of this *shura*-inspired representative governance. Likewise, any autocratic and elitist practices of governance are rejected according to this realm.

To articulate the spirit of *shura* in the political realm, which ensures the Islamic system of rule is entirely civilian and where every citizen is empowered through the spirit of *shura*, Abduh (1956: 58–9; 1973: 5) explains that revelation provides guidance and principles that prepare the foundations of governance to establish and organize governments by commanding the formation of an elective and consultative government that manages the temporal affairs of society and takes steps to realize the benefits for the people. Consequently, people are responsible for electing a government to manage public affairs through consultation and for remaining accountable to them. Thus, a government's legitimacy is solely based on the decision of the people, as the government is but the reflection of the people itself. In line of such argument, Iqbal ([1974] 2008: 155) asserts that Islam from the very beginning is a civil society thus differentiates it from the notion of a medieval state-church relation.

Amanah along with tawhid and al-'adl wa al-ihsan require accountability

Amanah as a political concept that suggests that God has given the trust to human beings to deliver and promote His guidance through justice and fairness in their lives. In the same spirit – as part of their trust – they are also responsible for eradicating evil and mischief. Everyone becomes a recipient of such a trust and consequently has to stand in awe-filled reverence before his people towards whom and for whose sake he will be called upon to exercise his duty. This enshrines what has been mentioned in the Qur'an: "Let there arise out of you a band of people inviting to all that is good, enjoining what is right, and forbidding what is wrong: They are the ones to attain felicity" (Qur'an, 3:104),²² and in another verse,

Ye are the best of peoples, evolved for mankind, enjoining what is right, forbidding what is wrong, and believing in Allah. If only the People of the Book had faith it were best for them; among them are some who have faith, but most of them are perverted transgressors

(Qur'an, 3:110)

In conjunction with such spirit, the Prophet was reported as saying:

Whoever amongst you sees anything objectionable, let him change it with his hand, if he is not able, then with his tongue, and if he is not even able to do so, then with his heart, and the latter is the weakest form of faith.²³

Similarly, there are other analogous records, which denote the Prophet's position towards the concept in the political life of the believers, amongst others his

praise and recognition to anybody who stood against tyranny with the words of justice: “The master of the martyrs is Hamza, and whoever is killed speaking truth in the court of a tyrant ruler”.²⁴ Equally, on another occasion he justifies an act of accountability performed by an individual by associating it to Jihad: “The best Jihad is the word of truth to an unjust ruler”.²⁵

These words from the authentic texts demonstrate that ‘accountability’ is pivotal in articulating the purity of the spirit of *amanah* in political life. The high sense of accountability empowers individuals, hence crystallizing the true meaning of equality and allowing individuals to act as a benchmark for the community of believers. These inter-dependent and inter-relating concepts reveal a clear picture of how *amanah* works within a *tawhidic* worldview-based society. Furthermore, in preserving and instilling the concept of accountability, the Prophet allowed himself to be accountable and criticized by his companions on many occasions. The Prophet was criticized by the companions on his decision regarding the positioning of the army during the battle of *Badr*. He was also urged to accept the companions’ proposal to fight the Makkan army outside Madinah when the Makkan troops were approaching Madinah during the battle of *Uhud*. Another occasion, which might clarify the implementation of the principle of accountability, was the treaty of *Hudaybiyah*.²⁶ Despite his companions’ disagreement and Omar calling him to account, the Prophet Muhammad did not condemn Omar for questioning him and explained to him that the decision was made according to the revelation he received from Allah.

The distinction between what is revelation from among the Prophets’ actions, and what is his personal *ijtihad* in the administration, as mentioned in the chapter about epistemological sources of governance, is needed in order to understand this event. Compared to his other decisions during the battle of *Badr* and *Uhud*, the Prophet was not able to retreat from the decision made about the treaty. It was merely a revelation to be implemented. At this point, Abu Bakr, who understood the issue earlier, managed to convince Omar. However, the most prevailing lesson to be learned from this and other events is the accountability concept being upheld and not being denied, other than in the case of revelation. Reasonably, as a statesman, the Prophet was held accountable and he accepted this and explained to Omar why the action was taken.²⁷

The practice of accountability in early Islamic political life could also be found during the period of Abu Bakr. He stressed the importance of accountability and the nature of individuals with authority in the community in his very first speech to the Muslim community after being elected as the Caliph by saying: “Cooperate with me when I am right, but correct me when I commit error; obey me so long as I follow the commandments of Allah and His Prophet; but turn away from me when I deviate”.²⁸ In fact, other companions often held him to account for his decisions and state administration. Furthermore, this was also the position of Omar when he was elected as the successor of Abu Bakr: in his very first speech after being appointed as caliph, he stressed the need for accountability in his administration, and the rights of every empowered citizen (Ibn al-Jawzi, 2001: 170–1).

In another event, while Omar was giving the Friday sermon, an ordinary person rose and interrupted saying, “O the leader of the believers, I won’t listen to your sermon until you explain how you came up with your long dress (Arabian robe)”. Apparently, there was some distribution of fabric to the people and given the measure of distribution and the height of Omar; he could not have made a dress out of his share. So, a vigilant voice of egalitarianism unhesitatingly challenged Omar, the leader of a vast caliphate. Omar’s son stood up, explaining that he gave his share to his father, so that a dress could be made to fit Omar. The vigilant voice then expressed his approval and sat down, and Omar resumed his sermon (Ibn Qutaybah, 2002: 1/55).²⁹

Omar’s policy on accountability did not end with the primitive style of verbal complaints and condemnations from the public. As for the public offices, he established a specific office to deal with the public administrators’ accountability. The office was designed for the investigation of complaints that reached the Caliph against the officers of the State. When it was first established, Omar appointed Muhammad ibn Maslamah to take the responsibility of this ombudsman-like department. In important cases Muhammad ibn Maslamah was deputed by Omar to proceed to the location, investigate the charge and take action. Sometimes an Inquiry Commission was constituted to investigate the charge. Whenever the officers raised complaints against him, they were summoned to Madinah, and the case was brought before the Caliph himself. The Caliph also dismissed governors when the people complained against them; amongst them was the Prophet’s companion, Sa’ad Ibnu Abê Waqqas, due to the people’s complaints against him (Majdalawi, 2000: 86 and 90). The same function was conducted in a later phase of Muslim history by a specially designed office known as *Diwan al-Mazalim*, which can be understood as the classical version of the contemporary ombudsman.

Another example of accountability practiced during the period of the rightly guided Caliphs can be found in the famous letter written by the fourth Caliph, Ali ibn Abi Talib to his governor of Egypt, Malik al-Ashtar. In his advice to the governor, he asserts that:

Out of your hours of work, fix a time for the complainants and for those who want to approach you with their grievances. During this time, you should do no other work but hear them and pay attention to their complaints and grievances. For this purpose you must arrange public audience for them; during this audience, for the sake of Allah, treat them with kindness, courtesy and respect. Do not let your army and police be in the audience hall at such times so that those who have grievances against your regime may speak to you freely, unreservedly and without fear

(al-Musawi, 2007: 2/459)

In articulating accountability as a manifestation of *amanah*, the principle is to be crystallized in a mechanism that will guarantee that no party will avoid being answerable for their *ex-ante* and *ex-post* responsibilities. The procedure

should comprise a comprehensive system, institutions and culture within society. As for an effectual macro accountability system, it would only prevail within the tangible and real division of powers in any state. Without a real separation of power, as can be seen in many contemporary Muslim countries, a culture of accountability could never prevail. In the absence of a palpable and salient atmosphere of accountability, ideal governance is not likely to be achieved, leading to arbitrary ascendancy.

Equally, political pluralism, which enables political parties to compete for power to represent the people, should also prevail to enshrine the practice of accountability in establishing Islamic norm-based governance. Likewise, freedom and more room for opposition in making the executives and the ruling party accountable is another prerequisite (Imarah, 2005: 100–9). Perhaps the establishment of a multi-party political system might be another efficient way of ensuring a process of constant accountability under such an axiom. Under such a structure, all parties engaged in the legislative and governance process must be treated equally without any discrimination regarding their political affiliation. The executive or the ruling party will be accountable before the opposition as the shadow government in order to improve their performance in delivering people's rights.

Similarly, in reflecting on the modern world developments and requirements, within the spirit of *amanah*-inspired accountability, all administrative bodies, including bureaucratic institutions and other public offices, must be transparent and monitored by the public through freedom of information and scrutinizing committees in order to achieve Islamic governance. In the same vein, accountability bodies for the executive and legislative agencies such as the ombudsman, the parliamentary accountability commission, and the anti-corruption agency, are vital to achieve the aims of *amanah* in governance. Independent and non-biased judicial systems with sound legal codes on the other hand are another necessity, of course with serious enforcement. More room for the civil society and media as watchdogs in monitoring the governance process and also as part of the decision-making process would enhance the ideals of accountability. Neither systems nor institutions could function in a culture that does not welcome such an ideal.

Correspondingly, the behavioural norms of the community should allow the spirit of individual consciousness of trustee typology to enable an accountability culture to flourish as a sustainable convention in society's social, economic and political life. While in order to allow the practice of accountability to be part of progressive governance system in the life of the people, the Islamic ethos of *islah* (constant striving for betterment), in providing a productive basis for accountability, freedom or *hurriyyah* within the framework of *ikhtiyar* (both restricted and voluntary notions), is indispensable. Likewise, the atmosphere of rule of law inspired from *al-'adl wa al-ihsan* are vital, since both elements are included in the major principles of Islam itself, thus they represent another important axiom for ideal governance.

Third axiom: *al-'Adl wa al-Ihsan* (justice and benevolence)

One of the major themes of Islamic teaching is justice ('*adalah* or '*adl*). It is stated in the Qur'an: "Allah commands you to deliver the trusts (*amanah*) to those to whom they are due; and whenever you judge between people, judge with justice ..." (Qur'an, 4:58). According to the Qur'an, justice along with *tawhid* was the most prevailing message and the mission of all the Prophets (57:25). In addition, justice has also been equated to piety (Qur'an, 5:8). Similarly, the Qur'an also abhors injustice and despotism through the stories of the despots and tyrants whom the prophets stood before to convey God's message of justice and truth. Abraham was sent to Nemrod (Qur'an, 2:258), Moses and Aaron were sent to Pharaoh, Qarun and Haman to remind them of their deviations from justice and God-given order (Quran, 28:38; 29:39; 40:23–4; 79:24). Due to the significance and vitality of this concept, it is important that it is included in the axioms of governance. This concept will be defined to understand its philosophical and semantic meanings before its implications are further elaborated in the following paragraphs:

Definition

The term justice can be defined clearly as the absence of injustice (*Zulm*). '*Adl* or '*adalah* or justice and fairness are the centre of Muslim actions. Although it is hard to set a parameter to give accurate specifications of justice, acts of injustice can easily be recognized. Accordingly, the semantic definition of '*adl*, which is derived from the root word '*A Da La*, is the antonym of injustice or tyranny (*Zulm* and *jawr*). '*Adl* or '*adalah* denotes straightness and uprightness, which are the state of the absence of tyranny, corruption, waywardness and deviation; '*adl* also means balance and proportion, which are in contrast to imbalance and asymmetry; it is also used for equality, equity and fairness, which are opposite to inequality and discrimination, inequity and oppression (Ibn Manzur, 1956: 11/430–1; al-Jawhari, 1956: 5/1760–1).

In such an understanding, '*adl* encompasses vast and comprehensive meanings exceeding the current limited notion of justice. '*Adl* represents the most vital position of Islam and exemplifies the highest objective of the Shari'ah itself (Imarah, 2005: 62–4) '*Adl* is also defined as 'putting things in their right place'. In this usage, being '*adl* is also delivering the *amanah* (trust), and delivering both '*adl* and *amanah* is the fruit of *Iman*, thus crystallizing the meaning of *tawhid* according to the trustee paradigm.

However, '*adl* (justice) alone is not sufficient for delivering the rights of the community. Islam promotes '*adl* along with *ihsan* (benevolence) in ensuring fairness prevails in human life. Such a principle is reflected in the Qur'anic message that orders both '*adl* and *ihsan* to be executed in parallel to enshrine the *tawhidic* ideal of 'justice and fairness' in all aspect of human life³⁰ (Naqvi, 2003: 151). *Al-'adl wa al-ihsan* has been promoted in Islamic epistemology by encouraging Muslims to deliver fairness and justice in every domain of their life.

Similarly, it is a trust upon every single individual to deliver and promote *al-'adl wa al-ihsan* as a paramount value of their mission as Allah's vicegerent.

Complementary to the axiom *'adl* (justice), *ihsan*, which originates from the word *hasan* (right or good) defines the nature of an environment needed to prepare the fertile ground for justice to be implemented. Semantically, *hasan* (right and good), as the origin of the term *ihsan* factually envisages the meaning of *ikhlas* or sincerity, and also alludes to the significance of beneficence, performance of good conduct and the act of mercy (Ibn Manzur, 1956: 13/117; Hans Wehr, 1979: 209) and the antonym of '*isa'ab*' (to misbehave, to abuse or to act unfairly). Implementing *ihsan* is articulating the denotation of both '*adl*' and *amanah*, which are fruits of *tawhidic* worldview.

In al-Qur'an, the term *ihsan* was used to exemplify different deeds, which refer to its central semantic meaning of beneficence, performance of good deeds, the act of mercy and striving to reach the best standards of performance, such as: To forgive the faults of others (Qur'an, 5:13, 3:134); To spend wealth for the welfare of humankind (Qur'an, 2:195, 3:134); To be kind to the parents (Qur'an, 46:15); To strive against evil in the way of God (Qur'an, 29:69, 9:120); To be generous (Qur'an, 2:236); To be humble (Qur'an, 2:58, 9:91, 5:82–5, 7:56); To be righteous, to fear God and be patient (Qur'an, 12:90); To establish *Salah* (prayer) and pay *Zakah* (charity alm) (Qur'an, 31:3, 11:114–15).

Similar to '*adl*', *ihsan* is a comprehensive concept that encompasses all human affairs including man's relationship with God, and his relationship with other creatures, especially in fulfilling social obligations. The state of *ihsan* epitomizes 'excellence in servitude to God'.³¹ The consciousness of one being observed by God will stimulate him or her to perform his deed with utmost sincerity and inclusive excellence just as people perform better when their superior is watching them.

Additionally, being a *muhsin* (implementer of *ihsan*) is the manifestation of equity and humbleness according to *tawhidic* reality. A *muhsin* should have mercy not only on himself and other human beings around him, but also on other creatures and the environment, as well as on future generations (intra-generation).³² By not implementing *ihsan*, one is subjected to commit injustice (*zulm*). However, the usage of the word in the governance term according to the *tawhidic* episteme can be expanded to its wider meaning based on the semantic usage of the term. The term illuminates the pure meaning of 'the act of benevolence towards another creature', and also connotes the meaning of striving to reach the best standards of performance in any circumstances or situations. It represents excellence, graciousness and benevolence, 'comprehensive excellence' and 'perfection', which are interconnected with '*adl*'.

Implications of al-'adl wa al-ihsan for governance

This comprehensive coverage of the term *al-'adl wa al-ihsan* also connotes the inter-connected application of *tawhidic* worldview in metaphysical, theological,

ethical, judicial, social, education, psychological, economical and political dimensions in which justice is the major aim to be achieved and crystallized in all those fields. This multifaceted nature of *al-'adl wa al-ihsan* constitutes the articulation of *tawhidic* reality to establish an Islamic ethos in many fields of human endeavour. Accordingly, *al-'adl wa al-ihsan* primarily insists on just order to prevail in a Muslim community through value-based development by ensuring justice along with fair distribution of wealth based on needs for a 'just' development and economic growth, which consequently "denote a state of social equilibrium" (Naqvi 1994: 267).

Furthermore, in ensuring the state of social equilibrium, this concept comprehensively articulates the crucial components in the governance process to be practised to achieve the ideal of Islamic governance, amongst them:

Al-'adl wa al-ihsan, tawhid, amanah and tazkiyah require establishment of the rule of law

Al-'adl wa al-ihsan, along with the notion of equality and purification from *tawhid*, *amanah* and *tazkiyah* axioms, demands the establishment of a just and fair society through the domination of 'rule of law' in the legal discourse of the community. Justice as the prime objective of Islamic governance is to be manifested through the attainment of *maqasid al-Shari'ah*, and by upholding it in its more inclusive interpretation. In the light of such aspiration, the concept of *al-'adl wa al-ihsan* along with the other axioms must ensure that all rules and laws promulgated and enacted must be respected by the people and subsequently every single individual will enjoy the feeling of security under the laws. Rule of law from a *tawhidic* worldview paradigm can be concluded in five major fundamentals: the equality of individuals, the innocence of individuals until proven guilty by fair judgement, the prohibition of imposing a penalty without a firm judgement sentence, the prohibition of torture by any parties upon the others and the separation of powers. Scores of evidence from Islamic epistemological sources entail explicitly and inexplicitly the formulation of certain principles and maxims on such concept, which can be further detailed as follows:

(i) All individuals are equal before the law

Amongst the essential features of *al-'adl wa al-ihsan* is 'equality of human beings before the law' regardless of class differences, race or even religion. Being treated differently by the law due to social status or class, opposes the conception of justice, fairness and comprehensive excellence and rightness. Furthermore, the unity of mankind before God, as part of *tawhidic* worldview, necessitates that men should be equal before the law for it to be a just and fair law. The most compelling tradition in regards to such a principle is what is popularly known as '*Hadith Fatimah*', in which the Prophet Muhammad refused to entertain the noble *Quraish* tribe, Bani Makhzum who appealed to the Prophet to lift the punishment of one of their women who was convicted of theft. He

was quoted as saying the cardinal precept: “By Allah, if Fatima, the daughter of Muhammad (my daughter) stole, I would cut off her hand”.³³

The tradition became a principal underpinning for Islamic jurists who later formulated the theory of individuals’ equality before the law. According to the intrinsic and explicit meaning of the tradition, all citizens, regardless of background or social level are subjected to the law equally: no person is above the law, and everybody is obliged to obey the same law. A *qadhi* (Islamic judge) is always conscious that he is not permitted to distinguish between people based on religion, race, colour, kinship or prejudice. In fact, there have been numerous cases in Muslim history where Caliphs had to appear before judges for litigation.

Amongst the incidents was the case of ‘Ubay, a prominent companion of the Prophet and a common citizen who charged Omar, who was then Caliph. Ubay took Omar to the court of *qadhi* Zaid bin Thabit. When the Caliph appeared before the *qadhi*, the *qadhi* paid his respects to him. There, ‘Ubay reprimanded him, saying, “This is your first act of injustice”. And he settled himself by the side of ‘Ubay. ‘Ubay had no proof for his claim and Caliph Omar rejected the claims. ‘Ubay demanded that the Caliph take the normal oath as was the practice. The *qadhi* disagreed and preferred that the Caliph should be exempted from such formality. However, Omar himself disapproved this and asserted, “Unless ‘Ubay and Omar are equal in your court, you do not deserve to hold the high office of the *qadhi* (Sallabi, 2007:1/507)”. Caliph Omar proved through his words and deeds that every person is born free and even the lowest of the low should not be abashed or humiliated.³⁴

Another clear example is the famous story of Ali, the fourth of the rightly-guided caliphs, who once had his armour stolen and he found it with a Christian. Ali confronted him about the armour. However, from the earliest days of Caliphate, Islam separated the judiciary from the executive and therefore, even though he was the caliph, his only recourse was to take the accused to the *qadhi* (judge). In the hearing, it was the words of Ali and his servant, a witness, against the accused. Having no independent witness, the *qadhi* dismissed the case and Ali was denied the opportunity to get his favourite armour back. There was a serendipitous outcome, however.³⁵

(ii) Individuals are innocent until being proven guilty through a fair judgement
 Under the shade of *al-'adl wa al-ihisan*, every person in a society is innocent until proven guilty in a fair trial. The conviction of innocent people is obviously unjust and against the notion of perfection of human action (Sherif, 2003; Hussein, 2003). The principle of ‘*karamah al-insan*’ (the honour of individual), which implies that God has honoured and dignified man and must be fully respected and observed by every other human being, applies to every citizen within Islamic jurisdiction (Hussein, 2003: 49). Based upon this concept, Muslim jurists (*fuqaha*) established a maxim (*qa'idah fiqhiiyah*) that every person is ‘innocent’ (*bara'ah al-dhimmah*) until he is proven guilty (Zaydan, 2004: 43). Under these precepts, Islamic theory of governance ensures that

every individual's rights will be respected and no arbitrary or unjust laws will be enacted and promulgated against them. In the same way, people are also duly protected from being accused based on mere doubtful information.

Many evidences can be found in both the Qur'an and Sunnah pointing to this. The Prophet Muhammad himself resorted to this principle in solving disputes between his companions. Amongst them, a well-known incident reported by Wa'il Ibn Hujr of the dispute between a companion from Hadramawt and a Bedouin from Kindah about a piece of land which belonged to Hadramawt's father being taken by the Bedouin. Unfortunately, the companion of Hadramawt had no proof of ownership. Despite the notorious attributes of the Kindah's Bedouin, the Prophet Muhammad instructed the plaintiff to provide proof and insisted that he could not pass any judgement without evidence showing that the land indeed belonged to the Hadramawti companion. The judgement was given in favour of the Bedouin due to the principle of evidence.³⁶ The tradition implies that individuals remain innocent until proven guilty with solid evidence and convictions by fair trial.

In another tradition, Ibn 'Abbas was reported as saying: "The Messenger of Allah has decreed that the onus of the oath lies with the defendant".³⁷ This tradition suggests that the plaintiff, in order to secure the rights of innocent people against false accusations, should provide proof. This serves as evidence that the defendant is innocent until proven guilty. Likewise, perhaps Omar's letter to his newly appointed *qadhi*, Abu Musa al-Ash'ari illustrates the very implication of this tenet. In this letter, he enlightens Abu Musa on how a *qadhi* should conduct his trial and how to deliver a fair verdict (Imarah, 2005: 195–200). Omar says in the letter:

Glory to Allah! Verily Justice is an important obligation to Allah and to man. You have been charged with this responsibility. Discharge this responsibility so that you may win the approbation of Allah and the good will of the people. Treat the people equally in your presence, and in your decisions, so that the weak despair not of justice and the high-placed harbor no hope of favoritism. The onus of proof lies on the plaintiff, while the party who denies must do so on oath. Compromise is permissible, provided that it does not turn the unlawful into something lawful, and the lawful into something unlawful. Let nothing prevent you from changing your previous decision if after consideration you feel that the previous decision was incorrect. When you are in doubt about a question and find nothing concerning it in the Qur'an or the *Sunnah* of the Prophet, ponder the question over and over again. Ponder over the precedents and analogous cases, and then decide by analogy. A term should be fixed for the person who wants to produce witnesses. If he proves his case, discharge for him his right. Otherwise the suit should be dismissed. All Muslims are trustworthy, except those who have been punished with flogging, those who have borne false witness, or those of doubtful integrity

(Imarah, 2005: 195–200)

In sum, this maxim reflects the rule of law and need to avoid arbitrary situations in the community.

(iii) Penalty should not be imposed on any individual without fair judgement

According to the previous principles, any penalty is meaningless without a fair trial (Hussein, 2003). A fair trial is crucial to the concept of *al-'adl wa al-*ihsan** in order to ensure that nobody will be treated unjustly. Islamic theory of governance ensures that the entire society is safe from unjust treatment. On a similar theme, any draconian acts and rules that allow the opposite situation will be contradicting the higher objectives of *Shari'ah (maqasid)*. Widespread usage of detention without trial and the use of torture in contemporary Muslim countries is strongly contradicting such virtue, which is not only unjust and merciless, but also against the worldview of *tawhid*.

Various examples from the *Sunnah* signify how pivotal this principle is. On one occasion before his demise, the Prophet Muhammad went to the Muslim community in Madinah and asked them:

He whose back I have lashed, here is my back, let him lash it. He whom I have ever insulted his honour, here I am offering my honour so that he may avenge himself.

(al-Mubarakfuri, 2002: 410)³⁸

His action in the tradition shows the meaning of equality of all individuals and their right to benefit from justice and fairness before the law regardless of their social status. It also denotes that he who has been wrongly punished can ask for his rights to be claimed even from the Prophet as the prime leader of the state; this also serves as evidence prohibiting rulers from punishing any of their subjects without establishing the charge for which he deserves such punishment. The Prophet also advocated that Muslims should evade punishment in the case of uncertainty.

This principle was also clarified through the Prophet's judgement on another event. It was reported that the Prophet abstained from convicting an anonymous woman for the crime she committed due to lack of proof. He was recorded as saying:

If I were to stone anyone without proof I would stone such and such a woman (of adultery). For doubts have been raised over the way she speaks, the way she dresses and over the people who go to her.³⁹

This means that the Messenger of Allah (saw) desisted from punishing her because there was a lack of proof in spite of the concerns raised over her conduct and his knowledge of the hidden truth as a Prophet.⁴⁰ This indicates clearly that in Islam, nobody deserves punishment until he or she is found guilty through a fair trial.

(iv) Torture is prohibited in Islam

Juxtaposing both the aforementioned principles of innocence of the individual and prohibition of penalty without fair trial, *al-'adl wa al-ihsan* also entails that no punishment or torture should be inflicted upon accused individuals before any clear verdict resulting from a fair trial is delivered. Another unequivocal implication of (*al-'adl wa al-ihsan*) is respect for people's honour and rights. The persistent use of torture to ensure the people obey their ruler is a medieval or *jahiliyyah* (ignorance) culture that has been denounced not only by Islam, but also by reason. Despite divergent opinions amongst classical Muslim scholars on the permissibility of beating the accused, the majority are against such practise. Kamali (2003: 82) points out that some scholars permitted the use of beating only of those accused of dangerous and notorious crimes who refuse to confess despite clear evidence against them that they will bring harm to the community.

However, many modern international conventions regarding human rights prohibit the use of such methods by civilized nations. Instead, through advanced methods of law enforcement agencies and various methods of judicial proceedings with fair trials the pursuit of justice in more civilized and fair means are sufficient (Kamali, 2003: 88). We can see from this that the torture of prisoners that has been widely practised in some Muslim countries in recent times are in fact against the very principle of *tawhid*, betray the *amanah* and contradict the understanding of *al-'adl wa al-ihsan*. The function of Islamic governance then, is to make certain that those crimes are absent from society, and to put all measures in place to prevent them from happening.

Much evidence in the Qur'an and *Hadith* condemns such action, amongst them the aforementioned tradition in which the Prophet refrained from punishing a woman for adultery, despite the fact that she was known to be an adulteress amongst the community of Madinah. Nevertheless, she was not detained and interrogated with the use of torture to obtain a confession from her. If it were fitting to inflict punishment upon the accused in order to cause them to confess, the Prophet would have punished the woman for her confession, due to her behaviour. Islamic teaching, however, as presented by the Prophet's action forbids any type of punishment of the accused before the charge has been established. In another incident, the Prophet also refused to impose a penalty on an accused drunken person due to a lack of evidence, despite his knowledge and that of others about the man.⁴¹ It can be understood from this tradition that it would be wrong to inflict any punishment on the accused prior to the establishment of the charge before a fair trial in a court of law.

(v) The separation between the judicial and the executive

In order for a law to be implemented justly and fairly, the law must work within a just and fair system. Accordingly, to have a just system, a state of arbitration must be avoided by separating the judicial system from the executive. Separation of powers enshrines the meaning of *al-'adl wa al-ihsan*, in reflecting the effort to attain the perfection of justice through a comprehensive mechanism. This

concept might not have been explicitly mentioned in the Qur'an nor practised by the Prophet Muhammad, since he was both the divinely appointed lawmaker and the state leader. It was Omar, the second Caliph who was the first to separate the judiciary from the executive due to his clear understanding of the needs for such a system. He established most of the administrative structure for the young Muslim empire, including the judicial administration (Wasil, 1977: 65). Other Caliphs without any type of basic amendments then followed his administration innovations.

Omar's establishment of a judicial administration department functioned to provide adequate and prompt justice for the people. Judges or *qudhah* (sing. *qadhi*) in the Arabic and Islamic term – were appointed at all administrative levels for the administration of justice.⁴² Judges were appointed in ample numbers, to all districts across the Islamic empire throughout Islamic history. In any legal litigation, the *qudhah*'s power exceeded the Caliph's in that if the Caliphs engaged in any proceedings he had to submit to the verdict of the *qudhah*. The example might be rather classical and primitive, but the spirit of good practice by Omar and the Caliphs across the centuries suggests that the separation of power is crucial, as is the empowerment of the judicial system and mechanisms. Islamic governance, therefore, must ensure that the separation of power not only exists but also is felt by the people to be seen and prevalent.

However, the rule of law principle itself is not the end to be achieved in the field of governance. It serves as a means to obtain *falah*, which is the ramifications of the comprehensive preservation of the *maqasid al-Shari'ah*. Rule of law is needed to warrant that religion, life in its comprehensive meanings, which include the quality of life and the means to life, and the other essentials (*daruriyyat*) will be safe and protected. The absence of rule of law will inevitably lead to the obliteration of human well-being through the loss of the *Daruriyyat* in their worldly life and the hereafter. Such a concept is also necessary to secure the rights of the individual, which is intertwined with the responsibility of a *khalifah* within the realm of Tawhidic reality. Rule of law also reflects the ideal of far-reaching understanding of '*ihsan*' in both its meanings as 'the act of benevolence towards other creatures', and 'comprehensive excellence' and 'perfection'. The implementation of just law through a just legal system by Muslims was purely inspired by these meanings.

Ihsan, amanah, rububiyyah and tazkiyah necessitate sustainability

Together with the instrumental meaning of justice and fairness of *al-'adl*, *ihsan* as the completion of Islamic understanding of comprehensive justice, fairness and benevolence reflects the very meaning of *tawhid*. The repercussion of *ihsan* resembles *tawhidic*-inspired belief that all creatures are one nation before God and certainly equal to each other. It is indicated in the Qur'an (6:38):

There is not an animal on earth nor being that flies on its wings, but forms part of communities like you...

This verse shows that creatures were created by God with different shapes, natures and roles, but are inter-related to each other as part of the law of nature. However, human being as the ‘trustee’ has the greater role in preserving and safeguarding (*ri’ayah*) of the earth and all other creatures that dwell on it and will be accountable before God for the duty. The holistic denotation of this ‘*ihsani*’ paradigm connotes that the human race has to maintain harmonious and equilibrium relations not only amongst themselves, but also between them and nature,⁴³ not only for the present generation but also for future generations. This responsibility is an *amanah* upon them to be delivered as the *khalifah* chosen by God.

In accordance with this argument, the Islamic theory of governance encompasses the issue of sustainability policies in social life. *Ihsan* along with *tazkiyah* and *rububiyyah* require that all policies and developmental models take into account the well-being of the environment and future generations. This assertion is not distinct from Schumacher’s (1993), who taught that nature is not to be dealt as a commodity but as part of the human being in their survival on this planet. Any model of development that fails to include the aspect of sustainability is morally intolerable in Islam. It might not be prohibited explicitly from a deontological *fiqhi* legal positivistic approach, but it violates the very consequentialistic concept of *ihsan*, which is greatly encouraged by Islam.

In the same way, the virtue of *ihsan* within the radius of *amanah* inspires individuals to be functioning active citizens in making themselves beneficial towards others. A *muhsin* or a person who has a proclivity of inner self-consciousness of *ihsan* is a person who does not live on the basis of individualistic egocentricity. A further contemplation of verses (al- Qur'an, 2:177; 107:1–7) reveals the urgency of social responsibility in community life. The verses imply that working for the sake of Allah to assist those who are less fortunate and in need of help to promote spiritual, physical, emotional, intellectual and social well-being among the members of the community is a core responsibility of the *muhsin*. With such a standard, the improvement of a society and nation towards a better future could be achieved if every ‘*muhsin*’ (pl. *muhsinun*) played their part in contributing to various social concerns that exist.

Thus this axiom provides for the horizontal dimension of equality “of all the virtues of the basic set of social institutions – legal, political and economic” (Naqvi, 1994: 27).

In this intra-and inter-generational equality, human beings and societies are expected to establish a balance between the needs of present and future generations, develop policies to fulfil the needs of individuals, enable them to earn a respectable source of living, develop policies for an equitable distribution of wealth and provide for growth and stability-oriented policies.

(Asutay, 2007a: 7)

Nevertheless, the overriding notion of equality promoted through this axiom must never be separated from the unique but important characteristic of

Shari'ah, *ukhuwwah*, or universal solidarity. The spirit of *ukhuwwah* as emphasized in many places in Qur'an and *Sunnah* ensures the efficacy of implementing many Islamic principles at the society level on a voluntary basis rather than by enforcement as will be seen in the following paragraphs.

Fourth axiom: *Ukhuwwah* (brotherhood)

Through a *tawhidic* worldview, Islam sets its own paradigm in defining the social nature of individuals and society. Unlike any other material incentives towards the issue, the relation between individuals in Islam is firmly fused by the spirit of '*ukhuwwah*', which philosophically connotes the expanded meaning of the term '*brotherhood*'. This axiom comprises many essential elements, which explain the socio-economic and political nature of Islamic governance that make it a unique concept compared with other ideologies or theories explaining the nature of the individuals-society relationship. The discussion will commence with the definition of *ukhuwwah* as '*brotherhood*', and will be followed by further discussions on its implications for the governance process.

Definition

In Arabic, *ukhuwwah* was associated with brotherhood or filial relation in the pre-Islamic period. During the early Islamic period, the term reflected the fraternity and camaraderie between believers. "The Believers are but a single Brotherhood" (Qur'an, 49:10), and in the Prophet's traditions, it is mentioned that: "a Muslim is a brother to another Muslim".⁴⁴ Ibn Manzur (1956, 14: 22) says,

Islamic and belief-inspired *ukhuwwah* such as the fraternity established by the Prophet between the *Muhajirun* (Muslims from Makkah) with the *Ansar* (Muslims living in Madinah). Accordingly, the semantic meaning of *ukhuwwah*, which has evolved since then thus, provides another dimension of brotherhood in which the affiliation to Islamic faith becomes the bond. When Muslim society entered a new phase in Madinah, the realm of *ukhuwwah* transcended the exclusive bond amongst the believers towards the universal sense of solidarity. Accordingly, the Qur'an emphasizes *ukhuwwah* in many verses as filial loyalty and solidarity.

(Qur'an, 2:83; 4:36; 6:151; 17:22; 29:8; 31:14; 46:15)

Nevertheless, it is important to note that *ukhuwwah* as universal filial solidarity varies from the constricted version of communism that repudiates private ownership under the banner of solidarity. *Ukhuwwah* does not eradicate the individual's choice in favour of the community as depicted by al-Qur'an and articulated through the Prophet's life as well as his companions'. The unique characteristic of *ukhuwwah* is its ability to include the very concept of individualism, ownership and gain of profit with the balance of certain elements of

collectivism, social justice and solidarity through wide-ranging *maqasidic* rules of interest (*wazn al-maqasid* or the *fiqh of maqasid*) by introducing a moral filter as part of Islamic moral economy. To grasp the holistic implication of *ukhuwwah*, one should have a broad view of what the word *ukhuwwah* really signifies and implies. The spirit of '*ukhuwwah*' interprets the very meaning of most functional and institutional concepts of the subject. Failing to be acquainted with this principle will impede one from comprehending the unique characteristic of an ideal Islamic 'governance'.

Implications of Ukhnuwwah on governance

Ukhnuwwah requires the unity of ummah

As an imperative element of Islamic governance, *ukhuwwah* affirms, amongst other things, the unity of the *ummah* (community). Throughout the Qur'anic verses and the Prophet's traditions, enormous emphasis has been placed on it. The unity of the *ummah*, which encompasses both the Muslim and non-Muslim community, is de rigueur to advocating the order to sustain justice, fairness, mercy and the higher objectives of *Shari'ah*. Unity of *ummah* in Islam has its central position in determining the landscape of Islamic political and economic doctrine and is therefore significant to the world of governance. Moreover, unity is intensified by the bond of *ukhuwwah* that embraces the rudiments of brotherhood, benevolence and equality (al-Qaradawi, 1993: 145). In conjunction to this, Qur'an notes:

And hold fast, all together, by the rope which God (stretches out for you), and be not divided among yourselves; and remember with gratitude God's favour on you; for ye were enemies and He joined your hearts in love, so that by His Grace, ye became brethren; and ye were on the brink of the pit of Fire, and He saved you from it. Thus doth God make His Signs clear to you: That ye may be guided.

(Qur'an, 3:103)

With such proliferation of the concept of unity, ideal Islamic governance should be workable not only to enable mechanisms and room for unifying factors, but must also to deter any possible threats to the *ukhuwwah*, which would polarize the *ummah*.⁴⁵ Allah praises the *Ansar* (Muslim community in Yathrib or Madinah) during the event of *Hijrah* due to the altruistic spirit shown by their sacrifices for the welfare of the *Muhajirun*,⁴⁶ (Muslim community from Makkah who migrated to Yathrib or Madinah) as an important landmark of the pivotal role of unity in Islamic tradition was the establishment of brotherhood between the *Ansar* and *muhajirun*. When the *Muhajirun* were compelled to migrate to Yathrib (thence known as Madinah) due to persecution in Makkah, they were immediately reconciled to the people of Madinah on the basis of what was then a unique concept: *ukhuwwah*. In an unprecedented act of magnanimity, the Madinah Muslims (who came to be collectively known as

the *ansar* or helpers) agreed to share their wealth and property with the *Muhajirun*. The *Ansar* gave a portion of their homes to the *Muhajirun* families for their use, and allowed them to farm on their lands under a system of share-cropping. This event from the recent post-developmental paradigm reflects a classic method of poverty alleviation and qualifies as the first instance of sustainable development in Islamic history.

Through the instrument of *ukhuwwah*, both *Muhajirun* and *Ansar* successfully established the first *ummah* (faith community) in Madinah. Despite the fact that it consisted of divergent elements with a long history of animosity and antagonism, those feelings were to a large measure tempered by the willingness of the *Ansar* to give their possessions to those in need at the time (Haykal, 1976: 153). In reflecting on all these meanings, al-Aqqad (1971: 79) insists that 'love' was one of the pillars of the Prophet's governance for an ideal Islamic community. In the same spirit, Prophet Muhammad was reported as saying that:

You will not enter Paradise until you have faith, and you will not have faith until you love each other. Shall I direct you to something, which if you fulfil it you will love one another? Spread peace among yourselves.⁴⁷

While in another tradition he said: "Each of you cannot be a believer until he loves for his brother what he loves for himself"⁴⁸; and he also stated that: "A Muslim is the brother of another Muslim. He does not oppress him, nor does he leave him at the mercy of others".⁴⁹

A proper deconstruction of the aforementioned verses and traditions leads us to understand the main theme of *ukhuwwah* in Islam, which is *mahabbah* (mutual love) and *ithar* (mutual altruism).⁵⁰ These two elements have been essential for the hearts of Muslims to feel that their individual life, which entails the right to private ownership and the right to accumulate wealth and profit must not be separated from their responsibility towards the society (Mannan, 1989: 41). These two elements manifest a high level of trust, which is the most important element in social capital, and at the same time exemplifies the meaning of benevolence in a Muslim's life as part of their social and individual obligation. With the cultivation of these two elements, the Muslim community will shape their governance based on the *tawhidic* framework, which will enhance the empowerment of society. This spirit provides the major framework for principles of governance for a nation's policies and institutions, through which the individual will be self-actualized but with *takaful* (mutual co-operation) based economy. In consequence, individuals will be empowered, hence, independent from the state.

Finally, in Islam, the process of governance at the community level is not to pursue the sole interest of the individual, nevertheless it is a mould based on the spirit of *ukhuwwah* to achieve or enhance *maqasid al-Shari'ah* virtues. This condition will generate *homo-Islamicus* individuals with high spirits of volunteerism, which is the most crucial heartbeat for the efficiency of any third sector industry

and civil society activities. Furthermore, mutual loving and altruism also necessitate sustainable development for the greater benefit of future generations.⁵¹ With sustainable policies in governance of the Muslim community, individuals' rights, public benefit and environment will be esteemed and preserved.

Ukhuwwah requires takaful ijtimā'iyy (mutual co-operation)

In an effort to understand the wider dimension of *ukhuwwah* implications to the field of governance, a very inseparable concept exemplifying its social gist should be highlighted, which in this case, is the concept of *takaful ijtimā'iyy* (mutual co-operation). *Takaful*, the very core concept of co-operation originates from the Arabic root word *Ka fa La*, which connotes the meaning of guarantee (Ibn Manzur, 1956: 11/590). However, in its usage, *takaful* closely translates to *ta'awun*, which means mutual or joint responsibility solidarity based on mutual agreement (Hans Wehr, 1979: 976). In delivering the virtue of mutual co-operation as part of the faith manifestation, al-Qur'an states: "And cooperate with one another in all that is good and pious and do not cooperate in sin and aggression" (Qur'an, 5:2). It is through *takaful* that *ukhuwwah* can be profoundly articulated where all individuals in the community are regarded as one nation or one body, and in turn they must mutually serve and co-operate with each other in decency and virtue.

Al-takaful al-ijtimā'iyy inspires the value of philanthropic and benevolence amongst believers, as well as other members of society. Many Qur'anic verses⁵² and traditions of the Prophet⁵³ encourage Muslims to act in this way through the virtues of caring, empathizing towards others, especially the less fortunate, being kind and honouring their neighbours, relatives and guests, and through stressing the importance of altruism (al-Qaradawi, 1993: 148–50; 226). In the field of governance, the concept acts as a useful element in providing a fertile ground for a community based on care and benevolence. *HomoIslamicus* with such criteria live with an innate feeling of an obligation to mutually co-operate with other members of society even though it is not legally compulsory.⁵⁴

This innate inclination is derived from a *Tawhidic* worldview that encourages individuals to live with such spirit and enjoy it as part of their act of worship ('ibadah), which will subsequently make them born philanthropists. This innate ramification would contribute towards the active role of third sector (voluntary sector or social enterprise) for economic development as has been seen throughout Muslim history through various *takaful*-inspired institutions, amongst them '*waqf*' (endowment). An effective state according to such governance encourages the prosperity of *waqf* institutions to shape the socio-economics of society, hence building a massive culture of trust-based economy and micro dynamics (Mannan, 1989).

In the same way, the virtue of philanthropy as the main foundation of *waqf* was praised by many verses and intensely associated with *Iman* (faith). This inter-relation between *ukhuwwah* and *Iman* illustrates the manifestation of *amanah* and '*adl wa ihsan* in the life of a community. In view of that, these

principles suggest a comprehensive and holistic ideal of 'Islamic' governance that entails fairness and justice in the life of society. In accordance with the stated practice, *takaful* also inspires fairness wealth ownership, in which it must not be manipulated by self-interest and monopolized by certain groups of greedy people (al-Qaradawi, 1993: 212). Such principal has been mentioned in the Qur'an:

What Allah has bestowed on His Messenger (and taken away) from the people of the townships,- belongs to Allah,- to His Messenger and to kindred and orphans, the needy and the wayfarer; In order that it may not (merely) make a circuit between the wealthy among you. So take what the Messenger assigns to you, and deny yourselves that which he withholds from you. And fear Allah. For Allah is strict in Punishment.

(Qur'an, 59:7)

In the same way, *takaful* inspires private ownership that is acknowledged and promoted in Islam, but with responsibilities and obligations towards less-fortunate members of the community. Ontologically, possession of wealth is not a definite or total control of an individual over his belongings but rather an act of trust regarding the wealth that in reality belongs to God (al-Qaradawi, 1993: 190–233). Accordingly, wealth is endowed to an individual as 'a bounty of Allah' as a test by which they will be accountable before God concerning those worldly possessions. Prophet Muhammad was quoted as saying that every person will be questioned before God during judgement day on "his wealth, from where he earned them and how did he spend them".⁵⁵ In sum, ownership of wealth is strongly linked with the moral and social obligations that come with it (Imarah, 2005: 76).

However, inner motivation could not solely function voluntarily to fulfil the ideal of *takaful*. Thus, some degree of practical enforcement is essential to ensure the concept will function smoothly. Historically, both *ukhuwwah* and *ihsan* (benevolence) were displayed in the Muslim community through the successful system of *zakah* (alms), which manifests the concept of *takaful* (mutual co-operation) through the culture of benevolence. Due to the significance of *zakah* in upholding justice and fairness (*al-'adl wa al-ihsan*) in Muslim community life, it is frequently mentioned together with *Salah* (prayer) in the Qur'an.⁵⁶ The Qur'anic message on the matter implies that *Salah* is regarded as the firm connection for the vertical relation between God and the individual, while *zakah* connects between the individual and his fellow human being. In depicting this pivotal role of *zakah* in relation to the governance process, Mannan (1989: 53, 92–2) asserts that *zakah* and its institution is a *sine qua non* for establishing a just Islamic social order.

Al-Qaradawi (1999) concludes in his thesis that the main objective of *zakah* is to bring stability and peace to a society through the philanthropic culture based on justice and benevolence. As mentioned earlier, *ukhuwwah* is pertinent to conserving the stability of the community. For this, *zakah* implicitly

contributes towards stability through the social welfare mechanism by establishing a just society or a society of ‘caring’. Through the spirit of *ukhuwwah* (brotherhood and solidarity), individuals never feel oppressed or forced to pay *zakah*, as they see the action of paying *zakah* as part of their worship to Almighty God. In a way, *zakah* is seen as a voluntarily action, rather than an enforcement upon individuals, as individuals are expected to return the share of the society to the society.

Ukhuwwah requires political loyalty

The impact of *ukhuwwah* in classical Muslim governance institutions can be seen clearly in the relation between rulers and their subjects. The nature of this relation is exemplified in the exchange of mutual-trust (*thiqah*) between the two parties akin to the notion of social contract explained by Locke and Rousseau. However, what separates the *thiqah* (exchange of mutual-trust) from the social contract is the ontological articulation and underlying objective of this relation. When Muslim Caliphs were elected and duly appointed as the head of the *ummah*, the oath of allegiance (*bay'ah*) given by the people indicated the responsibilities involved in being leader of the society (both Muslims and non-Muslims).

In exchange, the repercussion of the given trust obliges the people, and each individual in the society to make the leader accountable in the delivery of his duties. The unambiguous rationale of this mutual relation is to sustain order and to preserve community benefit (*maslahah 'ammah*) according to the highest objectives of *Shari'ah* (*maqasid*). Consequently, people are required to obey their rulers to maintain stability in the society. However, if the ruler departs from the rules of *Shari'ah* and neglects his responsibilities as a ruler, he no longer deserves people's obedience, thus the *bay'ah* is no longer binding for them (Bennabi, 1994: 104). The Qur'an insists on the need for such conformity in many verses including:

O ye who believe! Obey God, and obey the Apostle, and those charged with authority among you. If ye differ in anything among yourselves, refer it to God and His Apostle, if ye do believe in God and the Last Day: That is best and most suitable for final determination.

(Al-Qur'an, 4:59)

Numerous traditions of the Prophet also point towards the virtue of conformity to the ruler as long as the ruler does not enjoin the ruled to do sinful things. The Prophet was reported as saying:

The best of your rulers are those whom you love and who love you in return, whom you supplicate for and who supplicate for you in return. The worst of your rulers are those whom you hate and who hate you in return and whom you curse and who curse you in return.⁵⁷

This nature of *ukhuwwah* as the *raison d'être* for conformity was also articulated by Caliph Abu Bakr in his first sermon after his election as Caliph: “Cooperate with me when I am right, but correct me when I commit error; obey me so long as I follow the commandments of Allah and His Prophet; but turn away from me when I deviate”.⁵⁸ The attitude of equality, and the example shown by the succeeding Caliphs that leadership is an act of *wikalah* (representation), derives from the very spirit of *ukhuwwah*. As a *wakil* (representative) who has received the trust (*amanah*) and responsibility to lead the *ummah*, a Caliph should be obeyed to create order and maintain harmony and stability.

Ukhuwwah implies equality and equal opportunity

Equality is a cardinal and non-negotiable principle in the theory of ideal Islamic governance as has already been argued. Equality represents a bigger picture of what the spirit of *ukhuwwah* aims to obtain. As a result, solidarity, brotherhood and fraternity summarize the core understanding of *ukhuwwah* and always include humility and love. Consequently, the spirit of brotherhood also transforms an outward appearance of equality to *ukhuwwah* in governance. The principle of individuals' equality was highlighted in Prophet Muhammad's final sermon during his farewell pilgrimage (*khutbah al-wida'*):

All mankind is from Adam and Eve, an Arab has no superiority over a non-Arab nor a non-Arab has any superiority over an Arab; also a white has no superiority over black nor a black has any superiority over white except by piety and good action.⁵⁹

In this sermon, his address to mankind carried an ardent universal tone. Instead of directing his message exclusively to the Muslim community, he preceded with a universal appeal to mankind by asserting the principle of equality. This important principle and guidance implies that he is not supposed to be self-centred or concerned only with the Muslim community's interest and affairs, but rather he has been created as “the mercy for all mankind” as stated in the Qur'an (3:110).

Islam has nothing to do with social strife or hatred between the classes, unlike the condition of some other medieval civilizations where the population was divided into classes, which followed a particular social hierarchy (Thani, 2001: 95). It was this principle that Toynbee (1948: 205) regarded as “one of the outstanding achievements of Islam” saying that “in the contemporary world there is, as it happens, a crying need for the propagation of this Islamic virtue”. In the same vein, Gibb (1932: 379) notes that:

Islam has a still further service to render to the cause of humanity. It stands after all nearer to the real East than Europe does, and it possesses a magnificent tradition of inter-racial understanding and cooperation. No other

society has such a record of success uniting in an equality of status, of opportunity, and of endeavours so many and so various races of mankind.

Gibb also points out that Islam still has the *power to reconcile apparently irreconcilable* elements of race and tradition; hence, if ever the opposition of the great societies of East and West is to be replaced by co-operation, the mediation of Islam is an indispensable condition (Gibb, 1932: 379).

Consequently, this foundation compels Muslims to promulgate and adopt equality and justice-based policies in all areas of governance. Thus, any patronage or policies of inequality based on race, colour, clan, class, ownership or wealth is unIslamic. Consequently, the equality nature of governance inspired by *ukhuwwah* can be understood from the Qur'anic verse (59:7):

That which Allah giveth as spoil unto His messenger from the people of the townships, it is for Allah and His messenger and for the near of kin and the orphans and the needy and the wayfarer, that it become not a commodity between the rich among you.

The verse articulates the basic principle of how fair circulation of wealth is vital for the community and should be operated through various aforementioned compulsory and voluntary means (Muhammad Thani, 2001: 96).

Ukhuwwah entails tasamuh (mutual respect) and tafahum (mutual recognition)

As mentioned previously, *ukhuwwah* is not an exclusive concept, but rather a universal inclusive concept. The concept encompasses comprehensive solidarity not only amongst Muslims, but also toward other fellow humans, who Islam considers as brethrens in humanity (al-Qaradawi, 2008: 51). Furthermore, it also exceeds humankind to include other creatures. *Tawhidic* ontology demands from Muslims an understanding that the need to respect and acknowledge other believers within their radius of solidarity is pivotal and divine (al-Qaradawi, 2008: 51–3). In regards to this inclusive solidarity of *ukhuwwah*, the Qur'an (47:13) states that: "O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other (*li ta'arafu*).".

The above verse composes a constructive constitution of Islamic universal brotherhood. Not only does it address human beings as a whole without any exclusivity, it is also a promulgation of mutual respect and mutual acknowledgement. This inclusivity is semantically epitomized in the verse by the term '*li ta'arafu*' which literally means 'that ye may know each other'. '*Ta'aruf*' (knowing each other) as the main discourse of the verse, is etymologically derived from the root word '*'a Ra Fa*', which means 'to know', and also the root word for '*ma'rifah*' (knowledge), the acronym of which is '*ilm* (knowledge in depth) (al-Maidani, 1993). Thus, knowledge (both *ma'rifah* and *ilm*)

requires the action of *ta'lim*, or 'the process of learning', which in this case also carries the meaning of '*li ta'Alami*' or 'that ye may learn from each other'. The process of this mutual learning brings people together for mutual acknowledgement and mutual respect. This will negate the state of ignorance, which often brings about conflicts, misconceptions and misjudgements of others based on pre-conceived ideas and suspicions.

The concept of mutual respect and co-existence between Muslims has always been an essential formula for universal solidarity in Islamic teaching. Moreover, much evidence from al-Qur'an and Prophetic traditions supports this explicit universality of Islamic teaching (Rahman, 2009: 164–5). Likewise, the cohesion between Muslims and non-Muslims had been crystallized in Muslim history as early as during the Prophet's period in Madinah. This concept was also unambiguously addressed in *Sahifah Madinah* or the Charter of Madinah. As the pioneer social contract document in Muslim history (Imarah, 2005: 173; Hamidullah, 2006: 42–64), *Sahifah Madinah* indicates unequivocal acknowledgement of the Jewish tribes in Madinah as part of the *ummah* alongside the Muslims (al-Wa'iy, 1996: 49; Imarah, 2005: 176–7). The treaty was promulgated as the major reference to govern an architectural design for social structure and social contract for the people of Madinah, clearly indicating that the Jews of Madinah should be given aid and equality, should not be oppressed, nor should aid be given to others against them as recorded by Ibn Ishaq (Guillaume, 2007: 233).⁶⁰

The Prophet also stresses in the same document (as recorded by Ibn Ishaq) that the Jews will share the cost with the Believers as long as they fight a common foe; the Jews are one community with the Believers (but they have their own religion as the Believers have theirs). As with the Jews, so with their adherents, except for him who commits a crime? None shall depart to war except by the permission of Muhammad (but none shall be hindered from avenging an injury). There shall be mutual aid between Believers and Jews, in the face of any who war against those who subscribe to this document, and mutual consultations and advice. No man shall injure his ally, and aid shall be granted to the oppressed. The Jews, when fighting alongside the Muslims, will bear their own expenses. Madinah shall be sacred territory to those who agree to this covenant. If there should be any differences of opinion concerning this covenant and its meaning, they must be placed before Allah and Muhammad as the apostle of Allah. The document also insists that the Muslims and Jews will give mutual aid against whoever may attack Madinah (Guillaume, 2007: 232–3).

The co-existence and cohesion are not, hence, a new phenomenon in a Muslim's life, but was rather part of their history. The most colourful and pertinent model for this ideal was the *La Convivencia* in the Andalusia (Islamic Spain) period. The spirit of mutual respect and recognition did not only help the Islamic intellectual realm to flourish, but the Christian and Jewish intellectual and cultural environment also progressed (Pagden, 2008: 153–4). Historical evidence has recorded in abundance that coexistence was always visible within

the abode of Islam (*Dar al-Islam*). Despite numerous factual confirmations recorded regarding some abuses and bitter incidents concerning such relations in various periods due to certain disputes and discontent, nevertheless the very foundation of mutual acknowledgement and mutual co-existence remains as the undisputed precepts of *Shari'ah* (Ramadan, 2001: 104–18). Furthermore, these principles were not mere responses to the situation, but they are rather a reflection and articulation of the Islamic worldview. Therefore, mutual respect (*tasamuh*) and recognition (*tafahum*) of other believers and their beliefs are sacred and *sine qua non* for the governance of any Muslim community.

Fifth axiom: *Islah* (striving towards perfection)

Tendency to cause destruction and corruption is in the nature of human beings due to the desire given to them by God. The Qur'an explains this nature explicitly in the verse (2:30), in which the angels refer to man's role of *khilafah* (vicegerency) on earth by stating that men would "spread corruption thereon and shed blood".⁶¹ The fact that God did not reject their claim but merely said that, "verily, I know that which you do not know" shows that man by nature is prone to cause disorder (*fasad*) (Rahman, 1999: 17–18). However, as the vicegerent, al-Qur'an also emphasizes the role of Muslims to reform, which is also a part of human nature that has always been neglected. Muslims are born reformers, with a mission to bring goodness in the community's worldly life for their benefit in both this world and the life hereafter. The act of reforming is mentioned in many places in the Qur'an by the term '*islah*'⁶² (al-Zamili, 2009).

Definition

Semantically, the term *islah* is derived from the root word 'Sa La Ha', which means 'good' or righteous and is antonym to the term 'Fa Sa Da' (mischief or destruction) (Ibn Manzur, 1955: 3/335). The word '*islah*' is used in contrast to the act of '*fasad*' or '*ifsaad*' (destruction) in many Qur'anic verses and Prophet's traditions. From the word 'Sa La Ha', comes the verb *Salaha*, which means 'to act with piety', and 'As La Ha', which means 'to reform' and '*tasalaha*' which means to 'reconcile mutually'. It is also the foundation of the term '*salih*' (pious), *muslih* (reformer) and *Sulh* (reconciliation) and *Salih* (benefit) that is also known as '*maslahah*' (Ibn Manzur, 1955: 2/516–17). The use of *Salih* to mean *maslahah* is to identify that only good and pious elements should be acknowledged as of 'benefit' to the human being. However, in its contemporary denotation, the term '*islah*' is associated closely with the word '*tajdid*' (reform) and *taghyir* (change in its positive meaning) (al-Zamili, 2009).

Due to its original meaning of piety and good, *islah* represents the permanent behaviour of moving towards betterment and perfection. Similarly, *islah* also means the transformation from the state of bad to good, from good to better and from better to perfection. Therefore, its use to mean 'mutual reconciliation' or *musalahah* involves mutually agreed consideration towards enhancement and to

bring an end to *fasad* (destruction or mischief) (Ibn Manzur, 1955: 2/516–17). *Islah* could be defined as “a state of constant endeavour towards comprehensive excellence (*ihsan*) within the frameworks of innovation, construction and reconstruction to attain *halah* according to *maqasid al-Shari'ah*”. This definition is explicitly illustrated in al-Qur'an (3:104): “And there may spring from you a nation who invite to goodness (*khayr*), and enjoin right conduct (*ma'ruf*) and forbid indecency (*munkar*). Such are they who are successful”.

The term *khayr* (goodness) from the verse refers to the attribution understood as good and acknowledged by sound mind ('*aql*) the revelation (*shar'*). Hence, the invitation to *khayr* as the first element of *islah* compels the strong characteristic of cultivating the culture or atmosphere of goodness that varies from one context to another. Equally, *ma'ruf* (good conduct) as the second element of *islah*, literally translated as ‘known good conduct’, refers to the qualities that are explicitly identified and promoted by the revelation. Thus, ‘enjoining’ the *ma'ruf* requires constructive actions to bring people towards established or known ‘good conducts’. While forbidding *munkar* (indecency or abhorred), requires reconstructive elements to prevent people from committing the *munkar* to preserve the *Shariatic* environment or bring the corrupt situation to its intended state of natural goodness (*khayr* and *ma'ruf*).

Implications of islah on governance

Such a comprehensive understanding of *islah* could be accurately described as an act of ‘reform’ for good governance through micro dynamics, although reform might not accurately describe the extensive nature of the word. This is due to the fact that *islah* is not exclusively restrained within the basic parameter, but expands to reach a wider area, which implies all kinds of reform, *i.e.* mental, spiritual and material (al-Zamili, 2009).

It should be mentioned that *islah* was the *raison d'être* of the Prophets who were sent to bring justice and peace to the world and to prevent destruction and mischief. *Ergo*, as stated in al-Qur'an, Muslims were endowed with this mission of reform to uphold the well-being of man to the state of ‘*Salib*’ (good and piety) in both their worldly life and the life hereafter (Ghannoushi, 2001: 110).

To present *islah* in the realm of governance, it must be viewed from the abovementioned broad scope. Islamic governance is a paradigm that allows the spirit of *islah* to shape the system of governance, as well its practices. *Islah* should be presented in the life of the community through the culture of comprehensive excellence (*ihsani*) that engulfs every dimension of community life. In this way, *islah* reflects the collective responsibility taken by every individual with *tawhidic* consciousness in delivering their *amanah*, to create a community based on ‘*adl wa ihsan* with the spirit of *ukhuwwah*. Without a constant effort of *islah* those preliminary elements could hardly be put into place in any community, and *vice versa*. Within this spirit, development as viewed by the Qur'an⁶³ must never neglect the *islah* aspect in achieving the highest goal of *Shari'ah* (Omar, 1992: 45, 56).

Islah requires a conscious accountability and reform process through nasihah (counsel) and amr ma'ruf nahi munkar (enjoinment of good and the forbidding of indecency/evil)

The concept of equity has best been articulated through the mechanism of 'enjoinment of good and the forbidding of evil' throughout Muslim history. As mentioned previously, every single individual in the Islamic community is empowered to preserve justice and peace for the public interest according to this concept, which is the main objective of *Shari'ah*. The Qur'an emphasizes the need for this mechanism in various verses (Qur'an: 3:110; 9:71; 22:41; 4:114; 5:2; 7:165; 5:78–9). Similarly, countless Prophetic traditions have been recorded that point out the need for importance of this concept to enhance general justice within a community. In the same way, the experiences of the four rightly-guided Caliphs show that they received advice, complaints, oppositions and also rejections of their policy by the people, which reflects the level of success of the concept in creating empowered citizens during those periods.

It is through the spirit of *nasihah* and *amr ma'ruf nahi munkar* that the intrinsic meaning of *islah* is articulated to guide Muslims in their continuous striving to attain '*falah*' in both worlds. In the same way, *islah* as a landmark theme in individuals' lives will transform the society into self-actualized people striving to achieve *ihsan* (comprehensive excellence) in their daily life, leading to *falah*. Consequently, these concepts become pivotal in community life, in that they determine the consistency of the justice, benevolence, religiosity, good governance and development of the *ummah*. As an imperative, this concept allows for vertical accountability of peer assessment to be implemented within the larger governance process to ensure the trust is delivered effectively. At the same time, both top-down, and bottom-up evaluations as part of *islah* in all level of governance and community life will enable accountability to be exercised soundly.

Nasihah and *amr ma'ruf nahi munkar* also contribute towards the production of functioning and responsible individuals who live with the awareness of their responsibility to enjoin and promote virtue and at the same time to eradicate indecency and evil in their community. Evil is not only perceived as the sinful acts of individuals, in the realm of governance evil can be anything that will bring destruction to the community such as corruption, bribery, dictatorship, violation of rights, discrimination, misuse of power, and non-performance of leaders and administrators (Abdul Tawwab, 1983: 372–3). It is only through collectively practising the obligation of *amr ma'ruf nahi munkar*, that the *ummah* will progress, achieving unprecedented heights in development, hence 'good governance'. Taleqani (1986: 63) insists that any effort to eradicate those kinds of evils in community life and for the benefit of people reflects the true meaning of faith and religiosity as it proliferates the exercise of justice and epitomizes the wider implication of Jihad according to the Qur'anic verse (9:111–12).

In the same way, effective implementation of *amr ma'ruf* and *nabi munkar*, stipulates greater participation in governance activities (Zamili, 2009: 335–7).

To ensure the existence of this ideal, an adequate degree of freedom is vital. Consequently, ideal Islamic governance should permit the people freedom of expression, as well as freedom of associations, politics and access to information and media. Without such freedom, it would be difficult to implement this ideal. However, with freedom must come responsibility and that freedom must not exceed the moral obligations and ethics of Shari'ah (Ghraybeh, 2000). Shari'ah-based freedom is adherent to moral values, the feeling of respect towards others and the level of professionalism. Any acts that will lead to destruction or towards the infringement of moral issues are condemned and have no place in *tawhidic* reality-based life.

In the same way, *amr ma'ruf and naby munkar* has been institutionalized throughout history as a state-based mechanism of governance through the establishment of *Hisbah*. Initially, the institution of *Hisbah*⁶⁴ was established to prevent hindrances to the natural functioning of the market, but later on, the duty of the *muhtasib* (*Hisbah* officer) was expanded to the field of moral policing and to preserve the stability of the society. To summarise, the *muhtasib*'s major responsibilities were to supervise the markets and common morals. They were also responsible for checking irregularities and ensuring that market players were on the right path and did not indulge in malpractices. The *Hisbah* institution, hence, served as an efficient tool for regulating the market in the history of Muslims' governance ('Abdullah, 2000).

On the other hand, *islah*, as an important conceptual framework within the political realm, also implies the very concept of civil and democratic governance where people are empowered to choose the government they consider close to themselves and to remove anyone who fails to deliver public responsibilities. Al-Mawardi (2006: 17) confirms that people's conformation and support for the elected rulers depend on justice and effectiveness in conformity with the *Shari'ah* laws. However, in the case of the unjust or severely ineffective, then the Caliph or ruler must be impeached through the *majlis al-shura* (shura council). Similarly Al-Baghdadi, Ibn Hazm al-Zahiri, al-Ghazali, Ibn Hajar al-'Asqalani (Wa'iy, 1996: 289–90) and many others believe that impeachment is justified due to any ineffectiveness of a ruler, with some disagreements on the details. The *islah*-inspired thoughts concerning the impeachment issue are just another dimension of how the Classical Muslim scholars view the necessity of good governance in preserving public interest. The major ratio legist for the idea was that the trust given by the people is to be delivered by those in power by maintaining public order and *maqasid*, but once it has failed, an *islah* action is needed. In sum, apart from the *ex ante* role of *islah* in the empowerment of individuals as part of a governance of ideals, it is also crucial as a remedy should any failure occur in the *ex post* level of the governance process as part of the *tazkiyah* ideal.

The element of *islah* with the consideration of *amanah*, *ikhtiyar* and *ukhuwah* will motivate towards the cultivation of a pro-active role of civil society with the spirit of individual empowerment from *shura*. Every single individual, in achieving the '*khayr ummah*' status, will be working towards the enhancement of the governance ideal through their participation to ensure the other elements

of Islamic governance will be crystallized, hence the ‘functioning individual’. The consciousness of *islah* within society members will cultivate a culture of self-governance and active citizenship that is another essential element in maintaining the mechanisms and institutions of governance through the essence of *tazkiyah* (continuous purification.) In the same way, a culture of *islah* aims towards major philosophy of Islamic governance, and its major goal, the *maqasid al-Shari'ah* (higher objective of *Shari'ah*).

Therefore, the concept of *islah*, which is supported by concepts such as *ikhtiyar*, *tazkiyah*, *rubëbiyah*, will reflect the ideals of *al-'adl wa al-ihsan*, thus, indicating the comprehensive nature of the origin of Islamic governance. The role of these complementary axioms will be highlighted in the coming paragraphs, starting with a discussion on *ikhtiyar* (free-will) as the enabling factor for most of them (i.e. *amanah*, *islah*, *ukhuwwah*, etc.) to be fully articulated for the governance process.

Sixth axiom: *Ikhtiyar* (free-will)

Ikhtiyar (free-will) is essential in developing the Islamic axioms for governance. Free-will or freedom might have a specific notion in the contemporary usage. However, Islam has its own unique concept of free-will. This can be clearly seen from the semantic meaning of the term as follows:

Definition

Semantically, the term *ikhtiyar* originates from the root word *Kha ya ra* (to choose), which is also derived from the same root word as *khayr* (goodness) (Ibn Manzur, 1956: 4/266; al-Jawhari, 1966: 2/651–2). Consequently, the term *ikhtiyar* or free-will in Islam, therefore, implies free choice of what is good (*khayr*) or the choice for the better, which in this case is synonymous with the term *istifa'* (selecting the preferred best choice) (Ibn Manzur, 1956: 4/266). Hence, from the semantic argument, it is denoted that the choice to be taken from the freedom granted to the individuals is the one that benefits the individuals themselves. It is from this semantic meaning that the term *khayr*, which means liberty with generosity and kind-heartedness, comes.

According to this understanding too, *ikhtiyar* in Islam always comes with responsibility and accountability. Similarly, the same concept also applies to the notion of freedom from the Islamic point of view, in the sense that the freedom to choose must always be done for the right, true, just and correct reason (Alatas, 2003). In contrast, any choice for something bad is not the real freedom in accordance with Islamic understanding of free-will or *ikhtiyar*, but it is an act of *zulm* (injustice). A choice for better is therefore an act of freedom, and is also an act of *al-'adl* and *al-ihsan* in delivering the *amanah*. Thus, *ikhtiyar*

presupposes knowledge of good and evil, of virtues and vices; whereas a choice for the worse is not a choice as it is grounded upon ignorance urged

on by the instigation of the soul that inclines toward the blameworthy aspects of the animal powers; it is then also not an exercise of freedom because freedom means precisely being free of domination by the powers of the soul that incites to evil.

(Alatas, 2003)

According to this understanding, the Islamic definition of freedom differs from the conventional or secular interpretation of freedom (Ghraybeh, 2000; Ghanoushi, 1993).

From the Islamic economic systemic understanding, *ikhtiyar* connotes that individuals are believed to be endowed with “both unrestricted and voluntary” free-will (Naqvi, 1994: 29), which is guided by broad guidelines in order “*to interpret-reinterpret that freedom within specific societal contexts, and to suit the needs of changing times*” (Naqvi, 1994: 31) (emphasis is original). Therefore, this constitutes functional norms of economic activity in an Islamic economic system. A similar impact can be seen in the process of the role of *ikhtiyar* as a pivotal concept within the framework of governance. This can be seen clearly in the implications *ikhtiyar* brings to the governance process as will be explained in the following section.

Implication of ikhtiyar to governance

With reference to governance, *ikhtiyar* denotes that individuals are empowered with decision-making choices for themselves in affairs relating to governance without any enforcement or restriction. *Ikhtiyar* also explains the sufficient space needed for individuals to make their choices through freedom of speech, freedom of politics and freedom of expression that will enable them to exercise their rights in political and economical issues. However, freedom and choice from an *ikhtiyari* perspective are those within the radius of *tawhidic* worldview, and those that confirm *maqasid al-Shari'ah*.

The implication of *ikhtiyar* can also be seen in the duty of the state to enable the right choice to be made by individuals and society with the freedom available in the governance system, hence the realization of *al-'adl wa al-ihsan*. The enabling space in the governance process is needed to guarantee the functioning of all those who participate in governance to deliver their *amanah* through a wide spectrum of participations in the governance process.

Ikhtiyar requires freedom (Hurriyyah)

In order to execute *amanah* and develop a life within the *tawhidic* framework individuals should have the political freedom to exercise their respective responsibilities and enjoy their rights. Without political freedom, it is hard to believe that all the Islamic ideals on governance issues could be implemented. Nevertheless, only freedom that is guided by broad guidelines in order to interpret/reinterpret within specific societal contexts, and suits the needs of changing

times (Naqvi, 1994: 31) is essential for such an aspiration. Moreover, this type of freedom, which is part of human nature, is the fruit of 'free-will' (*ikhtiyar*) theological doctrine in Islamic doctrine (al-Kawakibi, 1953: 8–9). Due to the freedom, individuals will be responsible for whatever he/she chooses. In substantiating this, Sen (1999) argues that 'Without the substance and capability to do something, a person cannot be responsible for doing it'. However, freedom in the framework of Islamic *tawhidic* ontology is bound with responsibilities and denotes the sense of 'free from' rather than the explicit 'free to'.

Freedom or *hurriyyah* in Islam is the opposite of slavery in the human race (al-Khar'an, 2002: 309). This can be clearly seen from the statement of Rib'i bin 'Amir:

Allah revived us so that we liberate whoever He wishes from being slaves to others towards total submission to Allah, from the cruelty of other religions towards Islamic justice, from the narrow world to the vastness of this world and the Hereafter.

(Ibn Kathir, no date: 7/48)

Slavery in its widest definition encompasses the act of tyranny, autocracy and other infringements of individuals' freedom to make their own choices. It also connotes the state of autocracy and occupation of others' sovereignty.

According to Islam, deprivation of any individual from delivering his duties and rights by another human being is not acceptable unless it is due to God's ruling, which aims to preserve the interests of the individuals themselves, either in their worldly life or the hereafter, and it is therefore considered as against the *fitrah*. The Islamic doctrine of freedom connotes that it should go hand in hand with his responsibility as a social being (Ghraybeh, 2000; Ghannouchi, 1993). Thus, within the *tawhidic* framework, an individual's duties in exercising his rights are not confined to the claim on what is his, but also in delivering what is God's and what is others'. In a more specific term, a man is not only accountable for himself, but also accountable before God, and also as a member of a society, he is also accountable before the members of society.

According to such relations, individual rights and freedom are bound with a degree of social control outlined by the Shari'ah to enable the individual to perform his duties as commanded. Freedom is also important to instil the altruistic behaviour of individuals to create a mutual co-operating community. In this case, freedom and control do not contradict but rather complement each other (Mannan, 1989: 40). Control is needed to protect freedom and vice versa. Saying all that, *hurriyyah* or freedom as it should prevail without the degree of freedom to ensure *amanah* to be executed. This notion of *hurriyyah* should not be confused with the current infringement of rights by dictators under the banner of religion or public interest, which is a mere pretext to preserve the elites or the despot's interest.

However, the concept of *ikhtiyar* must also be directed towards the sustainability of development to maintain social equilibrium. Sustainability as part of

the major themes in Islamic governance has been mentioned in brief under the axiom *ihsan*, however, due to its importance to development and governance, the nature of sustainability should be explained more specifically. This concern will be included in the following discussion of another important axiom of Islamic governance, '*rububiyyah*'.

Seventh axiom: *Rububiyyah* (divine arrangement for nourishment)

Literally, the term *rububiyyah* is derived from the root word 'rabb', which denotes 'owner', 'obedience' and 'nourisher'. However, semantically, the word *rabb* by itself solely refers to God the Creator or Allah (Ibn Manzur, 1956: 1/399; al-Jawhari, 1965: 1/130; Salmone, 1890: 1/257). Technically, the term *rububiyyah* is strongly associated with the theologian discourse on the subject of *tawhid*. *Tawhid al-rububiyyah* as defined in the previous chapter on ontology connotes the sole Lordship of Allah as the only Creator, Owner and Nourisher of the universe. This type of *tawhid* determines the purity of the Muslim creed and faith. Thus, a Muslim is the one who firmly professes the Lordship and Ownership of Allah, thus His Oneness, without associating Him with other deities or gods (Ibn Manzur, 1956: 399–400).

However, in the Islamic economics usage, the term *rububiyyah* refers to "divine arrangements for nourishment, sustenance and directing things towards their perfection" (Ahmad 1979: 12). This implies the necessity of sustainable economic growth and development in terms of having harmony between various components of economic and social life. It is expected that within this balanced and sustainable environment as defined by Qur'anic principles human efforts take place (Asutay, 2007a: 7). Such a definition of *rububiyyah* as a philosophical foundation for Islamic economics reflects the continuation or extension of the axiom *amanah* axiom, which implies that individuals are the trustees, thus responsible for the sustainability of their life and the environment.

Rububiyyah within the governance framework denotes the administration of continuous sustainable development of individuals, society, natural environment and the state through an *ex ante* policy-making process and *ex post* governance mechanisms. Development and growth through *rububiyyah* demands the preservation of moral and environmental integrity, cultural strength and the advocating of *maqasid al-Shari'ah* as the cornerstone of governance to attain the holistic well-being of the society, as everything on earth is created with its own optimality or equilibrium, which has to be nourished and sustained. Within such a framework too, the *rububiyyah*-oriented development aims to create an infrastructure to meet the basic needs of a society (with the acknowledgement of the balance between individuals and community). Nevertheless, once such an infrastructure is created, the concept of *rububiyyah* implies the importance of maintaining a dynamic equilibrium between the infrastructure and the society. In preserving the development under the light of *rububiyyah*, which is an imperative factor in Islamic governance, the purification of means, actors and mechanisms

involved in the process is essential. According to this, *rububiyyah* as a concept is related strongly to the concept of *tazkiyah*, which denotes ‘purification’ of attitudes and relationships towards economic and social development as will be explained in the coming paragraphs.

Eight axiom: *Tazkiyah* (purification)

Alongside *rububiyyah*, Islamic economists have also highlighted *tazkiyah* as another cardinal principle for the formulation of an Islamic economic system (Asutay, 2007a: 7). Similarly, it is also to be considered as another important axiom in Islamic governance and will be developed in this research, as it, as a concept, directly relates to the nature of development and governance.

Definition

Literally, the term *tazkiyah* is derived from the root word ‘*zaka*’, which connotes growth, thriving, increased, just, good, pious, chosen as an adjective; and as a verb it suggests an ‘act of purification’ in both the physical and spiritual state (Ibn Manzur, 1956: 14/358–9; Salmone, 1890: 1/324). It is also used as an act of purifying wealth through the imbursement of a certain portion to be distributed to those entitled to receive it, which is known also as the act of ‘*zakah*’ (almsgiving) (Ibn Manzur, 1956: 14/359; al-Jawharë, 1965: 6/2368). Technically, *tazkiyah* denotes the act of spiritual and conceptual purification of the individual heart, and of society from impure elements and undesirable growth through a spiritual-moral struggle (Ansari, 1976: 1/299–315; Siddiqui, 2004).

The importance of *tazkiyah* in its technical usage has been elaborated by al-Qur'an⁶⁵ and *Sunnah* in many ways involving various levels of human life. Islam, as a creed, through the concept of *tawhid* is an act of purification from the state of *shirk* (association) and *kufr* (disobedience). At the individual level, *tazkiyah* is an important process to ensure the purity of a believer from any non-Islamic elements that will nullify his conviction and submission to God. At the society level, *tazkiyah* is important to purify the community as a whole from *jahiliyyah* (the state of inner instability) and other non-Islamic elements such as *kufr* (disobedience), *nifaq* (hypocrisy), *ma'siyah* (sinful), *zulm* (injustice) etc (Ansari, 1976: 1/299–315). This technical usage of *tazkiyah* brings it closer to the concept of *islah* as discussed previously.

Implications of *tazkiyah* in governance

In the field of Islamic moral economy, the concept of *tazkiyah* has been used as a subject that “concerned with growth towards perfection through purification of attitudes and relationships” (Ahmad, 1994: 20). It has been used to explain the natural consequence of *tawhid*, *'adl*, and *rububiyyah* in an integrated manner, as it directs the individual towards self-development, which leads to

economic and social development in harmony with growth that requires purification (Asutay, 2007a: 7). In other words, this principle refers to growing in harmony in every aspect of life, which in this way is connected to the meaning of *ihsan* (as a comprehensive excellence) and *islah* (continuous process to achieve *ihsan*), which also refers to its semantic meanings of just ('*adl*) and good (*khayr*).

According to Ahmad (1994: 20) “the result of *tazkiyah* is [therefore] *falah*, prosperity in this world and the hereafter”, hence its dual roles in determining the efficacy of economic activities according to Islamic standards. Accordingly, in explaining the role of *tazkiyah* as another important principal for economic growth and development from Islamic viewpoint, Sardar (1999: 58) maintains that “*tazkiyah* dictates that growth policies at the national level consist of four basic components: self-reliance, self-sufficiency, social justice and cultural authenticity”.

Correspondingly, with reference to the discourse of governance, *tazkiyah* illustrates the all-inclusive meaning of the governance process in attaining development, which is to purify individuals at the micro-level, and both the society and the state at the macro-level (Sardar, 1997: 48–51). As it is important in determining the way economic and social development should be directed, *tazkiyah* also plays an important role in determining the way governance development should be directed along with other axioms that can be clearly indicated in the section on the implication of axioms in the field of governance. Furthermore, *tazkiyah* is not a static state of purification, but a dynamic concept that seeks to motivate individuals and societies to grow by a constant process of purification (Sardar, 1997: 50).

It is worth noting that the culmination of *tazkiyah* in governance is the highest aim of *Shari'ah* (*maqasid*) in attaining human well-being according to the world-view of *tawhid*. This will be further explored in the ensuing paragraphs.

Ninth axiom: *Maqasid al-Shari'ah*

Despite the significance of the aforementioned axioms of Islamic governance, the main axiom of ideal governance after *tawhid*, is *maqasid al-Shari'ah*, which is a comprehensive and holistic paradigm. In other words, it is this operational dimension that can help to put into place the mentioned foundational concepts to achieve the Islamic nature of good governance.

Definition

Maqasid al-Shari'ah as the highest aim of *Shari'ah* provides the magnitude of the aims to be achieved from governance process itself. It is in these aims that Islamic governance differs from other versions of governance. Deep rooted from the ontological based epistemology of *tawhid*, *maqasid al-Shari'ah* lays down the foundation of Islamic governance encompassing all the meanings and objectives of the previous axioms. In other words, all aforementioned axioms reflect the very meaning of *maqasid al-Shari'ah* in their articulation of *Shari'ah*.

spirit, in attaining *falah*. ‘*Falah*’ in the worldly life can be achieved through comprehensive well-being in one’s life as a result of obedience to the guidance (see: Qur'an, 2:189; 3:130; 3:200; 5:35; 5:100; 24:31; 28:67; 24:51).

This final principle aims to interpret the text and restore the principles of Islamic governance in relation to the highest objectives of *Shari'ah*. Thus, it implies that the principles of Islamic economics must lead to ‘human well-being’. In sum, the objectives of *Shari'ah*, namely the Islamic way of life and code of conduct as discussed in the chapter on epistemology, are ‘the promotion of the well-being of all humankind, which lies in comprehensive preservation and safeguarding their faith, their human self (*nafs*), their intellect ('*aql*), their progeny (*nasl*) and their wealth (*mal*)’ (Chapra, 2008b). In other words, as can be seen, *maqasid al-Shari'ah* provides the motivation through which governance process should be conducted.

Implication of Maqasid al-Shari'ah to governance

However, to incorporate *maqasid* into the field of governance a new more inclusive and comprehensive approach is essential in order to present it in a non-legalistic *fiqh* manner. Recent re-interpretation of the *maqasid* by Siddiqi (2004) provides a more dynamic understanding to these axioms, thereby providing the legal-rationale framework within which ideal governance should be formulated. *Maqasid* according to this re-interpretation exceeds the al-Ghazalian’s protection (*hifz*) of benefit (*maslahah*) paradigm, and al-Shatibi’s preservation and promotion (*ri'ayah*). This dynamic understanding of *maqasid al-Shari'ah* includes broader measures ensuring welfare as asserted by Ibn al-Qayyim (n.d, 4: 309–11) who emphasized justice and equity according to which the means to achieve such objectives could never be captured by a finite list as articulated by Ghazalian *maqasid*.

Furthermore, Siddiqi (2004) argues that reason will guide human beings on how to ensure justice and equity in changing circumstances. This dynamic understanding of the *maqasid* offers a better conceptualization in the field of governance in our contemporary reality. *Maqasid* in this sense refers to goals of Islam as a way of life rather than with reference to the legal positivistic goals of *fiqh*. Meanwhile, *maqasid* as objective of Islam also refers to individual as well as societal considerations beyond the narrow definitional boundaries of *fiqh* legal framework. This will enable issues like poverty, inequality, underdevelopment and corruption to be tackled through certain significant governance policies (Siddiqi 2004). This comprehensive well-being can only be obtained through the integrated and ostensible articulation of the axioms through the extensive implementation of *maqasid al-Shari'ah* in the field of governance.

The endeavour to achieve this ‘human well-being’ causes the axioms to become visible in society life. In this way, *maqasid al-Shari'ah* as a holistic theme of Islamic governance must prevail and become the *sine qua non* in every detail of the governance process. Governance within this spirit thus becomes part of the act of servitude ('*ubudiyah*), which is the main purpose of human

creation as the trustee (*amin*) or vicegerent (*khalifah*) under the shade of the tawhidic *Weltanschauung*. The new interpretation of the *maqasid*, according to the inclusive definition by Ibn al-Qayyim, is thus indispensable in making Islamic governance possible. Limited *maqasid* as prescribed through the classical *fiqh* orientation is insufficient; therefore, from a legal aspect there is a need for infinite list-based policy dimension.

Appropriately, according to this new look into *maqasid*, a *maqasidic*-oriented governance, needs to constantly move towards the achievement of the greater benefit for the community or *maslahah 'Ammah* in its political, economic and religious life through the articulation of all the aforementioned axioms. With this understanding prevailing in the governance process, all policies relating to governance at all levels must aim to attain human well-being as reflected by the revisited notion of *maqasid al-Shari'ah*. This kind of policy-making method is equal to what Ibn al-Qayyim (1995: 10–19) coined '*al-siyasah al-shar'iyyah*' (Shariatic policy-making).

Numerous examples shown by the pious Caliphs during their time in administration reflect this principle. Abu Bakr's decision to compile the Qur'an in one book during his period to preserve it from extinction is one of the decisions or policies taken according to this principle. The battle he waged upon false prophets who declared war upon Muslims was another decision taken according to it in order to establish order and to maintain the stability of society. Likewise Omar, the second Caliph was also known for his many decisions taken under the *al-siyasah al-shar'iyyah* calculation, rooted firmly in realization of *maqasid al-Shari'ah*. Amongst them was his decision to suspend the implementation of punishment for poor thieves in times of famine, simply because the punishment would have run against the higher objective of justice since poor thieves would have been victimized twice (Ramadan, 2009: 75).

If the *maqasid* is to be perceived as the aim through the articulation of *falah*, hence it is no longer a mechanistic element to the governance process: it is a means and goal by itself. Therefore, good governance from the Islamic view is a governance process that consists of the *maqasidic* elements to fulfil the *maqasidic* end. According to this understanding, the governance process is not just a consequence of independent deontological activity just for the discharge of responsibilities for the sake of delivering the vicegerency tasks. In fact, it is to be viewed from a virtue-based consequentialistic paradigm, as it is a process to attain a holistic end for the benefits of individuals through its *tawhidic* paradigm, which goes beyond the instrumental value meaning.

This paradigm imposes multi dimensions of benefits, which encompass both individuals and community benefits, in this world and the hereafter. The whole process of governance within such framework is not only a mere process as mentioned, and not only for the pursuit of happiness of individuals, but also for the community, although not at the expense of other individuals.⁶⁶ This can be clearly seen through the axiomatic concepts of *ukhuwwah*, *rububiyah* and *tazkiyah* that summarise the comprehensive meaning of solidarity-inspired mutual kindness and multiple-happiness for individuals.

All the axioms mentioned must be understood and operate according to the theory of the revisited notion of *maqasid al-Shari'ah*. Consequently, the *maqasid* exemplifies the conclusion of the interconnected relations between the axioms and reflects the fruit of governance according to those axioms. In sum, all the implications derived from the formulated axioms, from social equilibrium, justice, sustainable development, rule of law, efficiency, empowerment etc., *en masse* lead to the attainment of human well-being, which can be summarised within the framework of *maqasid al-Shari'ah* and should be a major flagship in the policy-making process for development. To conclude, *maqasid al-Shari'ah* crystallizes the worldly picture of *tawhidic* reality and functions as an amalgamation to tie the axioms together and brings the very ideal of Islam in governance through the Shari'atic policy-making process as previously mentioned.

Conclusion

To conclude, each of the aforementioned axioms through their semantic and technical connotations constitutes the micro-foundations or the core principles for the proposed model of Islamic governance in this book. Through a universal ethical system, which those axioms produce, and (therefore) are believed to produce policies aimed at enhancing motivation to seek knowledge and work, enhance efficiency, through accountability and transparency in governance process. They should also enhance intra- and inter-generational equity, which will eventually lead to development. Consequently, the existence and efficacy of these axioms provide the rationale for Islamic governance.

Lastly, having presented the above-mentioned concepts, it is also important to establish how these can work together to deliver the Islamic notion of good governance. In addition, the interconnectedness of these axioms and their implication to the process of governance should be highlighted. Thus, the subsequent chapter will explain the details of how the axioms would come together to develop a fresh new model of governance rooted in the ontological-based Islamic epistemology. However, the articulation of those axioms as the philosophical foundation of a more realistic picture within the current framework of policy-making and development needs to be dealt with separately; which is the main focus of the following chapter.

From the discussions presented in this chapter, it can be concluded that the proposed Islamic governance framework aims to guarantee individual liberty, freedom of choice, rule of law accountability, transparency, efficiency, sustainability, and other governance goals in order to achieve development. However, at the same time it must ensure moral, ethical and value-laden elements as its core foundations. Moreover, it establishes its own distinct institutions according to the reality in order to fulfil the highest objectives of *Shari'ah* exemplified by human well-being, development and justice in society.

However, unlike the conventional approach to governance that emphasizes the value-free mechanistic institutions, which implicitly are not value free, and outcomes through certain indicators, Islamic theory of governance aims to

develop an integrated and dynamic model by indigenizing the behavioural norms of the actors and values involved in the governance process. Based on ‘*tawhidic* reality’ as its ontology, the exploration of Islamic governance derives its foundation from specific epistemological sources, namely al-Qur'an, *Sunnah* (Prophet's traditions), experiences of the pious Caliphs and *maqasid al-Shari'ah*. It is from these sources that the axioms of Islamic governance are formulated to provide a new perspective for the governance process based on revelation and virtue. These axioms summarise some core and important Islamic principals relating to the theory and the process of governance.

The axiomatic approach to Islamic governance is inspired by *maqasid al-Shari'ah*, which emphasizes the attainment of ‘*falah*’ through *ihsani* social capital by the development of *homo-Islamicus*. While the conventional notion of good governance insists on the promotion of ‘fairness, justice, liberty, an independent judiciary, respect for human rights, and an efficient and corruption-free bureaucracy’ as basic requirements for a modern state (Shihata, 1991: 85), Islamic governance as articulated by the axioms aims for a holistic moral-laden philosophy that will eventually lead to ‘human well-being’ with the emphasis on unity, peace and cohesion. Thus, Islamic governance rather than making reference to the creation of institutions, aims at developing ‘aware’ individuals or *homoIslamicus* that can then shape the institutions. Hence, the difference is also in the methodology of how good governance can be achieved in this process: the distinctions establish whether institutions will bring good governance (conventional) or aware individuals will develop individuals for good governance (Islamic). In other words, the distinction lies in whether institutions are ends and human beings are means (conventional functionalism) or human beings are ends and the institutions are means (the Islamic worldview).

As the discussion in the preceding section indicates, the axioms are interconnected and neglecting any of the axioms may lead to an incomplete bigger picture of the aforementioned ‘Islamic governance’. In other words, the axioms mentioned are interconnected to fulfil the whole idea of *maqasid al-Shari'ah* itself. Each axiom aims to preserve and promote essential needs to establish the human well-being. Hence, policies, systems, institutions and all the mechanisms formulated and promulgated must be within this parameter to ensure that Islamic governance is not mere rhetoric or a label put to some kind of governance approach due to its form, and not for its comprehensive and solid substance. As can be seen in Table 7.1, each of the identified axioms semantically refer to governance related issues; and hence it can be claimed that ‘good governance’ is a natural consequence of an Islamic paradigm.

Clearly, each component of real life activity concerning governance is taken into consideration in the course of the axioms in an integrated manner. Therefore, the emergence of the *homo-Islamicus*, with a heart and mind shaped by Islamic values, is expected to work towards the (extended) *maqasid al-Shari'ah* understood as human well-being within the framework of governance. In contrast to the conventional projection of good governance that emphasizes structural adjustment and mechanistic elements, the Islamic governance model

Table 7.1 Summarising the axioms of Islamic Governance and its implications

Axioms	Linguistic origin of the word	Its governance implications
Tawhid	Oneness of God	Equality Rule of law
Amanah	Trust to be delivered by individuals	Individuals Empowerment via Shura Sustainable development Rule of law Freedom Accountability Transparency
Al-'Adl wa al-Ihsan	Justice and benevolence	Rule of law Sustainable development Benevolent society Freedom
Ukhuwwah	Universal solidarity for balance between individual and society	Unity Takaful Ijtimaiyy (Social Mutual co-operation) Political conformity Equal opportunity Justice Tasamuh (mutual recognition) Tafahum (mutual respect) Shura
Islah	Constant struggle for comprehensive excellent	Amr ma'ruf nahy munkar Nasihah Accountability Transparency Open-Shura
Ikhtiyar	Free-will for a freedom to make a better choice	Freedom Sustainable development Shura
Rububiyyah	Divine arrangements for nourishment, sustenance and directing things towards their perfection	Sustainable development Social equilibrium Accountability
Tazkiyah	Purification in all level for a better development	Sustainable development Rule of law Accountability
Maqasid al-Shari'ah	Human well-being policy-making	Human well-being Shari'atic policy-making

Source: created by author

formulated in this research is strongly founded on the consideration that political, societal and economic developments are attached firmly to the very basic element of the community, the individuals who participate in the governance process in both an individual and collective capacity. It is through the vicegerency (*khalifah*) role given to individuals who, with their free will (*ikhtiyar*), are perceived to be active participants in social change (Asutay, 2007a).

According to this supposition, all activities relating to the field of governance akin to economic activity result from the individual's decision making constructed by the social reality surrounding them. Hence, through the axioms and their implication to the field of governance, it could be concluded that Islam provides a framework for the functioning of ideal governance through its value-laden doctrine, value-judgements and where the usual governance choices are made.

However, this does not imply that in the conflict between individual and society, and hence self-interest and social interest, Islam takes the stance of liberal individualism. In contrast, through its ethical foundation and propositions (i.e. the axioms), the proposed Islamic governance theory suggests that not only should individuals' interests be protected, but social interest should also be preserved in a harmonious and voluntary way. This is the condition for the *falah* journey and *ihsani* social capital. Thus, the framework provided by the axioms, denies any conflict between self-interest and social interest, thus preventing either of them superseding the other in efficiency, but suggests an optimization between the two in a two-dimensional utility function.

Perhaps in summarizing the interconnected nature of the axioms and how they can be articulated, Ibn Khaldun's (fifteenth-century) framework provides an interdisciplinary picture of the dynamic model of Islamic governance as an alternative systemic model (Chapra 2008a: 147–8):

The strength of the sovereign (*al-mulk*) does not become consumed except by implementation of the *Shari'ah*; the *Shari'ah* cannot be implemented except by a sovereign (*al-mulk*); the sovereign cannot gain strength except through the people (*al-rijal*); the people cannot be sustained except by wealth (*al-mal*); wealth cannot be acquired except through development (*al-'imarah*); development cannot be attained except through justice (*al-'adl*); justice is the criterion (*al-mizan*) by which God will evaluate mankind; and the sovereign is charged with the responsibility of actualising justice.

Notwithstanding such a fact, it should be noted that despite the extensive discussions on the axioms formulated for ideal governance, Islam does not prescribe any particular system to be known as 'the' Islamic governance due to the dynamic nature of its teaching and principles. However, as a comprehensive guidance for mankind (as believed by Muslims), Islam does provide the core elements and principles, which form the basic philosophy of a system for governance that engulfs change in its structure and mechanisms according to the reality through the process of *ijtihad*. For this reason the following chapter will

deal with the articulation of these axioms, which will be formulated into a specific typology to bring Islamic ideals of governance into reality.

The articulation of the axioms must, therefore, involve the holistic and comprehensive role of governance actors according to the *tawhidic* reality. Furthermore, the axioms will accumulate and create the *ibsanī* culture in the interaction of all the elements involved in keeping it alive and constantly functioning to achieve *falah*.

The elements required for such articulation amongst others ought to include individuals as the most basic instrument, as their role in governance is undoubtedly crucial. Active participants from the functioning individuals in their individual capacity and a collective societal level with certain qualities will ensure a level of success for the axioms to operate in the field of governance. Accordingly, the functioning individuals require effective institutions to enable them to be collectively active based on both actogenic and factogenic elements of the individuals, hence the efficiency of the governance system. By the same token, the combination of individuals, societies and institutions could never epitomize the perfect meaning of the aforesaid axioms without apposite space to enable and allow it to work in the current paradigm of state. In sum, an enabling state is but another prerequisite to ensure the capability of the other elements of the ideal governance actors to function. The combination of these elements necessitates distinctive typology to be supported by discrete culture to achieve explicit aims derived from the very ontology of *tawhidic* reality. All these building blocks will be examined thoroughly in the subsequent chapter.

Notes

1 www.shariati.com/Islamgyl.html.

2 However, this does not recognize a religious authority or theocracy akin to the medieval European relation between Church and the state (Abduh, 1956: 58–9).

3 Yusuf Al-Qaradawi (1977: 99–105) points out that:

Indeed, *syūmul* permeates time in totality, life in totality, and all aspects of human life in its entirety ... it is a thesis for all time and generations, and not just for a certain period or era ... it is a thesis that speaks to all humanity, all nations, all races, and all social classes. Indeed, Islam is a thesis for all mankind. It is also a thesis for every level of human of life and its existence.... It is a thesis for mankind in every aspect of life.

4 (Qur'an, 64:1; 22:18).

5 Most of the ideologies concerning the relation between human being and the environment, according to al-Faruqi (1984) are born of crisis, including the environmentalism or eco-centrism in this manner, but Islamic ideas of the relation between human being and the environment derives from the '*tawhidic*' worldview, which indicates that: a) Allah as the creator and the Supreme Master; b) Human being as the servants and vicegerent; c) Allah instructed human being via revelation; d) The ultimate triumph in the human life is the total submission to Allah's will.

6 Qur'an (11:61; 16:5–6, 10–11, 12–14).

7 The command to preserve the universe from destruction can be clearly deduced from the verse: "For I [Allah] have created you [Muhammad] to be nothing but a blessing for all creation ('Alamin)" (Qur'an, 21:107).

8 “There is not an animal on earth nor being that flies on its wings, but forms part of communities like you...”(Qur'an, 6:38)

9 This is similar to what was coined by Nadwi (1968: 204–5) that any system rooted in such an Islamic worldview, will be aiming for a healthy civilization.

10 Likewise, in explaining an ideal nature of a political system, al-Farabi pointed out that equality amongst the people is amongst the main essential pillars of the polity of in his utopian ‘the virtuous city’ (*al-Madinah al-Fadilah*) (al-Farabi, 1959: 141).

11

All mankind is from Adam and Eve, an Arab has no superiority over a non-Arab nor a non-Arab has any superiority over an Arab; also a white has no superiority over black nor a black has any superiority over white except by piety and good action.

(Narrated by Ahmad (2000: 38/474), al-Arnaut recommends this narration as authentic)

12 Narrated by al-Bukhari (1985: 1/304; 2/848, 901, 912; 3/1010) and Muslim (no date: 2/1459).

13 For a detailed discussion, see Ibn ‘Ashur, 1984: 2/91–102. Ibn ‘Ashur’s analysis of verses 4: 58–59 is one of the most comprehensive and insightful. It should be noted that Ibn Taymiyyah’s *al-Siyasah al-Shariyyah fi Islah al-Ra’iy wa al-Ra’iyyah* and al-Mawardi’s *al-Abkam al-Sultaniyyah wa al-Wilayat al-Diniyyah* focus only on verse 4:59.

14 Amongst those, the Hadith:

The fornicator, at the time he fornicates, does not commit adultery while he is a faithful believer (in the state of *Iman*), and the thief, at the time he steals, does not steal while he is a faithful believer (in the state of *Iman*)

(Narrated by al-Bukhari (1985: 2/875, 5/2120, 6/2487 and 2497)

and Muslim (no date: 1/176)). Perhaps this tradition states that a believer (*mu’min*) loses his *Iman* when he is not delivering his *amanah* by committing adultery and stealing, and vice versa.

15 *Al-wāli* (governor) the singular of *al-wulat*, was an office appointed by the Prophet to be his representative to the people in one of the provinces under the Prophet’s administration in al-Madēnah. Arabia was then divided into provinces of al-Madinah, Tayma, al-Janad, the region of Banu Kindah, Makkah, Najran, al-Yaman, hadramawt, ‘Ummān and Bahrain. The *wulat* then were responsible for educating the people in the provinces as well as establishing law and order, and in charge of some simple administration and governance affairs; While *Al-’Amil* (tax collector) the singular of *al-’Amilēn*, was an appointed agent to assist the governor in collecting zakat (fiscal tax) and *sadaqah* (voluntary alms) from the Muslims and *jizyah* (capitation tax) from the non-Muslims of any region specified to him. This position was very crucial to the revenue of the Islamic state during the period of the Prophet and after his reign, hence the accountability and transparency process were very apparent in most of the traditions due to its importance; *Al-qadhb* (judge), on the other hand, is the singular of *al-qudhah*, was another office appointed by the Prophet to each province to dispense justice. The *qudhah* are independent from the *wulat* (governors), and reported directly to the Prophet as the Chief justice of the Islamic State. Amongst the prominent *qudhah* during the Prophet’s period were Ali bin Abi Talib, the fourth pious Caliph and Muadh bin Jabal (Majdalawi, 2002).

16 Narrated by al-Bukhari (1985: 2/917, 6/2559, 2624, 2631) and Muslim (no date: 3/1463).

17 Narrated by Abu Daud (al-Tarifi, 2005: 2/683), and al-Dhahabi (2001: 5/2533) recommended the hadith as authentic.

18 Or in other wording, “*al-Tassaruf ‘ala al-Ra’iyyat Manut bi al-Maslabah*” (Any

decision for the people determined by the public interest) (Zaydan, 2004: 120). The people, in this manner, are the “*cestui qui trust*” or intended beneficiaries of powers given in trust.

- 19 Imarah (2005: 44) thus coins an Islamic political culture as *siyasah ra'iyyah* (civil politics).
- 20 Even on occasions when divine command is to be carried out, the *shura* process must take place to bring about consensus. This is illustrated by the story of Abraham and his son, where he was commanded to slaughter his son. Despite the nature of the command, Abraham still consulted his son for the boy's view (Qur'an, 37:102).
- 21 Ibn Atiyyah, the famous Andalusian exegete insists that there is no disagreement amongst the Muslim scholars that any ruler who does not consult with people of knowledge and expertise must be removed from office. This opinion strongly invoked by Ibn 'Ashur, due to the role of the ruler as the trustee who has the interest and welfare of the *ummah* upon his shoulders (Ibn 'Ashur, 1984: 3/148). Accordingly, 'Ibn 'Ashur proposes that the ideal way for Muslims to govern the country is through the representative democratic system, which represent people's will to preserve their own interest (Ibn 'Ashur, 2001: 333).
- 22 This verse and those like it are the best evidence that Islam promotes the active citizenship through participation in governance. The spirit of *al-amr bi al-ma'ruf wa nahi 'an al-munkar* (enjoinment of good and forbidding of evil) must be expanded from the exclusivity of spiritual-ritual dimension towards a broader horizon of moral, ethical and social responsibilities. From the contemporary 'governance' paradigm, this concept is utterly crucial as it is part of the individual empowerment, which is the important part of a democratic process. Not only does the concept lead to the active role of the people in political activity, furthermore it will mobilize civil society and the third sector industry. With the spirit *al-amr bi al-ma'ruf wa nahi 'an al-munkar* instigating all those elements, an 'Islamic governance' which aims for human well-being can easily be attained.
- 23 Narrated by Muslim (no date: 1/69), this hadith was also transmitted in another form on the authority of 'Abdullah bin Mas'ud who narrated that the Messenger of Allah (SAW) said:

Never before me has a Prophet been sent by Allah to his nation who had not among his people disciples and companions who followed his ways and obeyed his command. Then there came after them their successors who said whatever they did not practise, and practised whatever they were not commanded to do. He who strove against them with his hand was a believer; he who strove against them with his tongue was a believer; and he who strove against them with his heart was a believer; and beyond that there is no faith, not even as minute as a mustard seed.

(Muslim, no date: 1/69)

- 24 Narrated by al-Hakim (1991: 3/215).
- 25 Narrated by al-Tarmidhi (no date: 4/471), Abu Daud (1982: 2/965), Ibn Majah (no date: 2/1329).
- 26 The treaty was against the choice and the favour of the companions. Two points in the treaty made it distasteful to them, namely the prohibition from accessing the Holy Sanctuary that year, and the seemingly degrading attitude as regards reconciliation with the pagans of Quraish. The feeling of humiliation and distress made Omar, who was present hold the Prophet to account. Omar asked the Prophet: "Aren't you the true Messenger of Allah?" The Prophet replied calmly. "Why?" Omar again spoke and asked, "Aren't we on the path of righteousness and our enemies in the wrong?" Without showing any resentment, the Prophet replied that it was so. On getting this reply he further urged, "Then we should not suffer any humiliation in the matter of Faith". The Prophet was firm and with perfect confidence said, "I am the true

messenger of Allah, I never disobey Him, He shall help me". Omar replied: "Did you not tell us that we shall perform pilgrimage?", "But I have never told you that we shall do so this very year", the Prophet replied. He went to Abu Bakr and expressed his feelings before him. Abu Bakr who had never been in doubt as regards the Prophet's truthfulness and sincerity, confirmed what the Prophet had told him. In due course, the Chapter of Victory (48th) was revealed saying: "Verily, We have given you (O Muhammad) a manifest victory" (al-Qur'an, 48:1). The Prophet summoned Omar and conveyed him the happy tidings. Omar was overjoyed, and greatly regretted his former attitude. He used to spend on charity, observe fasting and prayer and free as many slaves as possible in expiation for that thoughtless attitude he had assumed. (For details of the incidents see: al-Mubarakfuri, 2002: 305–6).

27 A myriad of evidence explains the virtue and the vital role of accountability in Muslim political life, or in governance. It is rather surprising when some Muslims, especially the despots and the co-opted scholars, tend to dismiss the role of oppositions in their country. Unfortunately many of them tend to abuse the interpretation of the Qur'anic verse 4:59 (O ye who believe! Obey Allah, and obey the Messenger, and those charged with authority among you) to negate the myriad of aforementioned evidence on accountability in Muslim political life.

28 Narrated by al-Hindi (1989: 5/835) and Ibn Kathir (no date: 6/301), and both categorized the narration as authentic (*Sahih*).

29 Once while delivering a sermon, Omar said:

My rights over public funds (the *Baitul Mal*) are similar to those of the guardians of an orphan. If well placed in life, I will not claim anything from it. In case of need, I shall draw only as much as it constitutionally allowed for providing food. *You have every right to question me anything about, any improper accumulation of the revenue and bounty collections, improper utilization of the treasury money, provision of the daily bread to all, border-security arrangements and harassment caused to any citizen.*

(Ibn Saad, no date: 3: 215–19)

Omar presents the practice of transparency where a ruler, as well as the state officers, should have nothing to hide from the public and open to scrutiny of their usage of public wealth. In the same account he was recorded by historians to have issued a certificate witness by a group of elders to all duly appointed governors stipulating that the governor should not ride an expensive horse, or eat white bread, or wear any fine cloth, or prevent the people's needs (from being satisfied) (al-Tabari, 1994: XIV/113).

30 Al-Qur'an (16:90).

31 As mentioned in '*hadith Jibril*' narrated by al-Bukhari when the Prophet was asked by the Archangel Gabriel about the meaning of *ihsan*, he replied: "so that a person performs his servitude to Allah as if he is seeing Allah, and if he is not capable of having such quality, he must feel that Allah is right in front of him keenly observing his performance".

32 (See al-Quran: 9:120; 11:1115; 12:56; 12:90).

33 It was recorded by al-Bukhari, (1985: 3/1282, 4/1566) and Muslim (no date: 3/1311) that a lady from Bani Makhzum had committed theft. The people of Quraish worried about her. They asked, "Who will intercede for her with Allah's Messenger?" Finally they decided to approach Usama bin Zaid who was known as the beloved one to the Prophet. When Usama spoke about that to the Prophet, the Prophet said: "Do you try to intercede for somebody in a case connected with Allah's Prescribed Punishments (Hudud)?" Then he angrily stood up and delivered a sermon saying,

What destroyed the nations preceding you, was that if a noble amongst them stole, they would forgive him, and if a poor person amongst them stole, they

would inflict Allah's Legal punishment on him. By Allah, if Fatimah, the daughter of Muhammad (my daughter) stole, I would cut off her hand.

- 34 On another occasion, in another incident, the son of Amar bin al-'As, the governor of Egypt was reported to Omar for his misbehaviour towards a non-Muslim native of Egypt. The victim brought the case to the Caliph himself in Madinah. Caliph Omar reprimanded the father and his son and put the verdict upon the governor son saying his famous quotation, "Since when have you taken men as slaves? All are born free, you should know!" (see: al-Qaradawi, 1993: 119)
- 35 Narrated by al-Baihaqi (1994: 10/136).
- 36 Narrated by Abu Daud (1982: 2/140-1) and al-Tarmidhi (no date: 3/625), and he recommended it as authentic (*Hasan Sahih*).
- 37 Narrated by Al-Tarmidhi (no date: 3/626), and he recommended it as authentic (*Hasan Sahih*).
- 38 While in some narration, it was also mentioned: "He whose wealth I have taken, here is my wealth, let him take from it" (al-Mubarakfuri, 2002).
- 39 Narrated by Ibnu Majah (no date: 2/855) and al-Asqalani (1960: 12/181) in *Fath al-Bari* recommends the narration as authentic (*Sahih*).
- 40 This understanding is confirmed by Ahmed report in his *Masnad* quoting that Ibnu Abbas was saying: "The Messenger of Allah ordered a 'Mula'ana' i.e. a sworn allegation of adultery between Al-Ajlani and his wife". He said: "and she was pregnant". Al-Ajlani said: "By Allah I did not approach her since we made *Afr* (i.e. sprinkled the soil with dust)". An *Afr* means that the palm trees are watered two months after pollination. He said that her husband had thin legs and arms and had red hair; the one she was accused to have committed adultery with was Ibnu Samha. She gave birth to a black boy who had frizzy hair and chubby arms. So Ibnu Shaddad said to Ibnu Abbas: "Is she the woman about whom the Messenger of Allah (saw) said: 'If I were to stone anyone without proof I would stone such and such woman?'" He said: "No, that was a woman who used to display vice after Islam." Meaning that she used to be indiscreet but it was not proven either through evidence, or through admission (narrated by Ahmad (2000: 5/218), and al-Arnaut recommends it as authentic (*Sahih*) according to al-Bukhari and Muslim's prerequisites (Ahmad, 2000: 5/218)).

- 41 It was reported that

Ibnu 'Abbas said that a man consumed alcohol and got intoxicated; he was spotted staggering in a mountain pass so he was taken to the Prophet. As he neared the house of Abbas, he gave his escort the slip, entered Abbas's house, and hid behind him. They mentioned this to the Prophet, so he laughed and said: 'He did it', but did not order them with anything regarding him.

(Narrated by Ahmad (2000: 5/116)

- 42 It was reported that during Omar's reign that the *Qudhat* (judges) were appointed for their integrity and learning in Islamic law, and in most cases the wealthy men and those of high social status, so that they might not be tempted to take bribes, or be influenced by the social position of anybody. *Qudhat* were paid with high salaries and given many facilities to keep them from the temptation of bribery and were not allowed to engage in trade to avoid any personal interest in their judgements (Majdalawi, 2002: 97-103).
- 43 Al-Qur'an guides the human race not to bring destruction to the universe: "Do no make mischief on the earth, after it hath been set in order" (al-Qur'an, 7:56); "And make not your own hands contribute to your destruction; but do good; for God loveth those who do good" (2:195). There is much evidence in the Hadith that also emphasizes the importance of implementing '*ihsan*' to the other creatures. In a tradition of the Prophet narrated by al-Bukhari, it was mentioned that a prostitute went to heaven just because of her act in saving a dog from dying of

thirst (narrated by Muslim (no date: 4/1761)), while in another tradition narrated by Muslim, it was told that a lady went to hellfire because of her cruel treatment of a cat (narrated by al-Bukhari (1985: 2/834, 3/1205, 3/1284) and Muslim (no date: 4/1760)). In another hadith, Prophet Muhammad was quoted as saying that: “No Human kills a sparrow or something larger, without right, except God will ask him about it on the day of judgement” (narrated by al-Nasaa’i (1984: 7/206, 239). While on another occasion, he was recorded as saying: “No Muslim, who plants a shoot, except that whatever is eaten or stolen from it, or anyone obtains the least from it, is considered like paying charity on his behalf until the day of judgement” (al-Tarmidhi (no date: 3/666) and he categorised it as authentic (*Hasan Sahih*)).

44 Narrated by al-Bukhari (1985: 1/14) and Muslim (no date: 1/67).
 45 “The Believers are but a single Brotherhood: So make peace and reconciliation between your two (contending) brothers; and fear God, that ye may receive Mercy” (Qur'an, 49:10).

46 But those who before them, had homes (in Madinah) and had adopted the Faith, show their affection to such as came to them for refuge, and entertain no desire in their hearts for things given to the (latter), but give them preference over themselves, even though poverty was their (own lot). And those saved from the covetousness of their own souls, they are the ones that achieve prosperity.

(Qur'an, 59:9)

47 Narrated by Muslim (no date: 1/74).
 48 Narrated by al-Bukhari (1985: 1/14); and Muslim (no date: 1/67).
 49 Narrated by Muslim (no date: 4/1986).
 50 Qur'an praised the Ansar (people of Madinah) for their practice of *Ithar* (altruism) in the following verse: “And they prefer (their brothers) over themselves even if they are hungry” (Qur'an, 59:9).

It is mentioned in the Qur'an that those who practise *ihsan* (the *Muhsin*) will be rewarded by God with different rewards: To be loved by Him (al-Qur'an, 2:195; 3:134, 148; 5:13, 93); They will be granted the best reward (10:26; 53:31; 55:60); They will be showered by His mercy (7:56; 16:128); They shall have no fear nor grieve (2:112); They will be considered the best person in God's system (4:125); They have the most trustworthy support (31:22); Their deed of *ihsan* can never go to waste (9:120, 11:115, 12:56, 12:90, 18:30, 46:112, 51:16, 77:44); God will impart knowledge of truth into their heart (12:22); They will join their predecessors in Paradise (9:100); They will enter Paradise, (10:26); They will be praised by Allah and His slaves (37:119–20, 16:30).

Takaful is also a basic mechanism of natural economic growth according to Ibn Khaldun, who was quoted explaining the needs of such in his '*Muqaddimah*:

The power of the individual human being is not sufficient for him to obtain (the food) he needs, and does not provide him with as much food as he requires to live ... but through cooperation, the needs of a number of persons, many times greater than their own can be satisfied.

(Ibn Khaldun, 2005 [1967]: 45)

51 *Takaful* is also a basic mechanism of natural economic growth in according to Ibn Khaldun (2005 [1967]: 45).
 52 (2:177); (90:11–16); (107:1–3); (70:24–25); (3:91); (76:8–9) etc.
 53 Amongst them:

Each person's every joint must perform a charity every day the sun comes up: to act justly between two people is a charity; to help a man with his mount, lifting him onto it or hoisting up his belongings onto it is a charity: a good word is a

charity, every step you take to prayers is a charity and removing a harmful thing from the road is a charity.

(Narrated by al-Bukhari (1985: 3/1090) and Muslim (no date: 2/699))

You will see the believers in their having mercy for one another, and in their love for one another, and in their kindness towards one another, like the human body: when one limb is ailing, the whole body feels it, one part calling out the other with sleeplessness and fever.

(Narrated by Muslim (no date: 4/1999))

“None of you [truly] believes until he wishes for his brother what he wishes for himself.” (Narrated by Muslim (no date: 1/74)); “A man is not a believer who fills his stomach while his neighbour is hungry” (Narrated by al-Haythami (1992: 8/306), and he categorized the narration as almost authentic (*Hasan*)).

54 Qutb (1980:55) commented on such a concept:

Islam sets the principle of individual responsibility over against that of individual freedom; and beside them both it sets the principle of social responsibility, which makes demands alike on the individual and on society. In it one finds the responsibilities which exist ‘between a man and his soul, between a man and his immediate family, between the individual and society, between one community and other communities, and between one nation and the various other nations.

55 Narrated by al-Tarmidhi (no date: 4/612).

56 *Zakah* is mentioned 35 times in the Qur'an in which it was mentioned 27 times along the *Salah*.

57 In a similar description, Ibn Omar reported that the Prophet said,

It is obligatory upon a Muslim to listen (to the ruler) and obey whether he likes it or not, except when he is ordered to do *ma'siyah* (a sinful thing); in such case, there is no obligation to listen or to obey.

(Narrated by Al-Bukhari (1985: 6/2612))

on another occasion, Ibn Omar also recorded that the Prophet said,

One who withdraws his hand from obedience (to the leader) will find no argument (in his defence) when he stands before Allah on the Day of Resurrection; and one who dies without having sworn allegiance will die the death of one belonging to the Days of Ignorance.

(Narrated by Muslim (no date: 3/1478))

While Anas bin Malik, a prominent companion reported that the Prophet also said, “Hear and obey even if an Abyssinian slave whose head is like a raisin is placed in authority over you”. (Narrated by al-Bukhari (1985: 2/2612)); The Prophet also mentions: “He who swears allegiance to an Imam, he should give him the pledge in ratification and the sincerity of his heart. He should obey him to the best of his capacity” (Narrated by Muslim (no date: 3/1472)).

58 Narrated by Abu Daud (no date: 4/132).

59 Narrated by Ahmad (2000: 38/474), al-Arnaut recommends this narration as authentic.

60 There was a huge debate on the authenticity of the report from Ibn Ishaq in regards the section of the Jewish rights in the constitution. Beside Ibn Ishaq, none of the *sérah* authors, nor the hadith narrators of his contemporary ever mentioned about such a section in their reports on the document (Omari, 1991: 1/272). Despite being the only person narrating the complete articles of the document (including the section on Jews), Ibn Ishaq's narration was quoted by other Muslim historians who came after him like Ibn Hisyam, Ibn Kathir, Ibn sayyid al-Naas and etc. Hence it became the most popular narration for the document. However, Ibn Abu Khaythamah and

Abu 'Ubayd who came after Ibn Ishaq also managed to bring their own chain of narration mentioning the same articles of Ibn Ishaq's. Unlike Ibn Ishaq's, their narrations were not famously quoted by others. Several critics of those narrations concluded that all of them consist of a weak chain of narrators due to one or two doubtful narrators. However, al-'Ali (1995: 143) asserts that the reports of the document were authentic according to the method of *yataqawwa'* (strengthening of narrations due to its amount) in upgrading the status of the hadith. While in the same vein, Omari (1991: 1/275) proves that some of the details in those reports were also narrated scatteredly in many Hadith and history books with authentic chains of narration.

- 61 Muslim commentators have advanced different arguments as to the source of angels' knowledge about these two destructive qualities of man. There are arguments that the angels' knowledge was based on inference, which they came to by comparing Adam (as) with the *jinn* who had inhabited the earth prior to man and caused corruption and shed blood thereon. There are also arguments that the angels were informed by Allah (swt) and that the Qur'an, while discussing the events of the creation, because of brevity, did not mention this part of the conversation between Allah (swt) and the angels. See al-Tabari (no date: I/157–60); al-Razi (no date: 1/169–70); Shawkani (1973: 1/63).
- 62 The term *Islah* and its associates from the root word *Sa La Ha*, such as *Salaha* and *Aslaha* were mentioned 44 times in the Qur'an, in 38 verses and 16 chapters. *Islah* was used to coin the quality of individual personality in 2:182, 220; 4:114; 5:39; 6:48; 6:54; 7:35; 11:8; 42:40; and for family ethics in 4:16, 35, 128; and for the ethical quality possessed by the community in 2:11, 160, 224, 228; 3:89; 4:129, 146; 7:56, 170; 8:1; 11:117; 16:119; 24:5; 26:152; 28:19; 49:9.
- 63 The need of continuous effort of reform has been mentioned in several verses of the Qur'an (Qur'an, 2:220; 2:228; 4:35; 4:114; 7:57; 7:85; 11:88.)
- 64 The history of the institution of *Hisbah* goes back to the time of the Prophet Muhammad. It remained in existence throughout the greater part of the Muslim world until the beginning of the twentieth century. The officer in charge of the *Hisbah* was called *muhtasib*. For a discussion see Islahi (1988: 186–91).
- 65 e.g. Al-Qur'an, 2:222; 9:108.
- 66 This goal is close to what was coined by Confucius in his 'Spring and Autumn Period' as "Good government is attained when those who are near are made happy, and those who are far away are attracted" (Clements, 2000: 44).

8 Articulation of Islamic governance

Establishing a new model of governance from certain metaphysics-oriented ontology and epistemology may be viewed by some people as a construction of just another dream. Therefore, some might perceive that the axioms developed and the way the ideal of Islamic governance is articulated in this research is another imagined reality akin to Don Quixote's. It has been found through experience that the normal consequences of such imagined reality is but another failure in the reality of the physical world. In order to moderate the 'ideal' of the proposition made in this study, this chapter aims to articulate the axioms in real life, specifically in the realm of contemporary governance operation.

The axioms require a certain specific paradigm to ensure their articulation into the reality of the contemporary ideals of governance. For this reason, a comprehensive and holistic paradigm as a means of articulation and mechanism to translate a potentially operational realm is needed. After extensive scrutiny into the deep Islamic spirit of Shari'ah rulings through the literature and the practices of Muslims throughout history, the reader will see that the very foundation of efficiency of any Islamic ideals and teachings that derive from the ontology and epistemology are expected to operate only within the paradigm of *tawhid*.

However, contemporary usage of the term 'governance' connotes the exercise of power or authority (political, economic, administration, *etc.*) to manage a country's resources and affairs. The practice of governance, thus, comprises the mechanism, processes and institutions, through which people from all groups and social strata within society can articulate their interest, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences. Accordingly, good governance would imply the sets of rules (*system*) governing the actions of *individuals* and *organizations* (*society*) and the relations, transactions and negotiations of differences between them that could only be established and resolved through proper *institutions* (Van Dok, 1999). In the same spirit, the formulated axioms of Islamic governance cannot be relegated to work only through the individuals; instead they must be articulated through the comprehensive interconnection of all four main elements of governance: individuals, society, institutions and state. These four elements are expected to work as the articulator of Islamic governance through the typology of *khalifah* within the environment

and atmosphere (culture) of *ihsani* social capital, the expansion of which determines the nature of governance in terms of its quality.

Khalifah typology

Exploring the field of governance through the lens of the Islamic or *tawhidic* worldview requires that a fresh approach be presented due to the specific framework of its epistemology. At the same time, such effort demands certain room for *ijtihad* for the development of this new subject. Current reality and context inspire this subject to be more dynamic in responding to them. For such reason, *khalifah* typology in the sense of *homoIslamicus* is proposed as an ideal framework for the proposed Islamic governance axioms. According to this understanding, the notion of *khalifah* is to be expanded from its classical exclusive political meaning, which connotes an individual position as the highest political and administrative rank in the Muslim community. Unlike the conventional stereotyping of the meaning of *khalifah* in Islamic political doctrine, the term has to be brought back to its original and general meaning of Allah's vicegerent. This initial definition of the term indicates that every human being is God's vicegerent on earth and has been created to fulfil the mission of *istikhlaf* (vicegerency), in which they will be individually accountable before Him in the hereafter.

This *tawhidic* worldview shapes Muslims' lifestyle and vision of life that implies that Allah is the sole creator and the only omnipotent God to be worshipped, and human beings as a whole are the '*makhlūq*' (creature) or more specifically 'the servants' of Allah the Creator. These servants are created with a mission (*istikhlaf*), which is to be accomplished in this world and they will be questioned on it during the life hereafter. The human being in this sense, hence, is the vicegerent (*khalifah*) of the Creator in this world (Faruqi, 1989).¹

This *tawhidic* reality worldview also denotes that the human race has been created with a special quality over other creatures to be God's representative or *khalifah* or vicegerent. Thus, everything else in the universe is subservient to human beings, and if man utilizes them positively, he will participate in God's continuous process of creation (Omar, 1992: 43; Ahsan, 2007: 1). According to this worldview, the individual as *khalifah* will only succeed in both this world and the hereafter by executing God's order through delivering justice, fairness, prosperity, development and harmony according to the will or guidance from God as the fulfilment of his role as 'trustee' or vicegerent of Allah. Failing to deliver this responsibility or trust might lead the human to descend to a position that is less than that of *asfala safilin* (the lowest of the lowest) or animals.²

This vicegerency, hence, defines the position of man in this universe, to populate and civilize the earth, free, chosen, commissioned and responsible. On the other hand, his freedom was governed by the terms of the contract and covenant of vicegerency, which is the Divine Law.³ This worldview also demands from Muslims to further the '*da'wah* mission' (propagation) by calling people to the *ihsani* world for *falah*, which has been asserted in many Qur'anic verses.⁴

It is through this mission that Allah has given to the Muslims the title of ‘*ummatan wasatan*’ (justly balanced or moderate) to be the witness (*shuhada*) to the human being:

Thus, have We made of you an *ummah* justly balanced (*ummatan wasaīan*), that ye might be witnesses (*shuhada*) over the nations, and the Apostle a witness over yourselves; and We appointed the Qiblah to which thou wast used, only to test those who followed the Apostle from those who would turn on their heels (From the Faith). Indeed, it was (a change) momentous, except to those guided by God. And never would God Make your faith of no effect. For God is to all people, most surely full of kindness, Most Merciful.

(Qur'an, 2:143)

As implied, achieving development and bringing harmony and stability to the community (through the axioms of Islamic governance) are amongst those ‘righteous’ deeds and are part of the duty of all Muslims. Muslims as the *ummatan wasatan* should have an active role in such a field, since it is part of what are to be considered as the accomplishments of their mission as the *khali-fah*. Furthermore, as *khalifah*, Muslims aim to attain the status of *ihsan* in their life. As mentioned in the discussion on the axioms, *ihsan* connotes the holistic idea of ‘comprehensive excellence’, which is the level above of mere Islam (knowing) and *Iman* (believing) as mentioned in the popular tradition of the Prophet Muhammad known as *Hadith Jibril* (the tradition of the archangel Gabriel).⁵ *Ihsan* as a culmination of values and actions of Muslim life requires them to live with the quality of above *par excellence* in all their worldly, intellectual, spiritual and social life. The attainment of *ihsan* is but the essential of ensuring *falalah* in the life of the community, which is still subject to the fact that those aiming to achieve *ihsan* must also extend their support to others to follow the path for *ihsani* development.

Khalifah typology, thus, in this manner gives Islamic Governance a *sui generis* that distinguishes it from the others, the rationale which was discussed previously. The main difference is not only in the principles, structures and institutions, but also in its spirit and values within the individuals as the major actors of governance. It is from the *tawhidic* worldview that individuals under this typology will emerge as God-centred individuals, as their actions are strongly attached not only to the ritual-spiritual teaching of Islam, but also the action-based consciousness of articulating the requirements of being God’s vicegerent on earth, such as philanthropic elements in its socio-political and economical doctrines. Such ideals imply that the administration of such God-centred individuals entails the God-centred environment that brings the highly moral spirit in the realm of governance (Hudson, 1982: 9), and hence fulfils the notion of *ihsan*. This will result in ‘functioning individuals’ who not only believe and function according to what they believe, but also continuously impart what they believe and what they practise on others to form a culture or environment

conducive to 'Islamic governance' according to the axioms. Thus, ideal governance or 'good' governance within such a paradigm can only be attained or established by the community which lives according to the spirit of this system. This implies that individuals require certain characteristics within the community to shape its development according to the *tawhidic* worldview.

However, in formulating the means of articulation for Islamic governance, *khalifah* typology implies comprehensive and interrelated components of mechanisms to bring all the axioms into day-to-day practice. Thus, as mentioned previously, four major elements, or four dimensions are identified as crucial in order to deliver those ideals: individual, society, institutions and state. The Islamic governance ideals through the established axioms can best be articulated through these four interdependent elements in order to be operationalized. *Khalifah*, therefore, requires that good governance is practised on the individual level by '*functioning individuals*'; then on the level of society through '*benevolent society*'; and at the state level through '*enabling state systems*', which is ideally 'effective' and 'minimal' in nature; while at the institutional level the axioms must be interpreted through *effective institutions*. It should be noted that effectiveness in this paradigm should not only be understood in the limited conceptualization of the neo-classical worldview but rather it implies achieving the expected outcome, that is the maximization of *ihsani* social capital with the objective of reaching *falah*.

Based on the *khalifah* typology, it can be concluded that the aim of governance in Islam, unlike the conventional versions of governance is to achieve comprehensive human well-being (*falah*) through the articulation of *tawhid*, *amanah*, '*adl wa ihsan*', *ukhuwwah*, *islah*, *ikhtiyar*, *rububiyyah*, *tazkiyah* and *maqasid al-Shari'ah*' through the mechanism of *khilafah* (vicegerency). Furthermore, 'Islamic governance' is part of the means to achieve *ihsan* as the culmination of human life for a better life for the community.

It is upon such a definition that this research has been structured and organized and the articulation of the aforementioned axioms within the '*khalifah* typology' elements will be expounded extensively in the following sections.

Functioning individuals

Accordingly, *khalifah* requires harmony and interrelated stability of three major components in human life: the physical, intellectual and spiritual. These elements in human existence are not regarded as three different compartments, but neither are they necessarily irreconcilable due to their unique mutually exclusive nature. As *khalifah*, the human being is neither a fallen angel nor an ascending animal, but rather, a responsible being with the potential to ascend to a position that is higher than that of the angels, or to descend to a position that is lower than that of an animal (see Qur'an (2:30; 51:56; 95:4–6). (Badawi, 2002: 5)). The interdependence and the balance of the corporeal elements of human life (represented by the physical and intellectual) and the spiritual, in shaping the *hadharah* (civilization) of human life is explained in depth by Bennabi (1979: 21): "Hadharah

(civilisation) can be defined in fact as a set of spiritual and material elements that allow a society to ensure all social guarantees to every single individual".

Upon this foundation, Bennabi (1979) points out the essentials of consciousness of both material and spiritual elements for the progress of society, which must be articulated into a policy and a project according to the Islamic ideals. In this sense, *hadharah* emerges within the world of ideas and then it is transformed into a social regulation and a governing power within that society, framing itself with a spiritual control to ensure its safe and right steering. Hudson (1982) highlighted such uniqueness of Islamic society's political orientations by acknowledging the transcendental matter and therefore 'God centred' as opposed to the human centred ideals.

Within such a typology, an individual is a person who preserves his vertical relation with his God and his horizontal relation with his fellow humans and his environment by articulating the aforementioned axioms of Islamic governance. His *tawhidic* reality worldview guides him towards living according to God's guidance in the terrestrial life, to achieve *falah* through the culture of *ihsan*. Consequently, *falah* can be achieved through comprehensive well-being in one's life as a result of the continuous obedience to the guidance with the quality of *ihsan* (see: Qur'an, 2:189; 3:130; 3:200; 5:35; 5:100; 24:31; 28:67; 24:51). This comprehensive well-being is obtained through the preservation of the highest objectives of Shari'ah (*maqasid*) when the guidance is followed and implemented in one's life.

As far as *khalifah* is concerned, all his life is dedicated to fulfilling this responsibility of being the vicegerent of Allah on earth, as all actions are considered as acts of worship (*'ibadah*) or submission towards the Creator (Omar, 1992: 40). Arif (1989) names such an individual as *tab'ay* (obedient) human being,⁶ while Al-Buraey (1985: 237; 316) defines such a character as the 'God-fearing' individual. Such a person then is a responsible individual with a *tawhidic* mindset, which becomes the precious social capital for the community or the Muslim nation as a whole. This ideal makes 'Islamic' approach to governance different from the 'materialistic' and 'individualistic' proposal of conventional understanding of good governance. It also leads to the political economic idea of 'two-dimensional utility function' (present and the hereafter), which leads to a *homoIslamicus* being unlike the conventional economic system, which is based on a one-dimensional utility function, which leads to *homoeconomicus* or *homopoliticus* (Asutay, 2007b).

In substantiating the position taken here, it should be stated that the importance of 'functioning individuals' is thoroughly discussed by Bennabi (Berghout, 2005: 167–8) who strongly asserts that any social change or civilizing process should depart from the very tiny cell of the *ummah*, which is the individual himself. In this way, it is understood that civilization should never be confined to the formulation of objects and wealth per se or what (relates to what he terms the realm of objects or '*Alam al-ashya'*) as perceived by many, but it must rather be generated from the realm of persons and ideas or '*Alam al-afkar*' (which he calls the social investment). By quoting the example of the Germans who rose

up after World War Two, he declares that the driving force behind that was not its destroyed world of objects and things, but its human resources (individuals) and will of such individuals for reconstruction. The Qur'an (21:107) mentions this (functioning) individual's mission as the continuation of the Prophet Muhammad's mission as an agent of mercy to the universe: "For I [Allah] have created you [Muhammad] to be nothing but a blessing for all creation".

This type of *homoIslamicus* as a functioning individual is essential to the articulation of the axioms of Islamic governance according to the *tawhidic* worldview. They become sustainable people, conscious of their role of being the agents for *ihsan*, they are able to earn a living and to have a quality of life acceptable to themselves as they continue to learn about themselves and their communities and to strive to improve their life as well as the community by maximizing *ihsani* social capital.⁷ Functioning individuals are also those who live with self-integrity under the banner of *amanah*, which entails the inner attitude of self-accountability and due to this self-consciousness, they are always transparent in delivering the trust rendered to them. As part of the delivery of the *amanah*, functioning individuals *do* actively participate in the governance activities of the community as active not passive citizens due to the principle of individual empowerment through *shura* and *amr ma'ruf naby munkar* within the concept of *islah*.

In addition, according to the *tawhidic* worldview, functioning individuals, as part of the 'moderate nation' (*ummatan wasatan*), and also as part of the community, in which they live, should explore the field of participation to achieve good in the worldly life and to attain *falah*. Ramadan (2005: 134) suggests that the participation of Muslims in the political and social life of the society is but a reflection of their good faith and spirituality. Furthermore, their participation is but a fertile ground for those individuals to perform their '*al-amr bi al-ma'ruf wa nahi 'an al-munkar*'. This is in agreement with the current theory of people's empowerment in governance, in which individuals should have the right to participate in the activities of a political community and in effective decision-making about the shared future through their personal capacity or the group's collective action (Cornwall, 2002: 1; Saward, 2005: 179–94; Theiss-Morse and Hibbing, 2005).

Furthermore, in the prevailing theories of Islamic governance, the sphere of participation should be expanded towards every person in the community to enhance their direct-participation opportunities, which must aim at strengthening the lower echelons of public administration through various means such as plebiscite, civic-based policy-making efforts, public debate, polling etc. (Boyte, 2005; Kim *et al.*, 2005: 650). It is through participation that individuals exercise their culture of *ihsan* to ensure *falah*. It is their effort to fulfil this mission that is valued as 'Islamic' governance. Thus, participation should not only be limited to the political realm, but as a radical democratic position electors should claim their right in policy making beyond the elected. The importance of such active and functioning individuals in the realm of governance is mentioned by Havel (1997: 146), who firmly maintained that:

A modern state cannot consist merely of civil service, political parties, and private enterprise. It must offer citizens a colourful array of ways to become involved, both privately and publicly, and must develop very different types of civic coexistence, solidarity and participation.

It should be mentioned that Islamic moral economy's concept of participation can respond to such calls, as, instead of mere competitiveness, Islamic moral economy aims at the coherence of both co-operation and competitiveness. The financing participatory nature of the economy and finance is strongly argued, as the aim is the formation of *khalifah* typology through functioning and active individuals.

Participation, hence, according to this also contributes towards the broadening of responsibilities for the decisions adapted to each and every citizen and their commitments towards society, thereby fostering political competences, enhancing the quality of collective decision-making and activating the market by not solely depending on the state to plan for their micro-economic life.

As can be seen, participation related theories are but another face of the expansion of the *shura* concept by widening the scope of consultation to every '*empowered functioning individual*'. This ideal will lead to the active role of civil society, an independent community and less dependence on the authority.

In the same manner, a functioning individual lives within the spirit of the rule of law as part of their *amanah*. Similarly, the spirit of '*adl wa ihsan*' requires permanent guidance in the life of the functioning individual for them to not only respect the rule of law for the well being of the community but also to act as an agent to promote the concept. While at the same time, the principle of *ihsan* drives a functioning individual to keep striving towards comprehensive excellence to attain *falah* in his life in line with *maqasid al-Shari'ah*. Such an individual also lives with the high spirit of universal solidarity and benevolence through the concept of *ukhuwwah*. The *ukhuwwah* spirit also ensures mutual respect and mutual acknowledging between individuals with sufficient room for freedom for everybody to practise their rights and obligations.

Having said all this, *homoIslamicus*, as functioning individuals are not merely an imaginary, utopian society based purely on theory without consideration for the reality. Islamic governance as another means of achieving society's 'well-being' directly contributes towards the development of 'social capital', or *ihsani* capital, which is currently accepted by many as an effective element for the promotion of economic development, equality, participation, and democracy.⁸ Moreover, these 'material' objectives are not the ultimate aims of the Islamic governance. They emerge as a result of collective individuals exercising the axioms, motivated by an 'inner' foundation within the hearts of those individuals on their journey to attain *falah* through the culture of *ihsan*. Those individuals are not living individually in the pursuit of their aims, but rather acting collectively with the spirit of solidarity and sharing their ideals with others.⁹ The struggle of the functioning individual to pursue his own well-being and that of the community not only manifests the ritual-spirituality of the individual, but

also represents the true meaning of *Jihad fi sabil Allah* (striving in the way of Allah). *Jihad* in its broader term encompasses the struggle for individual development, justice, humanity and well-being, which are the results of Islamic governance through *khalifah*. Thus, this ‘inner’ element differentiates between the contemporary notion of ‘good governance’ and Islamic governance.

The functioning individuals, however, could not function in vacuum within the minimal state. The previously mentioned *ihsan* characteristic of Muslim *Ummah* requires the establishment of benevolent society comprise of the functioning individuals. With the spirit of universal solidarity amongst its individuals, the benevolent society will maximize the potential of its member to be independent and to self-actualize their *falah*. This ideal benevolent society will lead to the creation of ‘independent society’ or ‘virtuous society’ that will articulate the axioms of Islamic governance within the larger sphere of individuals. The ensuing section will elaborate further on how the benevolent society as an element of *khalifah* typology is essential in constructing the big picture of ideal governance in this book.

Benevolent society

As mentioned above the *khalifah* typology of functioning individuals does not work in a vacuum. The functioning element of individuals only becomes workable within the sphere of a society that enables them to be functioning. Upon this premise, a ‘big society’ in which the individuals are politically and economically less-dependent on the state, but rather interdependent on each other based on the concept of justice and universal solidarity, and hence the virtuous society. This paradigm, nevertheless does not deny the individualism and ownership, but the individualistic nature of the individuals are rather interdependent on each other not solely to pursue everybody’s respective personal interest, but rather to collectively assist each other to pursue their own personal *falah*, but also to help each other in reaching *falah* through the expansion of the *ihsani* social capital. Such a big society in Islamic governance is essential in order to articulate its philosophical foundations and it is best to be known as a ‘benevolent society’.

In the same token, this benevolent society itself is the result of the intercommunicating and interrelated networking of the functioning individuals within the culture of *ihsan*, which demands from every single individual not only to achieve his personal well-being by creating a ‘*falah*’ of his own, but also to cultivating an environment that can facilitate the *falah* of others due to the *tawhidic* reality worldview. As mentioned in the previous paragraphs, functioning individuals strive not only towards their own happiness through participation and self-determination, but also to assist others to attain total self-actualization (*falah*). This collective mutual interdependent nature of the functioning individual is the gist of the aforementioned axioms.

Tawhidic principal, which acts as the *imago mundi* of the society framework of governance within the hearts of individuals leads to the realization of their

amanah (trust), by preserving their rights and also enables them to execute their obligations in a just and benevolent manner as indicated by the *'adl wa ihsan* axiom. The just and benevolence principal requires the individuals, as part of the notion of *ihsan*, to live and pursue their lives not only for their own personal interest, but also as agents of mercy to mankind and the environment. Furthermore, the effectiveness of benevolent society that would mutually connect the individuals is strongly founded on the spirit of universal solidarity or *ukhuwwah* axioms through *takaful* (mutual co-operation), *tafabum* (mutual respect). The articulation of these concepts will lead towards social cohesion in achieving their well-being (*maqasid al-Shari'ah*).

Such a *tawhidic* ontology-based society of individuals exemplifies 'social capital' through the empowerment of each single cell of the society's members. A social capital of this type comprises all three types of social capital as proposed by Woolcock (2001): bonding, bridging and linking.¹⁰ If the contemporary notion of social capital arises from the horizontal material needs and is structured by the vertical framework of the state, Islamic social capital is to be shaped by moral-based and faith-inspired *ihsan* culture to produce the '*Ihsani* Social Capital', which implies that the horizontal relation amongst the people or individuals is established by the concept of *ukhuwwah* (universal solidarity), which is derived from the vertical *Tawhidic* worldview relation between the individuals and God. It is the quality of their inter-connectedness with each other (horizontal) that determines the quality of their vertical relation (with Allah) in attaining *falah*. Active, functioning, empowered individuals are thus expected to articulate their governance rights and responsibilities within the sphere of this *ihsani* social capital realm.

Furthermore, a continuous process of *tarbiyyah* and *ta'dib* (education and virtuous impartment process) as part of the *shuhada'* characteristics must prevail within the benevolent society, the nature and the magnitude of which will determine the magnitude and the quality of *ihsani* social capital and therefore the nature of good governance in a dynamic and integrated manner with causal relationship is expected to be yielded.

This process can only constantly and naturally be carried out on the very basic branch of society, the family institution. Islamic moral and teachings place crucial emphasis on the value of the family. Without a proper virtuous family institution that enables individuals to function, and Islamic values to prevail, it is hard to produce benevolent elements in the society. Strong family institutions with Islamic values will ensure social networking amongst society members to establish the *ihsani* social capital. The effective role of families and social networking with the influence of culture, virtue and religious value is acknowledged by many researchers of development and social capital as another factor towards the holistic and comprehensive development (Chang, 1997; Kenneth Newton, 1997; Teachman *et al.*, 1997; Kliksberg, 2000).

Universal solidarity within this benevolent society expands beyond political economy issues and the ownership and rights discourse. It encompasses the comprehensive elements of family, social, education and ethos, ritual-spiritual,

moral, values and responsibilities aspects of human life. It is through this process that virtue and values are kept alive in the lives of individuals and families. Such a realm of *ihsani* social capital enshrines the very meaning of *ukhuwwah* through the practice of *Nasihah* (mutual reminding) amongst its members. These qualities will sustain within the society due to the establishment of the support system of effective institutions working in the maximum space left by the minimal enabling state as discussed in the following paragraphs. This ideal practice of benevolence will lead towards balance, harmony and mutual respect within the society. Compared to the benefits of the contemporary notion of social capital,¹¹ the *ihsani* social capital through benevolent society would bring about the well-being (*maqasid al-Shari'ah*) of the community through the ideals of Islamic governance.

However, *ihsani* social capital through the benevolent society can only be articulated within the framework of effective minimal state where more room for the society's dynamism can be fully exercised through active state and non-state institutions, as *ihsani* social capital requires opportunity to flourish and nourish without the hindrance and interference of the state. Within such a framework, a society must be substantially autonomous to self-determine its way forward. Not only should the state with its system and mechanism allow a benevolent society to nourish, it should also allow non-state institutions as part of the realm where the individuals and the society with its limited autonomy can be actively involved in the centre along with the state's. In the same spirit, the state itself must be interdependent with the society in which it operates in creating the atmosphere of *ihsan* to attain *falah*. This nature of interdependency between the state and the society (represented by its individuals) in governance is exemplified through the effective institutions in civil society and the state.

Effective institutions

While determining the role of individuals and state in articulating the Islamic ideals of governance through the axioms, it should be noted that both elements as part of the *khalifah* typology could not effectively function without proper institutions connecting the two. This implies that the critical dual role of institutions can obviously be determined first by facilitating the articulation of any system or ideological objectives and aspirations and then by translating them into actions. Thus, the existence and capabilities of institutions for crystallizing and guiding collective efforts are most critical in the realm of governance, whether it is for strategic visioning and long-term policy-making or for actual implementation or evaluation and control. The significance of institutions also lies in their role in accomplishing the mandates, missions and objectives derived from the axioms, as well as in structuring and organizing groups and individuals within the community according to their roles and responsibilities due to the degree of authority vested in each groups.

In explaining the significant role of institutions, North (1990: 3) develops a theory that defines institutions as "humanly devised constraints that shape

human interaction". His theory explains that institutions are essential in exercising two fundamental roles: as 'rules of the game' and as a 'system of incentive distribution'. As the rules of the game, institutions regulate actors' (individuals') behaviour, in determining the conduct of the individuals, in a particular way, institutions will promote co-operative behaviour. While, as the system of incentive distributions, institutions have a duty to provide individuals with a fair and equal opportunity to apply sustainable strategies to pursue their interests collectively (North, 1990: 6–9). Institutions are also important for regulating the system of rules to crystallize and maintain the philosophy, ideology, culture and 'traditions' that underpin or rationalize the operation system of the institutions and its constituent parts. Governance institutions, thus, embody several elements: formal and informal rules of behaviour, ways and means of enforcing these rules, procedures for mediation of conflicts, sanctions in the case of breach of the rules, and organizations supporting market transactions (North, 1994; World Bank, 2002). Institutions are more or less developed depending on how well these different features operate. They can create or destroy incentives for individuals to engage in governance.

As an act of steering a people's socio-politico-economic development, governance is a multifaceted compound situation of institutions, systems, structures, processes, procedures, practices, relationships and leadership behaviour in the exercise of social, political, economic and managerial/administrative authority in the running of public or private affairs (Leftwich, 1993; Williams and Young, 1994; Van Dok, 1999; Rhodes, 2003). Good governance, in this context, is the exercise of this authority with the participation, interest and livelihood of the governed as the driving force. Hence, institutions that deal with the issue of governance must facilitate collaboration, involvement, consultation and participation of all stakeholders in all sectors (public sector, private sector and civil society) in the act of governance. At the same time, due to the nature of the social constructs of governance institutions, they encompass not only temporal structurally-conditioned behaviour, but also tendencies that are products of the socio-politico-economic and historical conditions of the context in which they operate.

Attention should be paid not only to central government institutions and processes under the notion of Islamic governance, but also to the attributes and capacities of sub-national and local government authorities as mentioned in the discussion of the enabling state. In addition, the current trend in worldwide governance assigns a more active role to civil society institutions due to the gap between states or governments and their citizens becoming wider. The term itself became so popular with the emerging non-state social actors in governing society interests either in education, the market or the socio-political field. Therefore, the civil society became an important institution for establishing good governance across the globe. The nature of such institutions can be described as "The realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or a set of shared rules" (Pasha, 2004: 1–2).

Unlike current civil society models that are derived from the framework of post-Enlightenment discourses of the West, the Islamic notion of civil society emerges from the ‘inner’ foundation of the functioning individual. Keane (2009: 133–6) asserts that the emergence of civil society could be traced in Islamic history through the flourishing social institutions within Muslim society in the past. The civil society (*mujtama’ madani*) that emerged was mainly motivated by economic factors, which amongst others was to protect ownership and welfare purposes. *Waqf* was identified as the early civil society institutions developed by early Muslim societies in enabling people to resist vigorously any attempts by the state over individuals’ wealth. *Waqf* as an important actor of governance will be discussed in the topic effective institutions as part of *khalifah* typology.

The realization of the axioms motivates individuals to act and react to the reality by forming the society according to *tawhidic* ideals. The very dynamo of such a civil society is not personal interest or the mere protection of individual rights against the state, but it was part of the articulation of the individuals’ conviction in achieving *falah* through the culture of *ihsan* with the continuous spirit of *islah*. In sum, civil society under the *tawhidic* paradigm reflects the degree of religiosity of the individuals in maintaining their vertical relation with God and their horizontal relation with their fellow humans as well as the environment.

Historically, several state and non-state institutions actively operated the governance of Muslim political economic affairs based on such motivation. From the time of the Prophet Muhammad up to the days of the Ottoman Empire, different institutions were formulated and functioned in Muslim society to articulate the ideals of Islamic-inspired governance alongside other institutions adopted from the occupied lands. As a matter of *ijtihad* and the ongoing process of development, the institutions flourished while contributing towards the aim of attainment of *falah* of the community. Hence, it is worth mentioning some of those institutions to see how the Islamic ideals of governance contributed to shaping the governance process of the past through institutions contributing to the micro dynamics of the governance. Some of the institutions’ functions may be worth reconsidering under the proposed paradigm of Islamic governance in this research.

‘Ulama’

‘Ulama’, or scholars and experts of the science of Islam have a special place in the heart of Muslims and within the social strata of the community. As people who possess the knowledge of revelation and the guardians of the religion through the preservation of the Qur’an and its traditions, the Qur’an and the Prophets glorify the status of *‘Ulama’*.¹² With such a status they sanction the greater role they have to perform and the massive responsibilities they have to deliver in all social, religious and political milieu (Ghannoushi, 2001; Imarah, 2005: 84–92). It is rather interesting to view that throughout Muslim history, *‘Ulama’*¹³ were not at the monolithic position as the Christian clerics during the

pre-Enlightenment and the so-called 'dark ages' of Medieval Europe. '*Ulama*', on the other hand emerged as an institution separate from the state, and as a product, but at the same time an essential part of Muslim civil society, to become the guardians of religion on behalf of society from any interference of the Caliph or the state. In this, the role of *ijtihad*, which is the prerequisite for any individuals to issue any decree on religious issues managed to safeguard the religion from becoming another tool for the despots. Since then, history has witnessed the rival of '*Ulama*' as an institution to challenge the state on behalf of society (Hofmann, 2001: 4).

However, '*Ulama*' have also acted as a buffer zone between society and the state (Ghannoushi, 2001). '*Ulama*', as the representatives of civil society, according to Ibn Taimiyyah have the role of mediator between the ruler and the ruled, as Ibn Taimiyyah suggests the collaboration between the leadership and the '*Ulama*' is essential in maintaining the order and the ideal of a just and virtuous state. It should therefore be noted that within the classical set-up of Muslim society, the two groups were the most central pillars in the governance process (Zubaida, 2005: 100).

The '*Ulama*' sustained their living and the continuity of their position through the nourishment of *waqf*, which was separate from the state. In fact, it was the '*Ulama*', for instance, who safeguarded the institution of *waqf* for the benefit of the people from any infringement by the state by making *waqf* an independent and separate entity from the state (Nafi', 2010: 276). The historical accounts also show the active role of the '*Ulama*' in protecting the religious, social and civil life of individuals against the overwhelming and infringing nature of the state. Therefore, the historical account also testifies the struggle given by the '*Ulama*' against the state in fulfilling such roles.

Unfortunately, the '*Ulama*' institution due to its informality is not a monolithic institution. History has proven that there are proportionate numbers of '*Ulama*' who also agreed to be in subservience of the state and rulers. Those who subjugated themselves under the power of the palace or working under the influence of the state were known throughout history as '*Ulama*' *al-Sultan*, which literally means the scholars of the castle or the co-opted scholars (Imarah, 2005). During these periods, the judiciary (*qada*), religious education and the *waqf* started becoming part of the bureaucratic state institutions administrated by or assigned to the '*Ulama*' (Lapidus, 1996; Ghannoushi, 2001). The number of these scholars increased after the closure of the door of *ijtihad* which resulted in the shift of the '*Ulama*' institution from civil society to the state, namely under the Sultanate state, which was the object of the Sultanate state which aimed to protect its power which was open to question in terms of Islamic legitimacy. The condition deteriorated especially during the Ottoman period when the institution of '*Ulama*' was officially put under the supervision of the state (Lapidus, 1996), leading to the control of the religion for the interest of the state, as Ottoman political culture is summarized by the concept of '*din ru devlet*', namely religion exists to serve the state, unlike the Islamic notion that everything in the universe is aimed at nourishing the state.

However, the survival of independent '*Ulama*' as unofficial institutions within civil society remains separate from the body of Muslim societies around the globe, which has become a reality under the global forces within the Muslim nation states. Moreover, the independent '*Ulama*' institutions have proven their leading role in the society of many Muslim countries during the period of colonialization. Historical literature has abundantly recorded the spearheading role of the '*Ulama*' in challenging the colonials (Zaman, 2002).

However, the post-independent Muslim nations, under the framework of the modern nation-state have managed to put the '*Ulama*' institution again under the control of the state by minimizing their role under the *waqf*, which turned has become just another ministry under state control in many Muslim states. Despite the global condition of the '*Ulama*' institution, many '*Ulama*' tried to revive the initial and viable role of their predecessors through what are nowadays known as Islamic movements or political Islamism (Butterworth, 1992; Lapidus, 1992; Ghannoushi, 2001; el-Affendi, 2003; Nafi', 2010).

Waqf institution

Zarqa (1988) points out that there are various institutions and structures that Islam has instilled to redistribute income and wealth for the fulfilment of the basic needs of all in society. The institutions include, among others, *zakah* (the provision of charity or alms) and *waqf* (land, property or cash used for charitable purposes). Nevertheless, *Waqf* is the most vital institution in enshrining the Islamic ethos by balancing between the private ownership and communal obligation. The *waqf* is not unlike the English trust. The originator places property or money into the *waqf* and the endowment is then used for the state charitable purposes. They have existed since the earlier Islamic times. The intention is that the *waqf* can last forever, but in reality they can be wound up under certain circumstances. When the *waqf* is created, the founder states the purpose and potential beneficiaries (for example, poor members of the family, migrants or the whole community). Non Muslims can be beneficiaries but not if they are in conflict with Muslims.

The fundamental idea of *waqf* was to bring the profound ideal of philanthropic and benevolent attitudes within the society into reality through institutionalizing. As an act of volunteerism and third sector of the economic structure, *waqf* overlaid a concrete foundation for the wealthy individuals of the society to share their wealth with the unfortunate as part of their social contribution. In modern jargon, *waqf* as endowment reflects a strong motivation for the development of social capital in a society due to the fact that the policy of modern economic development puts emphasis on the micro-dynamics of society.

Since the dawn of its practice, the idea of *waqf* was very inclusive in that it expanded not only within the territory of religious endowment, but also for social and welfare activities (al-Salih, 2001: 165–70). Prophet Muhammad encouraged his companions to perform *Waqf* for both religious and worldly purposes. Mosques for worship and community activities; wells for the usage of

the early Muslim community in Madina; horses for use in war; lands to be cultivated for feeding the poor were all financed by *waqfs* by early generations of Muslims under the supervision and guidance of the Prophet Muhammad himself. The practice continued and later expanded by following Muslim generations. The *waqf* continued to become the heartbeat of the Muslim community and survived in both its religious and worldly realms (Gil, 1998: 125–40).

Keane (2009: 136–8) implies that *waqf* was amongst the earlier vehicles, which have represented civil society since the dawn of Muslim history. It was a mechanism for Muslims in those periods to gain endless rewards for the ongoing benefits of charity from the *waqf* system (Gil, 1998). *Waqf* along with *zakah* (alms) as part of the voluntary sector has contributed towards the economic well-being of Muslim societies for centuries by creating a space for the development of a societal-based welfare system (Lewis, 1990: 38–41; Hoexter, 1998: 476–95; Baskan, 2002: 13).

The *waqf* overlaid a concrete foundation for wealthy individuals in society to share their wealth with the unfortunate as part of their social contribution, without any element of intervention or enforcement by the state. It also acted as the source of the individual's or the society's sources for independency from the state. The *waqf* system contributed to the flourishing of mosques, orphanages, motels, schools (*madrasah*), Sufi lodges (*zawiyat*), water wells, food distribution, debt relief and other forms of social welfare (Baer, 1997: 264–97; Hasan, 2006) as part of the people's independency from the state.

In time, the third sector of social life deteriorated and the *waqf* system became an official institution, which was centralized under the state separate from private *waqf* (*waqf abliy* or family *waqf*) (Lewis, 1990). However, it was al-Shafi'i through his *al-Risalah* who managed to prevent the *waqf* from becoming another state institution and returned it back to the society to be administrated by the '*Ulama*'. Since then the *waqf* institution has performed an important role in Muslim societies throughout history in establishing and sustaining educational institutions including prominent higher education institutions like the al-Qurawiyun University in Tunisia, al-Azhar in Cairo and other early universities in Islamic Andalusia long before Oxford and Cambridge (Baer, 1997). It was also the source of building hospitals and clinics throughout Muslim lands, which were known as *bimaristan*¹⁴ thus contributing towards the enhancement of medical science and discoveries by Muslim scientists (Baer, 1997). One would conclude that due to the vast and wide practise of *waqf* throughout Muslim history, individuals and society have been empowered, hence minimizing the role of state in education, welfare and even healthcare.

Unfortunately, after the colonialization period, when *waqf* became part of the state as an official institution or organ of the state, it became a separate ministry, the *waqf* ceased to have a dynamic role in the society any more (al-Salih, 2001: 209–10). The official role of *waqfs* was relegated to being strongly associated with religious matters (mosques, cemeteries, orphanages, *madrasah*, maintenance of religious authorities, etc.) with some emphasis in a few Muslim countries on other charity and welfare issues (Lewis, 1990; Baer, 1997). Non-official *waqf*, like family

waqf was also affected by this distorted image of *waqf* involved in the religious related matters per se. However, the emergence of Islamic movements, organizations and the *da'wah* (Islamic Propagation) and other progressive groups in the forms of NGOs, quasi-NGOs and foundations have established a new revival of the *waqf* as a movement of part of the citizen-based charity and welfare institution (Lapidus, 1992: 3–27; Clark, 1995: 11–17; Hasan, 2006; Harrigan and El-Said, 2009; Nafi', 2010).

In conjunction with the Islamic governance, *Waqfs* as they functioned in the past should be an important institution within the ideal independent non-state welfare system, hence, remains an important institution for ideal governance. With a constructive role in providing revenue for civil society, *waqfs* could fuel the sense of empowerment of individuals and accordingly constantly cultivate an atmosphere of benevolence in society, hence helping once again to detach society from the state. Historically, *waqf* was institutionalized as the rich wanted to keep away money from 'non-good governance of the state' as *waqf* gave them an opportunity to keep their wealth away from arbitrary confiscation by the state (Kuran, 2001).

Accordingly, Cizakca (2004) suggests a model in which the concept of cash *waqf* can be used in contemporary times to serve the social objectives of the society by referring to the experience of Muslims in Turkey during the Ottoman period in micro-financing. This self-micro-financing practised by the members of the society further minimized the role of the state and at the same time enhanced the element of benevolence within the community, hence leading to the nourishment of the aforementioned *ihsani* culture. Within the *ihsani* culture, both elements of *khalifah* typology depend proportionately on effective *waqf* leading to the lesser size of the state, which is an essential element in ensuring the viability of the *khalifah* typology for Islamic governance.

Ahl al-Hil wa al-'Aqd (shura council)

In medieval political theory, the term refers to a group of honest, wise, experienced and righteous people who possess the right to elect or remove a ruler. It could be depicted as council of experts, or elites or wise men to whom the Caliph or the ruler referred when making any decision (Ghraybeh, 2000: 306–7). Often it is associated with the important duty of electing caliphs based on extensive consultations to reach consensus as well as the ability to impeach them (al-Mawardi, 2005: 6–7). However, in practice, most rulers designated their successors so the task was generally a mere formality. In much of the literature, this institution has also been identified as 'shura council' or *shura* assembly in the modern term used by some contemporary Muslim countries. Some modern thinkers have tried to accommodate this task to that of a parliament (al-Sulami, 2003).

As part of governance, with a central role in Muslim history, the institution deserves to be discussed to understand the functions it has performed throughout history. Derived from the practice of Omar when he appointed some

companions to elect his successor after his demise, the institution became a landmark for the legitimate succession of leaders (Imarah, 2005: 59–60). Due to its *ijtihadi* nature, the structure, the size and the mechanism for selecting the members of the council varied at different times. A deep inquiry into the historical root of Omar's idea would trace it a long way back to the practice of pre-Islamic Quraishite-Meccan tribal leaders at *Dar al-Nadwah* in Mecca (al-Sulami, 2003: 38). Nonetheless, it is common sense for any leaders in any part of the world at any time to have such a council to assist them.¹⁵

Having described the *Ahl al-Hil wa al-'Aqd*, to take it to its minimum end and for its dynamic nature to appear in any structure of governance, it could be viewed as a useful tool in governance. As both a system and institution that reflect decision making in governance, the council could be developed into a wider paradigm to align with the *Tawhidic* worldview. In modern times, the size of the council should be expanded to include larger community representatives and actors including all individuals towards what should be known as 'open-*shura*'. It is through the mechanism of representatives of the people at every layer of society that every single individual will have their part and say in making decisions, which directly involve them (Hofmann, 2001: 9). Thus, individuals would be detached from dependency on certain elites representing the state to determine their life in the name of good governance. Every person's decision is valued through this open-*shura* process that will be articulated in representative councils at local, national and also society level. Only through such expansion can the *shura* council be another means to articulate the axioms in accordance with the *ibsan* culture in the interest of people according to the *Tawhidic* worldview attaining *falah* for all, and not only a mere rubber stamp that works in the interest of the rulers as happened in the past.

Hisbah (Regulation and enforcement body)

The institution of *Hisbah* initially emerged as a body to regulate and monitor the market. The main aim of the enforcement of *Hisbah* was to maintain the ethical norms within the marketplace based on honesty, propriety and hygiene (Ibn Taimiyyah, 1985). *Hisbah* in its original form was not only an institution of the spiritual order per se, but also part of the state mechanism to enable a total Islamic environment with which to manifest both the mundane and material aspects of the society (Husayni, 1969: 30–6) by directly engaging with the consequences of the market to prevent any excesses or deviations. The *muhtasib*, (officer in-charge of *Hisbah*) also known as *Hasib al-suq* (market inspector) was responsible for enforcing the regulations imposed on the market and supervising the day to day business affairs of the actors involved in the marketplace (al-Mawardi, 2005: 260). His function was to detect and punish immorality in terms of the consequences of the state amongst traders and customers alike, including the use of false weights and measures, the adulteration of wares and other offences.

Later, the *Hisbah* evolved and expanded beyond the marketplace into ethical issues to enforce moral and Islamic rulings in the public arena of the community. This can be seen in al-Mawardi's *al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyyah* (2005: 337–62) in which he expounded in detail the role, duties and rules relating to *Hisbah* and the *muhtasib* (*Hisbah* officer). Since then it has become an office of the state and the *muhtasib* has been appointed officially as a government officer. Ali (1975: 28) insists that the major responsibility of the *Hisbah* then came to ensure that community life was not contaminated with immoral and un-Islamic practices and also to execute other administrative duties, which were not directly connected with religion.

Being the most sustainable institution in Muslim experience of governance, the *hisbah* continued to exist as the major player in ensuring the preservation of moral issues in the community and marketplace until the middle of the nineteenth century (al-Soliman, 1988). Later the Ottomans replaced the institution with country councils (Mardin, 1969). In other Muslim states, unfortunately, today, nothing is left of the *hisbah* apart from the name and its single and distorted function. While in some countries the *Hisbah* is only known strictly as the moral police and spiritual enforcer and separate from its political economical and governance function. In the study of Islamic governance, *Hisbah* reflects how the state acts as the market regulator and how a state institution could contribute to establishing the relation between the state and the market.

Furthermore, good governance also requires checks and balances, which the *Hisbah* as an institution is capable of providing. While referring to the axioms developed for Islamic governance, the *Hisbah* implies the spirit of *amanah*, *islah* and *maqasid al-Shari'ah* through the continuous checks and balances mechanisms in the society, as well as in the state instruments represented by the accountability process and empowerment, hence good governance. Thus, it is not only an institution aiming at spiritual development, but also functions to overcome the excesses and deviations generated by the market system (Oran, 2010). This will be elucidated more in the coming sections discussing how these institutions could become a useful concept in the modern day notion of governance.

Diwan (Chancery or Bureaucratic offices)

Diwan has been an important aspect of administrative institution since the days of the second Caliph, Omar bin al-Khattab. It has long been used in the Islamic administrative machinery as a name for a tool for government organization of the administrative branch of state (Bureay, 1985: 278). Initially it was known as *Diwan al-jund*, emulating the Persian administration, and it was responsible for collecting revenues from taxation, managing the royal income and expenditure, and acting as the paymaster of soldiery (al-Mawardi, 2005: 217–18). It served the state as the contemporary department of financial operations and taxation. *Diwan* was also operated as the payment system institution responsible amongst other things for distribution or payments to the state officers and the army.

Diwan emerged as the first bureaucratic institution in Muslim history and continued to work as such throughout Muslim history under the administration of various Caliphs. As an important element in the governance of the Islamic state, the function of *diwan* expanded due to the expansion of the state and the bureaucracy.

Apart from *diwan al-jund*, Omar also established another important bureaucratic institution namely, *diwan al-insha'* (chancellery) to keep all official documents of the state (Majdalawi, 2002: 40), which can be considered in contemporary terms as articulating transparency and accountability. In the later years of Islamic administration, specifically during the Umayyad and the Abbasid periods, *diwan al-insha'* became the most crucial and sophisticated organ for state diplomatic affairs. The chief of *diwan al-insha'* or the *diwan al-rasa'il*, known as '*al-katib*' (secretary) was a very important rank in the state bureaucracy (Bosworth, 1964). He was the equivalent of today's Secretary of State, with his pen acting as the voice of the state's foreign policies. Also in this period, *diwan* shifted from its initial notion to the more progressive and comprehensive idea of bureaucratic institutions comprising offices, secretariats, boards, ministries and departments. Various other departments or ministries were established during the Umayyad period and continued to exist during the Abbasid period under the name of *diwan*, such as *diwan al-Kharaj* (treasury department), *diwan al-jund* (department for military affairs), *diwan al-khatm* (office of the seal), *diwan al-mustaghallasat* (department for land administration), *diwan al-baréed* (post office), and *diwan al-rasa'il* (department of correspondence) (Hitti, 1964: 321–5).

The institution was developed during the Abbasid reign (al-Mawardi, 2005: 282–308), when more *diwans* were established to facilitate the viziers and their officers such as *diwan al-musadarah* (department to look after the confiscated properties of political enemies), *diwan al-'Azimmah* (department to control and monitor the accounts of other *diwans* and supervise them), *diwan al-Riqa'* (department responsible for public complaints), *diwan al-Mazalim* (ombudsman for complaints against the officials of the state), *diwan al-Sawad* (department for tax only in Iraq), *diwan al-Nafaqat* (department of public officers payment and welfare), and other *diwans* (Buraey, 1985: 259–61). Unfortunately, this archaic bureaucratic institution did not contribute much to empowering individuals and the society, but rather gave excessive power to the state and hence resulted in producing results for the 'non-realization of good governance in Islamic norms'. However, the emergence of the *diwans* implies that Muslim politicians and leaders widely and wisely used the mechanism of *ijtihad* in the past to attain efficiency in state governance. *Diwan* was an example of how Muslims in the past articulated their ideals of governance through bureaucratic mechanism by developing an integrated system of administration, which aimed at maximizing the *ibnani* social capital through the activities and functions of the state.

Islamic Guild (Ahi system)

Ahi or *Ahilik* ‘union’ organization is another civil society institution that emerged in Muslim history in the area of Turkish Anatolia that is worth studying. As a fraternity, the Sufi-oriented organization, the ‘*Ahi*’ or ‘*Ahilik*’ in Turkish was actually a union of merchants and traders working together to achieve certain goals. Members of *Ahi* acted in accordance with rules because of their spiritual progress, which took place during the highly disciplined promotion procedure along the levels of organization hierarchy. It was established in Anatolia, and then spread all over towns and villages across the region during the Seljuk’s and contributed profoundly to the establishment of the Ottoman Empire (Lewis, 1937; Kuran, 2000).

The members of *Ahi* adhered strictly to Islamic codes of conduct and their articulation in their daily business and personal life. Not only was their life dedicated to the spiritual ethos, but they were also heavily involved in charitable works and ethical ways of trading. However, one might conclude that the main functions of this fraternity were religious and moral, military, political, cultural and social.

The word ‘*Ahi*’, which means ‘my brother’ explains in depth the very philosophy of this group. Furthermore, the members believed and upheld the four core principles: (i) Social responsibility of the organization; (ii) Excellence in service; (iii) Honesty and integrity; (iv) Living together. The structure of the union was very regimented and recruitment oriented. A certain period of training or apprenticeship under the supervision of a ‘master’ was a prerequisite for one to become ‘*ahi*’ (brother). At the end of the training, the new ‘*ahi*’ was given a hard task to be accomplished before he could be responsible for his own business or become another ‘master’ (Lewis, 1937).

The moral principles of *Ahi* organization were primarily for the well-being of society, and to protect individuals’ rights in the society. However, at the same time it aimed to maintain the spirit of solidarity in the community. These elements made a strong bond within the organization and resulted in resilience amid all the formal rules and laws imposed by the state (Ottoman) on them and on the market. During the Ottoman period, *Ahi* became an organization of pure craftsmanship akin to what is known in the West as a guild.

Despite the authoritarian nature of the Ottoman state and its interference in market life, the *Ahi* managed to survive and build their own benevolent society within their own territory, which was the marketplace (Mardin, 1969). They had the final say on the regulation of the market without any legal positivistic approach, but rather by maintaining their culture and practice amongst their members. Apart from their success in bringing the market atmosphere to value moral and ethics, *Ahi* were also able to bring the market back to society, instead of separating itself from them. For the *Ahi*, as well as realizing his economic activities and his personal interests in society, the public interest was also important for him (Lewis, 1937).

The ‘*Ahilik kulturi*’ or the ‘*Ahi* culture’ lasted for centuries, shaping the market economy according to their moral and virtue ideals in the Turkish

Ottoman land. What is interesting about the *Ahi* culture was their ability to harmonize between the private ownership of market economy and the ideals of charity, solidarity, welfare and communality. In sum, the *Ahi* culture reflected the independency of individuals in the social capital environment. It also implied the workable example of the benevolent society within the framework of market economy through the mechanism of internal-*hisbah*. The internal-*hisbah* mechanism through *Ahi* culture detached the market totally from the state (as it was structured within the classical *hisbah*) by empowering the market actors to inter-regulate and mutually monitor amongst themselves. Furthermore, the *Abilik* also resembled the comprehensive interdependency of the axioms to be articulated into a social capital means thus empowering the civil society as part of an important element in ideal governance.

Reflecting on the aforementioned institutions and their importance in governance throughout history, on the other hand, there were also a few informal and cluster civil societies that emerged in the form of informal but efficient institutions within Muslim communities such as guilds, *majlis* (informal assembly), brotherhoods and religious networks (i.e. *hawzah*, *zawiyah*, *katatib*) and flourished greatly throughout Muslim history. These multi-functional institutions sometimes acted as intermediaries for the public to approach their leaders for help and assistance, and sometimes as their voice against the injustice committed by the state, and on many occasions as a means to community welfare. These traditional forms of organizations remain functioning, as they were in some places, as a result in the present day in active modern modes of participation.¹⁶

The shift of the tectonic plate of governance in post-modern societies, however, demands a new paradigm for the classical governance institutions in Muslim history to re-emerge in a new form. The classical structure, which reflects the result of Islamic dynamism by responding to the political economic situation of the time, could never give any justice to the current situation. By referring to the *khalifah* typology, larger governance related institutions should shift towards civil society (due to necessity and not because it is imposed by the state), thus the *ihsani* social capital could be enabled. As mentioned in the discussion on the classical model, new non-state institutions akin to the earlier model/institutions should be developed with proportionate adjustment to make the *khalifah* typology workable.

As an example, the role of the '*Ulama*' in enhancing *ihsani* social capital through their advisory roles in civil society consciousness of the tawhidic paradigm is vital. Apart from the non-state involvement, the '*Ulama*' along with intellectuals and professional bodies (as interest groups) within the community in the modern time within the expanded *shura* notion and under the spirit of the *islah* axiom will enhance the governance process through their representation in some of the state bureaucratic institutions. At the same time *waqf*, along with *zakah*, by providing revenue for the society themselves should re-emerge as independent endowment foundations as part of the third sector (within small government existence based economy) within the society to fund welfare and

other civil society activisms by separating individuals from the state. This proactive role of *waqf* and *zakah* will strengthen the third sector to stimulate the governance process hence empowering the *ihsani* social capital in terms of creating an opportunity for the emergence of both functioning individuals and benevolent society with the objective of ensuring the minimal role of the state. Accordingly, in achieving such an aim, the notion of *waqf* has to be separated from the state and be expanded to its larger dynamic far from the current exclusive ritual-spiritual paradigm. In other words, *waqf* must be essentialized as part of the civil society away from the parameters of the nation state.

The open *shura* concept on the other hand, is essential to expand the classical framework of *Ahl al-Hil wa al-'Aqd* functions from its elitist exclusivity to effectively functioning for individuals within the *khalifah* typology. Thus, it is to be expanded to encompass all the stakeholders to represent every member of society. *Ahl al-Hil wa al-'Aqd*, within such a framework of ideal governance, becomes an inclusive mechanism not to be monopolized by the centre, but to empower individuals with the spirit of *islah* and *ukhuwwah*. In the same manner, the intertwined nature of open-*shura* with *Hisbah* spirit is essential for *ihsani* culture in the governance process for both state and civil society institutions. The very practice of *Hisbah* spirit within benevolent society will enable the axioms *amanah*, *'adl wa ihsan*, *islah* and *ukhuwwah* to interact thus strengthening *ihsani* social capital. Open *shura* itself is a major theme for civil society to interact with state and its institutions to provide active participation ideals within the *islah* spirit to attain the maximized *ihsani* level leading to *falah*. The functioning open *shura* institutions in both state and non-state institutions will serve political accountability and stability.

Finally, a historical institution, namely *ahi* of the Ottomans, exemplifies an excellent model on how *ihsani* social capital could operate within its own public sphere with *ihsani* culture to establish ideal governance at the level of institutions for individuals and society. An inclusive *ahi* culture within benevolent society represented by the networking of small entrepreneurs and other civil society and market actors will complement the bigger picture of governance at micro level, hence crystallizing the *khalifah* typology. *Ahi* manifests the *ihsani* social capital network practicality articulating and realizing all the axioms to work together on a smaller scale. The more *ahi* clusters within benevolent society could be developed, the more *khalifah* typology would emerge in the governance process, hence the ideal governance would be achieved and *falah* would be obtained.

While the ideal *Hisbah* concept and spirit as part of the proposed *khalifah* typology expands from a merely top-down process in which the people are morally policed or monitored by the state per se to a holistic process in the whole community involving all the elements functioning for the ideal governance within the *ihsani* culture. The very spirit of *islah* to exemplify the concepts of *tawhid*, *amanah* and *ukhuwwah*, which is the *raison d'être* of *Hisbah* encompasses the all-vertical hierarchical social and political economical dimensions of top-down, bottom-up and horizontal at the high and lower level will ensure the

workable nature of the institutions instead of a *Hisbah* institution delivering the *ihsani* governance function. Lewis (2006: 7) maintains that the institution of *Hisba*

offers a framework of social ethics, relevant to monitor the corporation, with the objective to obligate the correct ethical behaviour in the wider social context. It also empowers individual Muslims to act as 'private prosecutors' in the cause of better governance by giving them a platform for social action.

The effective *Hisbah* institutions, which represent the whole governance mutually functioning and interacting axioms within the *khalifah* typology in the current framework of governance, should prevail in the kind of anti-corruption agency, ombudsman, public inquiry, consumer watch, scrutiny committee for parliamentarians and bureaucratic offices, citizen bureau, and other civil society watchdog societies and organizations. Functioning *Hisbah* institutions in both state and non-state institutions enable collective political accountability and sustainable economic stability. This new function of *Hisbah* enables individuals to actively perform their functions in governance, thus ensuring the process encompasses the whole networking of the social capital and the bureaucrats. However, the efficiency of any *Hisbah*-inspired institutions is heavily dependent on the level of freedom that exists in the state, which implies a minimal state.

In achieving all these, the ideal governance demands the minimal but effective role of the state and the state system so that the room for opportunity should be left to other elements of civil society. *Effective minimal state* enables *benevolent society* to develop more independent social institutions to create a public sphere for the individuals to be empowered for functioning as mentioned. A larger state with a non-effective or autocratic system will not only disable the *khalifah* typology of functioning but will also deprive the *ihsani* culture through the dysfunction of the individuals' dynamic, as the large state implies large rents to be extracted and distributed in society in a patronage system leading to client-patron relationship. Rationally, in the case of individuals who are heavily dependent on the state, those individuals will be 'least functioning', and will never develop a benevolent society since the state will hold all the philanthropic means and leave nothing to the people except an imagined version of solidarity, which is actually state-enforced. The nature and the function of the minimal state functions, as part of the *khalifah* typology element, will be expounded upon in the following section.

Effective minimal state

In their proposal for the Islamic economy system to operate efficiently, El-Ashker and Wilson (2006) maintain that *a politically strong Islamic state* is amongst the essentials for the establishment of an Islamic economy soundly grounded in a strong moral order. In the same vein, Chapra (1992: 240)

accepts that the political structure is one of the most important factors responsible for the failure of Muslim countries to implement the Islamic strategy for development with justice. Hence, for an Islamically-optimum and efficient functioning of an Islamic moral economy-based integrated system for ‘good governance’ to be deeply rooted in any society requires political will and power. The same logic applies also to the field of development and governance, which are part of the political economy issues.

However, Zaman and Asutay (2009: 92–3) explain that politics or the political establishment is not always synonymous with the state or government-led establishment. They emphasize that the role of civil society as another important factor in the political structure is a crucial factor in modern day’s political system. Furthermore, they highlight the role of civil society as another important factor in the political structure. Furthermore, they argue that the state is a modern post-enlightenment Western concept and hence is not inherently an Islamic organization for political society. The nature of modern states is also highlighted by the Virginia School of political economics by arguing that,

the state should not be perceived in a romantic sense to serve the society and maximize a romantically constructed social welfare function, as new political economics evidences such a social welfare function does not exist at all, nor does there exist ‘benevolent despotic’ politicians to maximize such a welfare function.

(as cited by Nazim and Asutay, 2009: 93)

In light of such a discussion, the state should be ‘minimal’ and ‘limited’ in nature to allow the other representatives of society to have their share in power and decision-making. The state in early Islam was exemplified by the Prophet Muhammad during his reign in Madinah and by the Caliphs. It functioned as the protector of people, of their security and of their freedom. It maintained law and order, regulated the market and public goods without interfering in the market process through central planning. The state was the guardian of the conditions in which the individuals could act according to the beliefs. However, under the succeeding dynasties and sultanate regimes, the state became too large and was expected to undertake public works, be guardian of the religion and govern the life of the people. In exchange it demanded the obedience of the people (Kahf, 1991; Lambton, 1981: 308–9; an-Naim, 2008; el-Affendi, 2008).

Unlike the mainstream assumption that Islamic systems could only work within the paradigm of a larger state with planned economics through its welfare system, the Islamic governance theory proposed in this study espouses an *effective minimal state*. Such a state within such a paradigm is to be complemented by the mentioned functional individuals, benevolent society (or *ihsani* social capital) and effective institutions, which also make up the civil society. The active culminating interaction and interdependence of these three major elements within the minimal enabling state will ensure the effectiveness of the axioms operating in the realm of the contemporary society and responding to

the 'public choices' without the hegemonic nature of the large and strong state, which does not provide much opportunity for any other institutional form.

In searching for evidence for the impact of an enabling state on development, the *World Development Report 1997* shows that an effective enabling state is vital for development (World Bank 1997c). Using data from 94 countries over three decades, the study shows that it is not just economic policies and human capital but the quality of a country's institutions that determine economic outcomes. Those institutions in effect determine the environment within which markets operate. A weak institutional environment allows greater arbitrariness on the part of state agencies and public officials. Along this line, the importance of an effective and enabling state with effective institutions is also echoed by Fukuyama (2004: 19), who insists that the role of state institutions is more crucial than state functions. Similarly, Acemoglu *et al.* (2004) asserts that political and economic institutions play an enormous role in development and growth.

State, as a new topic within Islamic literature and as part of an ongoing debate of *ijtihad*, in the realm of the proposed Islamic governance ideals should be minimal and limited in nature to allow the other factors of governance to have their share in the power exercise and in decision-making. The nature of Islamic governance of an (ideal) state will not dominate the centre but rather empower the peripheries as a caveat to enable individuals to function thus have greater involvement in the public sphere. Apart from its limited nature, the state also plays an important role as regulator and enforcer in creating a just order and harmonious society through the implementation of the rule of law and its mechanisms¹⁷ according to the concept of '*adl wa ihsan*'.

It should be noted that an enabling state should match its role to its capability. What the government does, and how it does it, should reflect the capabilities of the government and those of the private sector. The performance of states based on their capabilities can be developed through the reinvigoration of the aforementioned *khalifah* typology institutions with the crystallization of the 'moral essence' of Islamic governance through the promulgation of rules and norms according to the axioms, in particular the concept of *tawhid*.

An enabling state, on the other hand, as a means to articulate the concept of *tawhid* and *amanah* ensures that the spirit of accountability appears in and involves the efficiently-structured administrative and technical capacity in its institutions and systems. This can be achieved by ensuring the efficiency of a minimal state's ideals through the feasible separation of powers to empower the legislative and the judiciary; viable checks and balances mechanisms through more room for accountability by the media, legislative members, political parties, civil society and other third sector actors; and decentralization of administration through the empowerment of individuals, local government administration and making greater use of non-governmental organizations through the networking framework (Williams and Young, 1994: 87). Enabling minimal state could also refer to 'open accountable and audited public service' with greater political and social accountability and transparency contributing to the realization of more

efficient government and efficient service delivery mechanisms' (Smith, 2003: 202–47; Sutton, 2003: 12).

Such a governance system will encourage the state to provide accountable and responsible public administrators and officials with moral and spiritual incentives to act in the collective interest while restraining arbitrary action and corruption as complementary elements of the *khalifah* typology. The effective state of Islamic governance should enable individuals, society and social institutions to be functioning and independently self-governing. With this enabling function, a state under such 'enabling minimal' typology will translate the culture of *ihsan* into the life of the individuals and society not only as something that lives within the heart of the individuals but is also embedded in mechanisms, institutions and the social consciousness by allowing the governance axioms to appear in the daily life of active, functioning individuals within the *ihsani* social capital framework.

On the other hand, an effective minimal state, according to Islamic governance, must also work as the regulator to secure property rights through the establishment of a just legal framework and the feasible practice of the rule of law. Such effort requires political and judicial institutions that effectively and impartially regulate the market to secure property rights under the concept of *Hisbah* and through the establishment of both state- and society-based (internal) *Hisbah* institutions. Without a secure environment for such rights, the possibility for any parties, in particular, the state to infringe private property rights is inevitable. If this occurs, the market, which consists of mainly private sectors, will shun it and this would lead to the destruction of economic activity in society.

The benevolent society, as part of the *khalifah* typology elements, will bring a meaningful solidarity concept of mutual wealth-sharing from the *zakah* and *waqf* mechanism despite property rights and individual ownership. Both institutions ensure the social economic independency of individuals and society through the maintenance of sustainable philanthropic welfare, which will contribute towards strengthening the third sector thereby shrinking the burden on the state's social economic duties (Zarqa, 1988; Hasan, 2006). Consequently, with effective endless funding from both institutions, and within the framework of an enabling minimal state, participants in the civil society will be able to assume responsibility for some aspects of social and economic development, such as the provision of essential services in education, public health, and so forth.

Such an institutional solution is aimed at the development of individual lives by

focusing on micro dynamics of the society rather than aiming at affecting the financial equilibrium. This also fits into the new development paradigm; which has shifted the focus from macroeconomic development to micro dynamics. This will imply maximization of welfare of the society by extending the financial involvement of the larger society in the dynamic economic involvement.

(Asutay, 2007b: 15)

Such sentiments might share some degree of similarity pointed out by North (1990, 121) in expounding the role of the enabling minimal state in securing the property rights for the stability of economy. He (1990, 121) asserts that:

The next (advanced) stage, the creation of capital markets and the development of manufacturing firms with large amounts of capital, entails *some form of coercive political order* (emphasize by the author), because as more complex and impersonal forms of interchange evolve, personal ties, voluntaristic constraints and ostracism are no longer effective.... International specialization and division of labour requires institutions and organisations to safeguard property rights across international boundaries so that capital markets as well as other kinds of exchanges can take place with credible commitment on the part of the players.

While in the political dimension, an effective and enabling minimal state should enshrine governance through representation by enabling greater opportunity for participation, which is the expanding notion of the classical *shura* institution to an open-*shura* mechanism. Thus, an enabling minimal state also emphasizes the implementation of sufficient public policies to promote more inclusive and significant political participation, economic development and fair distribution of resources and provision of essential services for all segments of the population. The interactive combination of all the above-mentioned elements, are essential for the substantive and sustainable realization of the underlying principle of empowerment and self-determination for individuals and societies, equally and without discrimination (an-Na'im and Abdel Halim, 2006).

Accordingly, functioning individuals could be fully and effectively empowered in governance within a sufficient space of freedom for political competencies and participations for decision-making and accountability. All the stakeholders, including men and women, all races and community members should have a voice in decision making, either directly or through legitimate intermediate institutions that represent their intention. Such broad participation is built on freedom of association and speech, as well as the capacity to participate constructively. The institutionalization of participation by all people without any discrimination is a cornerstone of ideal governance.

Thus, individuals must be acknowledged as part of the decision makers, problem solvers and co-creators of public goods. They can no longer be perceived only as voters, volunteers, clients, or consumers within economic but also polity market (Boyte, 2005: 537). Hence participatory governance is one which provides the close involvement of people in economic, political, cultural and social processes that affect them and facilitate the access of individuals and groups to a wide range of opportunities that, in turn, promote responsiveness of governance actors towards people-centred development (Kim *et al.*, 2005: 650). With this approach, individuals will move from their traditional role in voting and political rights to a more participatory approach to determining the country's future through a wider, all-encompassing process of governance.

In sum, the enabling minimal state would intensively increase the functioning of *ihsani* individuals in the political sphere through the representative government at all levels. Such a framework would enhance the active participation of individuals in the governance process. The creation of the formal structures of representative government must include different levels of community, from the basic neighbourhood community hall to the municipalities and the acknowledgement of the pressure group in the policy making process. In this sphere, the representatives are required to engage in participatory planning, management and auditing, management and auditing with local institutions such as peasant communities, indigenous groups, neighbourhood councils and vigilance committees.

Another elected representation that would enable the individuals to actively function could be put into practice in the 'local government' system, which is pointed out by Smith (2004: 156) as the strongest form of participation. Through this 'local representative government', people can make their needs known and ensure that the benefits of plans and projects go to the deserving target groups. Thus, the citizens of a locality will have full decision-making powers in some trivial areas of public policy. The participants will also have the right to be consulted on major issues that directly affect their lives, such as important development projects (Smith, 2004: 157).

Apart from the mentioned mechanisms of enabling state, the moral spirit of the axioms of Islamic governance also lead to the upholding of rule of law, which guarantees fundamental civil and political rights according to the prerequisites of *maqasid al-Shari'ah*. The needs for rule of law is to protect personal security and provide a context of consistent, transparent rules for transactions that are necessary to modern economic and social development in achieving the well being of the society. Preceding that, the proposed Islamic governance will also promote an open political system of law inspired by the *shura*, *amanah* and *islah* spirits, which encourage an active and vigilant civil society (as explained in the previous section on effective institutions) whose interests are represented within accountable government structures and which ensures that public offices are based on law and consent.

However, it should be noted that the concept of effective enabling minimal state as part of the Islamic governance system does not work alone in a vacuum. As far as *khalifah* typology is concerned, it works interactively with functioning individuals and effective institutions. An enabling minimal state is a state that provides and preserves the scaffold that enables individuals to function, and impart their knowledge to others. As part of the *khalifah* typology, the state should act as part of the '*ihsani*' concept in which the articulation of the axioms could work not only in their mechanistic part, but also within their spirit and philosophy. It should also manage to articulate the ethical worldview into the life of the people thus creating the social capital that works for it.

Having mentioned all four elements, it can be summarised that the level of success of ideal governance within the framework of this research is to be measured on their ability to make the *khalifah* typology workable. 'Islamic governance'

is the governance system that enables these four major elements to interconnect and interdependently complement each other to achieve the goal of articulating the axioms into real life. The state must be able to enable individuals to function and institutions to flourish and be self-dependent within the realm of the benevolent society. In the same way, both the individuals and the society are major players in state and civil society institutions in leading the way for citizens to exercise their rights and responsibilities.

It should also be noted that such governance would require a decentralized state with power rested in local communities. Historical experience shows that, when the Muslim empires pursued decentralised administration, it provided a very large space for civil society and social institutions to actively function and contribute to non-state welfare institutions to actively functioning and contributing to the governance process (Tamimi, 2001: 133–41). Such a decentralized state will ensure the separation of power, thereby leading towards an independent and effective judiciary to ensure the rule of law.

Besides, due to the detachment of the state from dominating every aspect of the individual's life, the decentralized state will motivate and enable a more efficient and strong role of civil society to self-administrate the social, economic and political lives of the people. The aforementioned civil society institutions in the past, such as '*Ulama*', *abi* and *waqf* were nourished due to the nature of the decentralized state in some periods of Muslim history. In reflecting on the historical experience, it is obvious that the decentralized nature of administration in every sphere of life brought about a strong society with a flourishing civil society. Thus in achieving the *ihsani* culture, hence the *falah*, decentralization is essential to enable large civil society, and checks and balances and therefore an enabling and effective minimal state.

However, modernity's imposed centralized nation state withered away the civil society by imposing official identities in the Muslim world; and hence removed the dynamics of development. This resulted in 'bad governance' and 'underdevelopment' in the Muslim societies. Thus, the alternative paradigm in this study also suggests that since all the core principles are related to the micro dynamics of development and governance, it requires that the nature of administration must be decentralized so that a large opportunity space should be available for the *ihsani* social capital to develop.

Methodological positioning in bringing the ideal into reality

To understand the proposed framework for governance in this study, there is a need to conduct a comparison with the conventional governance framework. Despite the vast diversity between the two in referring to the ontological and epistemological foundation, methods, applications, principals and modes of articulations and even goals and aims, a comparison of both structures will divulge the similarities that also subsist but are articulated in asymmetric patterns or means. It is hard to imagine how Islamic governance that rooted from

Islamic ontology and epistemology could be wholly contradicted with the universal or common ideal of fairness, justice and humanity (with slightly different way of articulation). In explaining the nature of the possibility of having an alternative governance system from Islamic ideals, which is complying to the ideals of common justice and fairness, Ibrahim (1996) points out that humane governance that based its root from the preservation of the dignity of man, the inviolability of life, and the responsible freedom has been the focal point in Islamic tenets.

It should be noted that this novel attempt should not be confused with the 'patching up' method adopted by many apologists in proving that Islam is compatible with the West or *vice versa*. El-Messiri (2006: 50) terms this approach as a process of retroactive Westernization, since it leads to the wholesale adoption of Western epistemological paradigms, through the alteration of terminologies and rationale. This was also the method adopted by the Islamization of knowledge movement. However, through this 'patching up' method, Euro-centrism remains eminent as natural, universal and ultimate, and accordingly all that is needed is to embellish it, or perhaps rearrange some of its components. This, in turn, will disallow the alternative means from emerging as a unique ideal-type and becoming a distinctive phenomenon. In spite of this, in contemplating the articulation of the axioms and the operational part of *khalifah* typology, one would conclude this to be an ideal model of governance, which is still workable within the sphere of contemporary governance.

To begin with, a closer look into the mentioned axioms (which summarizes the whole wide-reaching nature of Islamic values, spirituality and the horizontal-vertical moral precepts) will reveal how it indirectly contributes towards the moral and material uplifting of individuals, which is the central factor behind the rise or fall of any civilization or country. Similarly, *tawhidic* reality provides a life-long meaning to the individual's life, thereby motivating them to achieve the noble goals taught by the religion, which accordingly provide development-friendly institutions or moral values to provide a proper climate for their observance.

Equally, the articulation of the aforementioned *khalifah* typology would also cultivate all the social, human, cultural and natural capitals towards the achievement of development, through an inclusive meaning of capital and a wider definition of development. The inclusive definition of capital, which encompasses the wide-spreading interactions of humanistic elements (education, health, skills, ownership and lifestyle), social factors (networking, rules of society, solidarity, welfare) and cultural aspects (social relations, customs and structures, environment, sustainable development, natural resources) (Cochrane, 2006: 319–20), has been acknowledged as an active contributor to economic development,¹⁸ which ensures technical progress, competitiveness, sustained growth, good governance and stable democracies (Kliksberg, 1999).

In the same manner, at the macro level, it will lead to the maximization of the economic well-being of individuals along with the promotion of social well-being and human life without neglecting the promotion of environmental

sustainability. Meanwhile, at the micro level, the interrelated elements of *khalfah* typology cultivates the norms of human rights and the principle of self-determination, including respect for life, self-respect, justice and equity, mutual respect, caring, sharing and integrity. Nevertheless, all this is derived together with the *telos* aim to be achieved and fuelled by the inner satisfaction of delivering the job of *khalifah* in this worldly life.

Furthermore, the coherence of this model with the Western notion of democracy, justice and equality prevails by evaluating the conventional characteristics of 'good' governance with the implication of the previously-established axioms. The preference for such a claim could refer to the concept of *shura* and its inter-related components exemplified by the axioms, articulated through all levels of *khalifah* typology (individual, society, institutions and state). *Shura*, as part of Islamic moral doctrine, enables a morally-oriented political system where people are empowered to select their leader and also to stand before them for accountability and the check and balance process through the doctrine of *Amr bi al-ma'ruf wa nahi 'an al-munkar*.

Moreover, the previously-discussed *ihsani* culture resembles the constant struggle towards comprehensive excellence (*islah* for *ihsan*) in achieving *falah* through the accomplishment of the higher objectives of *Shari'ah* (*maqasid al-Shari'ah*). The continuously-mentioned *ihsani* process to be adapted into governance life of the community enables the *khalfah* typology to facilitate the ideal Islamic governance to emerge as a progress paradigm of governance for Muslims as well for non-Muslims. Within such a paradigm, the whole process of good governance, which encompasses all political, economic, social and legislative spheres, will allow healthy and fair interconnection of individual, institution, value and system to develop a meaningful life for the human being according to Islamic worldview or the *tawhidic* reality. The whole process of this ideal governance, which will remove the obstacles to the nourishment of a truthful human life in which all members of the society are able to develop their human capacity in order to obtain personal and social well-being, is but another version of '*Jihad fi sabil Allah*' (strive in the way of Allah).¹⁹

In pursuing such a struggle '*fi sabil Allah*', a multi-modernity approach works best as a framework for change. The current discourse of democratic processes and institutions, which fits the articulation of certain principles of good governance such as accountability, transparency, efficient public service, human rights, civil society and individual liberty, with certain modifications to align it with the spirit of ideal governance should be incorporated into the bigger picture of *khalfah* typology. As far as Islamic epistemology is concerned, much could be benefited from current experience but with caution regarding its Eurocentric values and philosophy within; as it is the aim of this attempt to avoid any kind of eclectic and pragmatic approach. Conversely, it should always be noted that those principles are not meant to be the aim of what is perceived as Islamic governance, but they are rather the outcome of the continuous process of the *khalfah* typology, as the main goal of the ideal governance is to achieve *falah* by expansion of the *ihsani* social capital within the *Tawhidic* reality. This is where

the true meaning of ‘*fi sabil Allah*’ lies. In a similar light, at the practical level, it is hard to imagine that *khalifah* could be easily implemented and practised as it involves construction of thought and action in line with the aspirational dimensions. Unless substantial room for democracy and freedom exists, the ideals of governance as targeted in this research will continue as a ‘utopia’.

Actualization of the Islamic governance

The discussion in this research in general and, in particular, in the previous chapter and in this chapter, has so far aimed to provide the architectonic of the Islamic governance by formulating the building blocks of this new paradigm. The model developed based on this paradigm is depicted in Figure 8.1. This section, thus, provides a short exposition on the working of this model as illustrated in Figure 8.1. However, this is a very brief summary or visual expression of the entire discussion presented in this research with the objective of demonstrating the actualization of the Islamic paradigm of good governance.

As previously discussed, the process of Islamic governance starts with an individual as the most important element in the governance process, which is the case in Figure 8.1, as the *khalifah* typology constitutes the heart of the entire model. As discussed, *khalifah* individual aims to articulate and actualize the objective of *maqasid* to get the acceptance from God.

The very foundation of this new model is where the Islamic ontological and epistemological principals are both represented through the axioms as the philosophical value of governance. The articulation of the axioms into reality, which is to crystallize the Islamic ideals, starts with the aforementioned smallest but rather crucial element of the governance process, namely the individual or the *khalifah* individual. Based on the inspiration of the foundations (ontology and epistemology articulated through the axioms), the individuals that are to bring the ideals into reality must be functioning and dynamically self-actualized according to the characteristic of *khalifah* typology. The ‘self-actualizing’ nature of the individual stems from the Islamic notion of the knowledge process, according to which Islam represents knowledge (hence, ‘knowing’), Iman represents ‘doing’, and *ihsan* represents ‘becoming’ in the sense of ongoing change and growth of an individual within the *tazkiyah* and *rububiyyah* axioms. Such an individual endowed with such qualities is expected to be an active agent of change and therefore responds to the development of other individuals, society, natural environment and the state according to the ontology of Islam as articulated in axioms.

The *khalifah* typology individuals, however, require an enabling minimal state along with the benevolent society and effective institutions to deliver the vicegerency duties as explained by the *khalifah* typology. In other words, these elements constitute the ‘contents’ of the ‘Islamic governance paradigm’ in the sense that the change is expected in these elements for Islamic governance to be actualized. Within this understanding of the *khalifah* or vicegerent mission, all the four elements inter-reacted and inter-connected to enable the individuals to attain *falah* for every and each person according to the *ihsani* culture.




Figure 8.1 Actualization of Islamic Governance as a model.

Source: created by author.

With the motivation and actualization of *khalifah* typology, contents need to be subjected to a process to result in Islamic governance as an outcome. The centre role in the process, as can be seen in Figure 8.1, is again an individual who has gone through the process of development to become an enabled and functioning individual as discussed so far. This is an expected outcome, as the objective function of the individuals in this paradigm is to achieve *falah* in this world and in the hereafter and also to achieve *ihsan* as social capital. In other words, the result of the workability of the *khalifah* typology could be seen from the production of *ihsani* social capital. Thus, the *khalifah* individual should be able to shape the ‘contents’ by subjecting them to the process of development as articulated by axioms and defined by the Islamic ontology and epistemology; and hence the *khalifah* typology based individual should be able to produce *ihsan* as social capital, as a natural process. In other words, *ihsani* social capital through *falah* is the natural expected result of having *khalifah* typology.

It can be noticed from Figure 8.1 that *ihsani* social capital is identified in a different way in the schematic exposition, which implies that it can expand and contract. The nature of the enabled and functioning individual in the initial part of the process will determine the quality of *ihsani* social capital. While *ihsani* social capital is considered as the natural consequence of the *khalifah* typology, the nature of the impact it can have on the contents and the initial process will determine the quality of *ihsani* social capital. In other words, the nature and the quality of the four elements functioning will determine if the *ihsani* social capital is expanding or contracting.

In the last part of the model, as depicted in Figure 8.1, the process of developing *ihsani* social capital will determine the achievement of the ideal governance. However, again referring to the dynamic nature of the process, Islamic governance, as the ideal governance, is represented with dotted lines, indicating that there could be degrees of governance, from ‘ideal’ or ‘good governance’ to ‘bad governance’. The quality of governance will be determined by the nature of the *ihsani* social capital, as the expanding *ihsan* will result in expanding governance getting closer to the ideal. The working mechanism being a dynamic system with check and balances helps the model to overcome the contraction in the *ihsani* social capital and hence in the quality of the good governance. As can be seen within the feedback system in Figure 8.1, any contraction (see –ve) will inform the model through the *khalifah* typology to check the nature of the functioning individual in the sense of whether the individual is functioning as expected by the Islamic axioms. By correcting the functioning individual (see +ve from articulation of axioms) through Imani self-actualization, the process continues to enhance the quality of *ihsani* social capital and hence the Islamic good governance. Since this is an *ihsani*-based paradigm, by nature it represents a ‘becoming’ process implying an ongoing and sustainable development with *ihsan* being expanded continuously, as opposed to ‘be’ or ‘being’, as the latter two represents the completion of a process.

Conclusion

Within the proposal of Islamic governance theory in this book, an enabling minimal state with its system, structure and philosophy is expected to yield functioning individuals and to render the benevolent society workable. Active functioning individuals, derived from a *Tawhidic* reality worldview and total self-actualization, will lead to *ihsani* social capital, which will operate in effective majorly non-state institutions (the civil society). It is through this sphere, that the axioms that act as the philosophical foundation will determine continuous individual and collective actions of individuals through a conducive institutional mechanism framework. The axioms will accumulate and create the *ihsani* culture in the functions of all the elements hence keeping it alive and constantly functioning in achieving the *falah*.

Accordingly, active and effective institutions, which are naturally the result of functioning individuals and a benevolent society, will determine the nature of *khalifah* typology vis-à-vis the *ihsani* culture, continuously regenerating the effectiveness of the individual's role. Integrated and comprehensive interdependent functioning of *ihsani* culture in achieving *falah* will increase the achievement of the ideal governance and *vice versa*. This functioning element will indicate the real benchmark of 'good governance' from Islamic ontology based epistemology rather than the evaluation of mere institution or economic growth.

In the same vein, the workable nature of such a system of governance within this paradigm will prevail in the effort and the continuous projections to form *khalifah* in the life of every individual to function within the realm of a benevolent society and the system that enables it to work in significant institutions. In the same vein, the four elements will be interconnected and work in parallel with each other. Without the elements integrating comprehensively to articulate the 'Islamic governance' axioms, none of the element will be able to present the ideal discretely and fairly. The interactions of the elements, especially the (*ihsani*) social capital represented through the benevolent society and the institutions enabling it, will be connected to the ideal notion of governance depending on their ability to appear and prevail by the functioning individuals.

The achievement or failure to achieve the ideal (Islamic) governance will heavily depend on the realization of this function. However, the interdependent structure of the elements will allow the process to correct itself by returning to the same continuous flow should any failure occur in the process. The example of the first and second Caliphs of Islam asking the people to correct them, even with a sword, indicates how the governance process from the Islamic perspective is not free from mistakes, and how a proper, self-correcting mechanism was provided and necessary in the process. Only through such *continuous* and *comprehensive* process will the effort to reach the Islamicness of the governance be valued.

To conclude, it can be summarised that the achievement of governance according to *Tawhidic* ontology and epistemological worldview, unlike the

Bretton Woods' (despite some similarities in terms of the outcomes) must not only be measured by the increases in GDP and human rights alone, as this not only limits the idea of 'well being' to economic growth and certain liberal values *per se*, but also inaccurately reflects the condition of society. A 'good' and ideal governance, according to Islamic ontological reality, is also *not only a set of instrumental or institutional tools* that work to tackle certain issues such as poverty, corruption and inefficiency of the market, but rather it represents the holistic and comprehensive effort involved in producing certain quality based on faith, morals and values in individuals and society; the continuous establishment of a system that enables such efforts and the mechanisms that facilitate the individuals and the society to achieve *falah* through the culture of *ibsan*; and finally the institutions to facilitate and enable the individuals and society within the minimal state environment to mutually function by implementing the aforementioned *maqasid* (higher objectives of *Shari'ah*) with the objective of achieving well-being, both in this world and in the hereafter, hence *falah*.

Notes

- 1 Qur'an (2:30; 51:56).
- 2 These are the ones who al-Qur'an mentions as: "Have hearts [minds] wherewith they understand not, eyes wherewith they see not, and ears wherewith they hear not. They are like cattle, nay more misguided; for they are heedless (of warning)" (Qur'an, 7:179).
- 3 "It is who hath created for you all things that are on earth" (Qur'an, 2:29); "Say: My Lord hath commanded justice" (Qur'an, 7:29); "O David! We did indeed make thee a vicegerent on earth: so judge thou between men in truth (and justice): nor follow thou the lusts (of thy heart), for they will mislead thee from the Path of God" (Qur'an, 38:26); "God commands justice, the doing of good and liberality to kith and kin, and He forbids all shameful deeds, and injustice and rebellion: He instructs you that ye may receive admonition" (Al-Qur'an, 16:90); "Ye are the best of peoples, evolved for mankind; enjoining what is right, forbidding what is wrong, and believing in God" (Qur'an, 3:110); "Those who have faith and do righteous deeds, they are the best of creatures; their reward is with God: Gardens of Eternity, beneath which rivers flow; they will dwell therein forever" (Qur'an, 98:7-8; also see 22:14; 4:57, 122, 124; 96:6; 30:14-15).
- 4 Ye are the best of peoples, evolved for mankind, enjoining what is right, forbidding what is wrong, and believing in God. If only the People of the Book had faith, it was best for them: among them are some who have faith, but most of them are perverted transgressors
(Qur'an, 3:110)

"(They are) those who, if We establish them in the land, establish regular prayer and give regular charity, enjoin the right and forbid wrong: with God rests the end (and decision) of (all) affairs" (Qur'an, 22:41); "Let there arise out of you a band of people inviting to all that is good, enjoining what is right, and forbidding what is wrong: They are the ones to attain felicity" (Qur'an, 3:104).
- 5 Narrated by al-Bukhari: One day when we were sitting with the Messenger of God there came unto us a man whose clothes were of exceeding whiteness and whose hair was of exceeding blackness; nor were there any signs of travel upon him, although none of us knew him. He sat down knee unto knee opposite the Prophet, upon

whose thighs he placed the palms of his hands saying: "O Muhammad, tell me what is the surrender (*Islam*)."⁶ The Messenger answered him saying: "the surrender is to testify that there is no god but God and that Muhammad is God's Messenger, to perform the prayer, bestow the alms, fast Ramadan and make if though canst, the pilgrimage to the Holy House." He said: "thou hast spoken truly," and we were amazed that, having questioned him, he should corroborate him. Then he said: "Tell me what is faith (*Iman*)."⁷ He answered: "To believe in God and His Angels and His books and His Messengers and the Last Day, and to believe that no good or evil cometh but by His Providence."⁸ "Thou hast spoken truly," he said, and then: "Tell me what is excellence (*ibsan*)."⁹ He answered: "To worship God as if thou sawest him, for if thou seest Him not, yet seest He thee."¹⁰ "Thou hast spoken truly," he said, and then: "tell me of the Hour."¹¹ He answered: "The questioned thereof knoweth no better than the questioner."¹² He said: "Then tell me of its signs." He answered: "That the slave-girl shall give birth to her mistress; and that those who were but barefoot naked needy herdsmen shall build buildings ever higher and higher." Then the stranger went away, and I stayed a while after he had gone; and the Prophet said to me: "O Omar, knowest thou the questioner, who was he?" I said: "God and His Messenger know best." He said: "It was Gabriel. He came unto teach you your religion." (al-Bukhari (1985: 1/27; 4/1793); Muslim (n.d.: 2/715).

- 6 Where according to him, "to be a Muslim is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to be *tab'ay*" (Arif, 1989).
- 7 This social-concern characteristic of functioning individuals is similar to the *socio-tropic individuals* coined by Asutay (2007b: 4).
- 8 Increasing evidence shows that social cohesion is critical for societies to prosper economically and for development to be sustainable (see: The World Bank, 1999).
- 9 This is due to the understanding of the '*shuhada*' (witnesses) mission, where the conscious individuals will strive to impart their consciousness to others.
- 10 The central thesis of social capital theory is that '*social networks based relationships are a valuable asset*'. People's interaction amongst themselves within the realm of social relation and networking enables them to build communities with each other, through the well-knitted social fabric. As argued by many, this trust-based relation within the community will bring great material benefits to people for the development and economic growth (Mehmet, 1999, 139; Klitsberg, 2000; John Field, 2003: 1–2). In expanding the discussion of this type of capital, Woolcock (2001) divides the relations of the social capital into three major types: '*The bonding*' type of social capital is the relation of community, which is based on enduring, multi-faceted relationships between similar people with strong mutual commitments such as friends, family and other close-knit groups; while the '*bridging type*' of social capital is formed from the connections between people who have less in common, but may have overlapping interests, for example, between neighbours, colleagues, or between different groups within community; and finally the '*linking type*' of social capital derived from the links between people or organizations beyond peer boundaries, cutting across status and similarity and enabling people to exert influence and reach resources outside their normal circles. Gilchrist (2004: 6) asserts that these types of social capital must come together in an interrelated way to produce a well-connected community.
- 11 Putnam (2001: 296–333) points out that what he coined as social capital is useful for education, social stability, lower crime rate, well-being of society, socioeconomic growth, health and others. The World Bank (1999) has also brought together a range of statistics to make the case for the social and economic benefits of social capital.
- 12 Amongst other verses: al-Qur'an (41:3; 29:43; 30:22; 2:230; 6:97; 6:105; 7:32; 39:9).
- 13 I am reluctant to translate them here as 'clerics' for its Eurocentric connotation.
- 14 Cordoba, Spain alone was reported to have had as many as 50 hospitals at the time of Abu al-Qasim al-Zahrawi (Abulcasis) (Francoise, 1996: 999–1001).

- 15 Keane (2009: 148–55) implies that the practice of consultation (*shura*, *mishwarah*, *mashwarah*, etc.) across Muslim history led to the emergence of representative democracy in the West through the Islamic Andalusian civilization.
- 16 But unlikely perceived by some Western researchers as a hindering factor of political development. As described by James Bill and Robert Springborg, “the culture and experience of the Middle East have combated the fires of political development through the use of traditional development crossfire” (Bill and Springborg, 2000: 12–13).
- 17 As mentioned earlier, rule of law demands the viable separation of powers, which entails the independent of judiciary, institutional checks and balances, and effective watchdogs, can all restrain arbitrary state action and corruption.
- 18 Of course with consideration of the refutation by mainstream methodological individualist economists who believes the social cannot be identified separately of individual interactions (Cochrane, 2006: 320).
- 19 As Taleqani (1986: 54–6) points out Jihad should be expanded beyond its conventional narrow understanding of merely war to protect people from enemy’s transgression to the struggle for the sake of humanity, freedom and the very path of the well-being and betterment of human society. Furthermore, Taleqani emphasizes that this broaden and comprehensive understanding of ‘*fi sabil Allah*’ derives from the very nature of Islam as a religion that aims at reforming humanity and saving them from falling into the valley of animalistic passion.

Conclusion

The phenomenon of ‘governance’ has emerged in the past decade as an aspect of structural adjustment policies. The term was first introduced as a Washington Consensus-based panacea for underdevelopment and poverty after the World Bank’s report on Sub Saharan Africa in 1989, and provided a new dimension, which was suggested as a remedy for many other problems and challenges. Generally, ‘good governance’, as initially introduced by the Bretton Woods Institutions and later emulated by many international aid and financial agencies, views developmental issues from a comprehensive political, economic, social and legal approach. In this regard, good governance implies a set of rules (system) governing the actions of individuals and organizations (society) and the negotiations of differences between them that could only be crystallized through proper *institutions* in order to achieve development (Van Dok, 1999).

A great deal of criticism has been made of this agenda from various technical, methodological, operational, economic, political and philosophical dimensions. However, since this research is not an empirical-based research aiming to expose the failures or shortcomings of the agenda, it has only focused on the philosophical issues concerning the subject. The treatment of the subject in this book has focused on the deconstruction of the concept of good governance, with a specific reference to its bias toward Eurocentric modernity. The result of this approach has revealed that this current concept missed an important building block of development in its discourse, which is the role of culture and religion.

Culture, faiths and other transcendental values that are often neglected in the modern world should be revisited and reinterpreted from their functional dimension. A great deal of empirical research has pointed to the fact that these values have their role in the life of modern society, as well as in the field of governance. The wide-ranging contributions of faith-based and faith-inspired organizations and movements in the field of development, civil society, educational, economics, politics and other areas in recent times has opened the eyes of many as to how *mitos* has its pivotal place in human life. As Nasr (1989) points out, human beings cannot neglect the inner spiritual dimension of their lives and how the parameters of inner development have consequences for their external development such as the case of governance. Countless efforts by the

faith-based and faith-inspired organizations, which have contributed towards tackling underdevelopment problems and other socio-political issues, were mainly driven from such a motivation. In this respect, it should be noted that faith and religious belief works efficiently to stimulate the elements of good governance in a similar way.

According to this rationale, this book develops a direct and exclusive analytical discursive study on how Islam as one of the major religions in the contemporary world could contribute towards development and governance by establishing a unique model of governance from its explicit ontological worldview and dynamic epistemology. As mentioned in the Introduction, this exploration aims to identify the possibility of an Islamic model of governance and ways to build the parameters for such a model as an alternative means of governance in replying to the need for a separate and unique paradigm for good governance for Muslim societies needs. This aim as explicitly spelled out in Chapter 4 has been the central working hypothesis of this research.

Islamic epistemology is derived directly from its ontological-based worldview, which acts as a beacon for Muslims in conducting their lives and provides the knowledge to assist them in the worldly life. This worldview is derived from *tawhid*, which is the *axis mundi* of *homo-Islamicus* in determining the 'truth' and the 'reality'. This *tawhidic* reality concept is clearly articulated through the status of man as vicegerent (*khalifah*) in the world, which is deliberately elucidated in the Qur'an through the story of human creation, and accepted as *a priori* in Muslims' faith.

Such an ontological premise provides the vertical relation between humans as *khalifah* with the Creator and, in a similar manner; the epistemology (which is derived from the ontology) articulates the ontology into real life, hence establishing the horizontal relation between human beings and the world. In sum, it is only through the epistemology that *tawhidic* reality can be articulated and work within the construction, perception and articulation of social reality. This *tawhidic* reality implies that only by obeying God's guidance in the terrestrial life, will the human being attain *falah* or prosperity in the worldly life and in the Hereafter, as the objective of each individual is considered to be *falah*. God's guidance for human beings can be exemplified by revelation and '*aql* (rationality) in interpreting the revelation. Revelation is represented by al-Qur'an and *Sunnah*, while the '*aql*'s role is to interpret the revelation according to the *consequentialistic 'moral and value' perspective*, since the resulting hermeneutic of legal rulings is based not so much on specific rules spelled out by the text as it is on the ethical principles revealed as God's purposes behind the text.

The articulation of the revelation to the practice as in the case of governance could be done through the theoretization of the relevant knowledge and experience of the four pious Caliphs. In order to understand the spirit and underlying concepts hidden in the revelation, a *maqasidic* approach has been pursued in this study. For that reason, through Ibn al-Qayyim's inclusive and extensive *maqasidic* approach, the attainment of *falah* could be achieved. According to this more dynamic interpretation of *maqasid al-Shari'ah*, the achievement of

falah is not solely confined to the attainment of the highest objectives of *Shari'ah* (*maqasid*) by preserving the al-Ghazalian five *Daruriyyat* and al-Shatibi's addition of *Hajiyat* and *Tahsinyyat*, but must also include broader measures to ensure welfare (as) asserted by Ibn al-Qayyim (n.d, 4: 309–11), who emphasized justice and equity, the means to which could never be captured by a finite list.

The comprehensive treatment of the mentioned *maqasid* elements would ensure human well-being in their worldly life and a state of salvation in the Hereafter (*falah*). Furthermore, *tawhidic* reality, which shapes the individual's worldview, will enable him to secure and promote the *maqasid* to ensure '*falah*' not only for himself but also for the community and the human species in the universe. While *falah* in the life hereafter is reflected by the life in heaven for eternity, this *maqasidic* approach will assist the quest to develop an ideal Islamic governance model theory. Consequently, the accomplishment of all the tiers of *maqasid* (*daruriyyat*, *hajiyat* and *tahsinyyat*) in the governance process will be a benchmark of an accomplishment of 'good' in the proposed governance model. However, accomplishment is only the end, and the end does not justify the means from the Islamic point of view. Similarly, the means must not be independent from the end; and hence internal consistency should be sought. As a consequence, the means to achieve the *maqasid* is part and parcel of Islamic governance itself.

In explaining internal consistency in relation to consequentialist expectations, according to the mentioned paradigm, and as prescribed in the literature related to the topic (Khan, 1984; Ahmad, 1992, 2003; Chapra, 2008a; Naqvi 1981, 1994; Choudhury, 1995), a four-tier system prevails in Islam as explained by Asutay (2010: 18) represented by the 'internal and external consistency and third one, which is consistent with both of them that is 'moral and behaviour norms of the society', i.e. harmonizing consistency. Whereas, a fourth tier is unique in an Islamic system that highlights consistency in between the action in this world and the hereafter, so behaviour of a Muslim individual should be examined, studied and analysed in this context for structural and textural change within men and society.

Thus, this model of Islamic governance is completely different from current 'good governance' because of its distinct features: the third and fourth tiers are not part of the conventional model. In Islamic governance, every governance activity moves around a specified nucleus, i.e. *falah* in this world and the life hereafter.

As an articulation of this process, the primary aim of life for humans as described by Islam is to attain *falah* (ultimate success) in both this world and the Hereafter, as *khalifah* (God's vicegerents) they are urged to use the resources of this world to achieve success in both lives. Islamic governance, therefore, aims to achieve *falah* (salvation) by aiming at *ihsan* (benevolence) through the framework of *khalifah* (individuals as God's vicegerent on earth). According to this notion, the individuals' success in this role depends, among many other things, on the acquisition, allocation and disposition of the resources, which are *amanah* or

trust, according to the consent of *Allah*. In the case of Islamic governance, *Shari'ah* is the paradigm.

Moreover, based on the preceding epistemological paradigm within the value-laden ontological-determined epistemological system, this research has avoided the adaptation of any literal emulation of the classical governance model and structures without deconstructing the context and underlying philosophy that led to their emergence. Instead, it utilizes a non-conventional way of constructing a new alternative model of ideal Islamic theory of governance. A 'consequentially-aimed social realization process based ethical approach' was chosen as the bedrock for this study instead of the classical deontological legalistic discourse in dealing with Islamic epistemological sources. Unlike the conventional approach to the subject, this new approach transcends the current (nature-matter) materialistic monism of governance by replacing the ends of its process with transcendental values, and by making humans the starting point of the subject and not mere commodities. In this model, the human being and his/her well-being is considered as the end and not the means.

Furthermore, it fits into the framework of governance from ontologically determined Islamic epistemology through the deductive method. In formulating this, all-Islamic principal values in relation to material, spiritual and ethical issues related to the subject were articulated in the form of mathematical axioms. As far as the term epistemology is concerned, the exploration also involves Islamic traditions and classical contributions on the subject, but without literal transcriptions; rather it denotes the ongoing, creative attempt to apprehend the paradigm implicit in different Islamic texts and phenomena. The axioms that are soundly derived from the epistemological sources (*al-Qur'an* and *sunnah*, the practice of the four pious caliphs and *maqasid al-Shari'ah*) elucidate the proposed governance model's philosophy and fundamentals of its philosophy. Consequently, the proposed model does not deal only with mere means and forms of governance through mere discussions regarding its mechanisms and institutions, but also includes the transcendental means and goals of governance from Islamic ontology and epistemology as its foundation being emphasized in its formulation.

This generative (non-cumulative) paradigm of looking into the governance issue is to be viewed as an incomplete certainty and a production of the continuous *ijtihad* progression, and is not aimed at an imperialist control of reality as the modernities project claimed. Furthermore, this emerging comprehensive theory does not try to relegate reality to its materialist components or dimensions, nor does it try to eradicate dualities. It does not stress the whole at the expense of the part or the reverse; similarly, it does not stress continuity at the expense of discontinuity or *vice versa*. In contrast, it relates the particulars to the general without necessarily reducing the part to the whole or the particular to the general and it attempts to reach the pivotal point where one phenomenon is related to another, yet remains distinct from it. In applying it to the discourse of governance, the individual and small social units cannot be eradicated in the interest of the state, and the human cannot be disregarded in pursuit of the

natural. Hence, the deliberation on the governance issue in this research does not focus on the materialistic components such as institutions or mechanisms or growth *per se*, but it encompasses the holistic nature of human life in accordance with the Islamic worldview.

In the development of the related paradigm, the formulated axioms are: *tawhid* (unity), which indicates the vertical dimension of the Islamic ethical system; *amanah* (trust), *al-'adl wa al-ihsan* (justice equilibrium) to provide the horizontal dimension of equity; *ukhuwwah* (universal solidarity); *islah* (constant striving for comprehensive excellence with ethical and moral considerations); *ikhtiyar* (free-will); *tazkiyah* (concerned with growth towards perfection through purification of attitudes and relationships); *rububiyah* (divine arrangements for nourishment, sustenance and directing things towards their perfection) and finally, the *maqasid al-Shari'ah* (*objectives of the Shari'ah*), which are used to summarise the whole spirit of Islamic governance by providing the socio-legal framework within which this new governance model is located. These axioms are interconnected to create an environment for the attainment of *falah* through the process of governance. It should be noted that these axioms proliferate the normative theory of guiding Muslims by ensuring the parameter of their governance process is in conformity with the *tawhidic* worldview. Policies, systems, institutions and all mechanisms formulated and promulgated must be within this parameter to ensure that the Islamic governance model is constructed in a comprehensive and robust manner.

However, these inter-reliant and interrelated axioms could only be articulated through a holistic and comprehensive role of governance factors within the '*khalifah* typology', which as a new aspirational human entity implies a comprehensive and interrelated component being shaped by the Islamic notions and the axioms in coming into the reality. In this way, four major elements, or four dimensions are identified as crucial in delivering such ideals: individual, societal, systemic and institutional. At the individual level, *khalifah* typology enshrines that good governance is to be practised by 'functioning individuals' through the articulation of the formulated axioms in their daily life; then at the larger radius of society through 'benevolent society', where the individuals could mutually and collectively exercise their governance rights and obligations; while at the institutional level the axioms must be interpreted through 'effective institutions' that enable both individuals and society to function at the macro level; and at the state level through 'effective minimal state systems', which provide mechanisms and an atmosphere that enables the previous three elements to be effectively workable. Based on this typology, we can conclude that the aim of governance in Islam, unlike any other version of governance, is to 'achieve human wellbeing through the distribution of trust and the organisation of resources on the basis of *tawhid*, *amanah*, *'adl wa ihsan*, *ukhuwwah*, *islah*, *ikhtiyar*, *tazkiyah*, *rububiyah*, and *maqasid al-Shari'ah*' through the articulation of *khilafah* (vicegerency)'. Furthermore, 'Islamic governance' is part of the means to achieve '*ihsan*' as the culmination of human life for a better life for the community; and hence Islamic governance aims at maximising or enhancing the

ihsani social capital through the consciousness of its participants, *namely khalfah* individuals.

Within the proposal of Islamic governance in this book, a minimal enabling state with its system, structure and philosophy is proposed as the nature of political culture, which must provide the opportunity to enable functioning individuals and the benevolent society to fulfil their aim, which is to achieve *falah* through the *ihsani* process. The active functioning of individuals in the form of 'being' and 'doing' individuals derived from the *tawhidic* reality worldview and total self-actualization is expected to lead to *ihsani* social capital to operate in an effective manner in mostly non-state institutions (the civil society). It is through this sphere that the axioms that act as the philosophical foundation of actions, will determine the continuous individual and collective actions of individuals through a conducive institutional mechanistic framework. The axioms will accumulate and create the *ihsani* culture from the actions of all the elements, hence keeping it alive and constantly functioning to help the participants to achieve *falah*. Appropriately, active and effective institutions, which are naturally the result of functioning individuals and benevolent society, will determine the nature of *khalifah* typology vis-à-vis the *ihsani* culture, which in turn will continuously regenerate the effectiveness of the individual's role. The integrated and comprehensive interdependent functioning of *ihsani* culture aiming to achieve the *falah* will increase the achievement of ideal governance and *vice versa*. The role of *ihsani* culture is akin to the role of 'manners' in maintaining democracy in America as coined by de Tocqueville (de Tocqueville, 2005: 348–53).¹ Thus, the proposed model is a dynamic model in which the system creates checks and balances to respond to the change in the *ihsani* social capital with the objective of keeping it at the maximum level possible.

This functioning element will indicate the real benchmark of 'good governance' from Islamic ontological-based epistemology rather than the evaluation of mere institution or economic growth. In the same vein, the feasibility of such a governance system within this paradigm is possible, with the effort and the continuous projections in forming the *khalifah* milieu in the life of every individual, of functioning within the realm of benevolent society, and the system that enables it through its institutions. In the same vein, the four elements are interconnected and work in parallel with each other. Without the elements integrating comprehensively to articulate and fulfil the 'Islamic governance' axioms, none of the elements discretely would be able to present the ideal fairly. The interactions of the elements, especially the *ihsani* social capital represented through the benevolent society and the institutions enabling it will be contracted to the ideal notion of governance depending on their ability to be integrated and internalized by functioning individuals.

Figure 8.1 in Chapter 8 clearly depicts this entire process by identifying each stage of the development process leading to Islamic governance. The model summarises the entire paradigm by linking it to '*ihsani* social capital' and its maximization. Thus, it provides another way of looking at social reality through Islamically-constructed knowledge.

Challenges in comprehending and implementing the proposed model

It should be noted that Islamic governance mediates differing interests to reach a broad consensus on what is in the best interest of society and, where possible, on policies and procedures. *Khalifah* typology as a framework also prepares the stage for people to make their contribution towards the development of the society in which they live. Every single axiom, which is articulated by *khalifah* typology, can only be meaningful through the apprehension and active involvement of all individuals within the Islamic governance framework. In the same vein, it is the people who eventually act as the dynamo for the mechanisms of governance to move and work to achieve the ultimate goal they want to achieve, namely *falah* through *ihsani* social culture. On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, the implementation of Islamic governance in the proposed framework will contribute towards what is known currently as good governance characteristics represented by accountability, the rule of law, transparency, efficiency of the public administration and the active role of civil society, hence will lead towards the development of the society.

Some might question, then, the rationale and the distinguishing nature of Islamic governance from the contemporary agenda of good governance, since the outcomes may have similarities. Some might also argue that the whole discovery of this research simply represents the actual idea of good governance but in a different guise. So, what is unique about the proposed ‘Islamic governance’?

It should be noted that despite the similarities in the outcome, the current notion of good governance proposed by international institutions and the Islamic governance model proposed in this study differ in many fundamental ways. Fundamentally, each version of governance is derived from distinct ontological and epistemological foundations that lead to the diversity of the ultimate aim. In addition to such fundamental differences, the aim or the expected outcome constitute another major difference. As for the conventional, it aims for a mere positivist materialistic goal, which could best be described as the Washington consensus efficiency. The aims are also evaluated by a specific barometer for the achievement of growth or, in some cases, a purely humanistic measurement. However, Islamic governance considers the process and the outcomes as mere means to achieving the bi-dimensional goals summarised by the term *falah* or human well-being. *Falah* as the goal could best be exemplified by comprehensive actualization of *maqasid al-Shari'ah*. In this case, the process and the outcomes are no longer the main focus of governance, but only represent part of the consequences required from the exercise of the governance realm. Thus, in Islamic governance, human beings are ends in themselves rather than means.

Furthermore, due to its ontological spectrum, the proposed governance model in this study is close to the heart and life of Muslims in accepting it. Due to its revelation-inspired nature, and the fact that it addresses both the material

and spiritual aspects of human life, this model of governance transcends the feeling of being forced to accept something foreign amongst Muslims. As per the discussion on the role of religion in development, this state of affairs will inspire and motivate the inner elements of human beings thus giving a meaning to their lives. This inner meaning will not only motivate individuals to pursue their own interests, but will also push them to share their happiness with others. As such, the process of development is not a result of mere individual persuasion of personal interests, but a fruit of mutually-interdependent individuals in bringing 'meanings' to society and its everyday functioning. By the same token, unlike the current good governance agenda, this Islamic governance model is not expected or formulated to act as an external solution to be imposed or enforced by outsiders upon Muslim countries, as the proposal suggests an authentic and indigenous attempt, which can be considered as a revision of the inner elements that they have lost and missed to serve their own interests and not for other hegemonies.

However, the changes, which would allow this proposed framework, could only be possible if there is political and economic freedom within Muslim communities, societies and countries. Without political freedom, the governance process will only be an artificial decoration of the authoritarian regimes, and without freedom, development is hard to achieve, as freedom is the essential element through which development efforts can be concerted (Sen, 2001).

Despite of this new formulation, the divergent Anglo-Saxon and European discourse on equity and justice, which are universally accepted and acknowledged, are not to be rejected. In fact, they are relatively incorporated into this model as part of the consequences of the axioms developed as its philosophical foundation. Furthermore, these two factors implicitly work as the amalgam of the articulation of the axioms through the interconnection of individuals and society. Without equity and justice it is hard to imagine how a society could be benevolent, and for what purpose the individuals are functioning. Equally, it is the concept of equity that the individuals enjoy if their sufficient space is functioning politically and economically. This will reflect the ideal of *ihsan* in enhancing the value of individuals within the framework of the aforementioned inclusive *falah* definition.

Considering the nature of the political culture in the Muslim world, it is difficult to imagine that the current situation in Muslims' polity in general will allow room for the proposed governance model to work. Looking into the comprehensive structure of *khalifah* typology as the framework for the established axioms to operate, political freedom is not only a condition for them to be enabled, but also primarily a *sine qua non*. The present status quo of polity in Muslim countries, therefore, can hardly allow the model to be implemented. The pseudo democratic system, too large state, state-dependent individuals, wide rent-seeking culture, patronage politics and economy and other undemocratic practices that allow corruption, mismanagement and other practices of bad governance are the major impediments for the implementation of the model.

Apart from encouraging a political environment needed to set a limit for the model to be exercised, a clear understanding of Islam from Muslims is another prerequisite. A narrow view of religion, which perceives it either as a static dogma that lies in the private sphere or the strict literal interpretation of it as a static doctrine against any amendment and dynamism, will never help the realization of the model. Instead, a new approach to religion from its functioning dimension is necessary; as without development of *homoIslamicus*, the Islamically-supported and created institutions would not be able to deliver the *falah* and *ihsani* social capital.

In referring to Islam, the model could also only be workable through a clear understanding of *Shari'ah*, as an inclusive doctrine providing a fertile ground for this aim. *Shari'ah* should not be confined within its limited legalistic consequent independent deontological parameter, but should be recognized as an ethical, value-oriented process to be referred to for all new *ijtihad* for its social realization. In other words, *Shari'ah* in relation to *maqasid* should be policy-oriented with the objective of interpreting and contextualizing the realities of everyday life within the Islamic epistemological and ontological order by also endogenizing morals in a dynamic manner rather than being confined to legal mechanism in a static fashion. In other words, a consequentialist approach rather than mechanistic *Shari'ah* compliancy must be adopted to create a dynamic environment for the development of *falahi* and *ihsani* cultures.

To enable that to happen, continuous educational efforts to broaden the horizon of individuals are crucial. Individuals, upon whom the model is to be subjected, must develop mentally and spiritually to enable them to think beyond the traditional conception (*taqlidi*) of Islam. In the meantime, they must also transcend the stereotypical mindset of captive mentality; therefore, the self-actualization of Muslims is essential. Individuals should be able to think beyond the imposed boundaries of modernity, and to realize reality according to their unadulterated ontological worldview. This again necessitates a certain degree of freedom and a total reform of religious education. Individuals should be freed from the current modernity-based discourse as well as the traditional dogma in looking into the relation between Islam and their life. In the same way, their perceptions of freedom, rights, responsibilities and self-determination must also be constructed according to the *tawhidic* reality rather than the priorities of the modernity project. In sum, this new model demands a reconstruction of reaffirmed Muslim individuals who are *ihsani* self-actualizing rather than *taqlidi* individuals, before it comes into the mechanistic dimension.

There is no doubt that the individual, as the main factor of any governance model, should first be contained with the spirit of the axioms before the mechanisms. The behavioural norms of the individual will then accumulate the social norms that will lead towards the aforesaid culture of *ihsan*. Individuals remain the major factor of the accomplishment of the governance system in this model. As per the discussion of the functioning individuals, Islamic governance should be considered as a process, which starts and finishes with the individual.

Questioning the functionality of the Islamic governance model

In replying to the global problems and issues by contemporary Muslim societies mentioned in the first chapter, this model is to be verified according to its compatibility to mitigate or moderate such results. If the Bretton Woods good governance was proposed as the panacea for those economic development problems, can the Islamic model of governance discussed in this research work as its alternative?

Generally, it is possible to identify four sets of attributes requiring reform for Islamic governance to be brought about: constitutional, political, administrative and public policy. At the constitutional level, *khalifah* typology requires changes to strengthen the accountability of political leaders to the people, as well as to empower the people to bring their leaders to account by developing individual and social capacities and capabilities. Such changes will cure the problem of the abuse of power and of individuals being deprived by many regimes in Muslim countries. As indicated by many, less-accountable leadership leads to unaccountable abuse of power that finally causes corruption and misadministration. Through such reform, leadership is to be understood as a trust (*amanah*) and not a privilege. Functioning individuals in this realm not only applies to the people, but also to all governance factors in the government and the non-governmental structures of markets and civil society.

Furthermore, constitution under the framework of *khalifah* typology also requires changes to ensure respect for basic human rights and individual freedom, together with the strengthening of the rule of law, and decentralization of political authority. With such reforms, the abuse of rights and freedom of individuals that is prominent in Muslim countries could be overcome. Islamic governance is about the sphere where individuals live freely according to their rights and obligations. In the same way, it is the sphere where freedom is present and guaranteed by the law. Accordingly, the viable separation of powers is constitutionally essential to ensure that rule of law is respected and implemented. In the absence of this element, we have witnessed how Islam has been used as a tool for some people to justify their political-economic and social misconduct and policies and human rights related abuses. Therefore, the notion that indicates Islamic rule of law is confined to the narrow implementation of certain criminal codes should be discarded.

At the level of political action and organization, along with the freedom ensured by the constitution, Islamic governance entails political pluralism to allow a wider sphere for the extensive participation of the people, as accountability, transparency and participation can only be attained through political pluralism. In the same way, real political participation through a free system will encourage probity and incorruptibility in the use of public powers and offices by public servants. In the Islamic governance model as proposed by this study, the functioning individuals, society and institutions effectively act as stakeholders and as a watchdog for the exercise of power. With such an ideal tool, the civil

society is empowered with more rights in determining the way the country is governed. By implementing this ideal, the level of democracy and accountability in Muslim countries is expected to rise. This eventually is expected to lead to less corruption and effective governance in terms of managing power and the country's wealth.

In terms of administrative issues, the Islamic governance model requires accountable and transparent public administration. The smaller but enabling and effective state encompasses more accountable public servants through a highly transparent system. The separation of power along with the freedom of information and politics will allow political parties, pressure groups and other watchdogs to monitor public services. Within such dominion, the functioning individuals through effective related institutions will have a great role to play. This will lead to effective public management, including a capacity to design good policies according to the *maqasidic* parameter and to implement them. With this type of reform, the Islamic governance model will be able to improve the performance of public services in Muslim countries, which in most cases are known to be the source of corruption and abundant inefficiency.

Finally, at the policy level, policy prescriptions must be developed according to the *maqasid al-Shari'ah* that will enable all the elements of *khalifah* typology to be articulated. The attainment of *maqasid al-Shari'ah* ensures the human well-being of the people, thus their human development. Besides, human development in Islam is not only indicated through conventional growth indicators or the HDI, which includes amongst others, life expectancy, adult literacy rate, educational enrolment, GDP *per capita*, longevity, knowledge and standard of living. The holistic understanding of human development within *khalifah* typology and the culture of *ihsan* goes beyond the positivist materialistic barometer. It requires the acknowledgement of culture and preservation of values, virtue and benevolent factors, religiosity and piety elements and knowledge and wisdom attainment, as expected through axioms such as *tazkiyah* and *rububiyyah*. They may not be able to be quantified and measured by figures, but institutions and activities can imply them. Moreover, their causal effects on other tangible indicators such as lower crime rate, literacy, educational level, and others could illustrate the fruits and outcomes of those intrinsic elements. With such effective policies, Muslim societies could improve the present miserable situation of human life they experience caused by bad governance.

Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, the key for such reforms must start from the individuals through a comprehensive educational reform which aims to change the internal and the external; as Islamic governance as a dynamic model aims at continuous change in the lives of individuals, societies and institutions. Individuals in Muslim countries should not only be empowered, but must be educated to realize their rights, responsibilities and functions.² The strong dependency and patronage culture in Muslim societies should be eliminated and would be eliminated through this new Islamic governance model, as it aims at *homoIslamicus*. In doing so, societies must not only be independent, but also effective within the spirit of *ihsan*. Without the *ihsani* self-actualization within

the heart of the individuals, Islamic governance is far from being achieved. Again, a proper system of education to develop individuals is required in order to develop the holistic implementation of *khalifah* typology within the sphere of *ihsani* social capital. In the same way, the willingness of Muslims to change themselves, specifically their regimes, is another crucial stipulation for Islamic governance to be implemented.

Can Islamic good governance work in multi-religious societies?

Another question that might be raised regarding this model is its compatibility with multi-religious societies. As most Muslim countries nowadays are no longer homogenous, the new reality demands that Muslims realize and acknowledge the existence of non-Muslims as their compatriots who deserve the same rights and obligations within the territory of the current nation-state system. In such a situation, does this proposed model of governance work equally and fairly for non-Muslim subjects? And does the *khalifah* typology along with the *ihsani* culture allow non-Muslim stakeholders to be included?

In responding to this, first it should be noted that fairness and justice do not distinguish between colour and faith. Equal opportunity according to the Islamic notion of universal solidarity (*ukhuwwah*) does not discriminate against any group of people. As for the whole process of Islamic governance, which could be summarised with the *khalifah* typology framework, and the culture of *ihsan*, their outcomes and consequences are in favour of social good for all. With such a consequence, one has to separate between the *fiqhi* legalistic discourses regarding non-Muslims with this version of Islamic governance. If the classical jurist designates certain selective rulings concerning non-Muslims under Muslims polity, they should be viewed from the context of those *ijtihad* being produced. In the absence of the context that leads to the rulings, the legal precepts on the issue should also be amended.

However, on the issue of governance, which is more technical and dynamic in its nature, a whole new revision of the field is needed. Non-Muslims, just like Muslims, are part of the whole picture of *khalifah* typology. As stakeholders they are also the actors of governance within the realm of Islamic governance. As the actors of governance within the *khalifah* typology, they should also constitute functioning individuals of the benevolent society and become part of the effective institutions. Accordingly, the culture of *ihsan* that encompasses the whole process of *khalifah* typology in delivering social good bears no faith significance to its functional mode. The same applies to the axioms, which are articulated by *khalifah* typology and could also be perceived according to their universal meaning through their instrumental consequential function. Furthermore, the main spirit of Islamic governance lies in the idea of overcoming the boundaries between faiths.

Future research: the way ahead

Despite the lengthy discussion in this book, it remains a purely theoretical discourse with a mixture of descriptivism and critical and analytical content analysis. Hence, further research is needed to continue what this book has started to examine. As part of the struggle to bring religion into the field of governance, the result of this book deserves empirical analysis in evaluating its suitability with the reality. For such, a formulation of new methods to harmonize the proposed Islamic governance into the current status quo framework is needed at both the macro and micro level.

Furthermore, similar to the current governance characteristics that could be quantified and measured with certain index mechanisms and tools there should also be an attempt to put the governance model proposed in this research into a specific index model. Dar's proposal for the evaluation of ethics in the economic sector, through the ethics-augmented human development index (E-HDI) as a new indicator of socio-economic change and development, could be considered for this. The E-HDI incorporates freedom, faith, environmental concerns and the institution of family to the existing model of Human Development Index (HDI). It is expected that ethical concerns will be injected more explicitly into policy making in the contexts in which the human development reports are used (Dar, 2004: 1071). Similarly, an Islamic Governance Index (IGI) could be developed for this purpose by replicating the Kauffman and World Bank's World Governance Index (WGI). The result of the articulation of the axioms and the output of the four elements of *khali-fah* typology would be essential indicators for measuring the governance performance of any Muslim country at the macro level, and any Muslim organization or institution at the micro level. However, the details of such an index should be taken up in further research.

By the same token, the mentioned axioms, established to erect the foundation of ideal government, are not to be confined and fixed to a limited number. There might be other axioms that have been overlooked in this research that would represent Islamic values in dealing with governance issues, either in the current situation or in the future. Contexts and changes would determine the necessity to expand the axioms with a proper exploration of Islamic epistemology, as the model proposed is a dynamic model and therefore should be able to respond to changes in the context. As has been repeatedly mentioned in this research, the field of governance is rather a new and fertile field of *ijtihad*. Applying or imposing certain classical or archaic structures or concepts on the new reality will not bring about a realistic result due to the incompatibility of the two. Instead, a fresh and innovative exploration should be initiated to understand the spirit and ethos of *Shari'ah* and incorporate it into the new reality. The examples from the Prophet Muhammad's administration and also the Caliphs' reflect this ideal and should thus be emulated. Finally, it is the *maqasid al-Shari'ah* that underlies any attempt to develop any new model or theory of governance, hence attaining *fulah* in both worlds.

Nevertheless, this book represents an initial step toward conceiving a new theory of governance. This work reveals that there are compelling reasons to resist the temptation to mechanically impose the growing global concept of good governance on peoples of the world without acknowledging their culture, faith and context. The failures of governance attempts and policies, therefore, could also be explained by them not taking into account such particularities. Significantly, this research demonstrates that governance exists in our contemporary world that may deviate from the conventional, but that is nevertheless *good*. Nonetheless, as another attempt of *ijtihad* within the shade of *tawhidic* ontological based epistemology, the model proposed in this study will remain as a relative and non-definitive answer and model for governance. While it is true that every period has its *zeitgeist* and context, the axioms will continue to guide any future changes in the model, but also in developing new models, as the *maqasid* suggests that all the efforts of *Shari'ah* are for human well-being.

Epilogue

It may be concluded, therefore, that Islamic principles of governance, constructed within the magnitude of value-laden, ontology-determined epistemology, could be presented as an alternative for the current discourse of governance as a tool for development. This conclusion is concurrent with the aim of this research as mentioned in the Introduction, that is to explore and analyse the Islamic axioms, foundation principles and values underpinning the field of governance in an attempt to construct the architectonics of a new systemic and dynamic theory and formulate the articulation of ‘Islamic governance’, which can be considered as a remedy for the ‘bad governance’ and underdevelopment cases in Muslim countries through an authentic Islamic approach. It is expected that the failure and the rejection of the conventional models can be overcome with this authentic proposal based on the values of the participants in the Muslim world.

As the discussion and presentations in the previous chapters demonstrate, this research has fulfilled its aim and established its hypothesis that it is possible to establish the building block of a new model of governance based on *khalifah* typology and *ihsani* social capital based on the principles of governance within Islamic discourse through the epistemological sources of Islam namely, the Qur'an, the Prophet Muhammad's tradition, the pious Caliphs' experience and the *maqasid al-Shari'ah*. This model, as repeatedly asserted in this research, transcends the materialistic monism of the current governance paradigm by replacing the ends of its process with transcendental values, and by putting humans as a starting point of the subject and as an end in themselves within the paradigm determined by Islamic ontology and epistemology.

However, the result of this research akin to all the previous studies is not the goal; it does not even bring us close to the ultimate end in describing the nature of the subject. Similar to the jurists (classical and contemporaries) who produced and are still producing their *ijtihad* in formulating the ideal model of ‘Islamic Governance’, all explorations beyond the parameter of *fiqh* are also considered as a continuous *ijtihad* process to bring people close to the ideals. As human life is constantly changing, no definite model could be promulgated as the final result in defining ‘the’ Islamic model of governance. It is an ongoing journey and the end is not yet in sight. Like the saying, “it is better to travel

hopefully than to arrive”, or what the old Taoist says, “the journey is the reward”. Our quest for discovery fuels our creativity in understanding the wisdom beneath the teaching and guidance of Islam. “More discoveries will only increase the complexity, if not in depth, and shall always be the centre of an expanding horizon of possibilities” (Hawking, 2001: viii).

Notes

- 1 Manners in this subject has been defined as “the sum of moral and intellectual dispositions of men in society” to be the most important influence in maintaining American political institutions-more important than laws of physical circumstances (Mottahedeh, 2001: 3).
- 2 As al-Kawakibi concluded his imagined Muslims conference nearly 100 years ago by saying:

Muslims all over the world are indeed in a state of deadly lethargy; and the only remedy for the sickness then is only through proper education and continuously motivating young people to strive for a better status; to be taken in collective efforts by scholars and sages of insight and wisdom.

(al-Kawakibi, 1316 H: 91–9)

Bibliography

Abaza, Mona (2002). *Debates on Islam and Knowledge in Malaysia and Egypt: Shifting Worlds*. New York: Routledge

Abduh, Muhammad (1956). *al-Islam wa'l-Nasraniyah ma'al-'Ilm wa'l-Madaniyyah* (Islam and Christianity, Between Knowledge and Civilization). (8th edition). Cairo: Matba'a al-Nahda.

Abduh, Muhammad (1966). *The Theology of Unity*. (Translated by I. Musaad and K. Cragg). London: Allen and Unwin.

Abduh, Muhammad (1973). *Risalat al-Tawhid* (The Message of Tawhid). (6th edition). Cairo: Dar al-Manar.

Abdul Salam, Izzudin (n.d.). *Qawa'id al-Abkam* (Islamic Legal Maxim). Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyah.

Abdul Tawwab, Muhammad Sayyid (1983). *Al-Difa' al-Shar'iyy fi al-Fiqh al-Islami: Dirasat al-Mugaranah* (Legitimate Self-Defence from Islamic Point of View: Comparative Studies). Cairo: 'Aalam al-Kutub.

Abu Hamdan, Samir (1992). *Mawsu'ah 'Asr al-Nahdhah: Abdul Rahman al-Kawakibi wa Falsafat al-Istibdaad* (Encyclopedia of Enlightenment: Abdul Rahman al-Kawakibi and the Philosophy of Tyranny). Beirut: Syarikat al-'Alamiyyah li al-Kitaab Syin Mim Lam.

Acemoglu, Daron (2004). *Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of the Long-run Growth*. Working Paper 10481, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts Avenue, May.

Adams, Ian and Dyson, R. W. (2007). *Fifty Major Political Thinkers*. (2nd edition). New York and London: Routledge.

Aguilera, Ruth V. and Cuervo-Cazurra, Alvaro (2004). "Codes of Good Governance Worldwide: What is the Trigger?". *Organization Studies*, 25(3), March, 415–43.

Ahmad, bin Hanbal (2000). *Musnad Ahmad*. (Revised and Edited by Syuib al-Arnaut). Beirut: Muassasah al-Risalah.

Ahmad, Kurshid (1979). *Economic Development in an Islamic Framework*. Leicester: Islamic Foundation.

Ahmad, Kurshid (1980). "Economic Development in an Islamic Framework", in K. Ahmad and Z. Ishaq Ansari (eds), *Islamic Perspectives: Studies in Honour of Mawlana Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi*. Leicester and Jeddah: Islamic Foundation and Saudi Publishing House.

Ahmad, Kurshid (1994). *Islamic Approach to Development: Some Policy Implications*. Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies.

Ahmed, Ishtiaq (1985). *The Concept of an Islamic State: An Analysis of the Ideological Controversy in Pakistan*. Stockholm: University of Stockholm.

Akhtar, Sayyid Wahid (1995). "The Islamic Concept of Knowledge", in *al-Tawhid: a Quarterly Journal of Islamic Thought*. Qum: the Foundation of Islamic Thought. Available at: [www.saharmedia.com/IslamicBooks/Alama%20Mutahari%20\(r.a\)/Allama%20Murtaza%20Mutahhari%20%20-%20Al%20Tawhid%20\(A%20Journal%20Of%20Islamic%20Thought%20And%20Culture\).pdf](http://www.saharmedia.com/IslamicBooks/Alama%20Mutahari%20(r.a)/Allama%20Murtaza%20Mutahhari%20%20-%20Al%20Tawhid%20(A%20Journal%20Of%20Islamic%20Thought%20And%20Culture).pdf). Accessed: 31st March 2009.

Al-Alwani, Taha J. (1990). "Political Science in the Legacy of Classical Islamic Literature". *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, 7(1), 9–14.

Al-Alwani, Taha J. (1991). *Toward a Proper Reading of the Sunnah*. IIIT Ocassional Paper. Virginia: International Institute of Islamic Thought.

Al-Aqqad, Abbas Mahmud (1971). *Mausu'at Abbas M. al-'Aqqad al-Islamiyyah* (Abbas al-Aqqad Encyclopaedia of Islam). Beirut: Dar al-Kitaab.

Alatas, Syed Farid (2001). "Alternative Discourses in Southeast Asia". *Sari* 19, 49–67.

Alatas, Syed Hussein (1972). "The Captive Mind in Development Studies". *International Social Science Journal*, 36(4), 691–9.

Alatas, Syed Hussein (2000). "Intellectual Imperialism: Definition, Traits and Problems". *South-east Asia Journal of Social Science*, 28(1), 23–45.

Al-Baqillani, Muhammad bin Tayyib (1951). *I'jaaz al-Qur'an* (Miracle of Qur'an). (Revised and Edited by Muhammad Abdel Mun'im Khafaji). Cairo: Maktabah wa Matba'ah Muhammad Ali Sbeih wa Awladuhu.

Al-Bukhari, Muhammad bin Ismail (1985). *Al-Jami' al-Sabih (Sabih al-Bukhari)*. Beirut: Dar Ibn Kathir.

Al-Buracy, Muhammad (1985). *Administrative Development: An Islamic Perspective*. London: KPI Limited.

Alcantara, Chyntia Hewitt de (1998). *The Use and Abuse of the Concept of Governance*. Oxford and New York: UNESCO, Blackwell Publishers.

Al-Dhahabi, Muhammad bin Ahmad (2001). *Al-Muhazzab fi Iktisar al-Sunan al-Kabir li al-Bayhaqi* (Summary of al-Sunan al-Kabir by al-Bayhaqi). Riyadh: Dar al-Watan.

Al-Faruqi, Ismail (1984). *Tawhid: Its Implications for Thought and Life*, Virginia: IIIT.

Al-Ghazali, Abu Hamid Muhammad (1952). *Al-Munqidh min al-Dhalaal* (Guidance for the Perplexed). (Translated by Watt, W. Montgomery). London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. Ruskin House Museum Street.

Al-Hafnawi, Muhammad Ibrahim (1991). *Diraasaat Usuliyah fi al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyah* (Usul al-Fiqh Studies on Prophet's Traditions). Cairo: al-Wafaa li al-Tiba'ah.

Al-Hakim, Muhammad bin Abdullah (1991). *Al-Mustadrak 'ala al-Sabihayn*. Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah.

Al-Haythami, Ali bin Abi Bakr (1992). *Majma' al-Zawaaid*. Beirut: Dar al-Fikr.

Al-Hindi, Ali al-Muttaqi ibn Husamudin (1989). *Kanz al-'Umal di Sunan al- Aqwal wa al-Af'al*. Beirut: Muassasah al-Risalah.

Al-Husayni, I. M. (1969). "The Institution of Hisbah in Early Islam". *The Islamic Review and Arab Affairs*, 57(2), February, 30–6.

Al-Jawhari, Ismail bin Hamaad (1956). *Al-Sihaah: Taaj al-Lughat al-'Arabiyyah wa Sihah al-'Arabiyyah*. (Edited by Ahmad Abdel Ghafur 'Attaar). Cairo: Dar al-Kitaab al-'Arabi bi Misr.

Al-Jneidal, Hamad Abdul Rahman (1986). *Manahij al-Bahithin fi al-Iqtisad al-Islami* (Research Methods in Islamic Economy). Jeddah: Sharikat al-Obeykan li al-Tiba'ah wa al-Nashr.

Al-Juwayni, Abu al-Ma'ali (1979). *Ghiyath al-Umam fi al-Tayath al-Zalam (al-Ghiyaathi)*. Alexanderia: Dar al-Da'wah.

Al-Kawakibi, A. Rahman (1316H). *Umm al-Qura* (Mother of the Cities). Cairo: Matba'ah al-Ummah.

Al-Kawakibi, A. Rahman (1953). *Tabaai' al-Istibdaad wa Masari' al-Istib'aad* (Characteristics of Tyranny). Cairo: Matba'ah al-Ummah.

Al-Khar'an, Muhammad bin Abdullah (2002). "Hurriyat al-Ta'bir Bayna al-Mafnum al-Syar'i wa al-Mafaahim al-Mu'asaraat" (Freedom of Speech: A Comparison Between Shari'ah and Contemporary Understaning). *Majallah al-Shari'ah wa al-Dirasaat al-Islamiyyah*, 17(48), Kuwait: Academic Publication Council, University of Kuwait.

Al-Maidani, Abdul Rahman Habannakah (1993). *Dhawabit al-Ma'rifah wa Usul al-Istidal wa al-Munazarah*. Damascus: Dar al-Qalam.

Al-Mawardi, Ali b Muhammad (1995). *Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyyah* (The Ordinance of Government). (Translated by Wahba, Wafaa). Berkshire: Garnet Publishing and Ithaca Press.

Al-Mubarakfuri, Safi al-Rahman (2002). *al-Raheeq al-Makhtum (The Sealed Nectar): Biography of the Noble Prophet*. (Translated by Abdul Malik Mujahid). Madina: Darussalam.

Al-Musawi, Muhammad ibn Husayn (2007). *Nahj al-Balaaghah: Selections From Sermons, Letters and Sayings of Ali bin Abi Talib*. (5th edition). (Translated by Sayyid Ali Reza). Qum: Ansariyan Publications.

Al-Najjar, Fauzi M. (1980). "Democracy in Islamic Political Philosophy". *Studia Islamica*, 51(1980), 107–22.

Al-Nasa'i, Ahmad bin Shu'ib (1984). *Al-Mujtaba (Sunan al-Sughra)*. Halab: Maktab al-Matbu'at al-Islamiyyah.

Al-Obeidi, Hammadi (1992). *al-Shatibi wa Maqaasid al-Syariah* (al-Shatibi and Maqasid al-Shari'ah). Tripoli: Mansyurat Kulliyyah ad-Da'wa al-Islamiyyah.

Al-Qaradhawi, Yusuf (1977). *Al-Khasais Al-'Ammah Li Al-Islam* (The General Characteristics of Islam). Cairo: Maktabah Wahbah.

Al-Qaradhawi, Yusuf (1993). *Malaamih al-Mujtama' al-Muslim alladhi Nanshuduuhu* (Glimpse of the Charecteristics of Islamic Society We Aim for). Cairo: Maktabah al-Wahbah.

Al-Qaradhawi, Yusuf (1998). *Al-Sunnah: Masdar li al-Ma'rifah wa al-Hadharah* (Prophet's Traditions as reference for Knowledge and Civilization). Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq.

Al-Qaradhawi, Yusuf (1999). *Fiqh al-Zakaat: A Comparative Study: The Rules, Regulations and Philosophy of Zakat in the Light of the Qur'an and Sunna*. (Translated by Monzer Kahf). London: Dar al-Taqwah Ltd.

Al-Qaradhawi, Yusuf (2004). *Kaifa Nata'amal ma'a al-Turath wa al-Tamadhhub wa al-Ikhtilaf* (Guidance to Deal With Classical Literatures, School of Thoughts and Disagreements). Cairo: Maktabah al-Wahbah.

Al-Qaradhawi, Yusuf (2007). *Approaching the Sunnah: Comprehension and Controversy*. (Translated by Jamil Qureshi). London and New York: The Institute of Islamic Political Thought.

Al-Qaradhawi, Yusuf (2008). *Khitaabunaa al-Islamiyy fi 'Asr al-'Awlamah* (Islamic Discourse in the Age of Globalization). Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq.

Al-Qarafi, Shihab al-Din (n.d.). *Al-Furuq*. Beirut: Dar al-Ma'rifah.

Al-Razi, Fakhr al-Din (n.d.). *Al-Tafsir al-Kabir (Tafsir al-Razi)*. (3rd edition). Beirut: Dar al-Marifah.

Al-Risuni, Ahmad (1995). *Nazariat al-Maqasid 'inda al-Imam al-Shatibi* (al-Shatibi's Theory of al-Maqasid (Highest Aims of Shari'ah)). Beirut: al-Ma'had al-'Alami li al-Fikr al-Islami.

Al-Rumi, Jalaludin (2002). *The Mathnawi*. (Translated by E. H. Whinfield). London: Watkins Publishing.

Al-Shafi'i, Muhammad b. Idris ([1358H] 1940). *Al-Risalah*. (Edited by Ahmad Shakir). Cairo: Dar al-Risalah.

Al-Shatibi, Ibrahim bin Musa (1996). *Al-Muwaafiqaat*. (Revised and edited by Muhammad al-Darraz). (2nd edition). Beirut: Dar al-Ma'rifah.

Al-Shawkani, Muhammad ibn Ali ibn Muharnmad (1973). *Fathul-Qadeer*. (3rd edition). Beirut: Dar al-Fikr.

Al-Siba'i, Mustafa (2006). *Al-Sunnah wa Makanatuhaa fi al-Tashri' al-Islamiyyah* (Prophet's Tradition as a Major Reference for Islamic Jurisprudence). Cairo: Dar al-Salaam li al-Nashr wa al-Tawzi'.

Al-Soliman, Tarik M. (1988). "Management and Supervision of Public Environment: The Role of the *Muhtaseb* in the Market of Early Muslim Community". *Habitat International*, 12(2), 43–52.

Al-Sulami, Mishal Fahmi (2003). *The West and Islam: Western Liberal Democracy Versus the System of Shura*. London: Routledge Curzon.

Al-Suyuti, Jalaludin (n.d.). *Al-Itqan fi 'Ulum al-Qur'an* (*al-Itqan*, the Sciences of al-Qur'an). Cairo: Maktabah Hijazi.

Al-Tabari, Muhammad ibn Jarir (n.d.). *Jamiu'al-Bayan an Ta'wel Ayi al-Qur'an* (*Tafsir al-Tabari*). Beirut: Dar al-Ma'rifah.

Al-Tarifi, Abdul Aziz (2005). *Zawa'id Sunan Abi Daud 'ala Sahibayn*. Makkah: Maktabah al-Rusyd.

Al-Tarmidhi, Muhammad bin Isa (n.d.). *Al-Jami' al-Kabir* (*Sunan al-Tarmidhi*). Beirut: Dar Ihya al-Turath al-'Arabi

Al-Tufi, Najmudin (1989). *al-Ta'yun fi Syarh al-Arba'in* (*al-Ta'yun* in Explaining al-Nawawi's Forty Hadiths). Beirut: Muassasah al-Risalah.

Al-Turabi, Hasan (1987). *Qadaya al-Hurriyya wa al-Wahda, al-Shura wa al-Dimocratiya, al-Din wa al-Fan* (The Issues of Freedom and Unity; Shura and Democracy; Religion and Arts). Jeddah: al-dar al-Su'udiyyah li al-Nashr wa l-Tawzi'.

Al-Zamili, Zuhayr Muhammad (2009). *Manhajiyat al-Islaah fi al-Islaam* (Islamic Method of Reform). Amman: Daar al-I'laam.

Al-Zirkli, Khayruddin (n.d.). *al-I'laam*. (3rd edition). Beirut: Dar al-Tiba'ah li al-Malayeen.

'Ali, Ibrahim (1995). *Sabih al-Sirah al-Nabawiyah* (The Authentic Biography of the Prophet). (Commentary: Humam Sa'id). Amman: Dar al-Nafais.

Anghie, Anthony (2000). "Civilisation and Commerce: The Concept of Governance from Historical Perspective". *Villanova Law Review*, 45, 887–911.

An-Naim, Abdullahi (1999). "Political Islam in National Politics and International Relations", in Peter L. Berger (ed.), *The Secularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics*. Washington DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center.

An-Naim, Abdullahi (2008). *Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari'a*. London: Harvard University Press.

An-Na'im, Abdullahi Ahmed and Abdel Halim, Asma Mohamed (2006). *Rights-Based Approach to Philanthropy for Social Justice in Islamic Societies*. Paper prepared for The John D. Gerhart Center for Philanthropy and Civic Engagement American University in Cairo, Egypt. August 2006.

Ansari, Muhammad Faz-Ul-Rahaman (1976). *The Qur'anic Foundations and Structure of Muslim Society*. Karachi: Indus Education Foundation.

Anwar, Ibrahim (1996). *The Asian Renaissance*. Kuala Lumpur: Times International.

Anwar, Ibrahim (2006). "Universal Values and Muslim Democracy". *Journal of Democracy*, 17(3), July, 1–9.

Arizpe, Lourdes (2004). "The Intellectual History of Culture and Development Institutions", in Vijayendra Rao and Walton Michael (ed.), *Culture and Public Action*. California: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Armstrong, Karen (2000). *The Battle for God: Fundamentalism in Judaism, Christianity and Islam*. New York: Ballantine.

Asad, Talal (1993). *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam*. Maryland: John Hopkins University Press.

Asfahaniy, Al-Raghib (1972). *Mu'jam Mufradat li Al-faz al-Qur'an* (Index of Qur'anic Terms). Beirut: Dar al-Fikr.

Ashcroft, Bill, Griffiths, Gareth and Tiffin, Helen (eds) (1995). *The Post-Colonial Studies Reader*. London and New York: Routledge.

Asutay, Mehmet (2007a). "A Political economy Approach to Islamic Economics: Systematic Understanding for an Alternative Economic System". *Kyoto Bulletin of Islamic Area Studies*, 1-2, 3-18.

Asutay, Mehmet (2007b). "Conceptualisation of the Second Best Solution in Overcoming the Social Failure of Islamic Finance: Examining the Overpowering of *HomoIslamicus* by *Homoeconomicus*". *IIUM Journal of Economics and Management*, 15(2), 1-17.

Asutay, Mehmet (2010). *An Introduction to Political Economy and Locating Islamic Political/Moral Economy*. Lecture Note for the Subject 'Islamic Political Economy' for MA/Msc Program in Islamic Finance, Durham University, Michaelmas Term 2010.

Auni Abdullah (2000). *Hisbah dan Pengurusan Moden*. Kuala Lumpur: Institut Kajian dasar.

Awdah, Jaseer (2006). *Fiqh al-Maqasidi: Inatab al-Ahkaam al-Syar'iyyah bi Maqasidihha (Fiqh al-Maqasidi: Formulation of Islamic Legal Rulings Through Islamic Higehr Objectives of Shari'ah)*. Virginia: International Institute of Islamic Thought.

Axworthy, Lloyd (2001). "Human Security and Global Governance: Putting People First". *Global Governance*, 2001, 7, 19-23.

Ayoub, Mahmoud M. (1984). *The Qur'an and Its Interpreters*. Albany: States University of New York Press.

Azami, Muhammad Mustafa (1977). *Study in Hadith Methodology and Literature*. Indianapolis: American Trust Publication.

Baas, Stephen (1997). *Participatory Institutional Development*, Presented at the Conference on Sustainable Agriculture and Sand Control in the Gansu Desert Area, in Klicksberg, 2000.

Bachelard, Gaston (1964). *The Poetics of Space* (Translated by M. Jolas). New York: Orion Press.

Badawi, Jamal (2002). "Islamic Worldview: Prime Motive for Development". *Humanomics*, 18(3&4), 3-25.

Baer, Gabriel (1997). "The *Waqf* as a Prop for the Social System (Sixteenth-Twentieth Centuries)". *Islamic Law and Society*, 4(3), 264-97.

Barzelay, Michael (2002). "Origins of the New Public Management: An International View from Public Administration/Political Science", in Kathleen McLaughlin, Stephen P. Osborne and Ewan Ferlie (eds), *The New Public Management: Current Trends and Future Prospects*. London: Routledge.

Baskan, B. (2002). *Waqf System as a Redistribution Mechanism in Ottoman Empire*, Northwestern University, Department of political science. Available at: <http://cas.uchicago.edu/workshops/meht/PapersWeb02>. Accessed: 20 January 2010.

Bayat, Asef (2007). *Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn*. California: Stanford University Press.

Baydoun, N., Mamman, A. and Mohrnaud, A. (1999), "The Religious Context of Management Practices: The Case of the Islamic Religion". *Accounting, Commerce & Finance, The Islamic Perspective Journal*, 3(1 & 2), 52–79.

Behishti, Muhammad Husayni and Bahonar, Muhammad Jawad (1993). *Philosophy of Islam*. London: al-Khoci Foundation.

Bendana, Alejandro (2004). 'Good Governance' and the MDGs: Contradictory or Complementary?. Paper presented at the Institute for Global Network, Information and Studies (IGNIS) conference on 20 September 2004, Oslo, Sweden.

Bendix, Reindhard (1977). *Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Bennabi, Malik (1979). *Shurut al-Nahdha* (The Prerequisites of Enlightenment). Damascus: Dar al-Fikr.

Bennabi, Malik (1993). *Islam in History and Society*. (Translated by Asma Rachid). Malaysia: Berita Studies in Contemporary Thoughts.

Bennabi, Malik (1994). *The Problem of Ideas in the Muslim World*. (Translated by Muhammad T. el-Mesawi). Petaling Jaya: Budaya Ilmu Sdn Bhd & Dar al-Hadara.

Berger, Peter Ludwig (1999). "The Desecularization Thesis of the World: a Global Overview", in Peter Berger (ed.), *Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion & World Politics*. Michigan: William and Eerdmans Publishing Company.

Berghout, Abdel Aziz (2005). "Malik Bennabi's Political Thought: Towards a Civilizational Analysis", in Zeenath Kauthar, *Contemporary Islamic Political Thought: A Study of Eleven Islamic Thinkers*. Kuala Lumpur: International Islamic University Malaysia.

Bhaba, Homi K. (1990). "The Other Question: Difference, Discrimination and the Discourse of Colonialism", in Russell Ferguson, Martha Gever, Trish T. Minh-ha and Cornel West (eds), *Out There: Marginalisation and Contemporary Cultures*. New York: New Museum of Contemporary Art, and MIT Press; Cambridge.

Bhaba, Homi K. (1994). *The Location of Culture*. London: Routledge.

Blunt, Peter (1995). "Cultural Relativism, 'Good Governance' and Sustainable Human Development". *Public Administration and Development*, 15, 1–9.

Boas, Franz (1974 [1887]). "The Principles of Ethnological Classification", in George W. Stocking Jr., *A Franz Boas Reader*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Bocock, Robert (1992). "The Cultural Formations of Modern Society", in N. Black and Cottrell A. Baker (eds), *Formations of Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity with Open University Press.

Bonnett, Alastair (2004). *The Idea of the West: Culture, Politics and History*. New York: Macmillan Palgrave.

Bornstein, M. (1979). *Comparative Economic Systems: Models and Cases*. Illinois: Irwin.

Bourdieu, Pierre (1983). "Forms of Capital", in J. C. Richards (ed.), *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*. New York: Greenwood Press.

Bovaid, Loffer (2003). *Public Management and Governance*. New York: Routledge.

Boyte, Harry C. (2005). 'Reframing Democracy: Governance, Civic Agency, and Politics', *Public Administration Review*, September/October, 65(5), 536–46.

Burnell, Peter (1994). "Why Good Governance?" *Democratization*, 1(3), Autumn 485.

Butterworth, Charles E. (1992). "Political Islam: The Origins". *Annals of the American Academy for Political and Social Sciences*, 524, November 1992, 26–37.

Cadbury, Adrian (2002). *Corporate Governance and Chairmanship A Personal View*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cadbury Commission (1992). *Cadbury Committee Report: Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance in the UK*. London: Gee Publishing.

CAFOD (Catholic Overseas Development Agency) (1998). *Taming Tigers: Social Impact of Crisis*. London: CAFOD.

Cahen, C. (1970). "Economy, Society, Institutions". *The Cambridge History of Islam*, 2, 511–38.

Casanova, Josa (1994). *Public Religions in the Modern World*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Case, William (1994). "Elites and Regimes in Comparative". *Governance*, 7(4), 431–60.

Casson, Mark (1993). "Cultural Determinants of Economic Performance". *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 17(2), 418–42.

Chang, H. N. (1997). "Democracy, diversity and Social Capital", *National Civic Review*, 86(2), 141–7.

Chapra, M. Umer (1992). *Islam and the Economic Challenge*. Leicester: Islamic Foundation.

Chapra, M. Umer (2008a), *Muslim Civilization: The Cause of Decline and the Need for Reform*. Leicester: The Islamic Foundation.

Chapra, M. Umer (2008b). *The Islamic Vision of Development in the Light of Maqasid al-Shari'ah*. London, Washington: International Institute of Islamic Thought.

Choudhury, Malik (1992). *The Foundations of Islamic Political Economy*. London and St. Martin Press, New York: Macmillan.

Choudhury, Malik (1993). *The Unicity Precept and the Socio-Economic Order*. Lanham: University Press of America.

Choudhury, Malik (1994). *A Theory of Ethico-Economics*. Hull: Barmarick Publications.

Choudhury, Malik (1999). "The Structure of Islamic Economics: A Comparative Perspective on Markets, Ethics and Economics". *Consumption, Markets and Culture*, 3(1), 1–97.

Cizakca, Murat (2004). *Ottoman Cash Waqf Revisited: The Case of Bursa 1555–1823*, Manchester: Foundation for Science Technology and Civilization.

Clark, Janine A. (1995). "Islamic Social Welfare Organisations in Cairo: Islamization From Below?" *Arab Studies Quarterly*, 17(4), 11–17.

Coborn, William W. (1991). *Worldview Theory and Science Education Research. NARST Monograph*, No. 3. Manhattan, KS: National Association for Research in Science Teaching.

Cochrane, Phoebe (2006). "Exploring Cultural Capital and Its Importance in Sustainable Development". *Ecological Economics*, 57, 318–30.

Coleman, James C. (1990). *Foundations of Social Theory*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Collins English Dictionary (1998). Glasgow: HarperCollins Publishers.

Cornwall, A. (2002). 'Making Spaces, Changing Places: Situating Participation in Development', *IDS Working Paper*, 170 (Brighton: Institute of Development Studies).

Cortina, Adela (2007). *Development Ethics: A Road to Peace*. Paper presented at a public lecture in honoring Prof. Denis Goulet, University of Notre Dame, April 2007.

Crawford, Gordon (1995). *Promoting Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance Through Development Aid: A Comparative Study*. Leeds: Centre for Democratization Studies, University of Leeds.

Crush, Jonathan (ed.) (1995). *Power of Development*. London and New York: Routledge.

Cunningham, Robert (2005). "Religion and Public Administration – The Unacknowledged Common (and Competitive) Ground". *International Journal of Public Administration*, 28(11 & 12), 943–55.

Curry, George N. (2003). "Moving Beyond Post-development: Facilitating Indigenous Alternatives for 'Development'". *Economic Geography*, 79(4), 405–23.

Dahl, Robert A. (1961). *Who Governs?: Power and Democracy in an American City*, New York: Yale University Press.

Dahl, Robert A. (1994). 'A Democratic Dilemma: System Effectiveness versus Citizen Participation', *Political Science Quarterly*, 109(1), Spring 1994, 23–34.

Dallmayr, Fred (1996). *Beyond Orientalism: Essays on Cross-Cultural Encounter*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Dalton, Russel J. (2002). *Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, New York: Chatam House Publishers.

Dar, Humayon A. (2004). "On Making Human Development More Human". *International Journal of Social Economics*, 31(11 & 12), 1071–88.

Davenport, John ([1882] 2009). *An Apology for Mohammad and the Koran*. London: J. Day and Sons.

Davutoglu, Ahmet (1994). *Alternative Paradigms: The Impact of Islamic and Western Weltanschauungs on Political Theory*. Maryland: University Press of America.

Dellios, Rosita (2005). *Governance in 21st century China: What would Confucius say?* Humanities & Social Sciences Papers, Bond University.

Demb, Ada and Neubauer, Freidrich (1992). *The Corporate Board: Confronting the Paradoxes*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Denhardt, Robert B. and Janet V. (2000). "The New Public Service: Serving Rather than Steering". *Public Administration Review*, 60(6), November/December, 549–59.

Denhardt, Robert B. and Janet V. (2003). *The New Public Service: Serving Rather than Steering*, New York and London: M. E. Sharpe.

De Tocqueville, Alexis (2005). *Selection from Democracy in America*. London: The Collector's Library of Essential Thinkers.

DFID (2001). Bernard, Amanda, Helmich, Henny and Lehning, Percy (eds), *Civil Society and International Development*, Paris: OECD Development Centre.

Diamond, Larry (1992). "Promoting Democracy". *Foreign Policy*, 87, 25–46.

Diamond, Larry (2002). "Elections Without Democracy". *Journal of Democracy*, 13(2), 21–35.

Donnelly, Jack (1984). "Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights". *Human Rights Quarterly*, 6(4), 400–19.

Donnelly, Jack (1999). "Human Rights, Democracy and Development". *Human Rights Quarterly*, 21(3), 608–32.

Drummond, Larry (1994). "Rethinking Civil Society: Towards Democratic Consolidation". *Journal of Democracy*, 5(3), 15.

During, Simon (1987). "Postmodernism or Post-colonialism Today". *Textual Practice*, 1(1), 32–47.

Dussel, Enrique (1996). *The Underside of Modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty, Taylor, and The Philosophy of Liberation*. (Translated by Eduardo Mendieta). New Jersey: Humanities Press.

Dwivedi, O. P. (2001). *The Challenge of Cultural Diversity for Good Governance*. United Nations Expert Group Meeting on Managing Diversity in the Civil Service, United Nation Headquarter, 3–4 May 2001, New York.

Dwivedi, O. P. (2002). "Challenges in Public Administration in Developing Nations", in Betrucci, G. and Duggett, M. (eds), *The Turning World: Globalisation and Governance at the Start of the 21st Century*. New York: ISO Press.

Eaton, Gai (1990). *King of the Castle: Choice and Responsibility in the Modern World*. Cambridge: The Islamic Text Society.

Edwards, Bob and Foley, Micheal W. (2001). "Civil Society and Social Capital: A Primier", in Bob Edwards, Micheal W. Foey and Mario Diani, *Beyond Tocqueville: Civil Society and the Social Capital Debate in Comparative Perspective: Civil society, Civil history: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*, Hanover and London: University Press of New England.

Eickelman, Dale and Piscator, James (1996). *Muslim Politics*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Eisenstadt, Shemuel N. (2000a). "Multiple Modernities". *Daedalus*, Winter, 129(1), 1-29.

Eisenstadt, Shemuel N. (2000b). "The Reconstruction of Religious Arenas in the Framework of 'Multiple Modernities' Millennium". *Journal of International Studies*, 29(3), 591-611.

Eisenstadt, Shemuel N., Riedel, Jens and Sachsenmaier, Dominic (2002). "The Context of the Multiple Modernities Paradigm", in D. Sachsenmaier, J. Riedel and S. N. Eisenstadt (eds), *Reflections on Multiple Modernities: European, Chinese and Other Interpretations*. Leiden: Brill.

El-Affendi, Abdelwahab (2003). "Islamic Movements: Establishment, Significance and Contextual Realities", in The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, *Islamic Movements, Impact on Political Stability in the Arab World*. Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research.

El-Affendi, Abdelwahab (2008). *Who Needs an Islamic State?* (2nd edition). London: Malaysia Think Tank London.

El-Ashker, A. A. F. and Wilson, R. (2006). *Islamic Economics: A Short History*. Leiden: Brill.

El-Mesawi, Mohamed el-Tahir (2005). "Towards Integrated Islamic Political Theory: A Systematic Analysis of Ibn 'Ashur Political Thought", in Zeenath Kauthar, *Contemporary Islamic Political Thought: A Study of Eleven Islamic Thinkers*. Kuala Lumpur: International Islamic University Malaysia.

El-Messiri, Abdelwahab (2003). "Towards a New Islamic Discourse", four series article dated 17th July 2003. Available at: www.readingIslam.com/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=1153698300016&pagename=Zone-English-Discover_Islam%2FDIELayout. Accessed: 23 July 2009.

El-Messiri, Abdelwahab (2006). "The Gate of Ijtihad: An Introduction to the Study of Epistemological Bias", in Abdelwahab el-Messiri, *Epistemological Bias in the Physical & Social Sciences*. London, Washington: The International Institute of Islamic Thought.

El-Sheikh, Salah (1999). "Sirat al-Mustaqim and Hikma: A Qur'anic View of Socio-economic Behaviour, Economic Discourse and Method". *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, 16(2), 55-88.

Enayat, Hamid. (1982). *Modern Islamic Political Thought*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Encyclopedia Britannica (2005). *Encyclopedia Britannica*. (Revised edition). Chicago: Britannica Inc.

Enke, Stephen (1963). *Economic for Development*. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc.

Escobar, Arturo (1995). *Encountering Development: The Making And Un-making of the Third World*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Esposito, John L. (1999). *Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality*. USA: Oxford University Press.

Falk, Richard (2001). *Religion and Humane Global Governance*. New York: Palgrave.

Fannon, Franz (2001 [1961]). *The Wretched of the Earth*. London: Penguin Classics.

Ferguson, James (1990). *The Anti-Politics Machine: 'Development', Depoliticization and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ferris, Elizabeth (2005). "Faith-based and Secular Humanitarian Organisations". *International Review of the Red Cross*, 87(858), 311-25.

Finer, S. E. (1997). *The History of Government (3): Empires, Monarchies and Modern States*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Finley, M. I. (1985). *Ancient History, Evidence and Models*, London: Chatto & Windus.

Fournier, Francine (2002). *Social Capital Formation in Poverty Reduction: Which Role for Civil Society and the State?*, (UNESCO) United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

Frankena, William (1973). *Ethics*. (2nd edition). Englewood Cliff: Prentice-Hall.

Frankfort, Henri (1959). *The Birth of Civilization in the Near East*, London: Ernest Benn Limited.

Frederickson, George H. (2002). "Confucius and the Moral Basis of Bureaucracy". *Administration and Society*, 33(6), 610–28.

Friedman, Milton (2002). *Capitalism and Freedom* (Fortieth Anniversary Edition). Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.

Frischtak, Leyla L. (1994). *Governance Capacity and Economic Reform in Developing Countries*. World Bank Technical Paper no. 254, Washington DC: World Bank.

Fukuyama, Francis (1992). *The End of History and the Last Man Standing*. New York: Free Press.

Fukuyama, Francis (2001). "Social Capital, Civil Society and Development". *Third World Quarterly*, February, 22(1), 7–20.

Gaventa, Jonh (2004). 'Towards Participatory Governance: Assessing the Transformative Possibilities, in Hickey, Samuel and Mohan, Giles, *Participation: from Tyranny to Transformation?: Exploring New Approaches to Participation in Development*, London/New York: Zed Books, pp. 25–39.

Geerts, Clifford (1973). *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*. London: Hutchinson of London.

George, Susan and Sabelli, F. (1994). *Faith and Credit: The World Secular Empire*. London: Penguin.

Ghai, Yash (1994). "Human Rights and Governance". *Australian Year Book of International Law*, 15(1), 1–34.

Ghannouchi, Rached (1993). *al-Hurriyat al-'Ammah fi al-Dawlah al-Islamiyah* (Public Liberties in the Islamic State). Beirut: Arab Unity Studies Center.

Ghannouchi, Rached (2001). "On the Dilemma of the Islamic Movement: A Political Party or a Reformist Organization?", in Abdel Wahab el-Affendi (ed.), *Rethinking Islam and Modernity (Essays in Honour of Fathi Osman)*. Leicester: The Islamic Foundation.

Ghaus-Pasha, Aisha (2005). *Role of Civil Society in Governance*. Paper presented at the Sixth Global Forum on Reinventing Government, on 24–27 May, Seoul, South Korea.

Ghraybeh, Ruheyl (2000). *Al-Huquq wal Hurriyyaat al-Siyasiyah fi al-Syari'ah al-Islamiyyah*. Amman: Dar al-Manar li al-nashr wa al-Tawzi'.

Gibb, Sir Hamilton A. R. (1958). *Mohammedanism*. Cambridge: Mentor Edition.

Giddens, Anthony (1974). *Positivism and Sociology*, London: Heinemann.

Giddens, Anthony (1990). *The Consequences of Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Gil, Moshe (1998). "The Earliest Waqf Foundations". *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, 57(2), 125–40.

Gilchrist, Alison (2004). *The Well-Connected Community: A Networking Approach to Community Development*. Bristol: Policy Press.

Gillingham, Richard (2005). "Praxis and the Content of Theology in Gustavo Gutierrez's Theological Methodology: A Comparative Critique". *Quodlibet Journal*, April–June, 7(2), Available at: www.quodlibet.net/articles/gillingham-gutierrez.shtml. Accessed: 20 June 2009.

Gladden, Edgar N. (1972). *A History of Public Administration*. Frank Class: London.

Godement, Francois (1997). *The New Asian Renaissance, From Colonialism to the Post-Cold War*. (Translated by Elisabeth J. Parcell). London and New York: Routledge.

Goh Chok Tong (1994, 27 August). "Three Lessons for Singapore". *Straits Times*, p. 4.

Goldstein, M. (2000). *IMF Structural Conditionality: How Much is Too Much?* Paper presented at NBER Conference on Economic and Financial Crisis in Emerging Market Economies, Woodstock, Vermont.

Gordon, Ruth E. and Sylvester, Jon H. (2004). "Deconstructing Development". *Wisconsin International Law Journal*, 22(1), 1-98.

Graham, J., Amos, B. and Plumptre, T. (2003). *Governance Principles for Protected Areas in the 21st Century*. Ottawa: Institute of Governance and Canadian International Development Agency.

Gray, A. and Jenkins, B. (1995). "From public administration to public management: reassessing a revolution?". *Public Administration*, 73(1), 75-99.

Gutiérrez, Gustavo (1988). *A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics and Salvation*. New York: Orbis Books.

GWG IIAS (1996). *The Governance Working Group of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences*. A draft composite definition by the IIAS (International Institute of Administrative Sciences (IIAS)) Working Group on 14 June, Brussels, Belgium. Available at: www.iiasiisa.be/iias/aigr/aigrthemes.htm. Accessed: 19 December 2008.

Habermas, Jürgen (1983). *The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume One: Reason and the Rationalization of Society*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Habti, Driss (2006). *Orientalism, Occidentalism and the Discourse of Modernity and Tradition in Contemporary Arab-Islamic Thought*, Unpublished Master Thesis Paper, University of Joensuu.

Haggis, Jane and Schech, Susanne (2002). *Development: A Cultural Studies Reader*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.

Hall, Stuart (1992). 'The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power' in Hall, Stuart and Gieben, Bram (eds), *Formations of Modernity*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Hamidullah, Muhammadi (2006). *The Prophet's Establishing a State and His Successions*. New Delhi: Adam Publishers & Distributions.

Hamilton, Peter (1992). 'The Enlightenment and the Birth of Social Science', in Hall, Stuart and Gieben, Bram, *Formations of Modernity*, Cambridge: Polity Press and Blackwell Publishers.

Hanifan, L. J. (1916). 'The Rural School Community Center', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 67: 130-8.

Hans Wehr (1979). *A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic* (Edited by J. Milton Cohen). Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz.

Harrigan, Jane and El-Said, Hamed (2009). *Economic Liberalisation, Social Capital and Islamic Welfare Provision*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Harris, Peter (1990). *Foundations of Public Administration: A Comparative Approach*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.

Hasan, Sami. "Muslim Philanthropy and Social Security: Prospects, Practices, and Pitfalls". (Paper presented at the 6th International Society for Third-Sector Research (ISTR) Biennial Conference on 9th-12th July 2006, Bangkok, Thailand, 2006).

Havel, Vaclav (1997). *The Art of the Impossible: Politics as Morality in Practice*. New York and Toronto: Knopf.

Hayami, Yuhiko (2003). "From the Washington Consensus to the Post-Washington Consensus: Retrospect and Prospect". *Asian Development Review*, 20(2), 40-65.

Hayek, Friedrich A. (2007 [1944]). *Road to Serfdom*. New York and London: Routledge Classic.

Haykal, Muhammad Husayn (1976). *The Life of Muhammad*. (Translated by Ismail Raji al-Faruqi). North American Trust Publications.

Haynes, Jeffrey (2007). *Religion and Development*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Heer, Nicholas (1999). "Abu Hamid al-Ghazali's Esoteric Exegesis of the Koran", in Leonard Lewisohn (ed.), *The Heritage of Sufism: Classical Persian Sufism from Its Origins to Rumi (700–1300)*. Oxford: One World.

Held, David (2006). *Models of Democracy*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Henzell-Thomas, Jeremy (2002). *The Challenge of Pluralism and the Middle Way of Islam*. (Occasional Paper Series The Association of Muslim Social Scientists (UK)). Surrey: The Association of Muslim Social Scientists (UK).

Hermansen, Marcia K. (Trans.) (1985). *The Conclusive Argument from God: Al-Diblawi, Shah Waliyullah of Delhi's 'Hujjat Allah al-Baligha'*. Leiden: E. J. Brill.

Hirafi, Susan (2006). *Al-Huwiyyah wa al-Harakiyah al-Islamiyyah: Hiwaraat al-Duktur Adbel Wahab el-Messiri* (Islamic Identity and Islamic Activism: An Interview With Dr. Abdel Wahab el-Messiri). Damascus: Dar al-Fikr.

Hirst, Paul (2000). "Democracy and Governance", in Jon Pierre, *Debating Governance, Authority, Steering and Democracy*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Hoexter, Miriam (1998). "Waaf Studies in the Twentieth Century: The State of the Art". *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 41, 476–95.

Hofstede, Geert H. (1984). *Culture Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values*. Newbury Park: SAGE Publications.

Hofstede, Geert H. (1991). *Cultures and Organizations Software of the Mind Intercultural Cooperation and its Importance for Survival*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company.

Hood, Christopher and Jackson, Michael (1991). "Administrative Argument". *Public Administration*, 69(4), 533–47.

Hopwood, Derek (1998). "Introduction: The Culture of Modernity in Islam and the Middle East", in John Cooper, Ronald Nettler, and Mohamed Mahmoud (eds), *Islam and Modernity: Muslim Intellectuals Respond*. London: I.B. Tauris.

Hudson, Michael C. (1982). "Islam and Political Development", in John L. Esposito, *Islam and Development: Religion and Sociopolitical Change*. New York: Syracuse University Press.

Hughes, Owen E. (2003). *Public Management and Administration*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hunt, Lynn (2007). *Inventing Human Rights: A History*. New York: W. W. Norton.

Huntington, Samuel P. (1992). *THE THIRD WAVE: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press.

Hussein, Gamil Muhammed (2003). "Basic Guarantees in the Islamic Criminal Justice System", in Muhammad Abdul Haleem *et al.* (eds), *Criminal Justice in Islam: Judicial Procedure in the Shari'a*. London, New York: IB TAURIS.

Hyden, Goran (2001). "Operationalizing Governance for Sustainable Development", in Jreisat, Jamil, *Governance and Developing Countries*. Leiden: Brill.

Ibish, Yusuf (1966). *The Political Doctrine of al-Baqillani*. Beirut: American University of Beirut.

Ibn Abdil Bar, Yusuf bin Abdullah (1968). *Al-Tamhid*. Morocco: Wizarah Umum al-Awqaf wa al-Syu'un al-Islamiyyah.

Ibn 'Ashur, Muhammad al-Tahir (1984). *Tafsir al-Tahrir wa al-Tanwir*. Tunisia: al-Tunisiyah li al-Tiba'ah.

Ibn al-Jawzi, Abu al-Faraj Abdul Rahman (2001). *Manaqib Ameer al-Muminin 'Umar ibn al-Khattab* (Biography of Umar ibn al-Khattab, the Second Right Guided Caliphs of Islam). Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-'Arabi.

Ibn al-Qayyim, Muhammad bin Abu Bakar. *Ilaam al-Muwaqi'iin 'an Rabb al-'Alamin* (Guidance for the *Mujtabid* Scholars). Beirut: Matba'ah Beyrut, (n.d.).

Ibn 'Ashur, Muhammad al-Tahir (1984). *Tafsir al-Tahrir wa al-Tanwir*. Tunisia: al-Tunisia li al-Tiba'ah.

Ibn 'Ashur, Muhammad al-Tahir (2001). *Usul al-Nizam al-Ijtima'i fi al-Islaam* (Fundamentals of Islamic Welfare System). Amman: Dar al-Nafais.

Ibn 'Ashur, Muhammad al-Tahir (2006). *Ibn 'Ashur Treatise on Maqasid al-Shari'ah*. (Translated by Tahir el-Mesawi). Virginia: International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT).

Ibn Faris, Abi Hussain Ahmad (1978). *Mu'jam Lughah* (Arabic Language Thesaurus). Beirut: Dar al-Fikr.

Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani, Ahmad bin Ali (1960). *Fath al-Bari Syarb Sabih al-Bukhari* (Commentary of *Sahih al-Bukhari*). Beirut: Dar al-Ma'rifah.

Ibn Kathir, Ismail (n.d.). *al-Bidayah wa al-Nihayah* (Muslim History, From the Beginning to the End). Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah.

Ibn Khaldun, Abdul Rahman (2005 [1967]). *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*. (Translated by Franz Rosenthal). New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Ibn Majah, Muhammad ibn Yazid (n.d.). *Sunan*. (Added Commentary by Muhammad Fuad Abdul Baqi). Beirut: Dar al-Fikr.

Ibn Manzur, Muhammad bin Mukrim (1956). *Lisaan al-'Arab*. Beirut: Dar Saadir.

Ibn Qutaybah, Muhammad bin Mukrim (2002). *'Uyun al-Akhbar*. (Revised by Muhammad al-Iskandrani). Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-'Arabi.

Ibn Saad, Muhammad bin Sa'ad (n.d.). *Kitaab al-Tabqaat al-Kubra*. Cairo: Dar al-Tahrir.

Ibn Sina, Abu Ali (1960). *Al-Isharat wa al-Tanbihat*. (Edited by Sulayman al-Dunya). Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif.

Ibn Taimiyyah, Ahmad A. Halim (1985). *Public Duties in Islam (al-Hisbah fi al-Islaam)*. (Translated by Muhtar Holland). Leicester: The Islamic Foundation.

Ibn Taimiyyah, Ahmad A. Halim (2005). *The Political Shariyah on Reforming the Ruler and the Ruled (al-Siyasah al-Shari'iyah fi Islah al-Ra'iyy wa al-Ra'iyyah)*. (Translated by Abdul Ghaffar al-Hanafi). Leicester: Dar al-Fiqh.

Ibrahim, Anwar (1996). *The Asian Renaissance*. Kuala Lumpur: Times International.

Ibrahim, Mahmood (1982). "Social and Economic Conditions in Pre-Islamic Mecca". *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 14(3), 355.

Ikekeonwu, Clara, Randell, Shirley and Touwen, Anne (2007). *Civil Society Partnerships and Development Policies: Emerging Trends*. UNESCO.

Imarah, Muhammad (2005). *Al-Islaam wa Huquq al-Insaan* (Islam and Human Rights). Damascus: Dar al-Salaam.

Iqbal, Sir Muhammad ([1974] 2008). *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*. New Delhi: Kitab Bhavan.

Iqbal, Zafar and Lewis, Mervyn (2009). *An Islamic Perspective on Governance*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.

Jacobs, Jane (1961). *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*. New York: Random.

Jansen, J. J. G. (1974). *The Interpretation of the Qur'an in Modern Egypt*. Leiden: E. J. Brill.

Jessops, Bob (1995). "The Regulation Approach, Governance and Post-Fordism: Alternative Perspectives on Economic and Political Change?". *Economy and Society*, 24(3), 307-33.

Jessops, Bob (1998). "The Rise of Governance and the Risks of Failure: the Case of Economic Development". *International Social Science Journal*, 50(155), 29-45.

Jones, Ian and Pollitt, Michael (2004). "Understanding How Issues in Corporate Governance Develop: Cadbury Report to Higgs Review". *Corporate Governance: An International Review*, 12(2), 162–71.

Jreisat, Jamil (2004). "Governance in a Globalizing World". *International Journal of Public Administration*, 27(13 and 14), 1003–29.

Kahf, Monzer (1991). "The Economic Role of State in Islam". Lecture presented at the Seminar on Islamic Economics in Dakka, Bangladesh, 1991. Available at: http://monzer.kahf.com/papers/english/economic_role_of_state_in_islam.pdf. Accessed: 1 August 2010.

Kakabadse, Andrew, Bank, John and Vinnicombe, Susan (2004). *Working in Organisation* (2nd edition). England: Gower Publishing Ltd.

Kamali, Mohammad Hashim (2003). "The Right to Personal Safety (Haqq al-Amn) and the Principle of Legality in Islamic Shari'a", in Muhammad Abdul Haleem *et al.* (eds), *Criminal Justice in Islam: Judicial Procedure in the Shari'a*. London, New York: IB Tauris.

Kant, Immanuel ([1795] 2003). *To Perpetual Peace: a Philosophical Sketch*, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.

Kant, Immanuel (1991). *Political Writings*, ed. Reiss, H. S., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kant, Immanuel (1992). *The Conflict of the Faculties*, trans. May J. McGregor, Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press.

Kaufmann, Daniel (2003). *Rethinking Governance: Empirical Lessons Challenge Orthodoxy*. 'Governance Crossroads' in the 2002/03 Global Competitiveness Report by the World Economic Forum (February, 2003). Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=386904> or doi: 10.2139/ssrn.386904. Accessed: 14 February 2008.

Kaufmann, Daniel, Kraay, A. and Mastruzzi, M. (2005). *Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996–2004*. Washington DC: World Bank.

Kaufmann, Daniel *et al.* (2008). *Governance Matters VII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators 1996–2007*. Policy Research Working Paper 4654, The World Bank Development Research Group Macroeconomics and Growth Team & World Bank Institute Global Governance Program on 9th June 2008. New York.

Keane, John (2009). *The Life and Death of Democracy*. London: Simon & Schuster.

Keohane, R. and Martin, Lisa (1995). "The Promise of Institutional Theory". *International Security*, 20(1), 39–51.

Keohane, Robert, O. and Nye, Joseph S. (2000). "Globalization: What's New? What's Not? (And So What?)". *Foreign Policy*, 118, 104–19.

Kettani, Houssain (2010). *2010 World Muslim Population*. Proceedings of the 8th Hawaii International Conference on Arts and Humanities on January 2010, Honolulu, Hawaii. Available at: www.pupr.edu/hkettani/papers/HICAH2010.pdf. Accessed: 31 March 2010.

Khadduri, M. (1987). *al-Shafii's al-Risalah*. (2nd edition). Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society Cambridge.

Khan, Habubullah and Bashar, Omar (2008). *Religion and Development: Are They Complementary?* (U21Global Working Paper Series, No. 006/2008, Graduate School for Global Leaders, Singapore). Singapore: Graduate School for Global Leaders.

Khan, Muin-ud-din Ahmad (2002). "The Concept of Knowledge in the Qur'an". *Humanomics*, 18(3/4), 26–41.

Khan, Muqtader (1999). "Identity as Epistemology". *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, 16(3), 107–20.

Khatami, Mohammed (2000). *Keynote Address in Round Table: Dialogue among Civilizations*. United Nations on 5 September 2000, New York. Available at: www.unesco.org/dialogue/en/khatami.htm Accessed: 20 June 2009.

Khir, Bustami (2008). "Who Applies Islamic Law in Non-Muslim Countries? A Study of the Sunni Principle of the Governance of the Scholars (*Wilayat al-'Ulama*)". *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 27(1), 79–91.

Khudari Beq, Muhammad (2002). *Usul al-Fiqh. Cairo: al-Maktabah al-Tijariyah al-Kubraa*.

Kickert, W. J. M. (1993). "Autopsies and the Science of (Public) Administration: Essence, Sense and Nonsense". *Organization Studies*, 14(2), 261–78.

Kjær, A. M. (2004). *Governance: Key Concepts Series*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

King, Cheryl S. and Stivers, Carmilla (1998). 'Introduction: The Anti-Government Era' in King, Cheryl, Stivers, Carmilla and Box, Richard C., *Government is US: Public Administration in an Anti-government Era*, London: Sage Publication.

Kliksberg, Bernardo (2000). *The Role of Social and Cultural Capital in the Development Process*. College Park: Latin American Studies Center Issues in Culture, Democracy and Development, University of Maryland.

Kliksberg, Bernardo (2001). *Towards an Intelligent State*, International Institute of Administrative Sciences. Netherland: IOS Press.

Kluckhohn, Clyde (1944). *Mirror for Man: The Relation of the Anthropology to Modern Life*. Columbus: McGraw Hill Inc.

Kooiman, Jan (1993). *Modern Governance: New Government-Society Interactions*. London: Sage.

Kooiman, Jan (1993a). "Social-Political Governance: Introduction", in Jan Kooiman (ed.), *Modern Governance*. London: Sage.

Kooiman, Jan (1993b). "Findings, Speculations and Recommendations", in Jan Kooiman (ed.), *Modern Governance*. London: Sage.

Kumar, Satish (2003). "Development and Religion: Cultivating a Sense of Sacred". *Development*, 46(4), 15–21.

Kuran, Timur (2000). "Islamic Influences in Ottoman Guilds". In *The Great Ottoman Turkish Civilisation*. (Vol. 2: Economy and Society), edited by Kamal Cicek et al. Ankara: Yene Turkiye.

Kuran, Timur (2001). "The Provision of Public Goods Under Islamic Law: Origins, Impact, and Limitations of the *Waqf* System". *Law and Society Review* 35, 4: 841–97.

Kothari, Uma (2005). "From Colonial Administration to Development Studies: a Post Colonial Critique of the History of Development Studies", in Uma Kothari, *A Radical History of Development Studies, Individuals, Institutions and Ideologies*. New York and London: Zed Books.

Lambton, Ann K. S. (1981). *State and Government in Medieval Islam: An Introduction to the Study of Islamic Political Theory: The Jurists*, London Oriental Series (Vol. 36). New York: Oxford University Press.

Lambton, Ann K.S. (1984). "The Dilemma of Government in Islamic Persia". *IRAN*, 22, 55–66.

Lancaster, C. (1993). "Governance and Development Agenda: The Views From Washington". *IDS Bulletin*, 24(1), 7–15.

Landell-Mills, Pierre and Sirageldin, Ismail (1991). *Governance and the External Factor*. Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics. Washington DC: World Bank.

Lane, Edward William (1978). *Arabic-English Lexicon*. London: Longman.

Lapidus, Ira M. (1996). "State and Religion in Islamic Societies". *Past & Present* 151, 1: 3–27.

Larbi, Sadiki (2004). *The Search for Arab Democracy: Discourses and Counter-Discourses*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Lawson, Stephanie (1995). *Culture Relativism and Democracy: Political Myths About 'Asia' and the 'West'*. Working Paper, Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, August.

Lawson, Stephanie (1997). *Society and Governance in Melanesia*. Discussion Paper of Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies (97/4), The Australian National University.

Lee Kwan Yew (2000). *From Third World to First: The Singapore Story 1965–2000, Memoirs of Lee Kwan Yew*. Singapore: Singapore Press Holdings.

Leftwich, Andrian (1993). "Governance, Democracy and Development in the Third World". *Third World Quarterly*, 14, 605–24.

Leftwich, Andrian (2000). *States of Development: on the Primacy of Politics in Development*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Lewis, Bernard (1937). "The Islamic Guilds". Review of *The Economic History* 8, 1: 20–37.

Lewis, Bernard (1990). "State and Civil Society under Islam". *New Perspectives Quarterly* 7, 2: 38–41.

Lewis, Bernard (1995). *Cultures in Conflict: Christians, Muslims, and Jews in the Age of Discovery*, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Publisher.

Lewis, Mervyn K. (2006). *Accountability and Islam*. Paper presented in Fourth International Conference on Accounting and Finance Transition on April 10–12, Adelaide, Australia.

Lewis, Preston (1992, 10 May). *Independent on Sunday*, p. 10.

Lincoln, Bruce (2003). *Holy Terrors: Thinking About Religion after September 11*. Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, Ltd.

Lindberg, Leon N. and Campbell, John. L. (1991). "The Evolution of Governance Regimes", in Richard M. Coughlin, *Morality, Rationality, and Efficiency: New Perspectives on Socio-Economics*. New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc.

Lindholm, C. (1996). *The Islamic Middle East: A Historical Anthropology*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Lynn, Laurence E. Jr. (2003). "Public Administration", in Guy B. Peters and Jon Pierre, *Handbook of Public Administration*. London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: SAGE Publication.

Lynn, Laurence E. Jr. (2006). *Public Management: Old and New*. New York and London: Routledge.

Lyotard, Jean-Francois (1992). *The Post Modern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*. (Translated by Geoff Benington and Brian Massumi). Oxford: Polity.

Mahathir Mohammad (1995a, 20th May). "No Freedom Without Responsibility". (*Malaysia*) *New Straits Times*, p. 10.

MacIntyre, Alasdair (2007 [1981]). *After Virtue*. London: Gerald Duckworth & Co Ltd.

Madison, James (1961). 'Federalist #10', in Madison, James, *The Federalist Papers*, ed. Clinton Rossiter, New York: New American Library.

Mahathir Mohammad (1995b, 8th September). "East beats West". *Asiaweek*, 40–3.

Mahbub ul-Haq Human Development Centre (1999). *Human Development in South Asia 1999: The Crisis of Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mahdi, Muhsin M. (1962). "Alfarabi circa 870–950", in Leo Strauss and J. Cropsey, *History of Political Philosophy*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Mahmoud, Abdul Halim (1998). *Al-Sunnah fi Makanatiha wa fi Tarikhaha* (The Status and History of Prophet's Traditions). Cairo: Dar al-Ghareeb li al-Tiba'ah wa al-Nashr wa al-Tawzi'.

Majdalawi, Farouk (2002). *Islamic Administration under Omar ibn al-Khattab*. Amman: Majdalawi Masterpiece Publications.

Malik, Maszlee (2011). *Constructing the Architectonics and Formulating the Articulation of Islamic Governance: A Discursive Attempt in Islamic Epistemology*, unpublished PhD Thesis in Durham University. Available at: <http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/832/>. Accessed: 31 January 2013.

Mandaville, Peter (2001). *Transnational Muslim Politics: Reimagining the Umma*, London: Routledge.

Mandel, Jeremy (1992). *Geoffrey Chaucer: Building The Fragments of the Canterbury Tales*. New Jersey: Farleigh Dickinson University Press.

Manglapus, Raul (1978). 'Human Rights are Not a Western Discovery'. *Worldview*, 4 (October), 4–6.

Manila Declaration on Governance 1999, Available at: <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan000209.pdf>. Accessed: 10 November 2007.

Mann, Michael (1988). "European Development: Approaching a Historical Explanation", in Baechler, Jean *et al.* (eds), *Europe and the Rise of Capitalism*, Oxford: Blackwells, pp. 10–15.

Mannan, M. A. (1989). *Economic Development and Social Peace in Islam*. London: Ta Ha Publishers Ltd.

Mardin, Serif (1969). "Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire". *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 11(3), 258–81.

Marshal, Barbara L. (1994). *Engendering Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity.

Marshall, Katherine (2005). *Faith and Development: Rethinking Development Debates*. (World Bank Paper, June). New York: World Bank.

Marx, Karl ([1843] 1970). *Marx's Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right (1843)*, ed. Joseph O'Malley, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Matheson, Alex (2003). "Public Management in Flux: Trends and Differences Across OECD Countries", in Bovaird, Tony and Loffler, Elke (eds), *Public Management and Governance*. New York: Routledge.

Mawdudi, Abul A'la (1976). *Human Rights in Islam*. Leicester: The Islamic Foundation.

Mawdudi, Abul A'la (1982). "Political Theory of Islam", in John J. Donahue and John L. Esposito (eds), *Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspective*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Mawdudi, Abul A'la (1983). *Islamic Law and Constitution*. Lahore: Islamic Publications.

Mawdudi, Abul A'la (1985). "Nazariyyat al-Islam al-Siyaasiyyah", in Abu al-A'la al-Mawdudi, *Nazariyyat al-Islaam wa Hadyibi fi al-Siyaasat wa al-Qaanun wa al-Dustur*. Jeddah: al-Daar al-Su'udiyyah li al-Nashr wa al-Tawzi'.

Mawdudi, Abul A'la (1985). "Tadwin al-Dustur al-Islamiyy", in Abu al-A'la al-Mawdudi, *Nazariyyat al-Islaam wa Hadyibi fi al-Siyaasat wa al-Qaanun wa al-Dustur*. Jeddah: al-Daar al-Su'udiyyah li al-Nashr wa al-Tawzi'.

Mazrui, Ali (2001). "Pretender to Universalism: Western Culture in a Globalizing Age". *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 21(1), 11–24.

Mearsheimer, John (1995). "The False Promise of International Institutions". *International Security*, 19(3), 5–49.

Mehmet, Bulut (2002). *Reconsideration of the Economic Concepts of the Ottomans and Western Europeans During the Mercantilist Ages*. Paper for Middle East History and Theory Conference organised by Division of the Humanities, University of Chicago, on 9–10 May, Chicago, USA.

Mehmet, Ozay (1995). *Westernizing the Third World: The Euro-centrism of Economic Development Theories*. London and New York: Routledge.

Metcalf, Barbara D. (1987). "Islamic Arguments in Contemporary Pakistan", in William Roff, *Islam and the Political Economy of Meaning*. New York and London: Routledge.

Micklethwait, John and Wooldridge, Adrian (2010). *God is Back: How the Global Rise of Faith is Changing the World*. London: Penguin.

Mill, John Stuart (1998). *On Liberty and Other Essays*, edited by John Gray, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mir, Mustansir (1987). *Dictionary of Qur'anic Terms and Concepts*. New York: Garland Publishing Inc.

Mitchel, Richard P. (1969). *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*. London: Oxford University Press.

Mitchell, Timothy (2002). *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Monks, Roberts and Minow, Nell (1995). *Corporate Governance*. Cambridge: Blackwell Business.

Moore, David (1996). "Reading Americans on Democracy in Africa: From CIA to 'Good Governance'", *The European Journal of Developmental Research*, 1996, 8(1), 123–48.

Moore, Mick (1993). "Declining to Learn From the East? The World Bank on Governance and Development". *IDS (Institute of Development Studies) Bulletin*, 24(1).

Mottahedeh, Roy (2001). *Loyalty and Leadership in an Early Islamic Society*. London and New York: I. B. Tauris Publishers.

Moussalli, Ahmad S. (1993). "Hassan al-Banna's Islamist Discourse on Constitutional rule and Islamic State". *Journal of Islamic Studies*, 4(2), 161–74.

Muhammad Thani, Hafiz (2001). *The Greatest Benefactor of Mankind and Human Rights*. (Translated by Zahra Bainter). Karachi: Darul Ishaat.

Muslim, Muslim bin Hajjaj (n.d.). *Sahih Muslim*. Beirut: dar Ihya al-Turath al-'Arabi.

Myers, Bryant L. (1999). *Walking with the Poor: Principles and Practices of Transformational Development*. Maryknoll: Orbis/World Vision.

Nadwi, Abul Hasan (1968). *Al-Sira' Bayn al-Fikrat al-Islamiyyah wa al-Fikrat al-Gharbiyyah* (The Clash of Islamic Thoughts and the Westerns). Kuwait: Dar al-Qalam.

Nafi', Bashir (2010). *Al-Islaamiyun* (The Islamists). Doha: Aljazeera Center For Studies.

Nanda, Ved P. (2006), "The Good Governance Concept Revisited". *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, 603, 269–83.

Naqvi, Syed Nawab Haider (1994). *Islam, Economics, and Society*. London and New York: Kegan Paul International.

Naqvi, Syed Nawab Haider (2003). *Perspectives on Morality and Human Well Being a Contribution to Islamic Economics*. Leicester: The Islamic Foundation.

Nasr, Seyyed Hosen (1994). *Ideas and Realities of Islam*. London: The Aquarian Press.

Nasr, Seyyed Hosen (1995). "Democracy and Islamic Revivalism". *Political Science Quarterly*, 110(2), 261–85.

Nasr, Seyyed Hosen (1996). *Ideals and Realities of Islam*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger.

Neumayer, Eric (2003). *The Pattern of Aid Giving: The Impact of Good Governance on Development*. New York: Routledge.

Newton, Kenneth (1997). "Social Capital and Democracy". *American Behavioral Scientist*, March–April, 575–86.

Ngaire, Woods (1999). "Good Governance in International Organisations". *International Affairs*, 5(1), 39–52.

Nizam al-Mulk (2002). *The Book of Government and Or Rules of Kings: The Siyar al-Mulk or Siyasat-nama of Nizam al-Mulk*. (Translated by Hubert Darke). New York: Routledge.

North, Douglass C. (1981). *Structure and Change in Economic History*. New York: W. W. Norton.

North, Douglass C. (1990) *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

OECD (1995). *The DAC Guidelines: Poverty Reduction*. Paris: OECD Publications Service.

OECD (1996). *Shaping the 21st Century – The Contribution of Development Co-operation*. Paris: OECD Publications Service.

Omar, Ibrahim Ahmad (1992). *Falsafat al-Tanmiyyah: Rukyah Islamiyyah* (Philosophy of Development: an Islamic View). (2nd edition). Virgina: IIIT.

Omari, Ikram Diya (1991). *Al-Sirah al-Nabawiyyah al-Sabihah* (The Authentic Biography of Prophet Muhammad). Doha: Markaz Buhuth al-Sunnah wa al-Sirah bi Jami'at Qatar.

Osborne, David and Gaebler, Ted (1992). *Reinventing Government*. Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing.

Pagden, Anthony (1995). *Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France, 1492–1830*, London: Yale University Press.

Pagden, Anthony (1998). “The Genesis of ‘Governance’ and Enlightenment Conceptions of the Cosmopolitan World Order”, *International Social Science Journal*, 50(155), pp. 8–14.

Pagden, Anthony (2001). *Peoples and Empires: Europeans and the Rest of the World. From Antiquity to the Present*, London: Weinfield & Nicolson.

Pagden, Anthony (2008). *Worlds at War: The 2,500-Year Struggle between East & West*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Paine, Thomas (1975). *Dissertations on the First Principles of Government*. E-book available from: www.cooperativeindividualism.org/paine_dissertations_on_first_prin.html. Accessed: 17 December 2009.

Palmer, Gary B. (1996). *Toward a Theory of Cultural Linguistics*. Texas: University of Texas Press.

Pantham, Thomas (1992). “Some Dimensions of the Universality of Philosophical Hermeneutics: A Conversation with Hans-Georg Gadamer”. *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, 9, 130–42.

Parekh, Bikhu (2006). *Rethinking Multiculturalism, Cultural Diversity and Political Theory*. (2nd edition). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Parry, Geraint (1972). “The Idea of Political Participation”. In Geraint Parry (ed.), *Participation in Politics*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Putnam, R. D. (1993). *Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Pelczynski, A. Z. (1984). *The State and Civil Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Phongphit, Seri (1988). *Religion in a Changing Society: Buddhism, Reform and the Role of Monks in Community Development in Thailand*. Hong Kong: Arena Press.

Porter, Roy (2001). *The Enlightenment*. New York: Palgrave.

Pierre, Jon and Guy, Peters (2000). *Governance, Politics and the State, Political Analysis Series*. London: Macmillan Press.

Pieterse, Jan N. (2000). “After Post-development”. *Third World Quarterly*, 21(2), 175–91.

Pollitt, Christopher and Bouckaert, Geert (2004). *Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Porter, Roy (2001). *The Enlightenment*, New York: Palgrave.

Power, Marcus (1998). "The Dissemination of Development". *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 16, 577–98.

Putnam, R. D. (2000). *Bowling Alone. The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Putnam, R. D. (2002). *Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Qutb, Sayyid (1980). *Social Justice in Islam (al-'Adalah al-Ijtima'iyyah fi al-Silaam)*. (Translated by John B. Hardie). New York: Islamic Publications International.

Rabinow, Paul (ed.) (1984). *The Foucault Reader: An Introduction to Foucault's Thought*. London: Penguin Books.

Rahman, Fazlur (1979). *Islam*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Rahman, Fazlur (1996). "The Living Sunnah and *Al-sunnah Wal Jamaah*", in P. K. Roya (ed.), *Hadith and Sunnah: Ideals and Realities*. Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust.

Rahman, Fazlur (2009). *Major Themes of the Qur'an*, (with foreword by Ebrahim Mousa). Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.

Rahnema, Majid (1997). "Towards Post-Development: Searching for Signposts, a New Language and New Paradigms", in Majid Rahnema and Victoria Bawtree (eds), *The Post-Development Reader*. London, New York: Zed Books.

Ramadan, Tariq (2001). *Islam, the West and the Challenges of Modernity*. Leicester: The Islamic Foundation.

Ramadan, Tariq (2005). *To Be a European Muslim*, Leicester: The Islamic Foundation.

Ramadan, Tariq (2006). "Ijtihad and Maslaha: The Foundation of Governance", in M. A. Muqtedar Khan, *Islamic Democratic Discourse*. Oxford: Lexington Books.

Ramadan, Tariq (2007). *In The Footsteps of The Prophet: Lessons From the Life of Muhammad*. USA: Oxford University Press.

Ramadan, Tariq (2009). *Radical Reform, Islamic Ethics and Liberation*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Rand, Ayn (1967). *Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal*. New York: Signet Book (Penguin Groups).

Raz, Joseph (1999). *Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Raz, Joseph (2003). *The Practice of Value*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Redclift, Mecheal (1987). *Sustainable Developments: Exploring the Contradictions*. New York: Methuan & Co. Ltd.

Reed, Charles (ed.) (2001). *Development Matters: Christian Perspectives on Globalization*. London: Church House Publishing.

Reuben, Julie A. (1996). *The Making of the Modern University: Intellectual Transformation and the Marginalization of Morality*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Rhodes, R. A. W. (1996). "The New Governance: Governing Without Government". *Political Studies*, 44, 652–67.

Rhodes, R. A. W. (2000). "Governance and Public Administration", in Jon Pierre, *Debating Governance, Authority, Steering and Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rhodes, R. A. W. (2003). *Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability*. England: Open University Press.

Rice, Tamara Talbot (1961). *The Seljuks in Asia Minor*. London: Thames and Hudson.

Rida, M. Rashid (1956). *Tafsir al-Manar*. Cairo: Matba'at al-Manaar.

Rida, M. Rashid (1984). *Yusr al-Islaam wa-Usul al-ashri' al-'Amm* (The Ease of Islam and the Foundations of General Legislation). Cairo: Maktabah al-Salaam.

Rida, M. Rashid (1986). *al-Wahy al-Muhammadi* (Muhammadan Revelation). Lebanon: Muassasah 'Izz al-Din li al-Tiba'at wa al-Nashr.

Rida, M. Rashid (1998). *al-Khilafah aw Imamat al-'Uzma* (The Caliphate and Supreme Islamic Leader). Cairo: al-Zahra Publications.

Rizvi, Rizwan Ali Syed (1977). *Nizam Al-Mulk Tusi – His Contribution to Statecraft, Political Theory and the Art of Government*. PhD thesis, University of Karachi, Pakistan.

Roberts, John M. (1985). *The Triumph of the West*. London: British Broadcasting Corporation.

Robertson, Arthur Henry and Merrills, J. G. (1996). *Human Rights in the World: An Introduction to the Study of the International Protection of Human Rights*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Robinson, Eric (1997). *The First Democracies: Early People Government Outside Athens*. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Vulag.

Robinson, Lindon J., Siles, Marcelo E. and Schmid, A. (2002). "Social Capital and Poverty Reduction: Toward a Mature Paradigm". Prepared for the International Invitational Conference, "Social Capital and Poverty Reduction in Latin America and the Caribbean: Toward a New Paradigm", held 24–26 September 2001, in Santiago de Chile.

Robinson, Richard (1996). "The Politics of Asian Value". *The Pacific Review*, 3, 309–27.

Rodinson, Maxime (1973). *Mohammed*. (Translated by Anne Carter). London: Penguin Books.

Rodrik, Dani (2006). "Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion? A Review of the World Bank's Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform". *Journal of Economic Literature*, XLIV, 973–87.

Romero, Catalina (2001). "Globalization, Civil Society, and Religion from a Latin American Standpoint". *Sociology of Religion*, 62(4), 475–90.

Rosenau, James N. and Czempiel, E.-O (eds) (1992). *Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rosenau, James N. (1992a). "Governance, Order and Change in World Politics", in J. N. Rosenau and E.-O Czempiel (eds), *Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rosenau, James N. (1992b). "Citizenship in a Changing Global Order", in J. N. Rosenau and E.-O Czempiel (eds), *Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rothbard, Murray N. (1961). "The Fallacy of the Public Sector". *New Individualist Review*, Summer, 3–7.

Rowland, Christopher (ed.) (1999). *The Cambridge Companion to Liberation Theology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Runes, Dagobert (1976). *Dictionary of Philosophy*. New Jersey: Littlefield, Adam and Company.

Safi, Louay (1996). *The Foundation of Knowledge: A Comparative Study in Islamic and Western Methods of Inquiry*. Selangor: International Islamic University Malaysia Press.

Said, Edward (1978). *Orientalism*, London: Penguin Books.

Salmone, H. Anthony (1890). *An Arabic-English Dictionary on a New System*. London: Trubner & Co., Ludgate Hill.

Salmone, H. Anthony (1890). *An Arabic-English Dictionary on a New System*. London: Trubner & Co., Ludgate Hill.

Sardar, Ziauddin (1985). *Islamic Futures: The Shape of Ideas to Come*. London: Mansell.

Sardar, Ziauddin (1989). *Explorations in Islamic Science*. London: Mansell.

Sardar, Ziauddin (1997). "Development and the Locations of Eurocentrism," in Ronaldo Munck and Denis O'Hearn (eds.), *Critical Development Theory: Contributions to a New Paradigm*. London: Zed Publications.

Sardar, Ziauddin (2003). "Asian Cultures: Between Programmed and Desired Futures", in Inayatullah, Sohail and Boxwell, Gail, *Islam, Postmodernism and Other Futures, A Ziauddin Sardar Reader*. London: Pluto Press.

Sartori, Giovanni (1962). "Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discussion". *American Political Science Review*, 56(4), 853–64.

Sartori, Giovanni (2005). *Parties and Party Systems*. Paris: European Consortium for Political Research.

Saward, Micheal (2005), 'Governance and the Transformation of Political Representation', in Janet Newman, *Remaking Governance*, Bristol: The Policy Press.

Sayyid, Bobby (1997). *A Fundamental FEAR: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of ISLAMISM*, London and New York: Zed Books Ltd.

Schech, Susanne and Haggis, Jane (2000). *Culture and Development: A Critical Introduction*, Victoria: Blackwell Publishing.

Schemeil, Y. (2000). Democracy before Democracy? *International Political Science Review*, 21(2), 99–120.

Sen, Amartya (1999). *Development as Freedom*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Shaikh, Muzaffar A. (1988), "Ethics of Decision Making in Islamic and Western Environments". *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, 5(1), 115–28.

Shaltut, Mahmud (2001). *Al-Islaan: Aqidah wa Shari'ah* (Islam, Between Creed and Legal Rulings). (18th edition). Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq.

Shanin, Teodor (1997). "The Idea of Progress", in Rahnema, Majid and Bawtree, Victoria, *The Post-Development Reader*, London and New Jersey: Zed Books.

Shari'ati, Ali (2007). *Ma'rifat al-Islam: Silsilat al-Athar al-Kamilah* (9) (Introduction to Islam: The Complete Compilation of Ali Shari'ati's Legacies). (Translated into Arabic by Haydar Majid). Beirut: Dar al-Amir.

Shari'ati, Ali (n.d.). *Islamology: the Basic Design for School of Thoughts and Action*. Available at: www.shariati.com/islamgy1.html. Accessed: 15 March 2009.

Sherif, Adel Omar (2003). "Generalities on Criminal Procedure Under Islamic Shari'ah", in Muhammad Abdul Haleem et al. (eds), *Criminal Justice in Islam: Judicial Procedure in the Shari'ah*. London, New York: IB TAURIS.

Shihata, Ibrahim (1991). *The World Bank and Changing World: Selected Essays*. Dordrecht. Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff.

Siddiqi, M. N. (2004). *What Went Wrong?* Keynote Address at the Roundtable on Islamic Economics: Current State of Knowledge and Development of Discipline, held at Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on 26–27 May 2004 under joint auspices of the Islamic Research and Training Institute, Jeddah; and the Arab Planning Institute, Kuwait. Available at: www.siddiqi.com/mns/Keynote_May2004_Jeddah.html, Accessed: 13 December 2006.

Smith, Adam (1976 [1776]). *The Wealth of the Nations*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Smith, B. C. (2003). "Political Parties and Party System", in B. C. Smith, *Understanding Third World Politics: Theories of Political Change and Development*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Smith, B. C. (2007). *Good Governance and Development*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Singer, Peter (1983). *Hegel*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sivaramkrishnan, K. and Agrawal, A. (2003). "Regional Modernities in Stories and Practices in Development", in K. Sivaramakrishnan and Arun Agrawal (eds.), *Regional Modernities: The Cultural Politics of Development in India*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

Solomon, Robert (1983). *In the Spirit of Hegel*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Soroush, Abdul Karim (2009). *Bast al-Tajribat al-Nabawiyyah* (Prophet's Experience). (Translated into Arabic by Ahmad al-Qabanji). Beirut: Arab Diffusion Company.

Stepan, Alfred (2005). "Religion, Democracy and the 'Twin Toleration'", in Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner and Philip J. Costopoulos (eds), *World Religions and Democracy*. Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press.

Stewart, F. (2000). *Income Distribution and Development*. Working Paper Series no. 37, Oxford, Queen Elizabeth House: Oxford University.

Stiglitz, John (1998). *Towards a New Paradigm for Development: Strategies, Policies and Processes*. 9th Raul Prebisch Lecture given at United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) on 19 October 1998, New York: USA.

Stiglitz Jospéh, E. (2002). *Globalization and its Discontents*. New York: W. W. Norton.

Stoker, Gerry (1998). "Governance as Theory: Five Propositions". *International Social Sciences Journal*, 50(1), 17–28.

Subramaniam, Surain (2001). "The Dual Narrative of Good Governance". *Contemporary South East Asia*, 23(1), 65–80.

Taleqani, Ayatullah Mahmud (1986). "Jihad and Shahadat", in Mehdi Abedi and Gary Legenhause (eds), *Jihad and Shahadat: Struggle and Martyrdom in Islam*. North Haledon and New Jersey: Islamic Publications International.

Tamimi, Azzam (2001). *Rachid Ghannouchi: Democrat Within Islamism*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Tawney, R. H. (1926). *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism: A Historical Study*. Gloucester: Peter Smith.

Taylor, Charles (1995). "Irreducibly Social Goods", in Charles Taylor, *Philosophical Arguments*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Taylor, Charles (1999). "Two Theories of Modernity". *Public Culture*, 11(1), 153–74.

Teachman, J. D., Paasch, K. and Carver, K. (1997). "Social Capital and the Generation of Human Capital". *Social Forces*, 75(4), 1–17.

Tetzlaff, Rainer (1995). 'Good Governance and Structural Adjustment Programmes – The World Bank's Experience in Africa South of Sahara', *Pakistan Journal of Applied Economics*, XI: 1 and 2.

The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (1995). (edited by W. Fowler and F. G. Fowler). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Theiss-Morse, Elizabeth and Hibbing, John R. (2005). "Citizenship and Civic Engagement". *Annual Review of Political Science* 8: 227–49.

Thompson, Ken and Woodward, Kath (2000). "Knowing and Believing: Religious Knowledge", in David Goldblatt, *Knowledge and the Social Sciences: Theory, Method, Practice*. London and New York: Routledge.

Throsby, David (2001). *Economics and Culture*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tibi, Bassam (1986). "Islam and Modern European Ideologied". *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 18, 15–29.

Tipton, Steven (1984). *Getting Saved From the Sixties: Moral Meaning in Conversion and Cultural Change*. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press.

Tocqueville, Alexis (1988). *Democracy in America*, Mayer, J. P. (ed.), Lawrence George (trans.), New York: Harper & Row.

Toynbee, Arnold (1948). *Civilization on Trial*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Turner, Brian (1984). *Capitalism and Class in the Middle East: Theories of Social Change and Economic Development*. London: Heinemann.

Tyndale, Wendy (2003). "Idealism and Practicality: The Role of Religion in Development". *Development*, 46(4), 22–28.

UNDP (1993). *Human Development Report*. New York: Oxford University Press.

UNDP (1994). *Governance, Public Sector Management and Sustainable Human Development: A UNDP Strategy Paper (MIMEO)*. New York: UNDP.

UNDP (1995). *UNDP and Civil Society Organizations: A Practice Note on Engagement (Policy of Engagement)*. (www.undp.org/partners/cso/). Accessed: 29 July 2008.

UNDP (1997). *UNDP AND GOVERNANCE: Experiences and Lessons Learned*. Management Development and Governance Division, Lessons-Learned Series No. 1, 1997.

UNESCO (1997). *Records of the General Conference: 29th session, 21st October – 12th November 1997*. Paris: UNESCO.

Uschold, Mike and King, Martin (1995). *Towards a Methodology for Building Ontologies*. Paper presented at 'Workshop on Basic Ontological Issues in Knowledge Sharing', July 1995. Edinburgh: Artificial Intelligence Application Institute, University of Edinburgh.

Uthmani, Sa'de al-Din (2009). *al-Din wa al-Siyasah: Tamayiz La Fasl* (Religion and Politics, Demarcation not Separation). Cassablanca: al-Markaz al-Thaqafi al-'Arabi.

Van dok, Geert (1999). *Good Governance: Paper Tiger of Source of Hope, Critical Reflections on the Success of Foreign Policy Concepts*. (Discussion Paper 6). Lucerne: Caritas Press.

Vidal, C. (2008) "Wat is een Wereldbeeld? (What is a Worldview?)", in H. Van Belle and J. Van der Veken (eds), *Nieuwheid Denken. De Wetenschappen en het Creatieve Aspect van de Werkelijkheid*. Acco: Leuven.

Von Denfer, Ahmad (1994). *'Ulum al-Qur'an: Introduction to the Sciences of al-Qur'an*. Leicester: Islamic Foundation.

Von Der Luft, Eric (1984). "Sources of Nietzsche's 'God is dead!' and its meaning for Heidegger", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 45: 2, April–June 1984, 263–76.

Wa'iy, Tawfiq (1996). *al-Dawlah al-Islamiyyah Bayna al-Turath wa al-Mu'asarah* (Islamic State, Between the Classical Interpretation and Contemporary Reality). Beirut: Dar Ibn Hazm.

Walzer, Richard (1963). "Aspects of Political Thought: al-Farabi and Ibn Khaldun". *Oriens*, 16, 40–60.

Walzer, Richard (1985). al-Farabi on the Prefect State: abu Nasr al-Farabi, *Mabaadi 'Araa Ahl al-Madina al-Fadila*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Wan Daud and Wan Mohd Nor (1989). *The Concept of Knowledge in Islam*. London and New York: Mansell.

Wasil, Nasr Farid (1977). *Al-Sultah al-Qadha'iyyah wa Nizam al-Qadha fi al-Islam* (Judicial Power and Judiciary System in Islam). Shoubra, Egypt: Matba'ah al-Amaanah.

Watt, Montgomery (1996). *A Short History of Islam*. Oxford: Oneworld.

Weber, Max (2003 [1958]). *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. New York: Dover.

Weber, Max (2003 [1930]). *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, New York: Dover.

Webster's Third New International Dictionary (2002). Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster Inc.

Wegner, Peter (1994). *A Sociology of Modernity: Liberty and Discipline*, London: Routledge.

Weiss, Thomas G. (2000). "Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance: Conceptual and Actual Challenges". *Third World Quarterly*, 21(5), 195–814.

WFDD (2003). "The Provision of Services for Poor People: A Contribution to WDR 2004". Available at www.wfdd.org.uk/programmes/wdr/WFDDWDR2004.pdf. Accessed: 25 November 2008.

White Paper on European Governance (2001). Available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/governance/index_en.htm. Accessed: 10 November 2007.

Williams, David and Young, Tom (1994). "Governance: the World Bank and Liberal Theory". *Political Studies*, 42(1), 84–100.

Williams, Patrick and Chrisman, Laura (1994). *Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Williamson, John (1989). "What Washington Means by Policy Reform", in John, Williamson (ed.), *Latin American Readjustment: How Much Has Happened*. Washington: Institute for International Economics.

Wittrock, Bjorn (1998). 'Early Modernities: Varieties and Transitions', *Daedalus*, Summer 1998, 127(3), 1–10.

Woolcock, Michael (2001). "The Place of Social Capital in Understanding Social and Economic Outcomes". *Isuma: Canadian Journal of Policy Research*, 2(1), 1–17.

Woolcock, Michael and Narayan, Deepa (2000). "Social Capital: Implications for Development Theory, Research, and Policy", *The World Bank Research Observer*, 15(2) (August 2000), 225–49.

World Bank (1989). *World Bank Report: Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth*. Washington DC: World Bank Publication.

World Bank (1992a). *Governance and Development*, Washington DC: World Bank.

World Bank (1992b). *World Bank 1991 Annual Development Economic Conference*. Washington DC: World Bank.

World Bank (1997). *World Development Report 1997: The State in the Changing World*. New York: Oxford University Press.

World Bank (1999). *What is Social Capital?* Available at: *PovertyNet*. Accessed: 10 January 2010. www.worldbank.org/poverty/scapital/whatsc.htm

World Bank (2006). *Faiths and Environment: World Bank Support 2000–5*. Washington: World Bank.

World Vision (2003). *World Vision International Annual Report*. Monrovia: World Vision.

Young, Robert (1990). *White Mythologies: Writing History and the West*. London: Routledge.

Zadek, Simon (1993). "The Practice of Buddhist Economics?". *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, 52(4), 433–45.

Zakaria, Idris (1986). *Teori Kenegaraan al-Farabi* (al-Farabi's Philosophy of State). Bangi: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia.

Zaman, Nazim and Asutay, Mehmet (2009). "Divergence Between Aspirations and Realities of Islamic Economies: A Political Economy Approach to Bridging the Divide". *IIUM Journal of Economics and Management*, 17(1), 73–96.

Zarqa, Muhammad Anas (1988). "Islamic Distributive Schemes", in Munawar Iqbal (ed.), *Distributive Justice and Need Fulfillment in an Islamic Economy*. Leicester: The Islamic Foundation.

Ziad, Abdel Samad (2008). "Civil Society in the Arab Region: Its Necessary Role and the Obstacles to Fulfillment". Available at: www.icnl.org/knowledge/ijnl/vol.9iss2/special_1.htm. Accessed: 4 December 2008

Zubaida, Sami (2005). *Law and Power in the Islamic World*. New York: IB Tauris.

Internet

Canadian Institute on Governance, (www.iog.ca)

Governance International United Kingdom (www.govint.org)

www.un.org/aboutun/charter/

www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/Ongoing/gg/governance.asp

<http://stats.oecd.org>

Principle of Governance, Singapore government website, (www1.moe.edu.sg/ne/About_NE/Governance/governance_principles.htm)

Index

Abduh, Muhammad 89, 101–2, 149, 187
Abdul Salam, Izzudin 107, 108
Abdullah bin al-Muqaffa' 123
abode of Islam (*Dar al-Islam*) 171
Abu Bakr 150, 168, 182, 190
Abu Yusuf 121
accountability xii, 10–13, 19, 27, 30, 32–3, 35, 44–5, 73, 83, 117, 124, 126–7, 131, 139, 144–5, 149–52, 173, 175, 183, 185, 188, 190, 200, 212–13, 216–17, 219, 221, 225, 239, 243
Acemoglu, Daron 219
'Adat 7
'Adl wa ihsan 166, 172, 198, 201, 203, 216, 219, 237
Abi 214–16, 223
Abilik 214
abl al-Hil wa al-'Aqd 117, 210–11, 216
al-Afghani, Jamaludin 101, 128
Al-'Abkam al-Sultaniyyah 117, 188n13, 212
Al-Alwani, Taha J. 96
'al-amr bi al-ma'ruf wa al-nahy 'an al-munkar 189n21, 189n22, 200
Alatas, Syed Hussein 48, 66–7
al-Banna 129–30
Al-Buraei, Muhammad 111n2, 116, 132, 199
al-Farabi 100, 121–3, 135, 188n10
al-Faruqi, Ismail 5, 187n5
al-Hisbah 215
al-Hisbah fi al-Islam 118–19
Ali bin Abi Talib 151, 188n15
al-Kawakibi 126–7, 177, 248n2
al-Kharaj 124, 213
al-Madinah al-Fadilah 112, 188n10
al-Mawardi 117–18, 135n5, 210–13
al-Mawdudi 129–30
al-Muqaddimah 115, 120
Al-Qaradawi, Yusuf 95, 103–4, 109, 111, 131, 165–6, 169, 187n3, 191n34
al-Qarafi, Shihab al-Din 103
al-Risalah (al-Shafi'i) 209
al-Shafi'i, Muhammad b. Idris 93–4, 98n10, 209
al-Shatibi, Ibrahim bin Musa 7, 94–5, 101, 108–9, 181
al-Siyasah al-Madaniyyah 122
al-Siyasah al-Syar'iyyah 118, 122, 182, 188n12
al-Turabi, Hasan 146
amanah 119, 139, 142–7, 149–51, 153–5, 159–61, 165, 168, 172, 174–8, 185, 188n14, 198, 200–1, 203, 212, 216, 219, 222, 235, 237, 242
Ansar 162, 163–4, 179, 192n50
an-Naim, Abdullahi 75, 218
anomie 62, 69
a priori 5, 53, 83, 87
'aql 82, 85, 86–90, 95, 99, 101, 108, 172, 181, 234
Aristotle 66n1, 123
Asad, Talal 72, 77
Asian Values 38, 43–6, 66n2
Asutay, Mehmet 64–5, 70, 135, 161, 178–80, 186, 199, 218, 220, 231n6, 235
Axis Mundi 82, 234
Bachelard, Gaston 137
benevolence 128, 131, 139, 142, 153–4, 160, 163–6, 173, 185, 201, 203–4, 210, 235
Bennabi, Malik 142, 168, 198–9
Berger, Peter Ludwig 2, 62, 65, 69, 76n2
Bhaba, Homi K. 60
Boas, Franz 57
Bretton Woods 19, 27, 48–9, 66n4, 230, 233, 242
brotherhood 123, 141, 162–3, 167–9, 192n45, 215

Cadbury 8, 12; Commission 13; Report 12–13

CAFOD (Catholic Overseas Development Agency) 37

Canadian Institute on Governance 10, 35n1

Casanova, Josa 3, 64, 71, 74

Chapra, M. Umer xi, xii, 4, 80, 138, 181, 187, 217, 236

Charter of Madinah (*Sabifah al-Madinah*) 171

Choudhury, Malik 6, 86, 235

civil society 1, 17–18, 24, 27, 30, 32, 38, 40, 50, 62, 71, 73, 75, 127, 146, 149, 152, 165, 174, 189, 204–10, 214–20, 222–3, 225, 229, 233, 238–9, 242

Cizakca, Murat 210

Cochrane, Phoebe 224, 232n18

Cold War 22, 26, 30, 47, 58

Coleman, James C. 2, 74

colonialism 37, 42, 49, 53–4, 60, 92

Communism 38, 47, 54, 67, 162

Confucian 43–4, 66n2, 74

Confucianism 44, 46, 62

constitution(al) 9, 18, 23, 33, 34, 42, 64, 116, 127, 130, 169, 190, 193, 242

constitutionalism 23, 30

corporate governance 12, 14, 20

Cortina, Adela 1, 6n1, 70

cultural relativism 58–9

cultural relativist 46, 57–8

Dar al-Islam 171

daruriyah 95

Davutoglu, Ahmet 92, 97n6

deontological 103, 105, 110, 133, 161, 182, 236, 241

deprivatization (of religion) 71

de Tocqueville, Alexis 238

Diamond, Larry 25–6, 46

Diwan 118, 212–13; (*Mazalim*) 151

Dwivedi, O.P. 61

effective institutions 187, 198, 204, 206, 218–19, 222, 226, 229, 237–8, 244

efficiency 1–2, 4–5, 12–13, 15, 17, 20–2, 27–9, 32–3, 35, 38, 40, 70, 74, 77n5, 144–5, 164, 183, 186–7, 195, 213, 217, 219, 239

Eisenstadt, Shemuel N. 62–5, 67

el-Affendi, Abdelwahab 75, 208, 218

el-Messiri, Abdelwahab 66, 79, 81, 92, 96, 100, 131, 224

enabling state 199, 204–5, 218–19, 222

endogeneity 57, 60

enlightenment 2–3, 22, 38, 46–51, 53, 55, 61, 67, 76, 80, 83, 85, 92, 96, 98, 103, 140, 206–7, 218

epistemology vii, 4–6, 51, 59, 65, 78, 81, 84–6, 90, 92–5, 97, 105–6, 115, 133–4, 137, 153, 180–1, 183, 195–6, 224–5, 227–9, 234, 236, 238, 246–7

Eurocentrism 3, 55

Eurocentrism vi, 1, 22, 38, 49, 51, 53, 61, 64, 66–7

equality 2, 24, 50–1, 54, 66, 84, 108, 112n2, 122, 131, 141–2, 146, 150, 153, 155–6, 159, 161, 163, 168–70, 185, 188n10, 201, 225

Escobar, Arturo 48, 59

Falah 160, 172–3, 180–2, 184, 186–7, 196–204, 206, 211, 216, 223, 225, 227–30, 234–5, 237–41, 245

Falk, Richard 2

Fanon, Franz 53, 68

fasad 114n15, 141, 171–2

fi sabil Allah 202, 225–6, 232n19

Finer, S.E. 22, 23

fiqh 91, 94–5, 103, 116, 132–3, 136, 138–9, 156, 161, 181–2, 244

fitrah 177

Foucault, Michel 56

Fukuyama, Francis 28, 39, 53, 67, 76, 219

functioning individual(s) 175, 187, 197–202, 206, 216, 220–1, 228–9, 231n6, 237–8, 241–2, 244

fuqaha' 91, 95, 116, 120–1, 124, 146, 156

Ghannoushi, Rached 131, 140, 146, 172, 178, 206–7, 209

Ghaus-Pasha, Aisha 76

Ghiyath al-Umam fi al-Tayyath al-Zulam 117–18, 135n4

Gibb, Sir Hamilton A.R. 101n24, 168–9

Giddens, Anthony 51, 55–6, 80

globalization 18–19, 27, 31, 56, 58; anti-globalization 17

Goh Chok Tong 44

Gutiérez 2, 74

GWG IIAS (The Governance Working Group of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences) 30

Habermas, Jürgen 52, 55

hadbarah 198–9

Hamidullah, Muhammadi 132, 170

Hans Wehr 143, 154, 165

Hayek, Friedrich A. 12

Haynes, Jeffrey 2, 72, 74
 Hegel, G.W.F 24, 51–2, 67, 79; Hegelian 39
 Held, David 18
Hisbah 117–19, 121, 132, 174, 194n63, 194n64, 211–12, 215–17, 220
 Hofstede, Geert H. 1, 45, 55, 66n2
 homoconomicus 199
homoIslamicus 165, 184, 196, 199–201, 241, 243
 homopoliticus 199
 Human Development Index (HDI) 245
 human rights xi, 1, 24–6, 29–30, 33, 39–43, 46, 62, 67, 70, 77, 131, 159, 184, 225, 230, 242
 Huntington, Samuel P. 26, 54, 67
ibadat 7, 108, 141
 Ibn al-Jawzi, Abu al-Faraj 150
 Ibn al-Qayyim, Muhammad 104, 109, 182, 234–5
 Ibn ‘Ashur, Tahir 113n9, 147, 188n13, 189n21
 Ibn Ishaq 170, 193–4, 194n60
 Ibn Khaldun 4, 100, 106, 115, 120, 135n2, 135n3, 135n4, 186, 192n50
 Ibn Manzur, Muhammad 143, 147, 154, 162, 171, 175, 178–9
 Ibrahim al-Nakha’I 107
 Ibrahim, Anwar 46, 224
 IDB (Islamic Development Bank) xii, 75
ihsani social capital vii, 186, 196, 198, 200, 203–4, 213, 215–16, 220, 223, 225, 228–9, 238, 241, 244, 247
ijma’ 100
ijtihad vii, 4, 87, 92, 94, 104–7, 118, 120–1, 128, 136, 145, 150, 186, 196, 206–7, 213, 219, 236, 241, 244–7
ijtihadi 104, 211
ikhtiyar 83, 138–9, 142, 152, 174–7, 186, 198, 237
illat 94
imago mundi 202
 Imarah, Muhammad 126, 146, 148, 152, 153, 157, 166, 170, 189n19, 206, 207, 211
 IMF (International Monetary Fund) xii, 27, 39
 Iqbal, Sir Muhammad xi, 3, 141, 149
islah 101n27, 114n15, 139, 142, 152, 171–5, 179–80, 185, 188n13, 194n61, 198, 200, 206, 212, 215–16, 222, 225, 237
istiqra’ 94–5, 101
ithar 164, 192n50
jabiliyah 159, 179
 Jessops, Bob 18–19
Jihad 150, 173, 202, 225, 232n19
 Jreisat, Jamil 10, 39
kalam, ‘ilm (theosophical) 95
 Kamali, Mohammad Hashim 159
 Kant, Immanuel 41, 42, 68
 Kantian 59, 69–71, 86
 Kaufmann, Daniel 28, 31–2, 36
 Keohane, R. 15, 26
Khalifah 82, 90, 100, 118, 123, 160–1, 182, 186, 195–9, 201–2, 204, 206, 210, 215–17, 219–20, 222, 224–6, 228–9, 234–5, 237–40, 242–5, 247
Khayr 172, 174–5, 180
khilafah 83, 116, 128, 130, 138, 171, 198, 237
Khulafa’ al-Rashidun 93, 106
Kitab al-Kharaj 121
 Kliksberg, Bernardo 2, 203, 224, 231n10
 Kooiman, Jan 10–11, 15–16
 Kuran, Timur 210, 214
 Lambton, Ann K.S. 120, 122, 124, 218
 Lapidus, Ira M. 207–8, 210
 Latin America 25, 37, 48, 63, 74
 Lee Kwan Yew 43
 Leftwich, Andrian 20, 31–9, 205
 Lewis, Bernard 4, 45, 66n1, 106, 209, 214, 217
 Lewis, Mervyn K. 9
 liberalism 23, 28, 30, 37–9, 45, 51, 54, 55, 59; neo-liberalism 38, 54
 MacIntyre, Alasdair 6n1, 69, 70, 76n1
mafṣadah 104, 110, 114n13, 11n15
mahabbah (mutual love) 164
 Mahathir Mohammad 43, 66n2
 Mahbub ul-Haq 33
 Mannan, M.A. 164–6, 177
mantiq 95
Maqasid al-Shari’ah vii, 93–5, 110–11, 114, 134, 139, 142, 155, 160, 164, 172, 175–6, 178, 180–5, 198, 201, 203–4, 212, 222, 234, 236–7, 239, 243, 245, 247
 market economy 18–20, 32, 38–40, 53, 214–15
masalih 95, 105, 107–9, 111

maslahah 90, 108, 114, 140, 145, 171, 181, 188n17; *'Ammah* 95, 104, 109, 111, 167, 182

Mawdudi, Abul A'la 129–31

Mehmet, Ozay 27, 37–8, 40, 42, 47, 54, 232

meta-narrative vi, 51, 56, 60, 64, 67, 70

Mill, John Stuart 67

minimal state 11, 12, 202, 204, 217–23, 227, 229–30, 237

mitos 62, 233

Mujajirun 162–4

multiple modernities 62–4, 69–70

mutual consultation 128, 147–8, 170

mutual co-operation 1, 70, 112, 123, 165, 203

Naqvi, Syed Nawab Haider 135, 138, 140, 153, 155, 161, 176–7, 235

Nasihat al-Muluk 125

Nasr, Seyyed Hosen xi, 63, 75, 85–6, 99, 233

neo-colonialism 38, 42, 49

neo-liberalism 37, 55

Ngaire, Woods 26–7

NGO (Non-Governmental Organization) 15, 18, 28, 32, 43, 210

Nizam al-Mulk 124, 125

nomos 62, 69, 71, 233

North, Douglass C. 204–5, 221

NPE (New Political Economy) 18

NPM (New Public Management) 13–14, 20, 27–8

OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) 20, 29, 30, 7

Omar, bin al-Khattab 106, 113n10, 117, 136, 145, 150–1, 156–7, 160, 182, 189n26, 190n26, 190n29, 191n34, 191n42, 210–13, 231n5

ombudsman 151–2, 217

ontological vi, vii, 5–6, 56, 70, 76, 78, 80–2, 84–6, 90, 92, 97, 103, 105, 110, 132–3, 137–8, 161, 166–7, 180, 182–3, 223, 226, 230, 234, 236, 238–9, 241, 246

ontology vi, xiii, 5, 64–5, 78–9, 81–6, 90, 92, 95, 105, 109, 115, 121, 133–4, 137, 140, 146, 169, 177–8, 184, 187, 195, 203, 224, 226–9, 234, 236, 247

Orientalism 56–7

Pagden, Anthony 37, 39, 41–2, 170

Paine, Thomas 24

persona-religiousus 5

political participation 2, 221, 242

post-colonial 60–1; post-colonialist 53, 60

post-developmental 65; post-developmentalist 38, 48, 64, 164

post-Enlightenment 3, 22, 38, 45, 47, 49–51, 53, 67, 80, 83, 92, 140, 206, 218

post-modern 1, 61, 62, 65, 79, 95, 215; post-modernism 56, 57; post-modernist 55, 57, 65; post-modernity 55, 56, 61

praxis 1, 70

Putnam, R.D. 73, 231n10

qiyyas (legal analogy) 94–5, 101

Rahman, Fazlur 104, 109, 170

Rahnema, Majid 37, 47, 49, 57

Ramadan, Tariq 88, 91, 96, 171, 182, 200, 231

Rhodes, R.A.W. 9–11, 13–21, 35, 205

Rida 105, 128

Rosenau, James N. 10, 17, 18

rule of law 12, 19, 23, 30, 32–3, 66n1, 77n4, 117, 124, 146, 152, 155, 158, 160, 183, 185, 201, 219–20, 222–3, 232, 239, 242

sacred canopy 62, 69

Sabifah Madinah 170

Said, Edward 51, 53, 56, 57

salih 171–2

Sardar, Ziauddin 138, 180

secular 50–2, 68, 71, 83, 96, 100, 176

secularism 40, 80, 96

secularization 22, 51, 71, 76n2, 100

self-actualization 202, 227–9, 238, 243

Sen, Amartya 44, 46, 67, 177

separation of powers 44, 117, 155, 160, 219, 223, 232n17, 242–3

Shari'ati, Ali 142

Shihata, Ibrahim 40, 184

Shuhada' 197, 203, 231n8

shura 104, 112, 117–18, 120, 127–8, 130, 145–9, 174, 185, 189, 200–1, 210–11, 215–16, 221–2, 225, 232

Siyasat Nameh 124–5

Smith, Adam 12, 51, 72

Stiglitz, John 1, 37, 41, 48

Sub-Saharan Africa xiii, 9, 23, 28

sui generis 63, 82

Sunnah 6–7, 86–7, 91, 93–4, 96, 98, 100, 103–5, 107–9, 112n6, 113n8, 113n9, 130, 134, 157–8, 162, 179, 184, 234, 236

sunnah tashri'iyyah 103

takaful 109, 164, 165, 166, 203
takaful ijtimā'iy 165, 185
 Taleqani 173, 232
tamthili qiyas (analogy) 95
taqlidi 138, 241
tashri' 103, 113n9
tawhidic reality 81–4, 86, 90, 92–3, 95, 97, 99, 110, 134–5, 145–6, 154–5, 160, 183–4, 187, 196, 199, 224–5, 229, 234–5, 238, 241
 Taylor, Charles 59, 63, 69, 71, 80
tazkiyah 138, 140, 155, 160–1, 174–5, 179–80, 185, 198, 226, 237, 243
telos 1, 70, 225, 233
 Tetzlaff, Rainer 19, 38, 41
 Third World 20, 22, 25–6, 29, 37–9, 47–8, 53, 60, 74
 Toynbee, Arnold 4, 168
 transparency 14, 19, 27, 30, 32–3, 44–5, 117, 144, 183, 185, 188n15, 190n29, 213, 219, 226, 239, 242
 Turner, Brian 4
 UDHR (Universal Declaration of Human Rights) 25
ukhuwwah 123, 139, 141–2, 162–9, 172, 175, 182, 185, 198, 201, 203–4, 216, 237, 244
Ulama 119, 206–9, 215, 223
ummah xi, 101n27, 104, 106, 113n9, 123, 126–9, 133, 163–4, 167–8, 170, 173, 174, 189, 197, 199, 202
Umm al-Qura 126–7
ummatain wasata 197, 200
 UN (United Nations) 24–5, 28, 30, 32
 UNDP xiii, 27, 29, 30, 32, 39, 61
 UNESCAP 29
 UNESCO 2
 USAID 29, 40
usul al-fiqh 93, 94, 113n9, 136
 Uthman, b. Affan 106
 Uthmani, Sa'ed eddin 104, 107
 Van dok, Geert 9, 19, 22, 32, 195, 205, 233
 vicegerency 85, 110, 130, 138, 146, 182, 196, 198, 226, 237
 vicegerent(s) 82, 85–6, 97n8, 110, 130, 138, 143, 146, 154, 171, 182, 187n5, 196, 197, 199, 230n3, 234, 235
 Waqf 128, 165, 206–10, 215–16, 220, 223
 Washington Consensus xiii, 27, 33, 35, 37–8, 54, 239
 Watt, Montgomery 106
 Weber, Max 4, 23–4, 51–3, 79
 Weiss, Thomas G. 17, 25, 27–8, 30, 33–4, 39–40
 well-being 4, 33, 37, 40, 43, 49–50, 59, 83–4, 89–90, 93, 100, 110–11, 124, 134, 139, 141, 160–1, 172, 178, 180–5, 189n22, 198–9, 201–4, 209, 214, 224–5, 230, 231n10, 232n19, 235, 236, 239, 243, 246
 Western values 45, 49, 52–3, 59
 WFDD (World Faiths Development Dialogue) 76
 WGI (World Governance Index) 31–2, 245
 White Paper on European Governance 31
 Woolcock, Michael 203, 231n10
 World Bank xii, xiii, 2, 8, 11–12, 15, 19, 22, 27–32, 34, 35n5, 35n9, 37, 39–42, 48, 61, 67, 76, 205, 219, 231n7, 231n10, 245
 Zadek, Simon 75
 zakat 128, 154, 166–7, 179, 188n15, 193n56, 208–9, 215–16, 220
 Zarqa, Muhammad Anas 208, 221



Taylor & Francis eBooks

Helping you to choose the right eBooks for your Library

Add Routledge titles to your library's digital collection today. Taylor and Francis eBooks contains over 50,000 titles in the Humanities, Social Sciences, Behavioural Sciences, Built Environment and Law.

Choose from a range of subject packages or create your own!

Benefits for you

- » Free MARC records
- » COUNTER-compliant usage statistics
- » Flexible purchase and pricing options
- » All titles DRM-free.

REQUEST YOUR
FREE
INSTITUTIONAL
TRIAL TODAY

Free Trials Available
We offer free trials to qualifying academic, corporate and government customers.

Benefits for your user

- » Off-site, anytime access via Athens or referring URL
- » Print or copy pages or chapters
- » Full content search
- » Bookmark, highlight and annotate text
- » Access to thousands of pages of quality research at the click of a button.

eCollections – Choose from over 30 subject eCollections, including:

Archaeology

Architecture

Asian Studies

Business & Management

Classical Studies

Construction

Creative & Media Arts

Criminology & Criminal Justice

Economics

Education

Energy

Engineering

English Language & Linguistics

Environment & Sustainability

Geography

Health Studies

History

Language Learning

Law

Literature

Media & Communication

Middle East Studies

Music

Philosophy

Planning

Politics

Psychology & Mental Health

Religion

Security

Social Work

Sociology

Sport

Theatre & Performance

Tourism, Hospitality & Events

For more information, pricing enquiries or to order a free trial, please contact your local sales team:
www.tandfebooks.com/page/sales



Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

The home of
Routledge books

www.tandfebooks.com